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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City

5 February 1970

FOREWORD

Most of our people do not fully realize the seriousness of the Communist threat that faces the nation today. Safe in the comfort of their homes and therir communities and away from the realities of Central Luzon, many have become passive bystanders. Some, too, have sought solutions to their social, economic and even political problems by enlisting the aid of or forging alliances with dubious groups and personalities and thus have wittingly or unwittingly helped the cause of Communism in our country. The ultimate objective of the Communist Party of the Philippines is, and has always been, **the seizure of national power -- to supplant the democratic system of representative government which we enjoy today with a Maoist- Leninist-Marxist system of the same kind that has enslaved millions of human being behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains.**

The violence which accompanied the student demostrations in Manila last 26 and 30 January 1970 was instigated by subversive elements and provocateurs who subscribe to Mao Tsetung's dictum of armed revolution. By riding on, and eventually superimposing themselves upon, the peaceful student organizations with legitimate issues for reform, these radical and extremist Red-tainted groups managed to create serious disturbances in the city. However, these tumultuous riots have served to awaken the people as to the growing menace of Communism in our midst. The disturbances jolted the nation; the people and their government came face to face with the naked realities of the destructive power of rampaging mob carefully manipulated and exploited by persons of dubious intentions.

In the continuing struggle afainst the forces of communism -- forces that have tenaciously pursued their goal of establishing a communist order to replace our free society -- we are faced with the difficult task of contending with both subversive and insurgent forces whose intricate operations and underground activities make them the most dangerous threat to out national security. This task becomes even more difficult if the people and their government remain complacent and fail to realize the nature and extent of the danger confronting them.

In the light of these developments, I fell that we must takes steps to inform the general public about the intentions of the local Communist movement. Unless we place this Communist threat in its proper perspective, our people may continue to be lulled by complacency and a false sense of security. On the other hand, we should avoid falling prey to unwarranted fear and panic. For these reasons, I am now making available for public consumption certain Communist Party documents now in the possession of the AFP.

The documents are part of numerous papers and materials captured in a "Revolutionary School of Mao Tsetung's Thought" in the remote barrio of Sta Rita, Capas, Tarlac whose camp was raided by elements of PC Tarlac, TF Lawin and Hq IPCZ last June 9, 1969. Our analysis of these documents confirmed, among others, the formation of a "reestablished" Communist Party of the Philippine; an apparent split in the leadership of the CPP; the organization of an insurgent group which is dedicated to the Maoist concept of violent revolution; and the blueprint for a "National War of Liberation" in the Philippines of the same type espoused by the Chinese Communist in Vietnam and Korea. It also confirmed previous findings of the AFP on the existence of working alliances between some so-called militant groups among the students, peasant and labor and certain dubious personalities. It is hoped that these documents, which portray the Comminist programme to take over the country, will be given a careful and thoughtful study by our people, particularly those concerned with molding public opinion and with directing the affairs of our government and people. Viewed against the mounting evidence of the Communist offensive throughout the world, especially in Southeast Asia, these documents may help bring about a more sober understanding of the threats that confront our people and provide a better insight to our national problems. An involved citizenry and a more responsive government must work hand in hand. After all, national security is as much the people's concern as it is ours in the Armed Forces.

Finally, let me assure our people that at this stage, there should be no cause for alarm. The security forces of our government, especially those under my command, have the situation under control and will continue to exert every effort to preserve peace and order, the security of our country and the constitutional rights of our people.

Manuel T. Yan

MANUEL T. YAN
General, AFP
Chief of Staff

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES (1946)

Preamble

The Communist Party of the Philippines (Merger of Socialist and Communist Parties) is the political party of the Filipino working classes based on the principles of scientific Communism and Marxism-Leninism. It fights for the immediate and basic wants of the workers, peasants and all elements exploited by capitalists. As the vanguard of the working classes, it stands in the forefront of this struggle.

The Communist Party will fight for the democratic rights won by the Filipino people and will defend them against enemies desiring to crush democracy and all national freedom. The Party leads the struggle against imperialism, exploitation of colonial and semi-colonial countries, division of classes and nations, and all forms of chauvinism.

In the struggle for democracy, the independence and progress of the classes, the Communist Party supports the democratic principles of Bonifacio, Rizal and Luna and other heroes and also the teachings of Crisanto Evangelista and other working class leaders.

In order to insure the success of these principles, the Communist Party has promulgated this Constitutions.

Article I - Name

This Organization shall be named the Communist Party of the Philippines (Merger of Socialist anand Communist Parties).

Article II -Membership

Section 1. Any resident of the Philippines, eighteen years ofage or over, regardless of race, sex, color, religious affiliation, or nationality whose loyalty to the working classes and the toiling masses is umblemished and believes in the principle and aims of the Communist Party shall be eligible for membership.

Section 2. A Party member is one who accepts the aims, principles and programs of the Party as stated in the Constitution andapproved by the Congress, attends regular meetings of his nucleus, active in Party work, pay his dues regularly and reads publications

Section 3. Any applicant for membership shall sign an application card which shall be endorsed by at least two memners of the Party. This application shall be sutdied and acted upon by the Nucleus, subject to the approval of the next higher organ.

Section 4. An applicant, after being accepted by the Nuclues and approved by the next higher organ, shall be considered a candidate. A candidate shall attend Nucleus meetings for his discipline, must know the Constitution, principles, aims, programs and policies of the Party, and shall be allowed to vote. All candidates shall undergo a period of probation as follows:

a) Two months for workers and poor peasants.

b) Four months for members of the party-bourgeoisie; rich or middle class peasants, intelectuals, professional and students.

c) Six months for the wealthy class.

Section 5. Town, provincial or national leaders of other political parties who apply for membership shall be subject to the approval of the highest organ of the Communist Party and shall undergo a trial period of not less than six months.

Section 6. Party members who fail to pay three months in arrears of dues, cease to be members of good standing, and must be informed thereof. Members who are five months behind in their Party dues shall be striken from the Party roll, after an effort has been made to bring such members into good standing. However, if a member who, for these reasons has been sticken from the Party roll, applies for re-admission within six months, he may, upon the approval ofthe Section Committee or any organ higher than the Nucleus, be permitted to pay his back dues and regain his standing as an old member.

Article IV - Rights and Duties of Members

Section 1. Every Party member who is in good standing has not only a right but a duty participate in the making of Party policies and in the election of leaders, committees and delegates.

Section 2. After a thorough discussion in any nucleus, committee, convention or congress, the final decision ismade through majority vote and all members are duty bound to carry out the decision.

Section 3. Party members who disagree with any decision of the nuclues, seccom, provincial or regional committee, or with the decisions of the Central Committee or the Political Bureau, have the right to appeal to the next higher organ up to the National Congress. The decision of the National Congress shall be final. All appeals before the Central Committee must be filed within one month after the decision has been made.

Section 4. Prior to the opening of the Congress, members have the right to question the action of the Executive Committee and the right to present their views in party implementation of this decisions.

Section 5. (Ommitted in Araneta copy)

Section 6. Party members have the tight to nominate and elect members in all committees, in accordance with the Constitution.

Members have the right to question the qualification of any candidate to a particular position or committee.

Section 7. Nucleus members, through majority vote have the right to remove the president or any member of the Nucleus Committee.

Section 8. A party member convicted of violating discipline has the right to appeal to the next higher organ, up to the National Congress, together with the right to ack for re-investigation and to present his witnesses.

Section 9. It is the duty of every Party member to combat any activity, emanating either from within or outside the country which is primarily aimed at supressing the democratic rights of the working classes and the Filipino people, or any group of Party aiming to establish a dictatorial government in the country.

Section 10. All Party members shall be required to belong to any peasant or workers organization.

Section 11. All Party members in mass organizations shall be required to promote and strengthen said organization and safeguard the interest of its members.

Section 12. All Party members are duty bound to strengthen their relationships with the masses, look after the needs and welfare of the working classes and clarify the aims of the Party and the principles of scientific Communism.

Section 13. All Party members shall strive constantly to increase their knowledge of politics and to understand the principles of Marxism-Leninism. All their tasks and actions should based on their knowledge of Communism.

Section 14. All eligible Party members shall register and vote in the elections for all public offices.

Article V - Quotas and Time of Payment

Section I. Every Party member shall pay a monthly quota based on the following rates:

a) Housewives, unemployed and all members earning up to P30.00 a month – P.020

b) Members earning more than P30.00 up to P50.00 a month – P0.30

c) Members earning more than P50.00 up to P80.00 a month – P0.50

d) Members earning more than P80.00 up to P100.00 a month – P1.00

e) Members earning more than P100.00 shall pay aside from the regular P1.00 quota P10.00 or fraction thereof.

f) Tenants or peasants who are members of the Party shall pay a monthly quota of P0.20

g) Proprietors who are members of the Party shall pay their quota based on their monthly incomes.

Section 2. All quotas collected shall be divided among the different party organizations as follows:

a) 10% for Nucleus
b) 20% for Seccom
c) 30% for Regional or Provincial Committee
d) 40% for National Office

Section 3. The national Congress or Central Committee or PB will decide when to ask for special quotas. The collection of quotas for the use of a town, province or region is forbidden, except when sanctioned by the Central Committee or PB.

Article VI - Organization

Section 1. The basic Party organization is the nucleus whish is established in districts, cities, towns and barrios and in different places or employment, such as factories, shops, transportation companies, mines, camps, school, etc.

The nucleus is headed by an Executive Committee whose members shall be elected by secret ballot every six months. Meeting of nucleus is held twice a month.

Section 2. The Seccom (Section Committee) is composed of all nuclei organized within one specified section of a city, town, or province as defined by higher organs.

The highest body of the Seccom is the Seccom Convention whish is held once a year. Delegates to the convention are elected through secret ballot by members of the nucleus. Members of the Section Committee are also considered delegates. The number of delegates from each nucleus is determined by the number of members, but each nucleus is represented by at least one delgeate.

When the Seccom Convention is not in session, the highest organ is the Section Committee whose members are elected by the Convention.At least six months‘ membership is required before a party member can be a member of the Section Committee. The section Committee will select the members of the Executive Committee of the Seccom, which, in turn, is responsible to the Committee.

Section 3. The provincial organization is composed of all Party organization within a province.

The highest body of a provincial organization is the Provincial Convention which convenes once a year. Delegates to the Provincial Convention are elected by members of the nucleus through secret ballot. Members of the Provincial Committee are also considered delegates. The number of delegates from the nucleus shall be based on the number of members. Each nucleus, however, shall have at least one delegate.

When the Provincial Convention is not in session, the highest Party organ in the province is the Provincial Committee whose members are elected during the Provincial Convention. Membership of at least one year is required before a party member can be elected to the Provincial Committee.

The provincial committee is authorized to select the persons who are to compose the Provincial Executive Committee which in turn, is responsible to the Committee.

The Provincial Committee can call a special session of the Provincial Convention upon approval of two-thirds of the total members of the nuclei after it has been authorized by the Central Committee or Political Bureau.

Section 4. The Central Committee can establish a regional organization composed of two or more provinces. In this event the Pronvicial Committee is placed under the Regional Committee. The procedure of conducting Regional Convention is the same as that of the Provincial Convention.

Section 5. In matter concerning a province, region or district, the Nucleus, the Seccom, Provincial or Regional Committee have authority over these matters, in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and the policies of the Party.

Section 6. All leaders and committees of the party shall make regular reports regarding their activities. The Central Committee and the P. B. shall issue reports and analysis of political trends to all Party organs.

Section 7. Any party leader can be removed from office any time after the approval of two-thirds of those who elected him to office.

Section 8. The request of a Party member for relief from his assignments can be allowed after the aproval of his organ and of the higher organ.

Article VII - National Organization

Section 1. The highest authority in the Party is the National Congress. The National Congress decides what should be the over-all work of the Party and the Central Committee. It defines the political program of the Party. It gives the final decision concerning tactics and organization, and plans for amending the Constitution. The Central Committee is elected by the Congress. It gives the final decision regarding appeals.

The National Congress meets once a year. Special sessions are held upon the request of two-thirds of the members of the Central Committee or two-thirds of the members of the Regional or Provincial Committee.

Section 2. Delegates to the National Congress are elected by the members of the Nucleus. Members of the CC are also considered delegates. Delegates to the Congress shall have been party members for at least six months.

Section 3. Sixty days before the opening session of the Congress, all party organizations should decide what problems or plans they want to present to the Congress.

Section 4. The Central Committee is composed of regular and alternate members, whose number and procedure of election is decided by the National Congress. Members of the CC must have been Party members for at least two years. Alternate members can be appointed regular members if some of the regular members die or are removed from office. In meetings of the CC, alternate members join discussion but cannot vote.

Section 5. The Central Committee is the highest authority in the Party when the National Congress is not in session. It sees that the Constitution is followed strictly, it carries out the policies promulgated by the National Congress. The CC represents the Party and has the authority to deal with important problems of the Party when the National Congress is not in session. The CC also establishes and supervises the different departments and committees; it supervises all political and organizational task publications and takes cjarge of the Party's finances. The CC shall prepare correct financial reports to the National Congress.

Section 6. The Cental Committee elects the Secretary-General and the members of the Politburo. Members of the Pb should have been active members of the Party for at least five years prior to their election.

The PB has the resposibility and authority to carry on the work of the CC when the Committee is not in session. The number of regular and alternate members of the PB shall be decided by the CC. The Secretary-General and the PB are responsible to the CC for all their decisions.

SEction 7. Ordinary meetings or plenums are conducted at least three times a year. Special meetings can be called by a two-thirds vote of the members of the CC.

Section 8. Ordinary meetings of the PB are held at least three times a month.

Article VIII - Disciplinary Measures

Section 1. Attitudes or actions that are harnful to the working class, the nation and the Party; violations of the Party Constitution or decisions of the Party derectorates; finance opportunism; or any action unbecoming a Party member shall be punished by warming or removal from the Party or by a difficult assignment in the Party. Committees that dommit the same errors shall be punished by abolition of said committees and substitution by another committee.

Section 2. Affilation with or partcipation in the activities of any group. class, faction or party which aims or acts to destroy, weaken or overthrow the democratic constitution of the Philippines shall be punished with immediates ouster from the Party.

Section 3. Participation or the study of any form of class and national division or religious intolerance is a sufficient ground for the ouster of any member from the Party.

Section 4. Personal or political sympathy with the enemy of the working classes and the nation is a violation of Party rules.

Section 5. Accusation against any member or committee can be filed only by writing to the member's nucleus or superior committee. The nucleus decides the case against its own member. Accusations should not be ignored, but should be given immediate attention.

Section 6. Anybody involved in any case relating to violation of descipline has the right to ask for an investigation, present his witnesses and publicize his opinions.

Section 7. The Nucleus or immediate executive committee has the authority to meet out the punishment for violation of discipline, with the exception of ousting members from the Party.

Section 8. The authority to oust a member from the Party is vested in any organ higher than the Nucleus; and the Central Committee shall be informed of the case.

Section 9. The Regional or Provincial Committee has the authority to accept anyone who has been ousted from the Party who has applied for readmission, with the exception of those who have been ousted due to political violations, which authority must come from the Central Committee.

Articale IX – Amendment to the Constitution

This Constitution can be amended only through the majority consent of the National Congress.

Article X – Program or Policies

Section 1. The National Congress or the Central Committee shall prepare a program or policy to be followed by all Party organizations.

Section 2. Programs or policies relating to the province shall be made by the Provincial Convention or Provincial Committee.

Article XI – Additional Matters

A Party member has the right to write articles, pamphlets or books about the democratic revolutionary movement. However, these articles or books shall be considered personal opinions of the author and not of the Communist Party. The Secretary-General is the authorized spokesman of the Communist Party.

Presented and approved by the fifth Congress of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Merger of the Socialist and Communist Parties) on the 28th day of February 1946.

COMMUNIQUE OF THE CONGRESS OF RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

The Communist Party of the Philippines opened its Congress of Re-Establishment on December 26, 1968, making the 75th birth anniversary of Comrade Mao Tse-Tung. The Congress was held in an area close to the border of Northern Luzon and Central Luzon and lasted until January 7, 1969. Attending the Congress was a highly representative body of revolutionary cadres who have militantly adhered to Mao Tse-Tung's thought, the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the era when imperialism led by U.S. imperialism is heading towards total collapse and socialism is marching towards world fictory.

The Congress of Re-Establishment was undertaken as the climax of long, persistent and arduous efforts to put Mao Tse-Tung's thought in command among old and new cadres of the Communist Party of the Philippines. With Mao Tse-Tung's thought and the proletarian revolutionary line prevailing, the Communist Party of the Philippines has been successfully regenerated and re-established.

The Congress of Re-Establishment ratified the Party Programme, entitled "Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution in the Philippines", and the new Party Constitution, supplanting the outmoded "Constitution of the Communist Party of the Philippines (Merger of the Communist Party and Socialist Party)". Both these new basic Party documents are inspired by Mao Tse-tung's thought and affirm clearly that the people's democratic revolution in the Philippines can be achieved only by taking the road of armed revolution.

The Congress discussed thoroughly Party rebuilding, Army building and the national united front as weapons of the Philippine Revolution. The main revolutionary tasks of the Party were clarified. It was firmly agreed that Mao Tse-tung's thought be put in command of everything and that the supreme task of the Communist Party of the Philippines is to integrate the universal theory of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought with the concrete conditions of the Philippine Revolution.

The Congress implemented the Constitution by electing the Central Committee. The Central Committee in turn elected the Political Bureau and the Secretariat.

The Central Committee elected the Party Chairman, the Deputy Chairman for Military Affairs, the Deputy Chairman for the National United Front, the General Secretary, the Secretary for Organization and the Secretary for Education. It also determined the composition of the Party Executive Committee to direct the Secretariat between meetings of the Political Bureau.

The Deputy Chairman for Military Affairs was directed by the Central Committee to initiate a military conference soon. Furthermore, the Central Committee appointed the leading staff of the Revolutionary School of Mao Tse-tung's thought and the editors of Central Committee publications.

It is through the intense process of inner Party struggle and waging of a rectification campaign involving the entire history of the old Communist Party of the Philippines, especially the extended period of the black bourgeois line of the Lava revisionist renegade clique, that the correct proletarian revolutionary line inspired by Mao Tse-tung's thought emerged triumphantly.

The Congress put into final form the document of rectification, "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party" drafted almost a year ago by the Provisional Political Bureau that had directed the affairs of the Party during the last more than two years. This document has been extensively discussed by Party cadres in the spirit of criticism and self-criticism under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

The provisional Political Bureau also submitted a general report on the current international, national and Party situation. The report stated the excellent conditions for the world proletarian revolution, the people's democratic revolution in the Philippines and the rebuilding of the Communist Party of the Philippines as the most advanced revolutionary detachment of the working class.

The Congress of Re-Establishment hailed the all-round victory of the great proletarian cultural revolution, the overthrow of the counter-revolutionary revisionist renegade, traitor and scab Liu Siao-chi and his likes, the consolidation of the People's Republic of China as the main bulwark of the world proletarian revolution, and the forthcoming Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China.

PRESS COMMUNIQUE

The First Plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines since the Congress of Re-Establishment and also since more than eighteen years ago was held in, two sessions, on May 12 and 13, 1969, somewhere in Central Luzon.

The Plenum was called to open further under the supreme guidance of Marxism-Leninisim-Mao Tsetung Thought the road of armed revolution against U. S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism and for the cause of people's democracy.

Chairman Amado Guerrero delivered the opening address. He hailed the formation of the New Peoples' Army and the steps being taken to wage the agrarian revolution under the powerful inspiration of Mao Tsetung Thought and correct leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines. He described both the national situation as extremely favorable for making revolution. In an all-rounded way, he stated the tasks of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Comrade Dante read the Statement of the Meeting of Red Commanders and Soldiers on March 29, 1969 soldiers on March 29, 1969 and submitted it to the Central Committee. The Central Committee enthusiastically accepted the Statement, thus, repudiating once and for all the Taruc-Sumulong clique as an ideological, political and organizational ramification of Lavaism and Taruc-ism, the two major local sources of modern ravisionism in the Philippines.

The Basic Rules of the New People's Army was unanimously ratified by the Central Committee after being discussed thoroughly and undergoing amendment during the latter half of the first session and first half of the second session. The Basic Rules of the New People's Army firmly embodies the invincible Mao Tsetung Thought.

During the first session of the Plenum, four important resolution directly related to the heightening of the armed struggle were approved. They are the following:

1. Resolution to include in the Central Committee nine more prolatarian revolutionary cadres from the New People's Army and the peasant movement;
2. Resolution to include the Commander-in-Chief of the New Ppeople's Army in the Political Bureau and Executive Committee of the Central Committee;
3. Resolution forming the Military Commission; and
4. Resolution electing Comrade Dante as the Commander-in-Chief of the New People's Army.

During the second session, three consolidated resolutions on Party organization, education and finances were unanimously approved after thorough discussion.

The resolution on Party organization was intended to strengthen the composition of the Education Department and its different bureaus, the administration of the Revolutionary School of Mao Tsetung Thought, the editorial staff of **Ang Bayan** as the publication of the Central Committee and the system of political commissars in the New People's Army. The resolution required that every Party member and candidate-member be provided with a copy of **Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung** in Pilipino as a constant companion guide in dealing with every problem and situation.

The resolution on Party finances was intended to strengthen the composition of the Finance Commission, to clarify the sources of Party funds and facilities, and to guarantee the establishment of certain useful and necessary projects. At this point, the Central Committee expressed serious concern about the abuses committed by the Taruc-Sumulong clique and by the henchmen of Lavaism and Taruc-ism, with special reference to funds and enterprises that have been privately appropriated by them in several preceding years of confusion.

The Plenum concluded successfully and it was hailed by every mmember of the Central Committee as a victory of Mao Tsetung Thought. It summarized the exceedingly fruitful work of the Party since the Congress of Re-Establishment last December 26, 1968 and at the same time it inaugurated a new and higher stage of Party work. It brought together the best representatives of all Filipino proletarian revolutionary cadres who have long engaged in revolutionary armed struggle and those who have recently joined it and are resolutely regenerating and revitalizing the Party and Army.

During the Plenum, quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-tung were read aloud for the guidance and edification of the Central Committee on problems at hand.

Comrade Amado Guerrero, as the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines, presided over the entire Plenum.

Issued by the
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

The integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, with the concrete practice of the Philippine Revolution is the supreme task of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

The Communist Party of the Philippines is a proletarian revolutionary party learning its lessons from all previous revolutionary struggles of the Filipino people and from the great teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-tung. It keeps abreast with the advance of the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism in the world proletarian revolution guided by Mao Tse-tung's thought, which is the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the present era.

The Communist Party of the Philippines is steadfastly opposed to modern revisionism and to all trends of subjectivism, Right and "Left" opportunism, liberalism and sectarianism, which should be the target of constant rectification and revolutionary vigilance.

The Party struggles hard to be the most advanced detachment and principal instrument of the Filipino working class, upholding proletarian revolutionary leadership, in the present stage of the people's democratic revolution against its two main enemies, U.S. imperialism and feudalism, and in the consequent stage of socialist revolution.

The Party constantly strives to develop the deepest ties with the masses all throughout the archipelago. It employs criticism and self-criticism to maintain its correct class standpoint and style of work.

To defeat the U. S. imperialists, the comprador bourgeoisie, the landlords and the bureaucrat capitalists, the Party wields the weapons of protracted people's war and the national united front. The Party upholds working class leadership, builds up the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry and further attracts the urban petty bourgeoisie and the patriotic national bourgeoisie into the fold of the people's democratic revolution.

In waging a people's war, the Party relies mainly on the mass support of the peasantry, especially the poor peasants and farm workers. The Party develops the revolutionary forces in the countryside to destroy the pillars of feudalism and the armed counter-revolution there, and to encircle the cities from revolutionary base areas until the people's democratic forces are ready to seize power in the cities.

It is both a national and an internatinalist duty of the Communist Party of the Philippines to strike down U. S. imperialism, feudalism and all kinds of domestic reaction. The national and social liberation of the Filipino people shall weaken the imperialists and all reactionaries on an international scale and shall strengthen fraternal parties and peoples in their own just and progressive struggle. Through concerted action under the principle of proletarian internationalism and under the policy of the international united front, the total collapse of imperialism and the world triumph of socialism shall be achieved in the era of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

Let us arm ourselves with the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung!

ARTICLE I
Name, Flag and Emblem, Anthem and Pledge

Section 1 The name of this organization shall be the COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES. If ever the need arises, the Party shall further differentiate itself in name and substance from the Communist Party of the Philippines (Merger of Socialist and Communist Parties) by appending the phrase Marxist-Leninist or Mao Tse-tung's thought in parenthesis.

Section 2. The Party flag and emblem shall be red with the hammer and sickle in gold or white at the middle.

Section 3. The Party anthem shall be the internationale

"I,________________, declared my full agreement with the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, with the Programme and Constitution of the Communist Party of the Philippines and with all decisions taken by higher Party organs and the Party unit to which I am assigned to work.

"I pledge to perform all my duties and responsibilities with the best of my ability, to raise my proletarian revolutionary consciousness, to serve the people constantly and be close to them, to defend and fight for the interests of the people, to keep high the integrity and prestige of the Party, to safeguard the security of the Party and all my comrades at the cost of my life if necessary, to criticize my own mistakes and weaknesses and those of others with the fullest honesty so as to improve work and style of work on the basis of correct class standpoint and so as to build up the unity and strength, and to advance the interests of the Party and the masses. I shall take every opportunity to propagate Mao Tse-tung's thought and implement the revolutionary line of the Party."

ARTICLE II
Membership

Section 1. Any citizen or resident of the Philippines, of at least 18 years of age, who accepts Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, the Programme, and Constitution of the Party and agrees to work diligently in one of the Party organizations, carry out the decisions of the Party and pay the entrance fee and regular monthly dues may be accepted as a member of the Party.

Section 2. Party membership shall be valid only on an individual basis and in keeping with the following methods of arranging the acceptance of members:

a. Workers farm workers, poor peasants, poor fishermen or urban poor may become members of the Party on recommendation of two Party members of good standing after having been accepted by a decision of a branch meeting, or as the case may be, the Branch Executive Committee, and after having completed a period of six months as candidate-members.

b. Middle peasants, middle fishermen, officer workers, handicraftsmen, pretty merchants, intellectual workers or professionals, students and other segments of the petty bourgeoisie may become members of the party on the recommendation of two Party members each of whom shall have been a member of good standing of at least one year, after having been accepted as member by decision of the Branch Executive Committee or Party Group in a mass organization and after having completed a period of one year as candidate-members.

c. Persons of social positions other than those mentioned in sub-sections a and b above may become members of the Party on the recommendations of two Party members each of whom shall have been a member of good standing of at least three years continuously, after having been accepted by the Branch Executive Committee or Party Group in a mass organization and after having completed a period of two years as candidate-members.

Party members who have been expelled may be re-admitted on the decision of the Party Committee that expelled them and with the endorsement of a higher Party Committee or on the decision of a Higher Party Committee, in accordance with the provisions concerning the acceptance of members.

Section 3. **Every Party member who recommends a person to become a Party member shall provide a responsible and true statement to the Party concerning the ideology, political record and personal character and** life history of the person concerned.

shall give his recommendee an adequate understanding of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, the Programme, Constitution, policies and decisions of the Party. The recommendee shall formally answer a standard set of questions formulated by the Party.

Before taking any decision accepting a candidate-member, the Branch Executive Committee or Party Group concerned shall appoint a Party functionary to hold the broadest possible exchange of views with the person wishing to become a Party member, so as to get to know him and verify all pertinent information.

Section 4. Under special circumstances, higher Party committees and Party groups in mass organizations may directly accept a new member.

Section 5. During the period of candidacy, the Party organs concerned shall provide candidate-members with basic Party education on Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, the Party Programme and Constitution, require trial Party work and control their political quality.

The Branch meeting, the Party Committee or Party Group may prolong or shorten the period of candidacy based on the performance and conscientiousness of the candidate-member.

The status of candidate-member shall be withdrawn if it becomes clear that the candidate-member does not meet the requirements of becoming a Party member.

ARTICLE III

Rights and Duties of Members

Section 1. The duties of Party members shall be as follows:

a. to build up the unity and strength of the Party by raising the level of their understanding of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, and by applying it on the concrete problems of the Party and the people's democratic revolution;

b. to place the interests of the Party, i.e., the interests of the masses of the people without reserve, learn from them as well as clarify to them the policies and decisions of the Party and make prompt reports to the Party regarding the people's needs and aspirations;

c. to combat modern revisionism and all erroneous trends of thinking and action within the Party;

d. to abide by the Party Constitution and Programme;

e. to carry out thoroughly the Party line and all particular assignments given to them;

f. to master their line of work and become an example of discipline, hard work, modesty and simple living in Party organizations, mass organizations, and before the people;

g. to conduct criticism and self-criticism in order to set forth mistakes and weaknesses, to try earnestly to overcome and correct them and to improve their political work;

h. to work in a particular Party organization and to attend meetings regularly;

i. to attend study courses regularly and to read and disseminate Party publications regularly;

j. to be loyal and honest to the Party and present all facts necessary for making correct decisions;

k. to pay dues promptly;

l. to be alert for anything inside or outside the Party which endangers the Party and to oppose all things which are harmful to the interests of the Party and the people.

Section 2. The rights of Party members shall be as follows:

a. To participate freely in discussions during Party meetings concerning theoritical and practical problems regarding the Party line, policies and decisions;

b. to vote and be elected within the Party;

c. to submit proposals, statements or complaints to any Party organization at any level;

d. to criticize any Party organization or member in Party meetings;

e. to question the qualification of any candidate to any position or committee;

f. to appeal any decision to a higher Party organ up to the Central Committee and National Congress, unless security of the Party requires otherwise; and

g. to request to be present in any meeting called to evaluate their characteristics, work or any disciplinary action to be meted out on them unless the security of the Party demands otherwise.

Section 3. The duties and rights of candidate-members shall be the same as those of Party members, with the exception that they do not have the right to vote or be elected and do not have a voice in decision-making within the Party.

Section 4. Candidate-members or Party members shall be free to resign from the Party. Every resignation shall be fully explained within the Party Committee concerned.

Section 5. Every Party member regardless of merits and functions who fails to fulfill his duties or fails to respect the rights of his comrades shall be criticized and educated. Serious violations of rights and duties shall be met with proper disciplinary measures.

a. Any disciplinary action against Party members shall be decided by the Branch or Group in a mass organization to which they belong, but if the punishment meted out is expulsion, the approval of the Party Committee immediately above shall be necessary.

b. Any disciplinary action against a member of a Party Committee shall be decided by the Conference that elected him into that office or by a higher Party Committee.

c. Any disciplinary action against a member or candidate-member of the Central Committee shall be decided upon by a Plenary meeting of the Central Committee.

Section 6. Disciplinary measures shall be meted out according to the gravity of the violation of Party discipline and shall take any of the following forms: warning, strong warning, removal from work decided upon previously, the giving of trial work, suspension or expulsion from the Party.

ARTICLE IV

Structure and Principles of Party Organization

Section 1. The structure of the Party shall be based on the principle of democratic centralism, meaning to say, centralism based on democracy and democracy under centralized leadership.

The basic conditions shall be as follows:

a. Leading organs of the Party at all levels shall be elected; and shall be responsible to, and make periodic reports to the Party organization or conference that elected them.

b. After free and thorough discussion, decisions taken by the Party shall be implemented without exception.

1) The individual subordinate to the organization;
2) The minority is subordinate to the majority;
3) The lower level is subordinate to the higher level;
4) The entire membership is subordinate to the Central Committee and to the National Congress.

c. Leading organs of the Party shall always pay close attention to the reports and views of lower Party organizations and of the masses of Party members and they shall constantly study their experiences and render prompt assistance in solving problems.

d. Lower Party organizations shall give regular and special reports about their work to the organization above them and shall request instructions promptly concerning problems which require the decision of a higher Party organization.

e. All party organization shall follow the principle of collective leadership and all important questions shall be decided collectively.

Section 2. A Party organization shall be established on the basis of territorial divisions or spheres of work.

a. The Party organ which arranges Party work in a given territory shall be the highest organ in that territory.

b. The Party organ which arranges Party work in a sphere of work or in a mass organization shall be the highest organ in that sphere of work or mass organization.

Section 3. The structure of the Party organizations and their leading organs shall be as follows:

a. For the whole of the Philippines, there shall be the National Congress, Central Committee and National Party Conference;

b. For the regions, there shall be the Regional Party Organization, the Regional Party Conference and the the Regional Party Committee.

c. For the provinces, there shall be the Provincial Party Organization, the Provincial Party Conference and the Provincial Party Committee;

d. For the districts, there shall be the District Party Organization, District Party Conference and the District Party Committee;

e. For the municipalities and sub-districts of Manila, there shall be the Party Section, Party Section Conference and Section Committee;

f. For factories, mines, plantations or haciendas, barrios, streets, offices, schools and residential areas, there shall be the Party Branch, Party Branch Meeting and the Branch Executive Committee.

Section 4. The supreme leadership of the entire Party shall be the National Congress; that of a region, province, district and section shall be the corresponding conference and that of a Party Branch shall be the Branch Meeting.

Between Branch meetings, Party Conferences, and National Congresses, the Party Committee elected shall be the leading organs of the Party organization at each level.

Section 5. All leading organs shall be elected:

a. The Central Committee shall be elected by the National Congress;

b. Committees at every level shall be elected by the Party Conference in each respective area; and

c. Branch Executive Committees shall be elected by Branch meetings.

The Central Committee shall set the standard requirements and procedure for elections. Where circumstances may not permit the holding of elections, the leading Party organs shall be appointed by higher Party committees.

Section 6. Members of the Central Committee must have been in the Party as active members for at least three years.

Section7. Leading organs or their members may be dismissed by the Party organizations which elected them or by the Party organs that appointed them even before the completion of their term of office.

Between Party cconferences at any level, the higher Party Committee may, if it deems it necessary, remove functionaries of the lower Party organizations.

Section 8. The establishment of a new Party organization or the dissolution of an existing one may be decided upon the the organization immediately above it.

Section 9. Party committees from the Section to the Regional Party organization shall set up departments, bureaus, commissions andother necessary organs in accordance with requirements.

Section 10. Party organization at any level may hold various types of meetings, seminars or conferences of cadres and active members to review or plan their work or to discuss important decisions of higher Party organizations.

Section 11. Prior to the policy decision taken by a leading party organ, lower Party organizations may freely discuss the matter and put forward proposals to the leading Party organ. After a decision has been taken, they must abide by it.

However, if they should hold the opinion that the decision does not accord with conditions in a certain territorial area or sphere of work, reconsideration of the decision may be requested. If the higher Party organ stands by its decision after making the proper reconsideration, lower Party organizations shall be obliged to carry it out.

Section 12. The Central Committee shall be the organ that makes decisions and issues statements or questions of policy that are national in character; although lower Party organizations and their leading organs may discuss such matters and are expected to submit their opinions to central leading organs, they shall be entitled to take their own decisions and issue their own statements only on local matters within their territorial scope.

Section 13. All Party publications must popularize the decisions and policies of the central organization, higher Party organizations and the particular Party organization itself.

All Party organizations must disseminate Central Committee publications. Local Party publications are required to get the approval of the Party organization immediately above it prior to publication.

ARTICLE V

Cental Organization

Section 1. The National Congress shall be called and convened by the Cental Committee every five years unless it is deemed necessary to hold it later or earlier. However, if a majority of regional Party committees formally request that the Congress be held, then the Central Committee shall accede to the request.

The announcement of the holding of the National Congress shall be made at least one month in advance. The number of delegates and the method of their election shall be decided by the Central Committee.

Section 2. The functions and powers of the National Congress shal be as follows:

a. to discuss, ratify, review or amend the Programme and Constitution;

b. to decide upon the political line of the Party;

c. to elect the members and candidate-members of the Central committee and other central organs after determining the appropriate size of membership in each organ;

d. to receive, discuss and endorse reports of the Central Committee and other central organs

e To create central organs other than the existing organs if necessary.

Section 3 Between national congresses, the Central Committee shall lead the entire work of the Party, implement the decisions of the National Congress, make current decisions and sove current problems, establish Party organs and lead their activities, direct and allocate Party cadres and attend promptly to appeals from lower Party organizations and individual members in cases of disciplinary action.

Section 4. The Central Committee at its plenum shall elect the Political Bureau, the Executive Committee of the Political Bureau, the Secretariat, the Chairman of the Cental Committee and his deputies, the General Secretary and other secretaries of the Central Committee.

a. The Political Bureau, together with its Executive Committee shall carry out the functions and powers of the Central Committee between plenums

b. The Secretariat of the Central Committee shall take charge of the administration and daily activities of the Party under the leadership of the Political Bureau.

The number of members and candidate-members of the Political Bureau, the Executive Committee and the Secretariat shall be determined by the Central Committee. Vacancies occuring shall be filled ordinarily by candidate-members

Section 5. The Central Committee shall also elect and have as its special organs, the Military Commission, the Higher Party School, the Revolutionary School of Mao Tse-tung's thought and its publications, aside from the Secretariat, with its Organization and Education departments.

Section 6. A plenum of the Central Committee shall be convened once every six months by the Political Bureau. However, the Political Bureau or a majority ofthe Cental Committee members may decide to hold it ealier or later. Member and candidate-members of the Central Committee shall attend the plenum, with the candidate-members having speaking rights but without voting rights.

Section 7. A National Party Conference attended by representatives of regional Party organizations and by the Central Committee may be called by the Central Committee to discuss and decide upon pressing political and organizational questions, review the work of all leading Party organs and Party organizations and adopt plans.

The number of delegates and the method of their election shall be determined by the Central Committee. A National Party Conference shall be valid only if attended by representatives of a majority of the regional Party organizations.

Party organizations.

Section 8. A National Party Conference may dismiss members or candidate-members of the Central Committee who have failed to carry out their responsibilities and may elect in their place candidate-members of the Central Committee as members and may elect new candidate-members, provided the number of members and candidate-members replaced at any one conference shall not exceed one-fifth of the total number of members and candidate-members of the Central Committee.

Section9. Decisions of a National Party Conference shall be valid upon the subsequent endorsement of the Central Committee.

ARTICLE VI

Territorial Organizations of the Party

Section 1. Territorial Party conferences shall be called by their respective committees; in the case of regions, once every three years; in the case of provinces and district, once every two years; and in the case of sections, once a year. Conference may be held any time, however, upon the decision of a higher Party organ or upon the petition of tha majority of lower Party organs

Section2. The functions and power of regional, provincial, district, and section conferences shall be:

a. to receive, discuss, and endorse the reports made by the Party committees and other Party organs at the same level;

b. to adopt resolution on organizational and political questions; and

c. to elect the Party Committee after determining the appropriate size of membership.

Section 3. At their respective plenums, the territorial Party committes shall elect an Executive Committee, a Secretariat, A Secretary and his deputy. The Secretary and his deputy shall chair the plenums, the Executive Committee and the Secretariat.

Regional Committees shall hold plenums once every six months; provincial committees, once every three months; district committees and section committees, once every month.

Members of the Executive Committee and Secretariats of committees at every level must be approved by the Party committee immediately above. If a vacancy occurs in an Executive Committee or Secretariat at any level, the higher Executive Committee which approves the composition until the Party Committee below appoints someone with the approval of the Party committee immediately below.

Section 4. The regional, provincial, district and section committees must carry out the dicisions of the higher Party organizations, create provisional Party organs, direct their activities and allocate Party cadres.

Section 5. provincial, district and section committees shall regularly call work and study conferences every year to be attended by delegates elected bythe Party branches and groups in mass organizations below. These conferences are empowered to make recommendations to a higher Party committee, regarding organizational work and political problems. These conferences are valid provided they are attended by delegates of a majority of the Party organizations below.

ARTICLE VII

Basic Organization of the Party

Section 1. The Branch as a basic Party organization shall be established whereever at least three Party members can work together as a collective unit, according to place of residence, place of work and place of study. Party banches shall be established in factories, mines, plantations or haciendas, barrios, streets, office and residential areas. If in such places, there are less than three members, these Parry members shall attach themselves to the nearest basic Party organization.

Section 2. If a Party Banch exceeds fifteen members, the whole membership shall be divided into Branch Groups for purposes of security, unless the Branch be in a revolutionary base area. Each Branch Group shall never exceed ten members.

Section 3. The most fundamental task of the basic Party organization shall be to develop the closest links between the Party and the masses of the people.

The general responsibilities of the branch shall be:

a. To carry out propaganda and organizational work among the masses so as to implement the Party line and the policies and decisions of higher Party organizations;

b. to learn from the masses their aspirations and demands, make timely reports to the higher Party organizations, give direction to and participate in the political, economic and cultural life of the people.

c. To muster material and moral mass support for the armed struggle wage by the New Poeple Army;

d. to recruit new Party members and soldiers, collect dues of Party members, examine reports from Party members and guard Party discipline and security among members;

e. to organize the study of Party members and the dissemination of Party publications; and

f. to recommend Party members for cadre training in the Revolutionary School of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

Section 4. Branch meetings shall be held at least once a month and shall be attended only by heads of Branch Groups if the Branch exceeds fifteen members and unless the Branch be in a revolutionary base area.

Branch meetings shall elect the Branch Executive Committee, Secretariat, Secretary and Deputy Secretary and appoint the heads of Branch Groups. The tenure of office of all these shall be one year.

Branch meetings shall approve applications for Party membership, receive and discuss reports of Branch members and committees and decide upon the work of the entire Branch.

Section 5. A Party member may belong to two branches and pay his dues to only one, provided permission is received from a higher Party Committee. A Party member transferring from one branch to another shall carry the authorization of the section committee above the branch from which he is transferring.

ARTICLE VIII

Party Groups in Mass Organizations

Section 1. In labor organizations which are not under Party control and in mass organizations of peasants, youth, students, women, cultural workers, professionals, handicraftsmen and the like, where there are at least three Party members, Party Groups shall be secretly created at every possible level above the area where a Party Branch can be established. Their responsibilities shall include the implementation of Party policies and decisions, strengtheing unity with non-Party activists and developing close ties between the Party and the masses within the mass organizations.

Section 2. Party members in bourgeois institutions of wide scope shall likewise organize themselves secretly into Party Groups. Their responsibilities shall include the implementation of Party policies and decisions, gathering of information useful to the Party, exposure of the wrongs and weaknesses of the exploiting classes and the recruitment of Party members from the ranks of the urban petty bourgeoisie.

Section 3. The membership of Party Groups shall be fixed by the Party Committees leading them. Party Groups at every level shall have a Secretary.

Section 4. The status and rights of Party Groups in the National Party Congress and Party conferences shall be determined by the Party committees leading them. In all questions, the Party groups must be subordinated to the Party committees leading them.

ARTICLE IX

The Party's Relationship with the New People's Army

Section 1. The Party, through its Military Commission under the Central Committee and through its military cadres at every level, shall command and guide the New People's Army in the concrete practice of Mao Tse-tung's thought and shall develop the most advanced fighters into Party members.

Section 2. The Rules of the New People's Army shall recognize the leadership of the Party and its Military Commission and shall require the assignments of political commissars to every armed unit under the Political department of the New People's Army.

Section 3. The New People's Army shall be the main weapon of the Party in the people's democratic revolution and in the subsequent socialist stage. It welds most profoundly the basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry. In the countryside, it shall create an independent regime by making agrarian revolution, waging armed struggle and building of rural base areas.

Section 4. The New People's Army shall develop three main forms of armed forces: regular mobile forces, guerrilla units and local militia or self-defense corps. It shall be a force for fighting, for propaganda and for production.

Section 5. The Party shall develop the closest ties between the Army and the people, between the Party and the Army and between officers and men in a proletarian revolutionary spirit.

Section 6. The New People's Army shall adhere strictly to the Three Main Rules of Discipline and the Eight Points of Attention:

The Three Main Rules of Discipline are:

1) Obey orders in all your actions.
2) Do not take a single needle or piece of threat from the masses.
3) Turn in everything captured.

The Eight Points of Attention are:

1) Speak politely.
2) Pay fairly for what you buy.
3) Return everything you borrow.
4) Pay for everything you damage.
5) Do not hit or swear at people.
6) Do not damage crops.
7) Do not take liberties with women.
8) Do not ill-treat captives.

ARTICLE X

Party Finances

Section 1. The Party shall be financed by member's entrance fees and dues, by productive undertakings of the Party and by unconditional contributions.

Section 2. The urban poor and rural poor shall pay fixed monthly dues of fifty centavos a month.

Section 3. Persons wishing to enter the Party shall be obliged to pay an entrance fee equal to the amount of one month's dues. Dues shall be paid monthly and shall be 2½ gross personal income. Adjustments may be made, however, on an individual basis because of unstable income, greater income or less, or greater family needs.

Section 4. Special assessments shall be made on members upon the approval of the Party Committee concerned.

Section 5. Party members who hold positions made possible by the Party in non-Party entities shall hand over their earnings to the Party and shall receive an amount determined by the Party according to regulations and the necessities of the members.

Section 6. The Central Committee shall receive eighty per cent of entrance fees, membership dues and other monthly income and shall apportion the amount to committees at various levels. Twenty per cent shall remain with the Party Branch.

ARTICLE XI

Amendments and Extraordinary Circumstances

Section 1. This Constitution shall be amended by a simple majority of the National Congress.

Section 2. If the Party or any Party organization cannot function in full accordance with this Constitution because of extraordinary circumstances, the forms of organization and methods of work shall be determined by a higher Party committee with the approval of the Central Committee or the Political Bureau.

Ratified by the Congress of Re-Establishment
26 December, 1968

PROGRAMME FOR A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES

I. The basic Condition of the Philippines Today

The basic condition of the Philippines today is that of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, dominated by the U.S. imperialists, the comprador bourgeoisie, the landlords and the bureaucrat capitalists. These vested interests mercilessly exploit the broad masses of the people.

It is U.S. imperialism and domestic feudalism that are the main problems afflicting the whole nation and from which the masses of the people aspire to be liberated.

The Philippine Revolution against Spanish colonialism failed to achieve the goals of national liberation and the elimination of feudalism. The flabby leadership of the ilustrados (liberal bourgeoisie) failed to win the revolution and played into the hands of U.S. imperialism which brutally massacred the Filipino people and deprived them of their national independence and democratic rights in the course of the Filipino-American War and thereafter.

Since the beginning of this century, U.S. imperialism has made use of feudalism as its social base in the Philippines. With the defeat of the old type of national democratic revolution, which was imbued mainly with the ideas of liberalism, U.S. imperialism has succeeded in employing domestic puppet forces to frustrate the revolutionary aspirations of the Filipino people and deprive them of their national freedom, class freedom and individual rights.

U.S. imperialism has bred and made use of the comprador bourgeoisie as its principal agency in perpetuating a semi-colonial and semi-feudal type of economy, culture, and political system. The landlord class has persisted as the most important ally of U.S. imperialism and the comprador bourgeoisie in the perpetuation of feudal and semi-feudal reltions in the vast countryside. The bureaucrat capitalists have also emerged under the imperialist tutelage for "self government and democracy" to perpetuate the dominance of U.S. imperialism, the local comrador bourgeoisie and the landlord class in the present puppet reactionary state.

The combined oppression of U.S. imperialism and feudalism involves the inequitable colonial exchange of cheap local raw materials (sugar, coconut, abaca, logs and mineral ores) and finished products imported chiefly from the United States and the investment of U.S. surplus capital in the Philippines chiefly to foster the semi-colonial and semi-feudal type of economy that exploits the toiling masses of workers and peasants.

During the direct and indirect rule of U.S. imperialism in the Philippines, the Filipino toiling masses have been exploited to serve the excessive hunger for profits of the U.S. monopoly capitalists and the local reactionaries. Acute exploitation of the masses of workers and peasants, a general state of backwardness in society and the corruption and brutality of the bourgeoisie reactionary state characterize the Philippines today.

The Filipino working class has significantly grown in number and experience since the later period of Spanish colonial rule. But its further growth has been stunted because of the limitations on local industrialization and emphasis on raw material production and, lately, on mere re-assembly plants, new plantations and businesses in the grip of foreign monopoly capitalism. The Filipino working class has suffered extremely low wages and the whole nation has suffered lack of opportunity and the remittance of super-profits from the Philippines by foreign monopolies and loan payments to imperialist banks.

Despite the emphasis on raw material production, there is the stagnation of Philippine agriculture and the exploitation of poor peasants and farm workers in areas where feudalism persists; and in areas where modern plantations are in operation both regular and seasonal agricultural workers also suffer low wages and sub-human levels of working and living conditions.

The rural poor, composed mainly of poor peasants, farm workers and poor fishermen and the urban poor composed mainly of workers, peddlers and poor handicraftsmen living in city slums, comprise together more than 90 per cent of the population. Though they are the overwhelming majority in the Philippines, they are now the most deprived and oppressed, politically, economically, socially and culturally. They are the vast source of revolutionary power against foreign and feudal exploitation.

The urban petty bourgeoisie also suffers from the state of foreign and feudal exploitation. Though they live in relatively better comfort than the urban and rural poor, their very limited and usually fixed income is subject to the pressures of foreign and feudal exploitation. They can easily be won to the side of the Revolution because they are not free from the abuses of the state on their livelihood and democratic rights.

The national bourgeoisie is the most wealthy of the forces that may be won over to the side of the Revolution. It is restricted by foreign and feudal domination in its goal of nationalist industrialization. Though it wishes to lead the patriotic and progressive classes through its entrepreneurship and its political actions, its kind of class leadership is already surpassed historically by the revolutionary class leadership of the working class. The vacillating dual character of the national bourgeoisie should be recognized by the working class while working for a national united front of all partiotic and progressive classes, groups and individuals under the leadership of the working class.

At this state of Philippine history and world history, it no longer suffices to have the old type of national democratic revolution. The era of imperialism has long invalidated the leadership of the bourgeoisie. An exceedingly high state of the world proletarian revolution has been achieved with the ascendance of Mao Tse-tung's thought the acme of Marxism-Leninism in this era. The Communist Party of the Philippines itself can never hope to lead the Filipino people if it does not rid itself of modern revisionism or the black bourgeois line, particularly Lavaism and Taruc-ism, that has marked its history.

The national bourgeoisie and the urban petty bourgeoisie, the latter especially are allies of the working class within the national united front but they have long become inadequate at leading the Philippine Revolution in the era of imperialism as demonstrated as early as the start of the armed conquest of the Philippines by U.S. imperialism when the liberal bourgeois leadership capitulated.

The class leadership in the Philippine Revolution is now in the hands of the working class. A proletarian revolutionary leadership, guided by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought is what makes the people's democratic revolution a new type of national democratic revolution. We are now in the world era in which U.S. imperialism is moving towards total collapse and socialism is marching towards world triumph. By adopting Mao Tse-tung's thought as the supreme guide for our revolutionary actions, we cleanse the vanguard party of its weaknesses (as presented by the document of rectification, "Rectify Erros and Rebuild the Party") and strengthen it to become the invincible weapon at the core of the revolutionary mass movement.

The Communist Party of the Philippines is now re-established and rebuilt as a party of Mao Tse-tung's thought. It is the most advanced detachment of the Filipino working class leading the Philippine Revolution forward. Its strives to be a well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism,Mao Tse-tung's thought using the methods of criticism and self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people. It wields the two weapons of armed struggle and the national united front to deal death blows at U.S. imperialism and feudalism.

There is only one road which the working class under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines must take. It is the road of armed revolution to smash the armed counter-revolution that preserves foreign and feudal oppression in the Philippines. In waging armed revolution, the working class must rely mainly on the mass support of its closest ally, the peasantry. The peasantry is the main force of the people's democratic revolution. Without the peasantry's struggle for land, no genuine and formidable People's Army can be built and no revolutionary base area can be established. The peasant struggle for land is the main democratic content of the present stage of the Philippine Revolution.

From the countryside, the people's democratic forces encircle the cities. It is in the countryside that the enemy forces are first lured in and defeated before the capture of the cities from the hands of exploiting classes. It is in the countryside that the weakest links of the reactionary state are to be found and these can be surrounded by the people's democratic forces tactically before strategically defeating them. It is in the countryside that the People's Army can accumulate strenght among the peasants by combining agrarian revolution, armed struggle and the building of revolutionary base areas. The Party and the People's Army must turn the backward villages into advanced military, political, and economic and cultural bastions of the people's democratic revolution.

A true national united front exists only when it is founded on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry and such alliance has been strongly welded by armed struggle, by the creation of a People's Army mainly among the peasants by the working class party, the Communist Party of the Philippines. A true united front is one for carrying out armed struggle. The urban petty bourgeoisie can join such a united front. The national bourgeoisie can also lend direct and indirect support to it although it always carries its dual character, its contradicting progressive and reactionary aspects. In a national united front of workers, peasants, urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, the proletarian revolutionary party can best guarantee its leadership, independence and initiative only by having the People's Army firmly at its command.

In the countryside, a revolutionary anti-feudal united front must also be created. The working class must rely mainly on the poor peasants and farm workers, then win over and unite with the middle peasants and neutralize the rich peasants. In its close alliance with the masses of poor peasants and farm workers, the working class undertaken agrarian revolution, armed struggle and building of revolutionary base areas to build the strong foundations of people's democracy.

While the old democratic leadership of the bourgeoisie no longer applies to the Philippine Revolution at this historical stage, the working class and the Communist Party of the Philippines cannot accomplish both democracy and socialism at one blow. While on a world scale socialism has already taken firm roots with the People's Republic of China as its main bulwark, the Party must first achieve a new type of national democratic revolution, a people's democratic revolution in the concrete semi-feudal and semi-colonial conditions of the Philippines before reaching the stage of socialist revolution. Socialism cannot be immediately achieved when the Filipino people under the leadership of the working class still have to liberate themselves from foreign and feudal oppression.

The people's democratic revolution rejects the old liberal leadership of the bourgeoisie. U.S. imperialism has long made use of the jargon of liberal democracy to deceive the people. In upholding proletarian revolutionary leadership, it should not mean, however, that socialism shall be achieved without passing through the stage of national democracy. Neither should it mean that such progressive strata of the local bourgeoisie as the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie have no more place in the revolution. They do have a role to play as national democratic allies of the working class. Indeed, people's democracy is a new type of democracy because of its proletarian, instead of bourgeois leadership. But this proletarian revolutionary leadership assumes the present democratic task of waging a protracted peasant war, an agrarian revolution, and organizing a national united front of workers in alliance with the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the national bourgeoisie. The proletarian revolutionary leadership is the most important link between the stage of the people's democratic revolution and the stage of socialist revolution.

The immediate general programme of the Filipino people and the Communist Party of the Philippines is a people's democratic revolution and the long term maximum programme is socialism. It is dishonest, demagogic and utopian to insist that socialism is the immediate goal under conditions that the people are still dominated and exploited by U.S. imperialism and domestic feudalism.

In the political field, the Communist Party of the Philippines advances the revolutionary leadership of the working class, fights to overthrow the reactionary bourgeois regime and all reactionary classes supporting it and, in its stead, establishes a people's democratic state system, a coalition or united front government of the working class, peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. In the economic field, the Party fights for a self-reliant economy, a just and prosperous people's livelihood and a national industry and trade emancipated from foreign monopoly capitalism and feudalism which have restricted and exploited the productive efforts of the people and the patriotic businessmen, ranging



So the People May Know series of 6 volumes published jointly by the Office for Community Relations, H P C, is based mostly on documents captured in a raid on a tunnel discovered in Barrio Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac, last June, 1969. The main entrance to the tunnel is shown in the picture above. Part of the documents recovered can be seen in the picture to the left.



So the People May Know series of 6 volumes published jointly by the Office for Community Relations, N.P.C., is based mostly on documents captured in a raid on a tunnel discovered in Barrio Sto. Niño, Capas, Tarlac, last June, 1969. The main entrance to the tunnel is shown in the picture above. Part of the documents recovered can be seen in the picture to the left.

from industrialists to petty producers. In the field of culture and education, the Party fights for the development of a national, scientific and mass culture and education. In the military field, the Party commands and builds up a People's Army that serve as the mainstay of the national and social liberation movement and, consequently, of the people's democratic state system.

II. Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution

The Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to implement its general programme for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipino communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of achieving the new type of democracy, of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and completely independent, democratic, united, just and prosperous. We are all keenly aware that the present bourgeoisie state and the reactionary classes that it serves will never surrender their political and economic power without a fight.

The Party is highly conscious that in rebuilding itself as the principal instrument of the leading class and in building a united front of all patriotic and progressive forces it must build a strong People's Army that can weld together the workers and peasants and destroy the local reactionary state and the interventionist forces of U.S. imperialism.

The Communist Party of the Philippines is the leading force at the core of the revolutionary mass movement against foreign and feudal oppression and for the establishment and consolidation of a people's democratic state. In the exercise of its leadership, the Party hereunder states ten guidelines for its general programme:

1. Destroy the Forces of U.S. Imperialist and Feudal Oppression in the Philippines:

National sovereignty and democracy can never be obtained without the destruction of the forces of U.S. imperialism and domestic feudalism whose basic interests lie in the continued national and class enslavement and exploitation of the Filipino people. The over-riding interest of the Filipino people now is to fight for national liberation and people's democracy. They must take the road of armed revolution to defeat the armed counter-revolution; and all patriotic and progressive classes, parties, groups and individuals must be aroused and mobilized to isolate and then destroy the power and influence of the U.S. imperialists, the comprador bourgeoisie, the evil gentry, the bureaucrat capitalists and all their political and armed agents. The political power and influence of these exploiters can be isolated, destroyed and replaced by both waging the armed struggle and building up the national united front. As a proletarian revolutionary party, the Communist Party of the Philippines should not be tied down by legalist and parliamentary struggle. The Party should concentrate on building up the people's democratic power in the countryside before seizing the cities and simultaneously on discrediting the monopolization of political power by the bourgeois political parties, like the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the like, which actually perpetuate the same single party of class interests.

2. Establish a People's Democratic State and a Coalition or United Front Government

The ultimate goal of the people's democratic revolution is the establishment of a people's democratic state and a coalition or united front government. The people's democratic state is under the leadership of the working class and it includes the participation of all democratic classes, i.e., the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. Its government is in the form of coalition or united front of all democratic classes. In the course of the protracted people's war, a national liberation front may be created to combine all available forces and elements to isolate and destroy the enemy and prepare for a democratic coalition government. In the meantime, while a nationwide coalition government can not yet be established, the masses of workers and peasants under the proletarian revolutionary leadership can establish an armed independent regime in the countryside where they shall learn to govern themselves, defend and advance their independence and democratic gains and manage well their relations with all friends and sympathizers. The armed independent regime is the nucleus of the People's Democratic Republic of the Philippines.

3. Fight for National Unity and Democratic Rights:

The firmest national unity founded mainly on the basis of the class interests of the workers and peasants must be created. On this popular basis, all patriotic and progressive classes, groups and individuals shall enjoy political and economic rights that U.S. imperialism and feudalism have deprived them of. Individual initiative and enterprise on the part of fishermen, handicraftsmen, intellectuals, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie shall be respected, encouraged and assisted. All efforts shall be exerted by the state, cooperative and private sectors to provide every citizen a decent livelihood. All democratic classes, groups and their members shall enjoy all such democratic rights as freedom of domicile, person, thought, belief, religion, speech, assembly and the like in a democratic bill of rights. The interests and rights of overseas Filipinos shall be protected; they shall be allowed to have the amplest contact with their kith and kin in the Philippines or to return from the United States or elsewhere.

4. Follow the Principle of Democratic Centralism:

The national government shall have central authority over the local governments at various levels. The national government, however, shall base its decisions on the needs and aspirations of the broad masses of the people and the lower levels of government. This is centralized leadership based on democracy and democracy guided by centralized leadership. At every level of the government (barrio, municipality, city or district, provincial, regional), there shall be elected representative bodies where decisions are taken democratically for every corresponding area. A lower representative body shall be subordinate to a higher representative body. Any part of the government shall be subordinate to the People's Revolutionary Congress which represents nationally the sovereign Filipino people. In all elections or voting on any question, the rule of the majority shall be followed.

5. The People's Liberation Army:

There can be no people's democratic state without a People's Army whose principal and most essential function is to defend and secure it.The People's Army, composed mainly of soldiers from the peasantry, must be under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party of the Philippines. The most pressing task of the People's Army now is to defeat and destroy the reactionary imperialist-created and imperialist-supported Armed Forces of the Philippines and all other kinds of armed power in the hands of the exploiting classes and the reactionary state at all levels. The people's democratic government can be established only with the triumphant advance of the People's Army. The People's Army shall be a fighting force, a propaganda force and a productive force closely linked to the masses of the people. It constantly strengthens itself ideologically, politically and organizationally with Mao Tse-tung's thought. The armed strength of the People's Army includes its regular mobile troops, the guerrilla units, the militia, the self-defense corps and armed city partisans. The Party should see to it that troops are well-provisioned and the welfare of the families of fighters are well taken care of.

6. The Land Problem:

The main content of the People's democratic revolution is the struggle for land among the peasants. The people's democratic revolution must satisfy the basic demands of the poor peasants and farm workers for land. The agrarian revolution is the necessary requirement for the vigorous conduct of the armed struggle and the creation and consolidation of revolutionary base areas. Land shall be distributed free to the landless. Usury and all other feudal evils shall be wiped out. Plantations and estates already efficiently operated on a mechanized basis shall be converted into state farms where the agricultural workers shall establish proletarian power and provide themselves with better working and living conditions. In the whole countryside, mutual aid teams and mutual labor exchange systems shall be created as the initial step towards higher forms of agricultural cooperation. Through agricultural cooperation, production shall be raised and well-planned, the sale of produce shall be assured at the best price possible and welfare services guaranteed. The higher purchasing power of the peasantry shall enable the ceaseless expansion of industrial production. The basis of the national economy shall be agriculture because it fulfills the food and raw materials requirement of expanding industrialization and mainly the peasantry absorbs the products of industrialization.

7. The Problem of Industry:

Foreign monopoly capitalism and feudalism which have hindered the growth of national industry are firmly opposed by the people's democratic revolution. All efforts towards the growth of national industry as the leading factor of the economy shall be mustered by the people's democratic government. There shall be three sectors in the national economy: the state sector, the cooperative sector and the private sector. All major sources of raw materials and energy, all heavy and basic industries and all nationalized enterprises, shall be run by the state sector. The private sector run by the patriotic enterpreneurs and merchants shall be given assistance and support by the people's democratic government. All peasants, fishermen and handicraftsmen shall be encouraged to organize themselves into cooperatives so as to increase their productivity and assure themselves of a ready market. While building up to the state and cooperative sectors of the economy as factors of proletarian leadership and socialism, the people's democratic government shall encourage and support all private initiative in industry so long as this does not monopolize or adversely affect the people's livelihood. The people's democratic government shall exercise regulation of capital only to protect the people's livelihood and guarantee a people's democracy.

8. The Problem of Culture, Education and Intellectuals:

A people's democratic cultural revolution is necessary to rid the nation of the stultifying dominance of imperialist and feudal culture and education. It must advance instead a national, scientific and mass culture truly serving the interests of the people. It shall see to it that the educational system and the mass media are securely in the hands of the people's democratic forces. Education at all levels shall be free, irrespective of class, religion, creed, sex or color. It shall promote the national language as the principal medium of communication in Philippine society. It shall give full encouragement and support to scientific experiment and technological progress. It shall see to it that the national language, art and literature shall be given revolutionary content and relate the revolutionary struggles of workers, peasants, soldiers and other participants of the revolution. Old forms as well as foreign forms of art and literature may be adopted so long as they shall be given revolutionary content. The working class assumes leadership in the field of culture and education in line with its leading revolutionary role. But it welcomes wholeheartedly the support of intellectuals for the revolution. All democratic intellectuals are given all the opportunity to serve the people and remould their own thinking. While freedom of thought and religion shall be accorded respect, it shall see to it that this freedom is not systematically employed to resist the people's democratic revolution or hurt the people's interests. In the course of the protracted people's war, the Party shall transform backward villages into cultural bastions of the Philippine Revolution. Illiteracy and superstition among the masses shall be wiped out and the scientific spirit of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, shall prevail.

9. The Problem of National Minorities:

National minorities in the Philippines have been abused and grossly neglected. U.S. imperialism, the local reactionary government and the Christian churches have too long regarded the national minorities as mere objects of bourgeois charity and Christian proselytization. The four-million people belonging to the national minorities, especially those of Mindanao and Mountain Province, can be powerful participants in the revolutionary overthrow of U.S. imperialism and feudalism. The bourgeois government, reactionary scholars and Christian chauvinists talk loud about national integration but they stand in reality for the exploiting classes that are the main sources of abuse and oppression. The main concern of the national minorities is land; the abuses of landlords, loggers and land grabbers and their exploitation in mines and plantations. A new type of leadership, a revolutionary one, must be encouraged to rise among them so as to supplant the traditional leadership that has failed to protect them and has merely contributed and participated in their exploitation. Wtih regard to naturalized Filipinos and foreign nationals, the class approach must be firmly taken so as to do away with "Malay" racism and chauvinism. Residents or citizens of Chinese ancestry are very often the target of rascist and chauvinist attacks launched by U.S. imperialists, modern revisionists, and other local reactionaries in line with their anti-China, anti-communist and anti-people policy. The Kuomintang comprador bourgeoisie should be thoroughly exposed and attacked for its class position and for the fact that it is an accomplice for U.S. imperialism, modern revisionism and all reactionaries.

10. The Problem of Foreign Policy:

The foreign policy of the Philippine bourgeois government is dictated by U.S. imperialism and the internal reactionary classes. The diplomatic relations and foreign trade of the Philippines is monopolized by the United States, together with its reactionary allies like resurgent imperialist Japan. Relations with revisionist states have been initiated only because of the permission granted by the United States which recognizes modern revisionism as its chief accomplice in maintaining neo-colonialism throughout the world, including the Philippines. The U.S. imperialists and the modern revisionists are maintaining an all-round cooperation to save puppet states like the bourgeois reactionary state in the Philippines. The only true basis for an independent and active foreign policy is the overthrow of the internal power of U.S. imperialism and its local lackeys in the Philippines, and the abrogation of all treaties, executive agreements and statutes that define "special relations" with the U.S. government and its imperialists allies. The People's Republic of China, and all other countries are willing to have relations in the spirit of mutual respect for nation sovereignty and on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. The people's democratic government shall give moral and material support to the revolutionary movements of oppressed peoples abroad and shall maintain the firmest alliance with genuine socialist states like the People's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Albania. It shall be inspired by the principle of proletarian internationalism and guided by the policy of the international united front. It regards the People's Republic of China as an iron bastion of the world proletarian revolution and as a reliable friend of all oppressed peoples, including the Filipino people.

III. Our Specific Programme

Our general programme will remain unchanged during the entire stage of the people's democratic revolution. But from phase to phase during this general stage, our specific and immediate demands shall change.

Hereunder are our specific and immediate demands:

In the Political Field

1. Attack, isolate and destroy the bourgeois reactionary state, the U.S. imperialists, the landlords and all local tyrants until their doom in our country.
2. Establish the armed independent regime and develop the people's ability in the conduct of government in the course of armed struggle;
3. Purge our ranks of modern revisionists and all other opportunists who sabotage our revolutionary efforts, and expose the bankruptcy of bourgeois legalism and parliamentarism;
4. Campaign for a people's democratic constitution and demand the revocation of provisions in the bourgeois constitution, laws, executive agreements and treaties that are reactionary;
5. Expose the curtailment of the political rights of workers, peasants, intellectuals and patriotic citizens who fight against foreign and feudal oppression, and allow the free operation of or support every democratic party or mass organization;
6. Fight the rise of fascism and the use of murder and threats against the people and their revolutionary and democratic leaders and organizations;
7. Punish the evil gentry and corrupt government officials and subject them to public trial by the people's court whenever possible;
8. Replace or re-organize the barrio councils and promote the leadership of the poor peasants and farm workers through revolutionary barrio councils;
9. Cooperate with all organizations and groups that can help build up the national united front and isolate the die-hard enemies of the people's

democratic revolution; and

10. Assure low-ranking officials and rank and file employees in the bourgeois government that they shall be re-integrated in the people's democratic government so long as they do not participate directly in the commission of public crimes and so long as they secretly cooperate with the revolutionary movement.

In the Economic Field

1. Render ineffective the Parity Amendment, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, the Agreement Relating to Entry Rights of American Traders and Investors, Agricultural Commodities Agreement and the Investment Incentives Law and all other such legal instruments that bind our country economically to U.S. imperialism and all its local lackeys, and reject the old and new loan agreements made by the bourgeois reactionary government, including the "aid" agreements;

2. Encourage the people and the national bourgeoisie to make a self-reliant economy and at the same time confiscate foreign goods that depress or eliminate the local production of goods by patriotic Filipino citizens while urging the broad masses of the people to boycott imperialist businesses and consumer goods;

3. Outlaw bureaucrat capital and all property gained through corrupt and criminal means;

4. Help improve the livelihood of workers, peasants, farm workers, fishermen and handicraftsmen by exercising price control in base areas and providing work for the unemployed and under-employed; and organize the peasants, fishermen and handicraftsmen into elementary cooperative units (mutual aid teams and labor exchange systems) and support every movement for the economic emancipation of the people;

5. Compel the reduction of rent and interest rates in guerrilla zone and abolish rent in the liberated areas, abolish exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies and establish a consolidated progressive tax, collecting an agricultural tax not exceeding two per cent of produce and also a fair business tax from the petty and the national bourgeoisie;

6. Help the workers in the factories, mines, plantations, transportation lines and offices to conduct strikes successfully;

7. Expose the deceptive and reactionary character of the Magna Carta of Labor, the Agricultural Land Reform Code and other such bourgeois measures pretending to support the economic and social struggle of the exploited masses;

8. Protect and encourage Filipino-owned commerce and industry by providing market guarantees, protection, credit and tax relief;

9. Support the national minorities in their fight against landlords, land

grabbers, mining companies, logging concessionaires and plantations; and

10. Safeguard the people's health and expand medical services.

In the Military Field

1. Organize and train units of the People's Army: armed propaganda teams, guerrilla units, regular mobile troops, militia and armed city partisans;

2. Campaign against the U.S. military bases and U.S. military assistance and all treaties (U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Treaty, Military Assistance Pact and Mutual Defense Treaty, the SEATO, etc.) that bind the reactionary government and army to the U.S. imperialists, and also against the anti-democratic intent of "civic action", the "Peace Corps" and other counter-insurgency projects of the U.S. imperialists;

3. Destroy the military units of the reactionary government and of the U.S. imperialists and capture useful military equipments;

4. Punish the spies and all subversive agents (especially members of the CIA and DLA) of U.S. imperialism and their local reactionary cohorts;

5. Campaign against the drafting of the youth, workers and peasants for military camp training and service and also against the PMT, ROTC and the Philippine Military Academy because of their reactionary orientation;

6. Eliminate cattle rustling and piracy, banditry and all other activities that prey on the poor;

7. Destroy the terror squads like the Home Defense Corps, the Monkees and the like, and disarm and disband the bodyguards of bureaucrat capitalists, civilian guards of landlords and strike-breakers;

8. Organize the oppressed national minorities to take up arms against imperialist and feudal oppression;

9. Wage a war of annihilation but exercise leniency on captured combatants so as to demoralize the enemy; and

10. Cooperate with all other armed movements or groups fighting against imperialist and feudal oppression.

In the Cultural Field

1. Develop a national, scientific and mass culture responsive to the needs and aspirations of the Filipino people;

2. Campaign against imperialist and feudalist or Church control and influence over the educational system and mass media;

3. Propagate the national language as the principal medium of instruction and communication;

4. Develop a people's democratic culture and put revolutionary content in art and literature while combatting the decadent literature of "universal humanism", pessimism, escapism, class reconciliation and all other per-

nicious bourgeois trends;

5. Combat Christian chauvinism against the national minorities;
6. Support the progressive movements and actions among students, teachers and all intellectuals;
7. Guarantee the better livelihood of teachers and other staff members of educational institutions and guarantee academic freedom;
8. Respect the freedom of thought and religious belief and use patient persuasion in gathering support for the people's democratic revolution;
9. Denounce imperialist study and travel grants;
10. Fight for free education at all levels and wipe out illiteracy and superstition among the masses and rouse them to a revolutionary scientific spirit.

In the Field of Foreign Policy

1. Base Philippine foreign policy on the Filipino people's sovereignty and self-reliance, and cooperate with all friendly revolutionary peoples, governments and movements on the basis of mutual respect and benefit;
2. Fight against all the unjust treaties and agreements imposed by U.S. imperialism;
3. Develop the firmest relations with the People's Republic of China, Albania and all revolutionary governments and peoples;
4. Support the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America; and all neighboring oppressed peoples of Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, Thailand, Kalimantan Utara, Malaya Burma, Korea and others;
5. Expose the United Nations as a tool of U.S. imperialism and their revisionist renegade accomplices in the crime of neo-colonialism;
6. Oppose every treacherous maneuver of all revisionist states and parties in their collaboration with U.S. imperialism;
7. Resist the attempt of U.S. imperialism to make use of Japan and the revisionist renegated cliques led by the Soviet Union as tools in the exploitation of the Philippines;
8. Oppose such "regional" arrangements as the Asian Development Bank, (ADB), Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC), and the like that reinforce the SEATO and other long-standing instruments of U.S. imperialism in the region;
9. Campaign against the imperialist advisers and survey missions in the bourgeois reactionary government; and
10. Follow the spirit of proletarian internationalism and the policy of the international united front.

IV. Conditions for Revolution are Excellent

The objective conditions for the implementation of our general and specific programme are excellent. U.S. imperialism, modern revisionism and all reactionary forces are receiving crushing blows from the oppressed peoples of the world and are in a state of disintegration. This is indeed the era when imperialism is heading towards total collapse and socialism is marching towards world victory.

Increasingly, armed struggles in the countryside of the world, Asia, Africa and Latin America, are ever intensifying and expanding to tear apart and destroy the over-extended power of U.S. imperialism and all its reactionary allies. In the close vicinity of the Philippines, the tide of people's war is ever rising under the powerful inspiration of Mao Tse-tung's thought. The heroic peoples of Vietnam, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, Burma, Malaya and others are fighting U.S. imperialism and feudalism. The Filipino people and the Communist Party of the Philippines are fortunate to be within the storm center of the world proletarian revolutions.

Because of its losses in the Vietnam war, because of its expensive but futile aid to its puppet governments and because of its failure to further expand its foreign trade, U.S. imperialism is rocked in its very heartland by a serious crisis that is now agitating the American workers and youth, both Afro-American and white, who refuse to be carried away into imperialist wars of expansion and to be abused economically and politically at home. The deepening internal and external crisis of U.S. imperialism is clearly depriving the Filipino reactionaries of a significantly great amount of imperialist protection and support.

The crisis of over-production severely afflicts the entire world capitalist system today and is profoundly agitating their own working class and youth whom they viciously exploit. All capitalist countries are now engaged in a cut-throat competition because each is trying to save itself from economic and political crisis at the expense of the other. Although all capitalist countries are united in manipulating the revisionist renegade states and parties and shifting the burden of their financial crisis on the backs of their colonies and semi-colonies, they only aggravate the hopeless situation of their puppets and intensify the aspirations of the oppressed peoples to be freed of their imperialist yoke.

Modern revisionism spearheaded by the Soviet revisionist clique is failing to be an effective accomplice of U.S. imperialism in their mutual crime of neo-colonialism. The Soviet revisionist renegade clique bloc is fast disintegrating. The Soviet aggression against the Czechoslovak people has demonstrated the treacherous character of modern revisionism. While U.S. imperialism and Soviet social imperialism collude in claiming their respective spheres of influence, they also struggle to redivide the same.

While U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism are in deep crisis, the People's Republic of China has consolidated itself as an iron bastion of socialism and the world proletarian revolution by carrying out the epochal and great proletarian cultural revolution and by holding aloft Mao Tse-tung's thought to illumine the road of armed revolution throughout the world. Also, in the Eastern European heartland of modern revisionism, the People's Republic of Albania stands forth as an advance post of the world proletarian revolution and Mao Tse-tung's thought and is encouraging all the oppressed peoples and Marxist-Leninists there to rebel against the ruling revisionist renegade cliques.

The most significant development in the entire history of the Filipino people so far is the re-establishment and rebuilding of the Communist Party of the Philippines as a Party of Mao Tse-tung's thought. This occurs at a time when world and national conditions are extremely favorable for revolution under the leadership of the proletariat.

The Philippine reactionary state can no longer rely on the "unlimited" support of the crisis-stricken U.S. imperialism and the world capitalist system. What the United States and other capitalist powers are vainly trying to do is to shift the burden of their economic and financial crisis on the backs of colonies and semi-colonies like the Philippines. This will only aggravate the foreign and feudal oppression of the Filipino people and will only goad them to take up arms.

The Philippine reactionary state is increasingly unable to rule in the old way. Armed opposition to it by the Filipino people under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines is sure to doom foreign and feudal oppression. It is both a patriotic and internationalist duty to fight U.S. imperialism and all its reactionary allies. Defeat of U.S. imperialism and modern revisionism and all domestic reactionaries in the Philippines is bound to have far-reaching world significance because our country has long served as a bastion of all these evils in this part of the world.

Ratified by the Congress of Re-Establishment
of the Communist Party of the Philippines
December 26, 1968

IV. MAIN TASKS OF THE PARTY

The central task of any revolutionary movement is to seize political power. The Communist Party of the Philippines assumes this task at a time that both the international and national situations are favorable to taking the road of armed revolution against armed counter-revolution.

U.S. imperialism is over-extended throughout the world. It is now receiving the powerful blows of an ever rising tide of armed revolutionary movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is wracked by internal crisis and by its contradictions with other capitalist powers. The revisionist renegade bloc in Eastern Europe, led by the revisionist renegade clique in the Soviet Union, which is relied upon by U.S. imperialism to peddle the "peaceful road" and disarm the fighting peoples of the world, is in the state of internal disintegration. Instead of confusing the proletarian revolutionaries of the world, the ruling revisionist cliques in Eastern Europe are in turn causing chaos among themselves and their stooges throughout the world.

On the other hand, the countryside of the world, Asia, Africa and Latin America, has a reliable well consolidated central base in China. The revolutionization of the Chinese people through the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution has guaranteed the irrepresible advance of the world proletarian revolution, the collapse of imperialism and the world-wide triump of socialism.

It is in the nature of things, however, that they change only on the basis of their internal unity of opposites. The people's democratic revolution in the Philippines can be achieved basically through revolutionary efforts of a truly Marxist-Leninist Party, the Communist Party of the Philippines, which applies concretely the universal truth of Mao Tse-tung's thought. At the core of the people's revolutionary movement is the most advanced detachment of the working class, the Communist Party of the Philippines. Through this party, the working class firmly allies itself with the peasantry to wage the people's democratic revolution on the basis of an agrarian war. Furthermore, it unites with the petty bourgeoisie, especially the urban petty bourgeoisie, and applies the revolutionary dual policy of unity and struggle with the national bourgeoisie against all the irreconciliable enemies of national freedom and democracy, U.S. imperialism, and comprador bourgeoisie, landlords and capitalist bureaucrats.

In the Philippines today, the ruling classes are in serious difficulties in ruling in the old way. They cannot prolong the present balance of forces indefinitely. As a matter of fact, armed opposition now will aggravate their difficulties and hasten the maturing of what is now discernible as a revolutionary mood among the people. What little but well consolidated strength we may have now will grow bigger in a series of waves in the long run so long as we launch a protracted armed struggle in the countryside.

Under its central task of seizing political power through armed revolution, the Communist Party of the Philippines takes up the three tasks of party rebuilding, army building and united front building. Only by raising these three banners, by achieving these tasks, can the internal weaknesses of the present exploitative system be fully taken advantage of by the Party and the people and U.S. imperialism and feudalism be overthrown to make way for a people's democracy.

A. Party Rebuilding

The Communist Party of the Philippines must rebuild itself with the guidance of the most advanced revolutionary theory, Marxism-Leninism whose acme in the present era is Mao Tse-tung's thought. Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary party; without this revolutionary party there can be no revolution.

As the Party performs the first requisite of ideological building, it must do it in the spirit of rectification, of correcting the errors of the past and the present so that future ones will be avoided and so that the Filipino working class will succeed in its historic mission of leading the people's democratic revolution.

The Party rebuilds itself at a time that it has suffered serious defeats and has been isolated from the masses of the people for a long period of time. Efforts to make the Party of a broad mass character and national in scale must take into critical consideration the serious errors committed by previous party leaderships and still carried over into the present.

A summing up of Party experience must be made in the scientific spirit of criticism and self-criticism so that the Party will learn to be closest to the masses throughout the country as it leads and musters the forces that make for the people's democratic revolution. The Party is the nucleus of the proletarian dictatorship; it should be able to rectify itself, remould the world outlook of its cadres and cast away the pernicious influence of the bourgeoisie and petty bourgeoisie among them.

Efforts of subjectivism in ideology, errors of "right" and "left",opportunism in politics and violations of democratic centralism in organization should be weeded out, no matter how long these tendencies may have embedded in the thinking and actions of Party members. It is perfectly alright for old and young cadres alike who want to make revolution to seek the basic reasons for the serious defeats and the present isolation of the Party occuring despite the thirty-eight years of Party experience and the sacrifice of thousands upon thousands of party members and sympathizers.

Our Party history reveals that the black bourgeoisie line of right opportunism and revisionism has persisted longer than "left" opportunism.

The most thorough exposure of this error must be made, especially at this time that modern revisionism is trving to grow in it. The "left" opportunism of the Jose Lava and Jesus Lava leaderships during the years of 1949 to 1965 should be related to the longer line of Right opportunism as the reverse facet of bourgeois subjectivism.

In carrying out a rectification movement to weed out modern revisionism and all forms of opportunism, ideological building should be conducted at all levels with closest supervision of the Central Committee and the Higher Party School, the Revolutionary School of Mao Tse-tung's thought. This rectification movement should be carried out in the course of ideological Party members and the masses of the people of concrete struggles by which Mao Tse-tung's thought is put to practice in the concrete conditions of Philippine society.

In the organizational rebuilding of the Party, the principles of democratic centralism and taking the mass line should be established. Errors of liberalism and sectarianism should be eradicated. No Party member or mass organization should be repudiated or coddled for subjective reasons or without any clear basis in principle. No segment of the Party should consider itself superior to the Party and the principle of democratic centralism. Those who are scandalously waving the black flag of "noble lineage" and those who prevent criticism of serious errors of previous party leaderships and of current party work lose their status as communists. The handful of revisionists who falsify facts like they were fourth-rate detectives and spread intrigues to run down loyal party members are counter-revolutionaries.

Because the Party must be close to the masses, it is utterly wrong for some elements to form themselves as a group and hoist themselves as the Party, even as they treat the affairs of the Party as merely a side-interest a week-end hobby to be attended to by bourgeois academic experts and high bureaucrats who actually give their best hours and efforts in the service of the present bourgeois reactionary government, to their private interests and to the reform projects of the bourgeois reactionary government.

The tasks of the people's democratic revolution should be taken seriously by every Party member at every level. The Party leadership should reflect to the utmost the mass of Party members who are engaged in the main tasks of the Party. The complementary relationship between the struggle in the city and that in the countryside should be developed fully while placing principal stress on the development of armed struggle in the countryside. Legal and illegal forms of struggle in both the city and the countryside should be waged and coordinated by the Party as the general staff.

The Party should master the handling of its two weapons, armed struggle and united front. It should grasp them firmly, with one hand holding armed struggle as the weapon of offensive and the united front as the shield that parries and blunts the attacks of the enemy. In the people's democratic revolution, armed struggle and united front are inseparable. Any attempt to separate the two can ony be done by "Right" opportunists and "Left" opportunists.

Aside from putting out a summing-up of Party experience the Communist Party of the Philippines should also put out now a Party Programme and Party Constitution that reflects the great advances of the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought and the long repressed aspirations of the masses of the Filipino people and that can guide the rebuilding of the Party and the revolutionary conduct of all Party members, cadres and leading organs in the struggle for a people's democratic revolution.

B. Army Building

The Communist Party of the Philippines can gain stature as a national revolutionary force only if it commands a People's Army. This truth has been proven since the establishment of the People's Army against the Japanese in 1942. Indeed, if the people have no People's Army, they continue to be the victims of national and class exploitation without let-up:

A movement is truly revolutionary when it has a People's Army. It is, therefore, the principal revolutionary task of the Communist Party of the Philippines to build up a People's Army. The People's Army is the principal weapon of the Party and armed struggle is the main form of struggle. It is only by taking the road of armed revolution that armed counter-revolution by the bourgeois state can be confronted and defected by the people.

The Marxist-Leninist theory of the state and Mao Tse-tung's great thought that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun", must be grasped by every Party member. The people have nothing to defend themselves with and to advance their democratic interests if there is no People's Army. The ruling class will never surrender its power voluntarily; the bourgeois state will not disappear on its own accord. The proletarian revolutionary party at the helm of the people's democratic revolution must strike it down and sweep it away with a People's Army.

The Party must build up a revolutionary army that is loyal and obedient to the Party, that is, close to the people and wherein officers and men share weal and woe and are welded together into one fighting family.

In accordance with the semi-colonial and semi-feudal conditions of the Philippines, the Party must build up a People's Army whose main support and whose main source of red soldiers is the peasantry. The proletarian revolutionary party welds the basic alliance of the working class and peasantry through the armed struggle. It is by waging a peasant war that the greatest number of masses are mobilized under revolutionary proletarian leadership. Necessarily, the Party and its Army must pay close attention to the implementation of an agrarian revolution that fulfills the struggle for land among the peasant masses. The struggle for land is, as a matter of fact, the main content of the people's democratic revolution.

It is in the countryside that the Party and the People's Army can establish an armed independent regime by pursuing the three integral components of armed struggle, agrarian revolution and rural bases.

It is in the countryside where the enemy can become over-extended, where it is weakest, where the peasant main force of the people is democratic revolution exists and can be mobilized, where the revolutionary forces enjoy the widest grounds of maneuver and where they can take the offensive. It is here where the strategic majority of the enemy at the beginning of the people's war can become so dispersed as to allow the revolutionary forces to concentrate superior forces tactically. It is here where the enemy can be lured in deep in territory and among the people with the greatest uncertainty for him.

It is here where the fighting forces of the people's democratic revolution can retreat when the enemy advances, where they can harass the enemy when it is at rest, where they can advance when the enemy retreats. It is also here where the enemy campaigns of encirclement and suppression can be smashed with counter-campaigns of encirclement and suppression by the Red Army.

With the importance of urban revolutionary activity, both legal and illegal, should not be disregarded, it should be recognized as secondary but complimentary to the armed struggle in the countryside, until the People's Army in the countryside is ready to seize the cities, the role of urban revolutionary activity is mainly defensive because the counter-revolutionary forces are here most concentrated and strong.

The Party takes the strategic line in armed struggle of making the countryside encircle the cities, of defeating the counter-revolutionary forces in the countryside before taking the cities. It must develop its main armed forces in the island of Luzon where the main forces of the reactionary state are also concentrated but it must at the same time give strategic value to armed revolutionary activity in the other islands of Visayas and Mindanao, as capable of dispersing and weakening the enemy's armed forces now concentrated in Luzon, especially in Central Luzon and the Greater Manila area. This is in consonance with the archipelago character of the Philippines. All the way, however, the Party and the People's Army are to take the correct class line in every island.

In pursuing the strategic line of developing the people's war in the countryside in every part of the country, the People's Army under the command of the Party must maintain the correct class line. It should arouse and mobilize the poor peasants, lower middle peasants and farm workers as its most reliable allies and sources of fighters. It should unite with the middle peasants while neutralizing the rich peasants. But it should constantly let the poor peasants, lower middle peasants and farm workers prevail in revolutionary barrio committees that replace the old barrio councils dominated by the rich peasants and landlords.

Agrarian revolution can be effected only through armed struggle and the growth of a People's Army. The Party guarantees the free distribution of lands to the poor peasants, lower middle peasants and farm workers only with the People's Army. Only the People's Army can be the effective weapon of the Party and the main pillar of the people in striking down the evil gentry and all other local tyrants and in effecting agrarian revolution. The armed struggle and the agrarian revolution in turn result in the establishment of stable rural bases where the people's democratic power is consolidated.

It is from rural bases the people's democratic revolution can advance in a series of waves. It is here where the People's Army and the masses of the people can drown the reactionary forces. From here, guerrilla units and armed propaganda units can be dispatched to adjacent and other areas to expand the people's democratic revolution by first developing guerrilla ones which in due time mature into revolutionary base areas where the great masses of the people are fully mobilized.

By advancing in a series of waves, the People's Army avoids the military adventurism of the Jose Lava and Jesus Lava leadership which until now is manifested by roving rebel activities, sectarianism and the mountain stronghold mentality. Politics should be in full command of the People's Army and all its activities. Errors of the purely or mainly military viewpoint should be discarded. The Party and the People's Army should arouse, mobilize and involve great masses of the people in activities ranging from struggle meetings in guerrilla zones to armed campaign in what are to evolve as stable base areas. To develop the closest revolutionary intimacy with the masses, the People's Army should not be merely a fighting force. It should also be propaganda and productive force.

The Party should now zealously lay the groundwork for a more intensive and extensive people's war at a few but well-chosen and manageable areas in the countryside and in the whole archipelago. The present number of cadres who have already grasped Mao Tse-tung's thought and who can be disposed in the countryside is still small but it shall surely grow big and strong as it merges with the masses of people on a national scale.

C. United Front Building

A genuine national united front can exist only if the Communist Party of the Philippines can maintain its independence and initiative by developing a strong People's Army that is correctly guided by Mao Tse-tung's thought.

The experience of the Party in the Popular Front and Democratic Alliance should provide us with several good lessons. The lack of armed preparation in the anti-fascist struggle preceding the outbreak of World War II caused severe damages to the Party when the Japanese invasion came; and difficulties occured even when the Party had already established the People's Army against the Japanese because of a persistent Right opportunist line that was the essence of the "retreat for defense" policy.

The Democratic Alliance as a formal united front organization was also put up as a part of the Right opportunist error of relying mainly on legal struggle after the anti-Japanese struggle. The importance of a consistent peasant war was not understood as the base of what could have been an effective people's democratic revolution against U.S. imperialism and feudalism. Even the promised return of U.S. imperialism had not been fully understood by the Party leadership in the course of the anti-Japanese war, and soon after its close.

The U.S. imperialists and the landlords did not spare all efforts to outmaneuver the Party and the People's Army even after the latter had become disarmed by Party decision during the period of 1945 to 1948. Instead of maintaining the armed vigilance of all units of the People's Army, the Party moved its central organs to the city started to participate in bourgeois parliamentary activity and engaged in alliances with bourgeois political groups and personalities through the Democratic Alliance.

Again the modern revisionists in the Philippines are trying to lead the progressive movement into promoting the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism beyond its limited tactical value, giving principal stress to the Agricultural Land Reform Code and Magna Charta of Labor of the bourgeois government and carrying the sedan chair for bourgeois personalities through who do not even carry any definite mass following.

The Communist Party of the Philippines must make a thorough and comprehensive class analysis of Philippine society in order to determine its friends and enemies, and also in order to distinguish its reliable and unreliable allies, its long-run and temporary allies. The Party policy of national united front is essentially a class analysis in Philippine society.

The leading force of the national united front is the working class led by the Communist Party of the Philippines. In the people's democratic revolution, working class leadership is best achieved in alliance with the peasantry, especially the poor peasants, lower middle peasants and farm workers through armed revolution. The basic alliance of the working class and the peasantry effected best and most deeply by armed struggle serves as the basis of a national united front against U.S. imperialism. the comprador bourgeoisie, landlords and bureaucrat capitalist.

The urban petty bourgeoisie is also an ally of the working class. It is less revolutionary than the peasantry but more revolutionary and more lasting as an ally than the national bourgeoisie.

The national bourgeoisie has a dual character, revolutionary and reactionary. To some extent, it can accept anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism. But it still has a bourgeois class character to which the working class and its Party must always be alert. The Party can cooperate with it within certain periods and to some limited extent but it must be on the alert for its betrayals and basically opportunist class character. Because of this dual character, the Party has to adopt consistently a revolutionary dual tactics towards it. The Party must be cautious towards it although concessions may be given to it without sacrificing the basic interests and principles of workers and peasants.

If the working class and the Communist Party of the Philippines do not firmly uphold and advance proletarian revolutionary leadership, the national bourgeoisie, with the assistance of the petty bourgeoisie pushes forwards its bourgeois leadership, misleads the peasantry and fosters directly or indirectly a Right opportunist or revisionist line within the Party. If the Party allows itself to lose revolutionary leadership over the peasant masses, it is bound to suffer from right opportunism or modern revisionism as the principal political error. The danger of cooperating with the national bourgeoisie always lies in tendencies towards urban political activity as the main political activity. However, if the Party should unduly cut itself off from the national bourgeoisie, it can easily make the effort of "Left" opportunism as its main error.

But what certainly takes precedence over the question of cooperating with the national bourgeoisie is the development of the closest alliance between the working class and peasantry through armed struggle conducted by the Communist Party of the Philippines. It is this alliance that can only be the true foundation of a national united front. Without this it is senseless to give decisive importance to a formal organization like the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism, consider it a united front and worry most of the time about the tolerance and attitudes of bourgeois allies for the sake of preserving some weak and artificial unity. It is not surprising then that the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism is getting to be vapid ineffectual group like the National Economic Protectionism Association (NEPA), the Civil Liberties Union or the Pre-War League for the Defense of Democracy.

The local revisionists who have been encouraged by the revolutionary mood of the people are busy capitulating to the enemy that uses an attractive phraseology and cheap gimmicks. They actually surrender themselves to the enemy like the liquidationist and Right opportunist Jesus Lava or they busy themselves begging for absolute pardons and amnesty, disrupting the armed struggle and building up bourgeois-controlled organizations as their parliamentary havens while they go about casting intrigues in privileged places as those they bewail as "upstarts" who question their sham authority as "veterans" and "born revolutionary leaders".

These local revisionist renegades copy the pseudo-principles and styles of their revisionist renegade counterparts abroad, led by the Soviet ruling clique. They are heavy baggage and disrupters within the communist and democratic movements in the Philippines today.

Their sinister links with the modern revisionists abroad, their active support for Philippine-Soviet relations, and their "united action" policy are nothing but a reflection of their deep-seated bourgeois character and their local revisionist line.

The Communist Party of the Philippines adheres to the policy of the international united front as an extension of its national united front. Its main guiding principle is proletarian internationalism.

By taking the road of armed revolution illuminated by Mao Tse-tung's thought, the Party contributes concretely to the collapse of U.S. imperialism, modern revisionism and reaction throughout the world. It clears the way for the world triumph of socialism and the liberation of all oppressed peoples.

The Party is fortunate that it is face to face in line and death struggle against U.S. imperialism, the No. 1 enemy of all peoples of the world. By fighting U.S. imperialism directly, it clearly performs its internationalist duty of giving support to all other oppressed peoples. U.S. imperialist control of the Philippines has too long been an important link in the chain of imperialist domination in Asia and throughout the world.

The Party must relate its national revolutionary efforts to the world proletarian revolution spearheaded by the People's Republic of China, the People's Republic of Albania and all Marxist-Leninist parties armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought.

In the countryside of the world, which is Asia, Africa and Latin America where the Philippines is, the 700 million Chinese people have become consolidated with Mao Tse-tung's thought and have become an iron bastion for the world-wide efforts to defeat U.S. imperialism. The Filipino working class and people have all reasons to be optimistic, no matter how hard the difficulties and sacrifices that they must undergo to achieve the triumph of their people's democratic revolution and the world-wide triumph of socialism.

THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

As surely as the Communist Party of the Philippines is being regenerated, reoriented and re-established under the supreme guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought, the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the present era, the People's Liberation Army which the Party commands as its principal in the Philippine Revolution is likewise being regenerated, re-oriented and re-established under the supreme guidance of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought.

In the same way that the Party is undertaking a rectification movement in the spirit of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones" and of "curing the sickness to save the patient", the People's Liberation Army is likewise doing so in order to regenerate itself correctly, cast away degenerates and take in new blood, so as to carry out more firmly and vigorously the tasks of the people's democratic revolution against U.S. imperialism and domestic feudalism.

The New People's Army is definitely emergent, after twenty-seven years of hard struggle and sacrifice in the people's democratic interests. It can take pride in its splendid achievements and in the glorious martyrdom of its heroic soldiers. It can also learn bitter lessons from more than two decades of not yet having won the Revolution nor having preserved a single liberated area in the country. It is now arduously striving to intensify the armed struggle in a number of guerrilla zones and girding for the realization of agrarian revolution as the condition for establishing the rural base and the armed independent regime.

At this juncture, the universal truth of Mao Tse-tung's thought is now being consciously and thoroughly integrated with the concrete practice of the Philippine Revolution. After an extended process of rectification and self-criticism lasting for a number of years, reflected by the historic document, "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party," the Communist Party of the Philippines put out in its Congress of Re-establishment on December 26, 1968, a new Constitution and a new Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution in order to give new guidance, the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought to the People's Liberation Army and to the conduct of our revolutionary armed struggle.

The Party Constitution and Programme make it clear that the road of armed revolution is the only road for the Filipino people to take in order to liberate themselves from the exploitative and oppressive rule of U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. This basic stand of our Party recognizes the great role of the People's Army in the Philippine Revolution. Since armed struggle is the main form of struggle, the People's Army is the main form of organization in the people's democratic revolution.

As Comrade Mao Tse-tung has long pointed out, "Without a People's Army, the people have nothing". Neither can the Communist Party of the Philippines nor the Filipino working class lead the revolution, nor fight for the people's interests without the People's Army. Neither can a true united front be formed without armed struggle and the People's Army welding together the workers and the peasants. The people and the Party can have political power only by taking up arms, only by having a genuine People's Army as the mainstay of all efforts to overthrow the reactionaries and consolidate revolutionary power. As Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun".

Today, on March 29, 1969, on the occasion of the twenty-seventh anniversary of the founding of the People's Army, we have the best and happiest reasons for celebration. In line with the rectification, re-establishment and re-invigoration of the Communist Party of the Philippines under the powerful inspiration of the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung, we the overwhelming majority of Red Commanders and soldiers are convened to formalize the adoption of the proletarian revolutionary line of the Party and Mao Tse-tung's thought, announce the creation of the New People's Army and approve the draft of the Basic Rules for submission to the Party Central Committee, proclaim our irrevocable repudiation of and triumph over the bourgeois headquarters in the Army which is lorded over by the Taruc-Sumulong renegade clique and express our resolute determination to combat and remove all vestiges of modern revisionism and Right opportunism, particularly Lavaism and Taruc-ism, which have besmirched the integrity and prestige of the Party and Army have hindered for so long the advance of the people's democratic revolution against U.S. imperialism and domestic feudalism.

Today, we speak of the new People's Army because it is under the unified command of Mao Tse-tung's thought and the Communist Party of the Philippines, because it truly serves the most fundamental interests of the people by being the principal instrument in the agrarian revolution that we are to launch, to mobilize the masses of peasants and farm workers and also in the united front against U.S. imperialism and feudalism, and because it has a style of being closely linked with the masses of the people by helping them in every possible way.

Our Army is new in two senses. It is new in the sense that it is fundamentally different from the reactionary puppet Armed Forces of the Philippines (and all its supplementary forces) that wages armed suppression of the people and defends the exploiting classes. It is also new in the sense that it is fundamentally different from the black bourgeois line that has persisted in the People's Army and has sabotaged the revolutionary armed struggle for quite a long time already.

That the New People's Army is resplendently new is beyond all doubt inasmuch as it has emerged as the fruit of inner Party struggle, the concrete result of the triumph of Mao Tse-tung's thought and the overthrow of the bourgeois headquarters in the Party and Army. Following the Marxist-Leninist leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the New People's Army has arisen as the fresh formation of Red commanders and soldiers who have rejected the bourgeois army headquarters of "Commander" Sumulong and who have upheld Mao Tse-tung's thought against the pernicious black bourgeois line of Lavaism and Taruc-ism.

Within the Party, we the Red commanders and soldiers following the lead of proletarian revolutionary cadres and inspired by Mao Tse-tung's thought have set ourselves free from the two main sources of modern revisionism and Right opportunism in the Party and Army.

One main source is, the city-based Lava clique which engages mainly in legalist and parliamentary struggle and whose principal leaders are in the payroll of the bourgeois reactionary government. This clique conceives of the national united front as something detached from the armed struggle. It is sponsoring a reformist peasant organization that limits its activities to arbitration within the narrow channels of the bourgeois reactionary government and systematically sabotages the activities of the People's Army and harbors surrenderees, swindlers, cattle-rustlers and other bad elements.

The other main source of modern revisionism and Right opportunism is lorded over by the Pedro Taruc-Sumulong clique that mis-appropriates the name of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the People's Liberation Army to advance the selfish counter-revolutionary bourgeois and feudal ends that are essentially not different from those of the Lava clique.

In dealing with the present situation in the Army, we have to deal at length with the Taruc-Sumulong clique which has since 1964 formally usurped the leadership over all those units of the People's Liberation Army that have heroically persisted in armed struggle against the enemy. Though we, the overwhelming majority of Red commanders and soldiers have already overthrown this revisionist renegade clique in the countryside, we must expose clearly its anti-Party and counter-revolutionary crimes so as to make them serve as negative examples and to show to all comrades and to the people that the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army are capable of rectifying errors and rebuilding themselves as genuine instruments of the people's democratic revolution against U.S. imperialism and feudalism.

Crimes of the Taruc-Sumulong Clique

The Taruc-Sumulong clique has deliberately encouraged the persistence of the ideology and activities of roving rebel bands for selfish counter-revolutionary bourgeois and feudal ends of its own. Though it has usurped the name of the Party and Army and even usurped high titles therein through a system of false appointments, it has outrightly taken the counter-revolutionary standpoint on many problems and issues of basic importance and has done so in open violation of the basic norms of a Marxist-

Leninist Party and People's Army. Like the heirs and advocates of Lavaism, the Taruc-Sumulong clique has never found it necessary during the 1964-1969 period to put forward a new Party Programme and Constitution and other documents and directives to replace the outmoded ones during the 1946-1951 period and also those put out arbitrarily by Jesus Lava until his surrender. There has never been any attempt on the part of the heirs of Lavaism and Taruc-ism to apply universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, on the concrete practice of the Philippine Revolution. They have only consistently abandoned and violated it.

Despite its presumptions of leadership, the Taruc-Sumulong clique has wilfully failed to issue ample, clearcut and correct Party guide in order to give the proper direction to the armed struggle. It has completely shunned the principle of agrarian revolution and has never made any significant step to advance towards it. Instead, this clique has merely made use of armed units of the People's Liberation Army to compel mediation by this clique between the landlords and the peasants; and this mediation has been used mainly to favor the landlords who get what they want by making financial or grain contributions to the "revolutionary" fund. In this manner, the Taruc-Sumulong clique has criminally tried to cut off the Red Army from the peasant masses. The outlook of the roving rebel has been bred by this clique on the basis of its criminal refusal to base the growth and development of the People's Army on the peasants' struggle for land and on the mobilization of the masses as the only true and strong basis for a people's democratic revolution.

On the other hand, this clique has systematically made use of the units of the People's Liberation Army to apply coercion more on the peasant masses than on the landlords whose friendship it would rather cultivate. It uses the flimsy reasoning that the landlords are needed in a "united front" against U.S. imperialism solely. But, when confronted with the specific case of poor peasants being ejected by the U.S. imperialists, landlords and capitalist bureaucrats as in Concepcion, Tarlac to make way for the gigantic radio installation of the Voice of America, this clique ordered the People's Army and the peasant masses to desist from fighting the ejection. In many instances, the Taruc-Sumulong clique has acted to discourage mass protest actions and labor strikes against the U.S. military on the counter-revolutionary ground that Angeles City would lose plenty of business if the U.S. imperialists were denounced and antagonized.

Shamelessly, this clique has on a big scale dictated the use of units of the Red Army as security guards for the landlords' fields and granaries again on the flimsy excuse of "actually helping out the peasants to cheat the landlords." This is a completely wrong orientation in the Revolution because the peasants do not have to cheat or be sly in fighting the landlords. The over-riding goal of the Party and Army is to arouse and mobilize the peasants into a revolutionary mass force capable of destroying the pillars of feudalism.

The peasants still voluntarily give support to the People's Army. That is because we the majority of Red commanders and soldiers have always tried to do our best in helping the peasant masses beyond the bureaucratic control of the Taruc-Sumulong clique. Being close to the masses of the people in the field, we the majority of Red commanders and soldiers have constantly sided with the peasants against the landlords, the armed agents and soldiers of the bourgeois reactionary government and such bad elements as cattle-rustlers, swindlers and bandits. In many areas, we have succeeded in reducing land rent and interest rates on loans beyond what the bourgeois Agricultural Land Reform Code promises. To reduce the bullying and abuses of the landlord class and the bourgeois reactionary government, we have used our weapons to wipe out both their big representatives and running dogs in many areas where the people now live in conditions better than elsewhere. We have also managed to help the peasants in their daily work and life.

But, whenever the Taruc-Sumulong clique is approached by landlords regarding agrarian disputes with peasants, the interests of the latter are sold out and, thereby, the good work of the People's Army is sabotaged. Thus, the peasants in particular areas become resentful over the fact that they have to give contributions to an army whose leadership takes the side of the landlords. Also in this manner are the reactionaries and counter-revolutionary reformists given the chance to malign the People's Army and prepare the betrayal and murder of Red fighters in the field, especially in those areas to which we are trying to expand for the first time.

In labor and student strikes in Central Luzon, the Taruc-Sumulong clique has also wantonly stood aside while the exploiting classes and their armed agents, the Philippine Constabulary and the local police wreak their vengeance on the strikers. In other cases, armed units have been scandalously used by the Taruc-Sumulong clique to coerce the strikers and their organizations to submit themselves to the capitalist owners of the hacienda, transportation company or school. This has been done in exchange for a paltry sum of money.

Class capitulation, class collaboration and class betrayal have been carried to the extremest point by the Taruc-Sumulong clique in several ways. Politically, it has kowtowed to the biggest representatives of the exploiting classes—such as Marcos, Nepomuceno, Cojuangco and the like, converted

Nepomuceno, Cojuanco and the like, converted themselves into "compadres" of these reactionary politicians and made agreements of "ceasefire" and "political support" with them. The folly of embracing the enemy, of collaborating with reactionary politicians has already cost the exposure and murder of so many comrades after the elections of 1965. This class betrayal is nothing but a political reflection of the counter-revolutionary bourgeois and feudal character of the Taruc-Sumulong clique. In that regard, this clique has been blatantly spreading the philosophy of survival among the Red fighters. It has recently ordered the stopping of campaigns launched by revolutionary commanders to wipe out enemy detachments and agents in their field commands. To please the detachments and agents in their field commands. To please the big reactionary politicians, this clique has also ordered, for monetary reasons, the surrender of a comrade to the reactionary government. Fortunately, this counter-revolutionary order to surrender a comrade has been frustrated.

The obvious reason for the counter-revolutionary revisionist policy of "peaceful co-existence" with the enemy is that the latter has promised to tolerate the landholdings, the investments in Angeles City and elsewhere and also the gang-style collections of this clique from businessmen, landlords and the peasant masses, which collections are under the one-man control and disposition of "Commander" Sumulong in the name of the Party and Army. This unprincipled compromise has always been falsely justified in terms of economism. Yet, the financial resources and property holdings accumulated by this clique have been privately appropriated by the clique-masters in the most rapacious manner and have been kept away mainly from the Party and Army.

The Taruc-Sumulong clique has deliberately restricted the growth of the People's liberation Army and also smothered therein. Party life so as to maintain its selfish capitalists and feudal rule. There is no democratic centralism; there is only the centralism of one big shot, "Commander" Sumulong has criminally made one-man decisions involving the execution of "erring" comrade and other people, the disposition of huge amounts of funds, and the like. Without due process and on the flimsiest grounds that usually have something to do with finance collection or some business enterprise, many comrades have been judged by him as deserving of the death penalty and mass murders have actually been committed on his orders. The Taruc-Sumulong clique has been directly responsible more for the filling of comrades and other people in connection with some shady business enterprise than in connection with revolutionary armed struggle against the enemy. Following the old sectarian style of the

Jose and Jesus Lava leaderships, cases of "finance opportunism" involving the smallest amount have often been concocted to discredit and justify the mass execution of comrades whose life histories as cadres are never considered.

Since there is absolutely no democracy practised by the Taruc-Sumulong clique, since there is no committee system, no system of political commissars, no report system and no accounting of funds, to clique-masters have been in a position to make arbitrary decisions, abuse the mechanical discipline of some comrades and armed units and to commit finance opportunism on a grand scale as scandalously manifested by their luxurious and corrupt living, by their having several wives and spending Party funds in such manner, by their lavish parties for their reactionary friends and "compadres" and also by having close relatives gain private titles over some sizeable property that properly belong to the Party and the people.

Consistently importing the style of the vagabond and the lumpen proletariat into the Party and Army and assuming a fascist gangster or petty warlord attitude, "Commander" Sumulong appoints goons and police characters to high responsibilities in his staff, mixed them up with dedicated comrades, personally administers beatings to them alike and orders their execution wherever they fail to satisfy his financial demands. "Commander" Sumulong has also made use of the name of the Party and Army in practising usury among comrades and the people at the average rate of 50% a month, in forcing the sale of properties to him at the price he dictates and in extorting money and grain from the masses. He has actually manipulated units of the People's Liberation Army to conduct his evil business practices in the style of a protection gang. This man who has assumed the functions of commander-in-chief and national finance officer of the People's Liberation Army is one of the blackest scoundrels that has ever infiltrated into the Party and Army. Pedro Taruc has to assume full responsibility as his accomplice.

Because of its selfish counter-revolutionary interests, the Taruc-Sumulong clique is afraid to see the building of a Marxist-Leninist party within the People's Liberation Army. It is afraid of inner democracy and the use of criticism and self-criticism within the Party and Army. It is afraid of seeing Party cades and Red soldiers raise their quality and the Party and Army expand under the guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought. It is afraid of being exposed, criticized and repudiated. Thus, would they rather have themselves continue acting like crime ring-leaders. It is now clear beyond doubt why the Taruc-Sumulong clique has consistently practised sectarianism and a new brand of closed-doorism. It wishes vainly to prevent the expansion of the Party and Army and the emergence of revolutionary mass organizations in order to keep out the good and keep in the bad and maintain its counter-revolutionary renegade command and its system of privately appropriating wealth. This clique wishes to lord over the Party and Army in Central Luzon as if it were their "independent kingdom! It does this at a time when the urgent need is to rebuild the Party and Army as the intimate and conscientious servants of the people on a nationwide scale.

Historical Roots of the Taruc-Sumulong Clique

The black bourgeois line carried out by the Pedro Taruc-Sumulong clique in Central Luzon has its historical roots. It has the same root cause as the counter-revolutionary revisionism and Right opportunism of the Lava clique. It is merely a branch of the long line of Right opportunism that has run through the history of the Party and that has retarded the growth of the Party and Army and prejudiced the consistent advance of the Revolution. It is directly related to the Right opportunist line of Lavaism within the Communist Party of the Philippines for the last thirty four years or since the mid-thirties. It is immediately related to that black bourgeois line carried forward by Jesus Lava who, as already isolated from the masses of the people, the masses of Party members and masses of Red soldiers and already preparing to surrender himself to the enemy after failing to get the help of fraternal parties for him to escape from the country, made one-man appointments and decisions that benefited his close relatives and also his accomplice in counter-revolution, Pedro Taruc, who in turn appointed his close relative, "Commander" Sumulong as the Commander in Chief and National Finance Officer of the People's Liberation Army.

Just before he surrendered himself to Macapagal through the Social Security System medical officer, Jesus Lava gave himself the title of Party Chairman and appointed a number of secretaries to form the Party secretariat for peasants. Independent of the other secretaries of whom were in Manila, Pedro Taruc made his own one-man decisions and appointments, among which was the sanctioning of "Commander" Sumulong as military and finance chieftain of the Taruc-Sumulong clique. Sumulong was appointed to his position despite the fact that the case against him in 1963 in the Party for malversation and rape had never been properly litigated.

It is possible to make an exposure and rectification of errors in the Party and in the People's Liberation Army because we, the majority of Party members and Red soldiers, have remained steadfastly true to the Party and to the Philippine Revolution. The

Party and Army have persisted under the most difficult conditions because among the masses of Party members and Red soldiers the vast majority have remained faithful to the interests of the toiling masses and have consistently taken the mass line. The Taruc-Sumulong clique which has usurped Party and Army leadership in Central Luzon has long acted as a hindrance to the advance of the Revolution and as a heavy burden on the masses of the people. Their crimes have been utilized by the enemy to discredit the Party and the People's Army. This clique has perpetrated the most grievous crimes inside and outside the Party and Army. It is best, therefore, that the Party and Army should wage rectification movement, ideological, political and organizational, in order to cleanse the Party and Army and make them ever stronger servants of the masses of people.

Comrades who are passive to or who refuse the call for rectification will only endanger themselves because if the evil practices of the Taruc-Sumulong clique are not repudiated now, then the reactionaries can use them to isolate the Party and Army from the people. The Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People's Army cannot carry out the tasks of the Revolution without engaging in criticism and self-criticism without engaging in a rectification movement and clarifying their revolutionary tasks, without arousing the people to feel free today what they think and what they expect to be done. Certainly, not all the particular crimes of the Taruc-Sumulong clique can be included in this document. Only the full play of a rectification campaign among Party members and Red soldiers can unfold them most amply and clear the way for the proletarian revolutionary line of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

However, to be most profound and to be of the greatest benefit to the Party and to the New People's Army, the rectification movement should encompass not only the wrongs committed by the Taruc-Sumulong clique but the whole history of the Communist Party of the Philippines. With such a scope of criticism, then comrades will fully understand why the phenomenon of a Taruc-Sumulong clique has come to pass and why, for instance, many of those who entered the Party and Army at various stages have become passive, afraid and reluctant to carry out the tasks of the Revolution or have turned the other way around only to strike back at the Party and Army as counter-revolutionaries. To understand the present as something that develops into the future, with the true proletarian thrown away into the dustbin of history, we must know the past that has brought about certain wrongs and weaknesses and also that has brought about what is good and strong about us to day.

An understanding of the whole history of the Party is necessary, especially because most of the Party members and Red soldiers who are now actively working for the success of the Philippine Revolution are literally a new generation. It is most important that we take advantage of the lessons of the past and of the positive and negative experiences of old comdrades who now compose a minority within the Party and Army at the moment.

Hereunder we outline briefly the major stages in the development of the Party and Army, with special interest in the latter and with special emphasis on the causes of failure. For an ampler view of Party history, it is indispensable for comrades to adopt this document together with the more extensive e document, "Rectify Errors and Rebuild the Party" issued previously by the Party.

1. Period Before the Establishment of the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon.

For twelve long years, after its formal establishment on November 7, 1930, the Communist Party of the Philippines failed to create a People's Army to combat the U. S. imperialist regime and the puppet comprador-landlord government of Quezon. Without a People's Army, the Party was defenseless. A few months after its public founding, repressive measures were taken by the U. S. imperialists and the puppet government against the Party. In 1932, the Party and all the mass organizations associated with it were formally declared illegal by the reactionary government and all principal Party leaders were sentenced, imprisoned and banished to various parts of the country. While being completely illegal, the Party leadership still failed to recognize the importance of Party and Army building among the peasants in the countryside. Throughout the decade of the thirties, widespread agitation for independence and land reform was being conducted more vigorously by other organizations.

In 1937, the Party was again allowed to operate legally in line with the anti-fascist Popular Front and in 1938, a merger of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Socialist Party was made under the influnce of the Right opportunist leadership of Earl Browder in the Communist Party of the U. S. A. The Party leadership continued to concentrate on parliamentary work in the city and no armed preparations were undertaken in the countryside against the impending Japanese invasion. Only campaigns for the voluntary boycott of Japanese goods were made mainly by the trade union movement under the leadership of the CPP chairman Crisanto Evangelista. The cadres of the Socialist Party continued to engage in purely legal urban agitation. At this time, Party members of petty bourgoeois orientation who stood out in advocating civil liberties and whose chief representative was Dr. Vicente Lava started to gain principal influence in the Party.

2. Period of the Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon

The People's Army in the form of the Hukbalahap was established under the leadership of the Party on March 29, 1942 in Central Luzon. Since then, confirming what Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun, the Party and the people gained a certain amount of power and prestige in Central Luzon that they had never held before. Within one year of waging guerrilla warfare, the People's Army grew from a small force to a big one. Its strength grew rapidly as the peasants rallied around it under such favorable conditions as the evacuation of the US imperialists and the Commonwealth government from the Philippines, the disintegration of landlord power in the countryside and the clear need among the people to take up arms against the Japanese imperialists.

But after the Japanese raid on the Mt. Arayat Base of the People's Army in the early part of March, 1943, the Party leadership of the Right opportunist Vicente Lava was overcome with pessimism and adopted the wrong policy of "retreat for defense" which was a passive military line,, involving the dissolution of armed units and prevention of tactical offense against the enemy. The Lava leadership also entertained serious doubts about the working class being able to lead under conditions, that the trade union movement in the city was in chaos. He did not recognize clearly that the Communist Party of the Philippines as the most advanced detachment of the working class was already in the countryside to lead the peasant masses.

The "retreat for defense" policy was rectified only sometime in September, 1944 when the U. S. military forces and their puppet forces were already starting to make their own offensive. Because of this Right opportunist policy, which covered more than half of the three-year Japanese occupation, the Red Army lost the opportunity of building up more massive fighting forces and of expanding as fast as it should have even beyond Central Luzon. On a national scale, the Party and Army failed to seize the leadership in the anti-fascist armed struggle. The plan to send out cadres to other parts of the archipelago to develop armed struggle had been called off even as early as 1942. Thus, the development of armed struggle under the leadership of the Party became limited to Central Luzon and to a small part of Southern Tagalog. Furthermore, the Party leadership failed to use agrarian revolution as the basis for its strength in areas securely held by the People's Army. It also glaringly failed to expose U. S. imperialism as an

It also glaringly failed to expose U.S. imperialism as an enemy. It utterly failed to implement the Communist Internation's policy of using the anti-fascist struggle as an occasion to establish a people's democratic government.

3. Period of the Democratic Peace Line.

As the U. S. imperialist and puppet forces were advancing, the Party leadership still mainly influenced by the Right opportunism of Dr. Vicente Lava and Luis Taruc relied on the word of American agents who contacted them that they could participate in the parliamentary life and economic reconstruction of the country. The Party leadership passed on to more outright Right opportunists like Pedro Castro and Jorge Frianeza who advocated an open and legal mass party in the style of bourgeois parties and who carried out further the line of separating the gun from the Red soldiers, despite the atrocious crimes being committed by the U. S. imperialists and their puppets against hukbalahap leaders who were being imprisoned by them despite entire Hukbalahap squadrons being massacred by them and despite a sizeable force like the Banal Regiment selling out for American back-pay. The Party leadership failed to recognize that the U. S. imperialists and the landlords were systematically disorganizing the People's Army to strengthen armed counter-revolution and re-impose their control over the entire countryside and over the whole country.

True to its Right opportunist line, the Party leadership shifted its headwuarters from the countryside to the city, launched the Democratic Alliance which was dominated by bourgeois personalities and engaged in the bourgeois electoral game only to discover too late that the U. S. imperialists, the comprador bourgeoisie and the landlords would violate parliamentary rules to get what they want, such as the Bell Trade Act, Parity Amendment and other reactionary laws, and would commit the most dastardly murders of revolutionary leaders and masses. During the period of the "democratic peace" line, the reactionaries were able to re-install themselves in positions of power all over the country while unhesitantly using their guns to suppress the people as in the regions of Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog.

4. Resumption of the Armed Struggle and Military Adventurism.

As a result of the ouster of Party-supported members of Congress from their parliamentary seats, the murder of revolutionary leaders, Red soldiers and ordinary people, and the just clamor of the people for resuming armed struggle, the Right opportunist leadership in the Party was overthrown and the Party decided to launch the armed struggle in 1948. But, as no sufficient rectification movement was waged aside from organizational rejection of the Right opportunists, the Jose Lava leadership that tried to resume the armed struggle was not able to formulate correctly the ideological, political and organizational basis for a protracted people's war. While the Party was already bent on waging armed struggle, the Right opportunist Luis Taruc, who was commander-in-chief of the People's Liberation Army, was still allowed to negotiate the surrender and disarming of the People's Liberation Army in the same year of 1948.

Taking a dogmatic and sectarian attitude as clearly manifested by its PB Resolutions of 1950, the Jose Lava leadership adopted the impetous petty bourgeois line of quick military victory within two years which underestimated the enemy and overestimated the revolutionary forces. It was a complete violation of Mao Tse-tung's strategic principle of a protracted people's war. It was merely a subjective conclusion reached by heavily relying on such external possibilities as a third world war, the absolute breakdown of the U.S. economy and the violent split among the local political factions in the country which were foretold to occur within two years. The putschist line of military victory in two years overstrained the limited revolutionary forces, made them leap over unstable areas, instead of advancing wave upon wave, and impelled the imposition of bourgeois rules of war and sectarian punishments on the overstrained cadres, soldiers and masses. The more the Party and Army leadership waved the black flag of commandism, the more the Party and Army became isolated from the masses on whom sectarian abuses were committed. These sectarian abuses were repeated in a big way by reactionary soldiers in civilian disguise and were blamed on the Party and Army, thus isolating them further from the masses.

The Left opportunist leadership of Jose Lava (PN-In and Secretariat) was isolated in the city from which it dictated its adventurist orders. It had a sub-command under Jesus Lava (the so-called PN-Out) which was likewise isolated in a physical base, not a political base, in the Sierra Madre fastnesses of Laguna, far away from the main military forces in the plains of Central Luzon. Even before half of the preliminary raids decided by the 1950 PB Resolutions could be implemented, the Jose Lava leadership was quickly smashed by only a few major counter-attacks such as the total capture of the central Party headquarters in the city, the massive encirclement of the Sierra Madre, the slicing-off of over-extended supply and communication lines, large-scale enemy imitation of the roguish sectarian activities of a big number of Party and Army units and heavy enemy infiltration of the central headquarters because of a liberal policy of recruitment in the city. The Jose Lava leadership was criminally responsible for the almost total obliteration of the People's Army within the short period of two years and for the most wanton sacrifice of the lives of Party cadres and Red soldiers in the entire history of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

5. The Period of Continued Military Defeat.

After the enemy had smashed the Jose Lava leadership, Jesus Lava assumed the Party leadership and, together with Casto Alejandrino as Commander-in-Chief, continued the Left opportunist and sectarian line of his brother. Adducing the failure of the Jose Lava leadership to mere negligence and tactical errors of some comrades and to mere accidence, the Jesus Lava leadership carried further the line of his brother and failed to launch a much-needed rectification movement. Revealing its utter ignorance of the theory of people's war. this leadership asserted that the strategic phase that the People's Liberation Army had been in since 1949 was neither the strategic defense nor the strategic offense." The Central Committee Conference of February-March, 1951 which elevated Jesus Lava to the general secretaryship did not find any substantial ideological, political and organizational errors in the previous leadership. Jesus Lava was more concerned then with outwitting and out-maneuvering the equally careerist renegade Luis Taruc to assume the Party leadership.

Taking advantage of the defeats suffered by the People's Army, Luis Taruc and his clique pushed forward the Right opportunist line of seeking peace negotiations with the enemy on the basis of weaknesses. This capitulationist line had disastrous results inasmuch as it encouraged the mood of many soliders to surrender even in areas where the People's Army was still strong. In 1954, the renegade, traitor and scab Luis Taruc surrendered to the enemy under the auspices of the Central Intelligence Agency.

While the enemy launched a series of massive campaigns of encirclement and suppression during the period of 1951, the Party and Army were severely split between two factions and the Jesus Lava leadership failed to give the unifying ideological, political and organizational leadership for a protracted people's war. The relations between the Party and Army on the one hand and the people on the other, between Party officials and Army officers one hand and soldiers on the other, and among soldiers worsened without let-up. The Jesus Lava leadership failed to grasp the mass line, failed to overcome but even increased the harsh sectarian activities of the previous leadership and continued to propagate a purely military viewpoint.

6. The Re-Emergence of Right Opportunism and Flightism.

In 1955, the Jesus Lava leadership was overcome with pessimism about the armed struggle as a result of its ceaseless military defeats and its isolation from the masses. Its dogmatis, Left opportunism and sectarianism easily reversed into empiricism and Right opportunism. It was a result of the continuous military defeats that this leadership subsequently adopted the line of parliamentary struggle. In 1957, it went out of its way to dissolve those armed units of the People's Army that it had access to and converted them into "organizational brigades". As Jesus Lava himself prepared to abandon the armed struggle and the countryside, he dissolved his own security unit. During this period, the Khrushchev revisionist renegades of the Soviet Union were already waging a world-wide campaign for the "parliamentary road" and the possibility of "peaceful transition". In 1958, he took flight from the countryside and began his career of being General Secretary in his secluded city room from which he issued political transmissions and directives without the benefit of collective discussions and concrete experience. This flightism was imitated by other principal Party leaders, particularly by the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army, Casto Alejandrino.

But not even the efforts of the Party in the parliamentary struggle directly bore fruit. Independent efforts of the leaders of the national bourgeoisie and urban petty bourgeoisie advanced the line of anti-imperialism and left behind the Jesus Lava leadership in political agitation. What crippled the Party most in this period was the one-man decision taken by Jesus Lava that the Party must take the single-file policy in organization. This is liquidationism pure and simple, destroying the collective life of the Party. The vast majority of Party members became disconnected and became passive as they were easily cut off from their single files due to the arrest of a single Party member, the increasing passivity and opportunism of others, or the in-members in both legal and illegal forms of struggle emerged to re-invogorate the Party and Army.

Carrying out further his flightist policy, Jesus Lava sought vainly to leave the country. After failing to do so, he tried to cajole President Macapagal with several letters of support for his bourgeois policies and finally wrote him a treasonous letter offering his surrender. Before his "capture" by the enemy in 1964, he alone made appointments to the Party leadership. These appointments were characterized by nepotism, thinly camouflaged by the appointment in name of Pedro Taruc as the secretary for peasants. The nepotistic character of the other appointments to the Party Secretariat was very obvious in that the beneficiaries were close relatives and had never before excelled in Party work or mass work.

7. The Ascendance of Mao Tse-tung's Thought in the Party and Army.

The Right opportunist line of the Jesus Lava leadership resulted into two degenerate and counter-revolutionary trends. Feigning loss of contact with the People's Liberation Army and Party cadres therein led by Pedro Taruc, the heirs in leadership of the Lava family took the blessings of the Soviet revisionist renegade clique, held a conference of its own in April, 1967 to perpetuate the "noble lineage" of the Lavas and put forward formally the line of opposing those engaged in armed struggle, of accepting the leadership of the reactionary government in land reform, of contraposing the united front with the armed struggle and of repeating the old error of letting bourgeois personalities assume the leadership in what they conceive to be a formal united front organization. On the other hand, also feigning loss of contact with the bare-faced city-based, local revisionist renegades, the Taruc-Sumulong clique defined a limited area in Central ~~Luson~~ as its own "independent kingdom" and put forward its own line of Right opportunism and revisionist treachery in the countryside as explained previously. Pedro Taruc, acting on his own alone, committed the serious crime of appointing Sumulong as Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army and also as National Finance Officer despite the fact that the latter was still facing the serious charges of malversation and corruption made in 1963.

If there is a bourgeois headquarters within the Party and Army and also factions within the same bourgeois headquarters, the counter-revolutionary line they put forward is bound to be opposed by a revolutionary line put forward by the proletarian revolutionary headquarters within the same Party and Army. During the years of 1964 to the present, when the one-man decisions and appointments made by the renegade Jesus Lava was creating confusion within the Party, those upholding Mao Tse-tung's thought led by Comrade Amado Guerrero rose up to criticize and repudiate modern revisionism, Lavaism and Taruc-ism, and thus, prepared the way for the re-establishment and rebuilding of the Communist Party of the Philippines under the supreme guidance of Mao Tse-tung's thought. At the same time, within the People's Liberation Army, Commander Dante, together with the late Commander Delio, struggled hard to put other Red commanders and soldiers on the revolutionary path, continued to wage armed struggle most militantly and fostered the revolutionary spirit of serving the people and making the Red soldiers and people like fish and water. Today, the efforts of the overwhelming majority of Red commanders and soldiers led by Commander Dante who remain ever faithful to the people's democratic revolution and to Mao Tse-tung's thought are crowned with the transformation of the old People's Liberation Army into the New People's Army under the supreme command of Mao Tse-tung's thought and the Communist party of the Philippines.

The Main Tasks of the New People's Army

Under the Marxist-Leninist principle that the Party commands the gun, the New People's Army follows the aboslute leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the supreme command of Mao Tse-tung's thought. The New People's Army is an instrument for implementing the Party Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution. It is, as a matter of fact, the principal organization under the command of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an organization for waging the main form of struggle, armed struggle in the people's democratic revolution.

The tasks of the New People's Army are comprehensively outlines in the Party Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution. Both the general and specific programmes are therein stated. But in another comprehensive manner, we out line hereunder its urgent tasks:

1. The New People's Army Must Engage in Party Rebuilding.

It is by propagating Mao Tse-tung's thought in the Army and among the masses, applying it in revolutionary practice and organizing Party branches and committees inside and outside the Army that the New People's Army engages in Party rebuilding. The New People's Army is not only a fighting force, it is also a propaganda and organizing force. It must propagate and apply Mao Tse-tung's thought as the highest development of Marxism-Leninism in the present era. Its cadres, commanders and soldiers must all alike still themselves with Mao Tse-tung's thought by undertaking Mao-Tse-tung's thought study classes under the discretion of the Revolutionary Schools of Mao Tse-tung's thought, under the Army Political Department and under the Political Commissars appointed by the Party to supervise Party life and political education in every Red armed unit. All Party cadres in the Army, commanders and soldiers should in turn effect an ideological mobilization of the masses under Mao Tse-tung's thought and they should see to it that the most advanced elements among the masses, as among the Red soldiers, should be taken as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines in the course of masses in politics, armed struggle, culture and economic work should be solved by applying the universal truth of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

As an organized force, the New People's Army must see to it that Party branches at company level, Party groups in every platoon and every guerrilla unit and Part committees at every level from the company upwards are established. As an organizing force, it must establish Party branches and local Party committees among the people. The New People's Army must always be conscious that the Communist Party of the Philippines is at the core of the mass revolutionary movement.

In instilling itself with Mao Tse-tung's thought, the New People's Army instills itself with the spirit of serving the people and repudiating itself. It rejects modern revisionism and subjectivism in its dogmatist or empiricist form. Right and "Left" opportunism, sectarianism and liberalism, commandism and tailism and all other weaknesses and mistakes that have obstructed the advance of the people's democratic revolution. Mao Tse-tung's thought is the most precise instrument for rectifying and weeding out all the weaknesses and mistakes bred by Lavaism, Taruc-ism and all other evil sources of errors in the Philippine revolutionary movement.

The New People's Army and all its living components have a conscious iron discipline. It follows the principle of democratic centralism. Centralism is essentially the supreme command of Mao Tse-tung's thought. It is the content of the subordination of the minority of the majority, the lower organ to the higher order and the individual to the Party. Inner democracy shall be fully enjoyed by all Red soldiers and shall serve as the means for the practical and concrete application of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Criticism and self-criticism shall be given full play in order to raise the political and the combat effectiveness of the New People's Army.

There shall be political democracy in the New People's Army with the soldiers having the right to hold meetings and speak out freely on any worthwhile subject or problem that confronts them.

There shall be economic democracy, with all officers and men enjoying equal material conditions, such as allowances and rations, with the men having the right to elect representatives to assist the company leadership in managing their material conditions and with all officers and men having the right to look into the books of accounts at anytime.

There shall also be military democracy, with the officers teaching the soldiers, the soldiers teaching the officers and the soldiers learning from each other with regard to military plans, methods and techniques of fighting. As much as possible, meetings shall be held before and after battles in order to raise their fighting knowledge and effectiveness. Bourgeois and feudal practices between officers and soldiers, such as beatings and bullying, shall be absolutely prohibited. The best of relations shall therefore be developed between officers and men within the Army so that the Army as a whole shall always be oriented towards the maintenance and development of the best relations with the masses.

The officers and men of the New People's Army shall be strictly bound by Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Three Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention and shall always go out of their way to serve the people, aside from performing well their fighting tasks.

2. The New People's Army Must Carry Out Agrarian Revolution, Build Rural Bases and Advance the Armed Struggle.

Since the people's democratic revolution is essentially a peasant war under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party of the Philippines, since the peasant struggle for land is the main content of the people's democratic revolution, the New People's Army must launch an agrarian revolution and mobilize the peasant masses, the vast majority of the Filipino people, for the people's democratic revolution. A revolution is a mass undertaking and so the New People's Army as a revolutionary army must rely on the masses for increasing its fighting strength, preserving itself, for winning battles, for winning the whole war and consolidating the power won.

It is only through agrarian revolution that rural bases can be created as great rears for the emergence of more rural bases and more guerrilla zones and that the great masses of the people are mobilized against US imperialism, the comprador bourgeoisie, the landlord class and the bureaucrat capitalists. Only by destroying the feudal base of US imperialism in the Philippines can the people's democratic revolution be won against both US imperialism and domestic feudalism.

It is only by having stable base areas can the New People's Army wage a protracted people's war. From these stable base areas, it can advance wave upon wave against the enemy. By building stable base areas to encircle the city, the biggest graveyard of the enemy forces are created. It is here in the countryside that the enemy is compelled to spread out thinly, lured in t~~he~~ destroyed piece by piece over a long period of time. It is here in the countryside that the enemy becomes exhausted and defeated before the main forces of the New People's Army march in on the cities to seize power, finally with the help of workers in general strike or in general uprising together with the urban petty bourgeoisie.

It is now the urgent task of the New People's Army to establish the armed independent regime in the countryside on the basis of agrarian revolution. The armed independent regime shall become the focus of an ever expanding wave of guerrilla zones throughout the country. All commanders and fighters must learn from Party cadres how to raise the level of a guerrilla zone to a rural base.

The New People's Army must establish its main fighting forces in Luzon to defeat the enemy forces concentrated in Luzon and in the Greater Manila area and also big forces at certain point in Visayas and Mindanao to compel the enemy to disperse its forces at great costs across the archipelago. We must disperse the enemy in two ways: first, throughout the countryside; and second, throughout the archipelago. Then we can destroy them piece by piece. For this purpose great rural bases must be created in Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao. The nationwide expansion of the Party and the Army should be made in the light of this consideration.

To carry out the armed struggle, the New People's Army should develop four types of armed units: the regular mobile forces, the guerrilla units, the militia or self-defense corps, and the armed city partisans. The New People's Army must learn from the experience of the Chinese and Vietnamese people's wars and must be trained to employ old and new methods of fighting and military technique. Aside from developing marksmanship with various types of guns, the New People's Army must train in night operations, bayoneting, using land mines, mortar fire, tunnel warfare and the like. It must also be able to muster all the indigenous methods of fighting that the workers, fishermen, peasants and national minorities know.

In building itself up, the New People's Army must be guided by the principle of self-reliance. So along as it is closely linked with the masses of the people and enjoys their support, the New People's Army shall find its efforts adequate for a protracted armed struggle. The Party committees in the Army and in local areas must unite in every way to carry out the tasks of the people's democratic revolution.

3. The New People's Army Must Build Up The National United Front.

The New People's Army must build up the national united front by upholding and following the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines, by welding together through armed struggle the workers and peasants whose alliance serve as the basis of the national united front and by attracting the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie to the fold of the people's democratic revolution.

Because of the anti-national, anti-democratic and corrupt character of the state that it seeks to destroy and replace, the New People's Army can easily attract the urban petty bourgeoisie which inevitably joins the ranks of the exploited in sentiment and material condition as the crisis aggravates. Because the New People's Army shall confiscate imperialist goods and deprive the imperialists of markets in the provinces, the national bourgeoisie and all small patriotic businessman shall be encouraged to produce goods locally and to support the revolutionary forces.

In the countryside, the New People's Army must wage an anti-feudal united front to unite poor peasants, poor fishermen and farm workers as its invincible political base, win over the middle peasants and middle fishermen and neutralize the rich peasants.

The New People's Army shall be willing to establish a National Liberation Front as an armed united front of all patriotic and progressive classes, groups and individuals. It welcomes the formation of other groups of armed units that wage armed struggle against the enemy. The New People's Army shall extend to them as much support and cooperation as it can.

In every istance of cooperative unity, the New People's Army must take firm hold of the revolutionary class line. So long as the goal of any class or group is the destruction of the power of US imperialism and feudalism, the New People's Army shall always be willing to extend its cooperation and helping hand. But it shall always be alert to enemy infiltrators and revisionist saboteurs of the armed struggle.

In performing its revolutionary duty of fighting US imperialism, modern revisionism and all local reactionaries, the New People's Army is highly conscious that it is contributing to the development of the international united front and that it is upholding the principle of proletarian internationalism. Revolutionary armed struggle in the Philippines is certainly an effective party of the world-wide struggle of all oppressed peoples against US imperialism, modern revisionism and all reactionaries. The overthrow of US imperialism and all domestic reaction in the Philippines will be a great contribution towards the total collapse of imperialism and the world-wide triumph of socialism.

Long live Mao Tse-tung's thought!
Long live the Philippine Revolution!
Long live the Communist Party of the Philippines!
Long live the New People's Army!

Issued by the
MEETING OF RED COMMANDERS
AND SOLDIERS
MARCH 29, 1969

BASIC RULES OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

Preamble

The New People's Army is under the supreme command of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, and the Communist Party of the Philippines. It is the revolutionary army of the broad masses of the Filipino people against U.S. imperialism, the comprador bourgeoisie, the landlord class and the bureaucrat capitalists.

The New People's Army is the principal form of organization under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines, which has taken the road of armed revolution in line with Mao Tse-tung's thought. It is the instrument for carrying out the Party's central task of seizing political power and consolidating it. It is the instrument for overthrowing the present bourgeois reactionary puppet government and for winning the people's democratic revolution. It is the instrument for helping in a big way carry out the Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

The New People's Army is completely in the service of the people's democratic interests and is the mainstay of the people's democratic dictatorship. It defends the people from the evil forces of U.S. imperialist and feudal oppression and exploitation and always strives to help them in every possible way in their daily life. It abhors the least harm done to the masses of the people and it instills an iron discipline among its officers and men which prevents them from doing the least harm to the masses of the people.

Armed with the invincible Mao Tse-tung's thought, the New People's Army has emerged after shedding off the counter-revolutionary revisionist errors of Lavaism and Taruc-ism and other sources of modern revisionism and opportunism, "Left" and Right. It combats within its ranks the purely military viewpoint, ultra-democracy, disregard of organizational discipline, absolute equilitarianism, subjectivism, individualism, the ideology of roving rebel bands and putschism. Now, the New People's Army includes the best fighters who persist in waging armed struggle and in propagating Mao Tse-tung's thought. It consistently integrates the universal truth of Mao Tse-tung's thought, the acme of Marxism-Leninism in the present era, with the practice of protracted people's war in the Philippines.

While following the absolute leadership of the working class and the Communist Party of the Philippines, the New People's Army incorporates mainly the armed peasants fighting for agrarian revolution which is the main content of the people's democratic revolution. In this sense, the people's democratic revolution is essentially a peasant war led by the working class. In the countryside, the New People's Army works and fights arduously to transform backward villages into the most advanced political, military, economic and cultural bastions of the people's democratic revolution. To carry out this great task, it relies mainly on the masses of poor peasants and farm workers and then wins over the middle peasants to neutralize the rich peasants. Such is its revolutionary anti-feudal class line in the countryside.

The main strategic principle of the New People's Army is a protracted people's war, with its armed units ever growing stronger in the countryside on the basis of agrarian revolution, armed struggle and the building of rural bases and consistently encircling the cities until such time that the enemy forces are finally exhausted after being defeated piece by piece in the countryside. The New People's Army is determined to build rural bases, establish local organs of people's government and advance wave upon wave until it can effectively destroy the remaining enemy forces concentrated in big cities and big military camps. It shall systematically create and elevate the guerrilla zones to the level of rural bases where local people's governments can operate fully. The rural bases shall serve as the great rears for the emergence and expansion of guerrilla zones and for the advance of all other forces of the people's democratic revolution.

The New People's Army shall undergo three strategic phases in the protracted people's war. The first phase is the strategic defense in which it always maintains tactical offense and initiative against the strategic military superiority of the enemy. The second phase is the strategic stalemate in which its fighting forces are already more or less equal to the enemy forces in strength. The third and final phase is the strategic offensive in which the regular mobile forces of the New People's Army have reached such a strength and scope to be able to take the offensive against the isolated enemy forces in their city and big camp fortifications. All throughout the protracted people's war, the New People's Army has the political initiative because it integrates revolutionary theory with revolutionary practice, because it is closely linked with the masses of the people and because it conducts self-criticism whenever it does wrong or carries weaknesses.

The New People's creates and employs several forms of fighting units in the course of the protracted people's war. The regular mobile forces defend the rural bases and destroy the enemy forces in a big way. The guerrilla forces defend the guerrilla zones, prepare the emergence or the advance of regular mobile forces or create new guerrilla zones. The militia and self-defense corps defend the masses in local areas without separating themselves from daily productive work. The armed city partisans perform special tasks of disruption the enemy and punishing traitors in cities. All these fighting units of the New People's Army shall be coordinated and shall employ all kinds of warfare that they can develop and that are made available by the situation and the masses of the people.

The New People's Army is highly conscious that by performing its revolutionary duty of overthrowing U.S. imperialism, the comprador bourgeoisie, the landlord class and the bureaucrat capitalists in the Philippines, it is performing a great and noble task for the broad masses of the Filipino people, especially for the exploited masses of workers and peasants, as well as for the oppressed peoples of the world. It is both a patriotic duty and an act of proletarian internationalism for the New People's Army to fight for a people's democratic revolution as the transitional stage towards socialism. Armed struggle in the Philippines weakens and helps destroy U.S. imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction in the countryside of the world and in the whole world in the same way that the armed struggle waged by all other oppressed peoples weakens and helps destroy the same in the Philippines. The New People's Army has the internationalist mandate to fight for the total collapse of imperialism led by U.S. imperialism and the worldwide triumph of socialism in this era of Mao Tse-tung's thought.

RULE ONE
THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Point 1. The New People's Army shall always follow the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines and shall, therefore, be bound by the decisions, orders and directives of the Party National Congress, Central Committee and Military Commission.

Point 2. The Military Commission is the highest special organ of the Central Committee which shall receive regular and special reports from the lowest to the highest military command and shall issue appropriate policies, orders and directives.

Point 3. The Military Commission shall see to it that the Party leadership, Party organization and Party life are maintained within the entire New People's Army. The Party Branch shall be based at the company level and a Party Group shall operate in every platoon and guerrilla unit. All non-regular armed units shall be under the direct control of local Party committees.

Point 4. The Party committees shall be created from the level of the Branch upwards and shall be responsible for the maintenance of the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the development of the best relations between the Army and the people, between the officers and men, among the men and between the Army and the local Party committees.

Point 5. The New People's Army shall have its own Political Department responsible for the revolutionary class education of all officers and men, for developing proletarian revolutionary cadres from the Army and for making mass mobilization, specially in new areas of armed operation.

Point 6. Political commissars shall be assigned to every unit of the regular mobile and guerrilla forces in order to educate all the fighters and maintain Party organization and Party life.

Point 7. Territorial and unit Commanders shall be responsible for internal military administration and combat operations in their respective areas and units but they shall be guided by the Party at every level. The number and special functions of Deputy Commanders shall be defined by the Military Commission.

Point 8. All district commanders and platoon leaders upwards shall have graduated from the Revolutionary School of Mao Tse-tung's Thought conducted centrally or locally.

Point 9. All non-regular fighting units such as the guerillas, militia, self-defense corps and the armed city partisans shall be directly controlled by the local Party committees. However, they shall take orders from the Military Commission or the Military Command for purposes of coordination with regular mobile forces.

RULE TWO
FUNCTIONS OF THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

The main function of the New People's Army at present shall be to wage a protracted people's war to destroy the reactionary state power and the interventionist U.S. imperialist forces, protect the people and advance their national and democratic interests.

Point 2. The New People's Army shall help organize the revolutionary barrio committees and other revolutionary bodies as local organs of people's government.

Point 3. The New People's Army shall serve the people in every possible way aside from performing combat duties.

Point 4. The New People's Army shall engage in revolutionary propaganda and mass mobilization.

Point 5. The New People's Army shall help organize local

Party Branches, local Party committees and revolutionary mass organizations.

Point 6. The New People's Army shall engage in construction, productive and economic work for its own needs as well as for those of the Party and the people.

Point 7. The New People's Army shall help keep public order and it shall arrest wrong-doers and submit them to the people's court for trial.

Point 8. Within the New People's Army, various sections of work shall be created such as staff work, training, internal order and security, intelligence, reconnaissance, supplies, ordinance and repair, medical care, communications, transport, construction, production and others.

Point 9. Short rest periods from combat shall be allowed for regular mobile and guerrilla forces only to undergo further ideological, political and combat training, to regroup, recuperate and replenish their forces and conduct local political work.

RULE THREE
MEMBERSHIP IN THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY

Point 1. Any able-bodied person, irrespective of age, sex, color, nationality or religious belief, who is capable of combat duties and who is ready to participate in a protracted armed struggle against the reactionary state power may become a member of a fighting unit of the New People's Army.

Point 2. Those who wish to join the New People's Army shall inform any unit or office of the New People's Army, Party Committee or Party members or revolutionary mass organizations of their intention.

Point 3. Local Party Committees, armed units of the New People's Army and revolutionary mass organizations shall take the initiative of accepting individual and collective requests for membership in the New People's Army or of directly recruiting fighters and of creating new fighting units of the New People's Army.

Point 4. The military command and the local Party committee immediately responsible for the area where recruitment of Red soldiers is being made shall direct and supervise the recruitment work.

Point 5. A higher military command or Party committee shall have the right to dissolve or re-organize any armed unit on valid grounds.

Point 6. Individual or mass deserters from the enemy side or captive soldiers may be incorporated into the New People's Army, provided they are re-educated and re-organized. Their incorporation shall be approved after a thorough investigation by the Military Command and Army Party committee of the provincial level at least.

Point 7. The New People's Army shall regularly check up the class origin, performance of duty and will to fight of all its fighters in order to raise consistently their proletarian revolutionary character.

Point 8. The vast majority of members of the New People's Army shall be armed combatants at all times, although some members may be assigned to non-combat functions which are directly related to the fighting effectiveness of the New People's Army.

RULE FOUR
DISCIPLINE

Point 1. The discipline of the officers and men in the New People's Army shall be a conscious discipline guided by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, by the Communist Party of the Philippines and by the organizational principle of democratic centralism. The Army Party committees shall see to it that the line, policies and decisions of the Party shall be implemented by the military command at every level.

Point 2. The New People's Army shall be bound by the following discipline:

a. ~~The~~ individual is subordinate to the whole Army;
b. the minority is subordinate to the majority
c. the lower level is subordinate to the higher level; and
d. the entire membership is subordinate to the Military Commission and to the Central Committee.

Point 3. All officers and men shall be prohibited to do the least harm to the people's interests and they shall be always bound by Comrade Mao Tse-tung's Three Main Rules of Discipline and Eight Points of Attention in order to keep high their revolutionary integrity.

a. Three Main Rules of Discipline
    1) Obey orders in all your actions.
    2) Do not take a single needle or piece of thread from the masses.
    3) Turn in everything captured.
b. Eight Points of Attention
    1) Speak politely.
    2) Pay fairly for what you buy.
    3) Return everything you borrow.

4) Pay for anything you damage.
5) Do not hit or swear at people.
6) Do not damage crops.
7) Do not take liberties with women.
8) Do not ill-treat captives.

Point 4. Officers shall be absolutely prohibited from bourgeois and feudal practices in their relations with their men and with the people.

Point 5. Officers and men shall be strictly prohibited from getting drunk and from gambling.

Point 6. The Army Party Committee at the proper level or the military court it may create shall hear and decide cases against officers and men at the level where the alleged mistake or crime is committed and shall impose the following penalties according to the gravity of the offense committed:

a. reprimand and public apology to the offended party
b. reprimand and re-assignment
c. demotion
d. suspension and hard labor
e. expulsion
f. expulsion and execution

Point 7. In all kinds of penalty, excepting expulsion and execution, the offender or offenders shall receive re-education within a reasonable period of time and shall be required to make a public apology to the offended.

Point 8. The highest penalty, expulsion and execution, shall be meted out on offenders for the proven crimes of treason, betrayal, desertion in the face of the enemy, espionage, sabotage, mutiny, inciting to mutiny, murder, robbery, rape arson and grave malversation of people's funds.

Point 9. All cases shall be fully investigated and all accused shall be given a fair hearing.

RULE FIVE
DEMOCRACY

Point 1. To be able to enjoy democracy yet maintain discipline and avoid ultra-democracy within the New People's Army, all officers, soldiers and Party cadres shall discuss and educate each other on Mao Tse-tung's thought and on the Programme, policies and decisions of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Point 2. All officers and men shall together engage in periodic and special criticism and self-criticism sessions in order to improve their political and combat effectiveness. Ideological, political and organizational mistakes and weaknesses shall be corrected through the process of criticism and self-criticism.

Point 3. There shall be political democracy in that the officers and soldiers shall be free to hold meetings and speak out freely on how to raise their proletarian revolutionary consciousness, bring themselves closer to the people, improve their fighting ability, organize their non-combat work and improve their material conditions.

Point 4. There shall be economic democracy among the officers and soldiers in that they shall weal and woe, enjoying equal material conditions such as equal rations and equal allowances, they shall have the right to manage together their supplies and mess, with the soldiers electing representatives to assist the company leadership in management, and that anyone shall have the right to look into the accounts and supplies anytime.

Point 5. There shall be military democracy among officers and soldiers in that together they shall hold a series of meetings before and after battles and campaigns, whereby the officers teach the soldiers, the soldiers teach the officers and the soldiers teach each other concerning operational plans, methods and techniques of fighting and winning the fight.

RULE SIX
MILITARY CONFERENCES

Point 1. A National Military Conference shall be called by the Military Commission at least once a year to discuss the political and military situation and tasks of the New People's Army. The Military Commission, the National Operational Command, the Regional, Provincial and District Commands shall attend the conference. The Chairman of the Military Commission shall preside.

Point 2. A Regional Military Conference shall be called by the Military Commission at least once in six months to discuss the political and military situation and tasks of the New People's Army within the region. Representatives of the Military Commission, the Regional Operational Command, the Provincial and District Commands and the Regional Party Committee shall attend the conference. The chief representative of the Military Commission shall preside.

Point 3. A Provincial Military Conference shall be called by the Provincial Military Command at least once in three months to discuss the political and military situation and tasks of the New People's Army within the district. Representatives of the Provincial Operational Command, the District Operational Command, the District Party Committee, the secretaries of Party sections, all unit commanders and all heads of Party groups in the Army shall attend the conference. The chief representative of the Provincial Operational Command shall preside.

Point 5. The above military conferences may formulate recommendations to be acted on by the Military Commission of the Central Committee.

RULE SEVEN
SYSTEM OF MILITARY COMMAND

Point 1. The National Operational Command shall be responsible for the execution of national and inter-regional military policies and plans approved by the Military Commission and/or the Central Committee, shall command all forms of armed units of the New People's Army and shall make regular and special military reports and recommendations to the Military Commission.

The National Operational Command shall be composed of the Commander-in-Chief, his Deputy Commanders, the Regional Commanders and their Deputy Commanders.

Point 2. The Regional Operational Command shall be responsible for the execution of regional and inter-provincial military policies and plans, shall command all forms of armed units within the region and shall make regular and special military reports and recommendations to the Military Commission and to the National Operational Command.

The Regional Operational Command shall be composed of the Regional Commander, his Deputy Commanders, the Provincial Commanders and their Deputy Commanders.

Point 3. The Provincial Command shall be responsible for the execution of provincial and inter-district military policies and plans, shall command all forms of armed units within the province and shall make regular and special military reports and recommendations to the Regional Operational Command and Provincial Party Committee.

The Provincial Operational Command shall be composed of the Provincial Commander, his Deputy Commanders, the District Commanders and their Deputy Commanders.

Point 4. The District Operational Command shall be responsible for the execution of district military policies and plans, shall command all forms of armed units within the district and shall make regular and special military reports and recommendations to the Provincial Operational Command and to the District Party Committee.

The District Operational Command shall be composed of the

District Commander, his Deputy Commanders, company commanders, guerrilla commanders and commanders of militia units.

Point 5. The National Operational Command shall be constituted by the Military Commission and all Regional, Provincial and District Commanders and Deputy Commanders shall be appointed by the Military Commission with or without the recommendation of the National Operational Command. Commanders for strategic campaigns or special operations of national significance shall be appointed by the Military Commission or the Central Cimmittee.

Point 6. The selection of all military commanders shall be made on the basis of their revolutionary class standpoint and fighting performance. However, commanders of non-regular units may emerge in local areas in the course of practical armed struggle.

Point 7. Territorial commanders shall be superior to unit commanders and their respective areas of command shall be set by the higher military command.

Point 8. The size and variety of the people's armed forces under any territorial command at any level shall depend entirely on the development of the people's war. Further disposition of these shall be decided according to the needs of winning battles, campaigns and the entire war.

Point 9. Unit commanders, from the level of battalion upwards, shall be appointed by the Military Commission upon the recommendation of the National Operational Command and the local Party committees. Company commanders shall be appointed by the National Operational Command upon the recommendation of the Party committee in the company. Platoon and squad leaders shall be appointed by their company commanders upon the recommendation of the Party Groups in the platoon.

Point 10. In any coordinated operation of all forms of armed units, the regular mobile forces shall play the central role in destroying the enemy.

Point 11. The system of command shall in no case prevent the taking of any quick military action by any armed unit within a particular area unless it can br proven that it prejudices a current larger military operation against the enemy.

Point 12. The headquarters of the National Operational Command shall be decided by the Central Committee or the Military Commission and the headquarters of the lower command, regional, provincial and district, shall be decided by the higher command.

RULE EIGHT
FORMS OF PEOPLE'S ARMED FORCES

Point 1. The New People's Army shall encompass the following forms of fighting units:

a. regular mobile forces
b. guerilla units
c. militia and self-defense corps
d. arm city partisans

Point 4. The militia and self-defense corps shall be composed of those who continue with their daily productived life. They shall play a mainly defensive role but they shall serve as the vast reserve and support for the regular mobile forces and the guerilla units.

Point 5. Every unit of the armed city partisans shall consists of at least three combat members and shall specialize in city operations, in discrupting the enemy rule, in raising the fighting morale of workers and the urban petty bourgeoisie and in preparing in a long-term way for a general city uprising upon instructions of the Military Commission.

Point 6. The unit commanders and their deputy commanders shall constitute the unit operation command.

Point 7. The regular mobile forces shall distribute arms and ammunitions to the guerillas, militia self-defense corps and armed

Point 2. The regular mobile forces shall be organized in the following manner:

a. Squad: 5 to 10 men plus Squad Leader
b. Platoon: 2 to 3 squads plus Platoon Leader
c. Company: 2 to 3 platoon plus Commander and Deputy Commanders,
d. Battalions: 2 to 3 companies plus Commander and Deputy Commanders
e. Regiment: 2 to 3 battalions plus Commander and ~~Deouty~~ Commanders
f. Division: 2 to 3 regiments plus Commander and Deputy Commanders
g. Corps: 2 to 3 divisions plus Commander and Deputy Commanders
h. Army: 2 to 3 corps plus Commander and Deputy Commanders

The territorial commanders and unit commanders shall always strive to raise the size of the above regular units to the maximum limit.

Point 3. The size of guerilla units shall be allowed to range between five and fifteen men, including their commander. As soon as the size of a guerilla units shall have reached the size of two full squads, it shall be converted into two regular mobile forces upon the approval or order of the Provincial Command and the Provincial Party Committee.

city partisans to raise their fighting capacity or integrate them as regular troops or create new fighting units of the same type. The guerillas shall likewise distribute arms and ammunitions to the militia and self-defense units to raise their fighting capacity, or create new fighting units of the same type or raise them to a higher combat formation.

Point 8. Party cadres, officers and men in the New People's Army may be assigned to create the non-regular armed units mentioned in Points 3, 4, and 5 above.

RULE NINE
LOGISTICS

Point 1. The regular mobile forces and guerilla units of the New Poeple's Army shall receive a special appropriation in the regular budget of the local people's government, the local Party organization and/or revolutionary mass organizations.

Point 2. The New Poeple's Army shall take initiative in establishing production units such as farms, shops, transportation and other enterprises which are useful to the people and Army which shall support the latter in kind or in cash.

Point 3. The central people's government shall sell war bonds or set aside a reasonable percentage of money issued by it to support the New Poeple's Army.

Point 4. The New Poeple's Army shall assist the people's government in the collection of taxes, business and agricultural, and and shall be automatically compensated fot its efforts.

Point 5. Units of the New Poeple's Army shall work for the masses as a measure of paying back for the material support given to them.

Point 6. Contributions in kind or cash from allies and symphathizers `which are specifically intended for the New Poeple's Army shall be accepted.

Point7. A certain precentage of the income derived from confiscated goods, capital and properties sof the U.S. imperialists, comprador bourgeoisie, landlords, bureaucrat capitalist and traitors shall be allocated for the support of the New People's Army.

Point 8. The logistic shall always be accounted for by a committee created for the purpose.

TULE TEN
AMENDMENTS

Point 1. The Central Committee, Political Bureau of Military

Commission of the Communist Party of the Philippines may initiate any amendments to these Basic Rules of the New Poeple's Army.

Point 2. The National Operational or any Regional Command may recommend any amendment it deems necessary.

Point 3. The Military Commission or the Nationa Operation Command may issue rules and regulations to supplement these Basic Rules.

Draft issued by the
MEETINGS OF RED COMMANDERS
AND SOLDIERS
May 29, 1969

RESOLUTION ON THE COMPOSITION OF THE MILITARY COMMISSION

Whereas, The Military Commission is the special organ of the Central Committee responsible for handling military affairs and for seeing to that the absolute leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines is maintained in the New People's Army;

Whereas, the most advanced proletarian revolutionary elements guided by Mao Tse-Tung thought must compose the Military Commission and direct the main form of struggle, armed struggle.

Whereas, a high ideological and political consciousness and tested military experience be integrated within the Military Commission to make it highly representative and truly vital. Be it resolved as it is hereby resolved that Comrdrade Amado Guerrero, Rosario del Fuego, Pio Labrador, Ante and Eddie shall compose the Military Commission; Be it resdued further, as it is hereby resolved that pending further development of the agrarian revolution and the armed struggle, the Military Commission be a round-table organ to stress at the beginning its collective character.

RESOLUTION TO ELECT NINE CADRES FROM THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY AND THE PEASANT MOVEMENT TO THE FIRST CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

Whereas, the New People's army is the leading organization following the road of armed resolution in accordance with Mao Tse-tung Thought;

Whereas, It is necessary to strengthen the Party in the countrysides and the armed peasants are the main force for the victoryof agrarian revolution led by the Communist Party of the Philippines;

Whereas, the leaders of the New People's Army and the peasant movement have high political consiousness and are guided by Mao Tse-tung Thought and have shown courage as proletarian revolutionary cadres;

Whereas, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved that 9 cadres from the New People's Army and the peasant movement be effected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines;

And be it further resolved, as it is hereby resolved that Comrade Dante, Comrade Melody, Comrade Goody, Comrade Eddi, Comrade Ruben, Comrade Elias, Comrade Juaning, Comrade Ben be the nine cadres from the New People's Army and the

peasant movement be elected to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

RESOLUSYONG UPANG MAGKAROON NG KINATAWAN NG BAGONG HUKBO NG BAYAN SA POLITBURO AT SA KOMITENG TAGA–PAGPAGANAP

YAYAMANG, ang pangunahing pamamaraan ng pakikibaka sa paggapi sa imperyalismong Amerikao ay puyudalismo ay sandatahang rebolusyornaryong pakikibaka;

YAYAMANG, ang Bagong Hukbong Bayan ay ang pangunahing organisasyong at sandata ng ginagamit ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas sa rebolusyonaryong pakikibaka sa Pilipinas;

YAYAMANG, ang Politburo ang siyang gumagawa ng pangkalahatang desisyong pampulitika sa pagitan ng mga pulong ng Komite Sentral at ang Komiteng Tagapagpaganap ay ang organong nagsasagawa ng mga desisyong ito;

YAYAMANG, ang Bagong Hukbo ng Bayan ay ang organisasyong ng Partido na siya mismong nagsasagawa ng sandatahang pakikibaka sa Rebolusyong sa Pilipinas;

KUNG GAYON, pagtibayin, gaya ng pagpapatibay dito, na ang Punong Kumander ng Bagong Hukbo ng Bayan sa Politburo at sa Komiteng Taga-pagpaganap ng Partido.

RESOLUSYONG HINGGIL SA PAGHAHALAL NG PUNONG KUMANDER (COMMANDER–IN CHIEF) NG BAGONG HUKBO NG BAYAN

YAYAMANG, siya ay malaon nang at buong tatag na nagpapatuloy ng sandatahang rebolusyonaryong pakikibaka kasama ng iba pang rebolusyonaryo;

YAYAMANG, siya ay nagpatunay na isang magiting at matibay na komakatawan ng sandatahang rebolusyong pakikibaka laban sa imperyalismong Amerikano at piyudalismo sa Pilipinas;

YAYAMANG, siya at ang kanyang mga kasama ay buong tapang na lumalaban sa mabahong liderato ng pangkating Taruc-Sumulong sa Gitnang Luson;

YAYAMANG, siya ay may mataas na kamulatang pampulitika at napapatnubayan ng kaisipan ni Kasamang Mao Tse-tung, and rurok ng Marxismo-Leninismo sa Kasalukuyan;

YAYAMANG, siya ay matapat na kasapi ng Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas;

KUNG GAYON, pagtibayin gaya ng ginagawang pagpapatibay dito, and paghahalal kay Kasamang Dante bilang Punong Kumander (Commander-in-Chief) ng Bagong Hukbo ng Bayan.

All Party Should Be Alert to the Dangers

All Party members should grasp the lessons of the history of the Party. Right opportunism, more than "Left" opportunism, has led the Party into the most serious debackles for longer periods of time. Even the "left" opportunism committed during the period of 1949 to 1955 was merely the result of a preceeding and continuing Right opportunism.

All Party members should be alert to modern revisionism lurking behind the bourgeois proposal to"legalize" the Communist Party of the Philippines. It is not at all any accident that the Enverga bill is being taken up in line with the proposed opening of trade relations between the Philippines and the Soviet Union, together with other revisionist countries.

All Party members should affirm that we are all now in the era of the impending collapse of imperialism and the worldwide triumph of socialism, an era in which Marxism-Leninism is Mao Tse-tung's thought. The universal truth of Mao Tse-tung's thought, the highest development Marxism-Leninism in the present era, must be consistently applied on the concrete conditions of the Philippines in order to defeat U.S. imperialsm, all local reactionaries and modern revisionism which is social democracy in the present era.

All Party members should never forget that armed struggle is main form of struggle. Without a People's Army generated by an agrarian war led by the proletariat, the people have nothing. The seizure of political, power is the central task of every revolutionary movement. And political power grows out of the barrel of a gun. These are truths stated clearly and proven in practice by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

All Party members should resist the siren call of the bourgeoisie for "legalizing" the Communist Party. The purpose of the bourgeoisie is to encourage the emergence and growth of a revisionist party, that is mainly parliamentarian, city-based, legal, opem, academic and journalistic. It wants to see a Party betraying the proletariat, with such revisionist theories as the three "peacefuls" and the two "wholes".

In all revolutionary earnestness, all Party members should strive to rebuild the Party in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's thought and master armed struggle and the united front. No proletarian revolutionary ever expects favors from a reactionary regime. The standing of the Party can be built only with the revolutionary efforts of all Party cadres and the broad masses of the people that they lead in struggle.

There are two points which all Party members must disseminate pertaining to the question of "legalizing" the Party:

1. The "legalization" of the Communist Party of the Philippines as proposed by bourgeois politicians, apparently with the encouragement of the revisionists, is a big bourgeois trap. Only the local revisionists and all types of Right opportunists will fall into the trap. No revolutionary party ever relies on the assurances of bourgeois legality.

2. The people and all progressive quarters must be forwarned of the provisions of either the Enverga bill and the bills of Amante and company which are violative of constitutional rights. The Communists Activities Control Board in the Enverga bill is empowered to classify individuals and organizations, compel them to register as communist and subsequently limit their freedom of speech and action. The Anti-Subversion Board in the Amante bill is outrightly an instrument for recommending the criminal prosecution of organizations and persons whom it considers to be "communist, cryptocommunist, communist-infiltrated or totalitarian."

In this connection, the Party has the deepest concern for the civil liberties and welfare of all organizations and individuals including nationalists, who are standing courageously against U.S. imperialism and feudalism.

The Communist Party of the Philippines had dialectically considered "legalization" under the terms of the reactionary proposals and of continuing to exist and work as it has always had since it was outlawed on practice after World War II. Guided by its long legal and illegal experience and by the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought, the Party finds no other alternative but to go beyond the pale of the bourgeois state even while cooperating with the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie on anti-imperalist and anti-feudal grounds in the spirit of a national united front for the establishment of a people's democratic regime.

OUR STAND ON THE QUESTION OF "LEGALIZING" THE CPP

Because of the far-reaching influence of modern revisions fostered by the neo-capitalist renegade clique in the Soviet Union and because of the long-standing Right opportunist and revisionist line that has afflicted the Communist Party of the Philippines, there is a strong tendency on the part of some comrades to welcome the "legalization" of the Party even under the terms of those proposals made in Congress and in the press by some bourgeois quarters.

That "legalization" should come from the palm of the class enemy should immediately arouse all Party members into a critical investigation. In this spirit, the Party has made a thorough examination of the proposed terms of "legalization" and has decided to issue this statement.

Two Proposals for Legalizing the Party

Two proposals for "legalizing" the Party have been made. One is made by Sen. Arturo M. Tolentino who declared on April 27, 1968 in Davao City that a new Communist Party of the Philippines can be established because under the liberal principles of the bourgeois legal system communism as an ideology can never be outlawed and only communist culprits of the past were outlawed for their overt acts. Another is made by Rep. Manuel Enverga in H. No. 16536, entitled "An Act to Regulate and Control Through Compulsory Registration and Such Other Means All Communist Persons and Organizations, Including the Communist Party of the Philippines, and Providing Penalties for Violations Thereof"; the Communist Party and its related organizations and members can operate legally provided they register.

In response to these seemingly progressive proposals, some Party members have been heard to say that once more they can openly work as communists and they may even be able to run in bourgeois elections under the banner of the Party, as during the Popular Front days after 1937 and as during the Democratic Alliance days after World II. Another kind of reaction comes from the barefaced agents of imperialism and feudalism, like Amante and company, who demand in several bills filed in Congress that "more teeth" should be given to Republic Act 1700 or the Anti-Subversion Law for more expeditious prosecution of communists.

While Enverga's bill seeks the creation of the Communist Activities Control Board to compel the registration of all "communist persons" and "communist organizations" for purposes of regulating and controlling them as they can operate legally, the bills of Amante's company of congressman seek to create the Anti-Subversion Board with the purpose of expeditiously classifying communist organizations and prosecuting them immediately.

The question of "legalizing" the Communist Party of the Philippines has only brought out the fact that the bourgeoisie, whether it be the Enverga type or the Amante type, is interested in two things: bourgeois control of an open, legal and registered Communist Party and aggravation of the undemocratic and unconstitutional terms of the Anti-Subversion Law.

RECTIFY ERRORS AND REBUILD THE PARTY

I. Mao Tse-Tung's Thought is Our Guide to Self Critism and Party Rebuilding

Mao Tse-Tung's thought is the highest developement of MarxsimLenisnism in the present world era of the impending collapse of imperialsm and the world triump of socialism. A genuine proletarian revolutionary party must in the present era, constantly strive for the integration of Mao Tse-Tung's thoughts and revolutionary practice in order to achieve thorough going victory.

Mao Tse-tung's thought is the supreme guide in summing up and analysing the experience of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Our Party has been committed from the very beginning to the Marzist-Leninist theory and its creative application to the concrete conditions in the Philippines in fighting U.S. imperialism and feudalism. Availing itself of the constant advance of the theory and practice of the international communist movement our Party is consequently committed to the theory and practice of Mao-tse-tung's though which is now the highest development of Marxism-Leninism.

We are at the stage of world history ad of the international communist movement when all Parties and cadres of Marxist-Leninist theory standpoint are re-examining their experience according to Mao Tse-Tung's though. Communist parties, like the Communist party of the Philippines, which so far have not yet established proletarian revolutionary power are confronted with the question of pursuing Mao Tse-tung's though or otherwise. This urgent question is sharpened by the emergence and world wide campaign of modern revisionism.

Mao Tse-tung's thought sets the demarcation line dividing the proleterian revolutionaries from the false pretenders to the title of revolutionaries in this period of great upheaval, great division and great re-organization of political forces. Mao Tse tung's thought now guides all proletarian revolutionary movements that are inflicting mortal blows on U.S. imperialism modern revisionism and all forms of reaction. The continuing failures of old parties that are not guided by Mao Tse-tung's thought only prove that without its guidance and faithful application revolutionary triumph cannot be won and consolidated. The experience of the revisionist parties of France, Italy and many others provides more than sufficient proof. The history of our own Party is marked by failures on account of serious errors and weaknesses that need to be rectified now in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's thought.

As modern revisionist is being fostered and spread by the modern revisionist clique, with its headquarters in the Soviet Union, all proletarian revolutionaries are goaded to express themselves and act in accordance with Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung's thought which is the acme of Marxim-Leninism in this world era. Two steps forward forward are now being made with Mao Tse-tung's thought, and the People's Republic of China serves as the central base of the world revolution while the world's countryside surround the cities of the world.

In a Philippines that is not yet liberated of imperialism and geudalism revisionist currents are bound to develop, as they have Currents of opportunism, with the local petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie as their fountain-head, serve as the basis for the super-imposition of modern revisionism from its world center in Moscow. If modern revisionism is not effectively combatte with correct theory and practice, then U.S. imperialism and domestic feudalism can persist in the Philippines society.

II. Summing-Up our Experience and Drawing Revolutionary Lesson

It is our urgent task to sum up and analyze our experience as a Party, The sole reason for this summing up and analysis is todraw revolutionary lessons, to identify errors andweaknessesin order to enable us to rectify them, strengthen ourselves and rebuild a proletarian revolutionary party that is guided by Mao Tse-tung's thought.

When we criticize errors and weaknesses, it is "to learn from past mistakes to avoid future one" and "to cure the sickness to same the patient". In the scientific spirit of Marxism-Leninism, we make our criticism in order to rebuild the Party on stronger foundation and buiod up revolutionary power. As the nucleous of proletarian dictatorship, the Communist Party of the Philippines must itself be well-consolidated through the process rectification.

Our Party has existed for the last thirty-eight yeats and yet it has not won revolutionary power. The failures it has incurred should be cleanly analyzed in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's thought so as to enable the proletarian revolutionaries of today to act correctly.

Only the broad outlines of Party history could be herein presented withthe view of showing its dialectical development. This summing up cannot possibly incorporate all the details that may be available. It is for further discussions among party cadres to do this. However, our trusted comrades, old and new, have already engaged during the last three yeats in thorough discussions concerning the problems of the Party.

At the outset, let it be stated that in out summing up, the handling of the three man weapons of the Philippine revolution assimes prime consideration. These are: the building up of a Marxist-Leninist party; arned struggle; and the national united front.

Also in our summing up, we shall cover the fields of ideology, politics military and organization. As a matter of fact, theman body of this discussion is divided into these four aspects. However, before dealing with these, let race briegly the history of the Communist Party of the Philippines,q

III. Brief Historical Review

A. Founding of the Party and Its Illegalization

The national-democratic movement in the Philippines entered a new stage when on November 7, 1930, the Communist Party of the Philippines was founded in Manila. The founding of the Party served to signify that the Filipino working class had advanced ideologically, politically, and organizationally, and had started to assume class leadership. Thus, the era of the new-democratic movement was ushered in with the emergence of a working class party committed to the integration of Marxist-Leninist theory and Philippine practice.

As a newly founded working class party, the Communist Party of the Philippines was immediately based in the city among the most advanced workers represented by Crisanto Evangelista. Without sufficient consideration of and safeguard against the coercive class character of the American imperialist regime and the domestic ruling, classes, the Party was publicly launched in celebration of the thirteenth anniversary of the October Revolution. Within a short period, on May 1, 1931, and subsequently, the reactionary authorities took punitive actions against the Party, its mass organizations, its leaders and members, resulting in the arrest and impronment of Party cadres and in the Supreme Court decisions of 1932 which illegalized the Party and banished its leading members to various parts of the country.

There was no chance for the Party to advance from its urban orientation to develop an extensive peasant mass following and broaden its alliances in the city and in the countryside. Because of the immediate circumstances it had to face, it did not have much chance to develop its revolutionary theory and test in theory in practice.

While Party leaders were banished to several provinces, they had little consciousness of the importance of casting the seeds of the people's democratic revolution in the countryside. They were compelled by the enemy to be where they were and they had no-plan of continuing Party work while in banishment.

Another setback was that there was no reliable second line of Party leaders who could have carried on Party work while the first line of Party leaders were incapacitated. Nevertheless, by 1935, there were already some elements who established Marxist study groups among the petty bourgeoisie in Manila. The Communist Party of the U'S.A., under the Third Communist International, was aware of these elements, some of whom had their political education under the Right opportunist Browderite leadership, and more of whom came from studies in the Soviet Union, but who failed to grasp the essence of the Great October Revolution, even as, because of their studies in the Soviet Union, they enjoyed high prestige within the Party.

During the period of illegality of the Communist Party of the Philippines, the Socialist Party headed by Pedro Abad Santos was building up strength on the basis of a loose mass organizarion of peasant and agricultural workers in Central Luzon. Although a few leading members of the Socialist Party studied Marxism, their studies were not done so systematically and under communist discipline. Although the Socialist Party became engage in large peasant mass action, it was not well-consolidated organization chiefly because of its essentially petty bourgeois although radical outlook which put emphasis on seeking agrarian reforms from the reactionary government and also on advancing the parliamentary ambitions of Abad Santos.

B. Merger of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Socialist Party

A merger was made between the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Socialist Party of November 7, 1938 after the former was legalized by the Commonwealth government in accordance with the anti-fascist Popular Front Policy. The Constitution of the merger party contained in its preamble the clause that it "defends the Constitution (of the U.S. puppet Commonwealth government) and the rights proclaimed therein..." and in Section 1 of ArticleII, the statement that it "opposes with all its power any obligue, group, circle, faction or party which conspires or acts to subvert undermine, weaken or overthrow any or all institutions of Philippine democracy whereby the majority of the Filipino people have obtained power to determine their own destiny **in any degree.**" (Underscoring ours.)

This merger come about with the assistance of James Allen, representative of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. During this period. the Communist Party of the Philippines continued to be closely associated with the Broderite leaderships of the Communist Party of the U.S.A.

The open leadership elected by the merger Congress was represented by Crisanto Evangelista as chairman; Pedro Abad Santos as vice chairman, and Guillermo Capadocia as secretary general.

The secret second line of leadership was represented by Vicente Lava whose time was mostly devoted to his full-time government employment at the Bureau of Science and whose political work as limited to leading a small progressive petty bourgeois organization, the League for the Defense of Democracy. Lava epitomized Party membets of petty bourgeoise origin who were under the influence of the Right opportunist Browderite leadership of the Communist Party of the U.S.A. Others members of the secret second line of leadership were those who had achieved limited success in urban Party work, especially among petty-bourgeois elements, during the period of illegeality.

After the Communist Party (Merger of the Communist Party and Socialist Party) was established, the Evangelista leadership worked hard for a city based anti-fascist movement, which advocated the boycott of Japanesegoods and the creation of "labor battalions" under the auspices of a united labor front, the Collective Labor Movement, and with the cooperation of the Commonwealth government. Political work among the urban petty bourgeoisie was carried on by Vicente Lava. With the aid of communist cadres, the ersthile socialist leaders tried to raise the political consciousness of preasants in Cental Luzon; but this was given only secondary importance The main Bulk of Party work was done in the city by a city-based and city-oriented Party.

C. The Party During the Japanese Occupation

There was no adequate preparations in the countryside for the imminent Japanese imperialist invasion and occupation of the Philippines. There were no adequate preparations by the entire Party leadership (first line and seond line) for the establishment of the necessary rural bases from which to wage a protracted people's war against the fascists. There had been no claer programme of agrarian revolution under the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines before the anti-Japanese struggle; there had only been peasant demonstration demanding linited reforms from the reactionary government and the landlords.

Upon the arrival of the Japanese invaders in Manila; which had been declared an open city by the American imperialist regime, the first line of Party leadership was easily arrested by the

Japanese. The second line of leadership and Party members who had been concentrated in the city spontaneously fled to the countryside in various directions. A well-ordered retreat from the city to the countryside was not made possible. Nevertheless, the majority fled to various towns in Central Luzon but without coordination.

At the time that the Central Luzon Bureau Conference was held to discuss Party policies in the light of the grave situation to establish the People Army Against the Japanese (Hukbalahap) and to legitimize the ascendence of the second line of leadership into the central leadership of the Party, Vicente Lava was elsewhere in Rizal province and had to ve elected in absentia as general secretary.

Meanwhile, two principal leaders of the Party who had been arrested, Abad Santos and Capadocia, agreed to cooperate with the Japanese in convincing Party members to desist from resistance. However, the former was incapacitated by illness and the latter attempted to implement his compromise but was soon arrested by the Party. These capitulationist weaknesses among principal Party leader in the face of the enemy showed that their ideology and political orientation were defective. In the first place, they became victims of their own political errors of being mainly unprepared to conduct a people's was against the Japanese aggressors. Later on, however, Capadocia was re-educated by the Party with the cooperation of comrades in the Chines bureau.

The error of Right opportunism woyld continue to bedevil the Party even after the establishment of the People's Army Against the Japanese (Hukbalahap). After the Japanese raid was launched on Mount Arayat in the so-called "March Raid" of 1943, the Vicente Lava leadership committee the most serious error during the Anti-Japanese war by adopting the "retreat for defnese" policy.

The adverse results of the Japanese raid proved that the area of Mount Arayat was not a stable seat of the Party leadership despite the fact that the people in his vicinity had relatively the highest

Chinese comrades but which were not fully and correctly availed of by the Party leadership.

During the encircling raid, the Party people in the vicinity of Mount Arayat dispersed and had to slip through in small groups; in the process, many leading cadres and Party members were captured. This pattern of dealing with enemy encirclements would be repeated even during the period from 1948 to 1959, when the Party could command a sizeable armed force.

The "retreat for defense" policy was essentially a passive military line both strategically and tactically. As tested in the practice of the fighting masses through the squadrons of the Hukbalahap, it was proven to be an incorrect policy; it became clear that with a policy of active resistance the strength of the Party and the masses would grow faster.

It was only as late as the Bagumbali Conference of late September 1944, when the Party declared the "retreat for defense" policy incorrect that the squadrons of the Hukbalahap were regrouped to take the offensive against the enemy. After a policy of active resistance was taken and implemented, the srength of the people's forces increased by leaps and bounded. But while this policy was adopted, the American air force had already started to bombard the Philippines, preparing for massive landings by the American imperialist military forces.

While the particular error of line was corrected and Vicente Lava was demoted from the general secretaryship, he retained his membership in the Central Committee together with others who kept a Right opportunist line. As previously in the history of the Party, there was no rectification campaign launched to root out the poisonous weeds of subiectivism and opportunism thoroughly.

D. The Party Upon the Return of American Imperialism

It was in the couse of conducting a people's war during the Japanese occupation that the Communist Party of the Philippines gained of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's that "political power out of the barrel of a gun"

Nevertheless, there was no prompt position taken with regard to the central question of keeping the people's armed power in the face of the return of American imperialism and the concomitant re-instatement of landlordism in those areas where the people had asserted their own armed power. During the anti-Japanese struggle, the needed consciousness that the Filipino people must held their own armed and must assert their owm political indenpendence on the basis of their own armed strenght was neglected and determined by the Right opportunists within the Party Central Committee. Among Party members and their mass following, the aggressive nature of American imperialism was not thoroughly exposed. The armed peasantry under the leadership of the Party was not also mobilized in line with the necessity of an agrarian revolution which was an essential content of the new-democratic stage of the Philippine revolution of which the peasantry is the main force. In areas where the Party had already established proletarian leadership, the anti-national and anti-democratic links between American imperialism and feudalism were not exposed and stressed by the Party leadership for the guidance of the people.

Aside from deficincy in political education and in mass line with regard to American imperialism and the thorough implementation of a programme of agrarian revolution, the Communist Party of the Philippines did not succeed in developing a party organization and armed force of a nations scale even while developing its main force in Central Luzon. To a much lesser extent, it was only in Southern Tagalog region where Party units and armed units outside of Central Luzon were established towards the end of the anti-Japanese war.

At the end of World War II, the Party leadership committed the Right opportunist mistake of deciding to shift its headquarter and the center of its political activity from the countryside to the city. Relying on the word of American agents, Party leaders took the rightist attitude that the main form of struggle had changed into the parliamentary form, that the people were tired of war, that they could participate in bourgeois elections under conditions of "peace and democracy". Thus, the central organs and newspapers of the Communist Party of the Philippines were shifted to the city.

In the countryside, the National Peasant Union (Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid) was set up as the legal mass organization of the peasantry to supplant the Hukbalahap and the BUDC (Barrio United Defense Corps). In the city the Congress of Labor Organizations and other urban organization were established. The Party and these mass organizations were to engage in legal and parliamentary struggle through the Democratic Alliance. Within the Democratic Alliance, the Party itself was supposed to be merely one of the organizations subordinate to the bourgeois personalities leading the alliance.

The disastrous policy of disarming and disbanding armed units of the People's Army was adopted and implemented. The political power that had been gained by the people's armed forces was, therefore, broken when the arms became separated from the men that carried them and directed them against the exploiting classes. However, the Party leadership nurtured the subjective illusion that whereas the "democratic peace" line of making a token surrender of arms to the Military Police was merely a "propaganda line" the "true line" was that the Party was actually keeping caches of arms. Little did they realize that the enemy could not be fooled by a token surrender of arms, and that the gap between the "propaganda line" and the "true line" merely confused the masses more than it misled the enemy. The basic fact was that armed units were disarmed and disbanded even as the enemy massacred whole squadrons of the Hukbalahap (like squadrons77 and 99) and took other forms of repressive measures against the masses and the leaders and members of the Hukbalahap. Under the direction of American imperialism, armed protection was given to the landlords to enable them to recover control over therir lands in Central Luzon and even to exact demands, such as arrears on land rent, on the past years of the Japanese occupation. These subsequent developments, proved the bankruptcy of the counter-revolutionary line of abandoning the armed struggle.

During the period that the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung's was setting the example of heighteningits armed struggle and capability at a time that the U.S. imperilists were manuevering a Kuomintang-controlled "coalition" government, the leadership of the Communist Party of the Philippines nurtured the illusion that it could engage in bourgeois parliamentary struggle through the Democratic Alliance and it did field its own candidatesin the few areas where it held great political influence. Soon after the Party had taken the legal forefront in fighting against the Bell Trade Act and Parity Amendment, the Military Bases Agreement and other imperialist-landlord measures, Party-supported members of Congress were unjustly ousted from Congress, thus exposing once more the bankruptcy of the policy of relying mainly on bourgeois parliamentarism.

During the early post-war period, the Right opportunist trend dominated the Party. The Party leadership was left to Jorge Frianeza who advocated a united front with the reactionary Roxas administration and subsequently, to Pedro Castro who merely wanted to develop a mass open party for purposes of bourgeois parliamentary struggle. The 1946 Constitution of the Party continue to carry the black bourgeois line of revisionism. Section 2 of Article VIII states, "Affiliation with or participation in the activities of any group, class, faction, or party which aims or acts to destroy, weaken or overthrow the democratic Constitution of the Philippines shall be punished with immediate ouster from the Party." The revisionist line within the Party was aggravated by regionalism, petty-bourgeois careerism and by individual acts of flightism which seriously undermined the Party.

E. The Party in the Period of Military Adventurism

It was only in 1948 that the question of armed struggle was raised among cadres in the face of fascistic methoeds being employed by the puppet government of Roxas against the Communist Party leaders and sympathizers who had been duly-elected to Congress and against the masses, their organizations, especially the National Peasant Union (Pambansang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid). The question of armed struggle was raised by the Jose Lava leadership merely on the basis of immediate circumstances like the upsurge of fascism attended by a split in the local ruling war "occurring soon".

Where as the policy of armed struggle could have been profoundly justified in terms of Mao Tse-tung's thought and on the basis of the laws of development in Philippines society, the Jose Lava leadership gave superficial reasons which until today. are taken advantage of and derided by Right opportunists and revisionists, including barefaced traitors like Luis Taruc, as reasons against the whole theory of people's war. Comrade Mao Tse-tung had made clear that the main form of struggle is armed struggle inasmuch as the seizure of state power is the central task of revolutionary movement in an exploitative semi-feudal are semi-colonial society like that of the Philippines.

Furthermore, if the Party and the people had gained aremd political power in the course of the anti-Japanese struggle, there was no reason at all why this had to be voluntarity surrendered in favor of participation in bourgeois politics as the main activity of the Party or parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle.

The Party leadership represented by Jose Lava failed to provide the most essential reasons for engaging in armed struggle, like a programme of armed struggle against U.S. imperialism and agrarian revolution among others, and equally it failed to recognize that armed struggle under the conditions existing in the Philippines would have to be protracted. Against the superficial reasons provided by the Lava leadership to justify the policy of armed struggle, the Right opportunists took the line of converting the Communist Party of the Philippines into a big mass party for purposes of the parliamentary form of struggle and took the narrow view that the trade unionists should automatically prevail in the Party leadership. Both opposing sides, however, failed to consider extensively whether the Party's headquarters and center of political gravity should be the city or the countryside. Both

Right opportunists and "Left" opportunists agreed that the Communist Party of the Philippines remain an urban Party.

Despite its advocacy of armed struggle, the Jose Lava leadership decided to command the People's Liberation Army (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan) from the city. Although it assumed the policy of armed struggle, the Jose Lava leadership did not lay down the correct theoretical and political basis for its organizational and military efforts. For this reason, it consistently allowed Luis Taruc, as commander-in-Chief of the People's Army to negotiate for amnesty with the Quirino government. If "leftism" is the principal aspect of an opportunist policy, it is bound to give rise to "Rightism" as a secondary aspect.

The Jose Lava leadership adopted a two-year timeable for seizing political power in the cities, without an all sided and dialectical appreciation of the strenght of the Party and the People's Army on the one hand and the strenghth of the enemy on the other. From May, 1948, when Jose Lava assumed the general secretaryship until January, 1950, when a Politburo conference was held attended by the Politburo-In and the Poliburo-Out, the Party leadership failed to clarify and draw the ideological, political and organizational basis for a protracted people's war. Instead, the Politburo conference of January, 1950 drew up the "PB Resolutions" which maintained a line of rapid military victory within 1950 and 1951.

An adventurist military policy was initiated by a city based Party leadership, which was called the Secretariat or the Politburo–in. Instead of advancing in a series of waves within a protracted period of time, the People's Army in the countryside was ordered to make simultaneous vertically over extended attacks on the enemy at widely separated points in Central Luzon and Southern Luzon as part of the plan to prepare for the seizure of Manila within two years. The military objectives were big military camps, cities and provincial capitals. This was done in a spirit of haste on August 26, 1950 in accordance with the "PB Resolutions" of January 1950, without any thought of the forthcoming counter-attack by the enemy with massive blows of encirclement and suppression and also without any serious though of the necessity of being able to concentrate the forces of the People's Army in order to deal with the subsequent enemy's counter-attack. There was the one-sided expectation by the Party leadership that the split in the ruling classes, due to the election frauds of 1949, and the favorable external conditions like the revolutionary victory of the Chinese people, the Korean War and the economic recession in the United States, would absolutely open the way for the victory of the People's Army in the

Philippines, notwithstanding the internal weaknesses of the Party and the People's Army due to previous Rights opportunist errors.

There was no serious consideration at all of the necessity of being able to concentrate the people's forces in order to deal with a counter-attack of encirclement by the enemy whose military forces and reserves had not yet been exhausted. Direct US imperialist intervention was wishfully put out of the question. With adventurist abandon, the people's forces were dispersed for military action through widely separated unstable areas. Over-extended and inadequately armed units were also adventuristically disposed on the "gates" of Manila to bolster the illusion that the seat of reactionary rule was "soon" to fall. On the other hand, the headquarters of the Politburo-Out, with a camp membership of a little over 200 men and women, was smuggled in the unpopulated vastness of the Laguna portion of the Sierra Madre detached from the main force of the People's Army. As the Secretariat or the Politburo-In (the main Party leadership) was separated physically far separated from the people's armed forces that it was supposed to command upon orders of the Politburo-In. The sources of military orders were, therefore, too far apart; from the Politburo-In to the Politburo-Out and from the Politburo-Out to Regional Commands, etc. A general pattern of military operations, supplies and communication lines that were excessively over-extended over unrealiable areas obtained.

In the countryside, because of a sectarian political command, relations between the People's Army and the people, between the Party and the army and between officers and men were not properly handled. Instead of politics being in command, the purely military viewpoint took command; Party building was neglected in favor of sheer military operations. The Party overstressed the importance of physical bases in the Sierra Madre instead of developing stable political bases among the rural population; armed units depended too much on over-extended supply and communication lines. Bourgeois rules of war and excessive punishments on erring soldiers of the People's Army were adopted even as there was no sufficient systematic political education of soldiers that would have made them conscious of the importance of Party discipline. All these resulted in the sectarianism that divided the People's Army from the people, the Party from the Army and the officers from the men.

In the city, however, in accordance with the two-year time-table for seizing power, there was an adventurist policy of rapid recruitment in order to get a big Party membership on time for the "seizure" of power. The Party leadership that was far separated from its military force dared to be liberal in its Party recruitment in the city and easily exposed itself to the enemy.

With a liberal policy of organization in the city, a high-ranking officer of the Manila-Rizal Command and a trusted security officer of the Politburo-In turned out to be an enemy agent, a spy of Ramon Magsaysay. Despite his low ideological and political consciousness and experience, he was able to assume high position in the Military Department. Within the Politburo-In itself, the liberal policy of recruitment in the city was reflected in the inclusion of Major Bautista as Politburo member without having been elected by the proper body simply because of his close personal friendship with the Lava family. Here was a Party member of recent Party experience who immediately assumed high office and who became most trusted in military matters, the principal concern of the day, cheifly because of his bourgeois military knowledge and his close personal friendship with the general secretary. Bautista represented the dominant trend of military over-confidence and great reliance on a latent internal split within the reactionary regime, including the reactionary army.

In October 1950, soon after the adventurist campaign of August, the Politburo-In was totally smashed in the city, with other Party members, sympathizers and couriers apprehended. A big harvest of Party documents, which included lists of members and tactical plans, was made by the enemy and helped the enemy destroy severely the party organization in the city as well as in the countryside.

F. The Party in the Period of Continued Military Defeat

After the October raids in Manila by the enemy which netted the Secretariat or the Politburo-In, the Politburo-Out organized a Central Committee conference in February and March of 1951 in order to discuss the new situation. As clear proof of the increasingly desperate situation of the Party, the conference itself was under heavy military pressure by a massive enemy encirclement; the conference could only depend on mere physical concealment within the encirclement, with only a small armed force of 150 men to protect them.

The Central Committee conference failed to pose and criticize the adventurist errors of the Jose Lava leadership either organizationally, politically or ideologically. The Jesus Lava leadership elected by the conference was essentially part of the previous leadership; the Politburo-Out merely replaced the apprehended Politburo-In as the main leading body. At the most, the capture of the entire Politburo-In was narrowly adduced to tactical errors, like negligence of security particularly in the city. The Central Committee failed to make a profound and systematic self-criticism as basis for a rectification movement. The CC Resolutions of 1951 as basis for a rectification movement. The CC Resolutions of 1951 merely reitereated mechanically with the same over-confidence as that of the Jose Lava leadership the PB Resolutions of 1950, although dually the incumbent leadership stated that the Party and the People's Army would have to wage a protracted armed struggle. As in previous stages of our Party history, a new situation within the Party developed due to grave errors of a previous party leadership and yet no rectification movement was launched to correct the basic mistakes and weaknesses in ideology, politics, organization and armed struggle.

The Central Committee conference put an undue importance on the forthcoming bourgeois elections of 1961 and adopted the policy of boycott as a component part of its overconfident plan to seize power on the basis of a subjective over-estimation of a supposed violent split occurring within the bourgeois state. In line with the unrectified sectarianism of the Jose Lava leadership, the incumbent Party leadership ruled that Party cadres who were to deviate from the boycott policy would be executed or "liquidated", as it was wont to use the term.

The errors of the Jose Lava leadership were obscured by the inner Party struggle which arose between Jesus Lava and the Taruc brothers on fragmented issues. In this regards, the Jesus Lava leadership resorted mainly to organizational maneuver to cover up for the adventurist errors of the Party leadership and to combat the capitulationist ideas of the Taruc brothers.

As a result of the unrectified ideological and political weaknesses, and as a result of the disastrous military adventures of the Jose Lava leadership, capitulationism started to set into the ranks of the Party leadership as represented by the disgruntled and traitorous Luis Taruc who surrendered to the reactionary government of Ramon Magsaysay in 1954. The outright capitulationist trend was aggravated to become the principal current by successive military defeats and by the chronic incorrect handling of cadres and the sectarian and liberal manipulation of cadres to perpetuate the clannish chain of Lava leaderships.

Upin its assumption of office, the Jesus Lava leadership was buffeted from one military defeat to another. After the 1951 Central Committee conference, the Party's headquarters, with its small complement of staff members, divided itself into several smaller groups and these were in blind flight within the massive enemy encirclement that enveloped the Sierra Madre from Laguna to Nueva Ecija. At a time that the Party leadership needed its armed forces to concentrate and break through the weak points of the enemy encirclement there was no sufficient number of men it could command. From this time on, the Jesus Lava leadership was never in effective control of any sizeable armed force because the strongest regional command (Reco 2) closely associated with Luis Taruc became disaffected with the Lava leadership and all forces had been fragmented because of the over-extended dispersal of armed units during the adventurist leadership of the Jose Lava.

During the period of 1951 – 1954, many principal leaders of the armed struggle fell under the massive encirclement campaign in Southern Tagalog, Central Luzon, Bicol and Panay. It was during this period that roving rebel tendencies developed in the HMB because of ineffective central command and the slicing-off tactics of the enemy.

Under the impact and conditions of military defeat, the Jesus Lava leadership decided to adopt the parliamentary form of struggle as the main form of struggle in 1957, thus, falling into the same capitulationist line of Luis Taruc. The policy of protracted people's war was abandoned and those who had opposed this policy became gleeful, wrongly feeling vindicated by the adventurist error of the Jose Lava leadership and by the Right opportunism of the Jesus Lava leadership.

The Jesus Lava leadership went as far as de-activating armed units that were accessible to his command, and these were converted into so-called organizational brigades. Under the impact of the world revisionist campaign that was being waged by the Khruschev revisionists, the Jesus Lava leadership in succeding years felt more justified in its wrong policy. In 1958, he disbanded his own security men and fled from the countryside to the city to start the life of a city fugitive, isolated from the masses. This pattern of flight from the countryside to the city resulted in the capture of principal leaders of the Party in the Greater Manila area. It signified the utter failure of the series of Lava leaderships in the Communist Party of the Philippines.

Living the life of a city fugitive, Lava wrote political transmission and directives and made appointments without the benefit of collective Party discussions. It was during this period that his leadership degenerated from Right opportunism to one-man flightism of 1958 and to liquidationism by the adoption of the so-called "single file" policy.

The "Single file" policy required one Party member to be in contact with only one other Party member. This was clearly a destruction of the collective live of Party organization. The whole Party organization was, at first, reduced into a few one-way files until the loss of only one member in a single file would result in the automatic disconnection of several others from the Party of the complete dissolution of the entire file. This process led into the grave disorganization of the Party. After a few more years, Jesus lava was bound to lose contact with both legal and armed cadres of the Party.

Party.

It was during this liquidationist period that the Party fell behind, even behind the national bourgeoisie and urban petty bourgeoisie who were raising the banner of "nationalism" of the Recto brand as early as 1951 and more strongly in 1961. Until new Party cadres emerged and some Party members were reactivated, the Party fell too far behind the events of the day. Meanwhile, Jesus Lava made decisions for the Party all by himself as Party discussions would now reveal. In May 1964, Jesus Lava was finally arrested in Sampaloc, Manila under circumstances which indicated that he surrendered himself, or, at least, which indicated that he deliberately, by his own Right opportunism, oneman flightism and liquidationism, has gone into the urban mouth of the reactionary whale.

III. Main Errors and Weaknesses

A. Ideological Weaknesses

The main ideological weakness of all previous leaderships of the Communist Party of the Philippines has been subjectivism, appearing in the form of dogmatism and empiricism, and resulting in Right and "Left" opportunist lines. The Philippines, being a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, has a large petty bourgeoisie which serves as the historical and social basis for subjectivism. Since the Party exists in this kind of society, it is liable to reflect subjectivist trend from without if it is not alert and careful in its Marxist-Leninist ideological building which is the first requirement in Party-building.

The Party could be penetrated by a considerable number of Party members of petty bourgeois orientation who fail to remould their world outlook and methods of thinking in accordance with Marxism-Leninism and who fail to integrate revolutionary practice with dialectical materialism and historical materialism.

Although the first Party members were mainly from the working class represented by Conrade Crisanto Evangelista, the Party leadership erroneously put much reliance on open, legal and urban political activity which resulted in the paralyzation of the Communist Party of the Philippines once it was illegalized a few months adter its founding. A revolutionary and throughgoing proletarian world outlook would have made the Party recognize the whole Philippine situation, adopted the correct method of legal and illegal struggle and averted the disaster that befell the Party during its period of immaturity.

It was around 1935, however, while the Party was still illegalized by its class enemies when a considerable number of Party members of petty-bourgeois class status creeped into a fluid underground Party that was deprived of a definite central leadership and tried to carry on political work, bringing with them their unremoulded petty-bourgeois ideas. At the helm of these petty-bourgeois elements within the Party were those who were greatly influenced by the empiricist and Right opportunist current of Brewderism. At this time, the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Communist Party of the U.S.A. had close association; and the latter, under the auspices of the Communist International, assisted the former by seeing to it that cadres like Dr. Vicenter Lava who became their leading representative would carry on Party work.

Sunjectivism of the empiricist type was manifested by major political policies and developments such as the principal importance given to urban Party work before the outbreak of the Pacific war; the merger of the Socialist Party and the Party which artificially increased the membership of the latter and the Rightist preamble in the Constitution; capitulationism towards U.S. imperialism and the Commonwealth government; the spontaneous evacuation of Party cadres from the city to the countryside; the adoption of the "retreat for defense" policy of 1943 and the belief of Vicente Lava that there could be no proletarian leadership in the countryside; and the shift of Party central organs to the city after the anti-Japanese war and the blatantly Right opportunist policies of Vicente Lava, Jorge Frianeza and Pedro Castro during the period of 1945 – 1948.

Empiricism grows on a static underestimation of the people's democratic forces and on a static over-estimation of the enemy strength. Party work becomes dictated by the actions of the enemy instead of by a dialectical comprehension of the situation and the balance of forces. Revolutionary initiative becomes lost because of a static, one-sided, fragmented and narrow view of what are the dialectical, all-sided, whole and broad requirements of the anti-feudal; anti-imperialist and anti-fascist struggle.

Thus, there is the overconcentration on urban political work because of the subjectivist and opportunist desire to compete with the bourgeois parties and groups, and beg for peace and democracy from the U.S. imperialists and reactionaries in their own urban citadel. The revolutionary initiative of the proletariat in the countryside, where its main ally, the peasantry is, and where it has the widest area for maneuver, is underestimated. There is also the personal desire of the petty bourgeois to enjoy the comforts and the prestige of city life.

There is, however, the other side of the coin of subjectivism. Between 1948 and 1954, subjectivism of the dogmatist type arose under the Jose Lava leadership and partially under the Jesus Lava leadership. This dogmatism grew on an over estimation of the people's democratic forces and an underestimation of the enemy strength, without taking into full account the painstaking process of a protracted people's war. Under the Jose Lava leadership, the strategic view was adopted that, in a brief period of two years, the Party was army and the building of a revolutionarv national united front.

Subjectivism of the dogmatist type is over-active and excessively on the defensive. The former underestimates the bourgeois state power while the latter over-estimates it.

Empiricism and dogmatism are two sides of the same petty-bourgeois coin. A twirl of the coin of subjectivism will show this or that abrupt side. The subjectivism errors of the Vicente and Jose Lava leaderships, both empiricism and dogmatism, belong to the same petty-bourgeois coin. They are also the same petty-bourgeois disease of subjectivism that has afflicted the Party and that has wrought havoc in our Party history.

Reversals from empiricism to dogmatism and from dogmatism to empiricism is peculiarly common to those who still retain the petty-bourgeois world outlook. Nevertheless, when one is the principal aspect of a subjectivist stand, the other is bound to be the secondary aspect and the secondary aspect becomes the principal aspect at another moment. That is the dialectical relationship of empiricism and dogmatism. Comrades should not wonder why under a dogmatist leadership there should be cases of empiricism; what is common between dogmatism and empiricism is the use of narrow and limited experience as the basis for over-all decisions. Also, comrades not wonder why a leadership with the same petty-bourgeois orientation should swing from empiricism to dogmatism and back to empiricism, and soon and so forth. All subjectivists fail to grasp the laws of dialectical development and so they are volatile and erratic.

In 1951, the Jesus Lava leadership continued to carry the dogmatist line of the Jose Lava leadership. But, after a few more years, subjectivism of the empiricist type started to overcome the Jesus Lava leadership because of military defeats. Subsequently, this leadership started to over-estimate the strength of the enemy and it adopted parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle, took flight from the countryside and then took up the so-called "single file" policy based on his narrow individual experience.

Summing up the subjectivist leaderships of Vicente Lava, Jose Lava and Jesus Lava, we can state that the main petty-bourgeois disease that has so far afflicted the Comminust Partv of the

Philippines is Lavaism. It is revisionism in the Philippines and it is essentially the inability to grasp revolutionary proletarian ideology. Lavaism has afflicted the Party for the last more than thirty years; this accounts for the fact that the Communist Party of the Philippines is still weak despite its decades of existence. Although the political errors of each Lava leadership was recognized after the far-reaching damage had become exposed, no thorough going rectification movement had ever been conducted to expose and correct the basic errors in ideology. Despite the fact that Vicente Lava's subjectivism as expressed by his "retreat for defense" policy had resulted in great damage to the Party, there was no subsequent rectification movement that could have prevented the Right opportunists errors of the subsequent early post-war years. Also despite the serious errors of the Jose Lava leadership, the subsequent leadership did not engage in any serious rectification movement. Until now, despite the grave errors of the Jesus Lava leadership and those of other previous leaderships, there has been strong resistance to their ideological, political and organizational correction. Thus for the last more than thirty years, the Party has flundered from error to error because there has been no systemeatic and objective evaluation of each error ideologically, politically and organizationally as each occurs.

The fact that Party leadership was passed from one blood brother to another, a singular phenomenon in the entire international communist movement, could be taken as a magniloquent symptom of the subjectivism that had predominated within the Party.

Lavaism is careerism on a grand scale within the Party. A dangerous pattern has been established wherein Party responsibilities are apportioned to blood relatives on the basis of personal trust rather than on the basis of ideological and genuine Party trust. In this manner a mechanical and slavish artificial majority could always be depended upon to elect the Lava brothers as general secretaries of the Party in a series.

The evil of subjectivism is still persistent within the Party and must be eradicated. It still appears in the form of sentimentalism on the part of elder cadres who had received their ideological training from the previous leaderships. Sentimentally, they recognize the personal sacrifices of the Lava brothers but at the same time they do not see how many lives of people and cadres have been sacrificed at the altar of subjectivism errors and failures and they do not see that the so-called personal sacrifices of the Lava brothers were the very product of their own subjectivist errors and failures.

This sentimentalism has become a hindrance to the rectification of ideological, political and organizational errors. It is combined with a subjectivism awe for high bourgeois academic degrees that some cadres have. It also appears in the form of personal trust for those who have had ideological training from and those who enjoy the sanction of the series of Lava leaderships.

Lavaism as it has developed on the basis of subjectivism now nourishes the growth of modern revisionism in the Philippines. Since we are determined to rebuild the Party, Lavaism and all errors of subjectivism must be resolutely opposed and weeded out by a thorough going rectification movement. In conducting such a movement it is not so much the persons of the Lava "dynasty" that we are after; what we are after is the rectification of the subjectivist errors. If no rectification movement is to be undertaken, if no ideological consolidation of the Party is to be made, then modern revisionism would flourish to disarm and undermine the people's democratic revolution. Lavaism has been persistent for decades now within the Party only because rectification, as demonstrated by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in the Chinese Communist Party has never before been conducted as seriously as we have decided. A rectification movement within the Communist Party of the Philippines, the nucleus of the proletarian dictatorship, should be conducted in the Marxis-Leninist way that a cultural revolution is conducted within the proletarian state in order to combat Right opportunism and modern revisionism.

The preponderant form of subjectivism that characterizes Lavaism is empiricism. The dogmatist leadership of Jose Lava and, partially, of Jesus Lava was approximately an eight-year "Left" interregnum in what is more than thirty years of Lavaist empricism carried out mainly by the Vicente Lava and Jesus Lava leaderships. During the entire period of Lavaism, empiricism principally characterized its world outlook; and dogmatism secondarily. Empiricism in philosophy results in Right opportunism in politics. Empiricism and Right opportunism in turn provide the basis for modern revisionism which is persistently advocated by the neo-bourgeois and revisionist renegade clique in Moscow. At present, modern revisionism is fast gaining ground. The Communist Party of the Philippines must combat it thoroughly and seriously, especially now that Party rebuilding is being undertaken.

B. Political Errors

Right and "Left" opportunism have been committed in the history of the Communist Party of the Philippines. These political errors emanated from the subjectivism world outlook. This arrow world outlook restricted the Party from building up as a proletarian revolutionary Party of Mao Tse-tung's thought that is firmly linked with the masses on a national scale, working with the correct style and conducting criticism and self-criticism, that implements a programme of agrarian revolution through persistent armed struggle and that makes use of the national united front to broaden its influence and support in its struggle against feudalism, imperialism and bureaucrat capitalism.

The urban, parliamentary and open character of the Communist Party of the Philippines during the early months of its existence in 1930 and 1931 was mainly responsible for the Political disaster and difficultues that it soon suffered. During this early period, the Party Leadership was given to the use of "Left" language in public against the entire bourgeoisie and yet illegal work was not effectively carried out together with legal work. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of the countryside encircling the city was not yet grasped by the Party.

Closed doorism was a marked tendency of the Crisanto Evangelista Leadership; the idea of the national united front was not immediately taken up and adopted. The urban petty-bourgeoisie was not seriously paid attention to as a class ally and as a source of cadres, because the Party was still being built up among the workers. Pertaining to the most important ally of the working class, the peasantry was not immediately considered as a main force that the Party should have aroused and mobilized, because the center of gravity of the political activity of the Party was in the city. Even when the principal leaders of the Party and its mass organizations were banished to different provinces, they were not conscious of the significance of planting the seeds of the new-democratic revolution under proletarian leadership in the countryside.

During the period of illegalization of the Party, cadres of petty-bourgeois origin crept into the Party and their presence therein became marked by 1935 and thenceforth. Because of their continued petty-bourgeois social status and because of the inadequacy of cadres working among the toiling masses, it was during this period that an imbalance in Party work, which essentially meant the inadequacy of Party cadres among peasants and workers, occured. In the trade unions, Party cadres working illegally could be counted on one's fingers and among the peasant masses, it was only sometime in 1937 that a still fewer cadres were working illegally in a few towns of Central Luzon with very modest success. It was the Socialist Party of Pedro Abad Santos, however, which had a large but loose mass following; a few socialist activists actually read Marxist literature but were lacking in the discipline of communist cadres. One thing was obvious – the Crisanto Evangelista leadership never had the chance to conduct political work among the peasantry and develop illegal Party work before the Party and its mass organizations were illegalized.

The merger of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Socialist Party in 1938 artificially and in a liberal manner brought together quite a number of peasants in Central Luzon, particularly those of Pampanga, and the city workers whom Crisanto Evangelista immediately tried to arouse and mobilize under the banner of the anti-fascist Popular Front. Also under the same popular Front banner, Party members of petty-bourgeois origin tried to bring the urban petty-bourgeoisie closer to the Party through some anti-fascist organizations as the League for the Defense of Democracy and the Civil Liberties Union. Unfortunately, what amounted to be the principal Party work was again urban.

It was through the merger that the black bourgeois line of revisionism became formalized with a Rightist clause in the Preamble of the Party Constitution, stating that the Party "defends the Constitution (of the U.S. puppet Commonwealth government) and the rights proclaimed therein . . . " Getting the good wishes of Quezon in the Popular Front preoccupied a great deal of Party leaders then.

The necessity of preparing and developing rural bases in the face of the growing threat of fascism was not fully grasped by the Party leaders; and even if it were so sumised, there were no adequate preparations for armed struggle that was made. The international situation that was already clearly pointing to the imminence of World War II was not fully related to the Philippine situation. From 1938 to 1942, the first and second lines of leadership agreed on the principal importance of urban Party work and the former over-concentrated on defending "civil liberties" while minimizing the importance of Party building and Army building among the peasants under a programme of agrarian revolution. It was simply assumed that the merger of the Communist Party of the Philippines and the Socialist Party would enmass the peasantry to the side of the Party. Under the banner of the Popular cadres ran for electoral offices especially in Greater Manila and in some few provinces, without consciously pursuing what was principal revolutionary work in the countryside.

At the outbreak of World War II, the Party submitted a memorandum to Commonwealth President Manuel L. Quezon for arms support from the bourgeois government; but the latter, sure of its class interests, refused despite the Popular Front. Instead of having relied mainly on its principal revolutionary work of arousing and mobilizing the peasant masses under the leadership of the working class, the Party leadership chose to place the main stress on the secondary, leading it to over-rate the Popular Front and the false prospect of arms support from a puppet government under U.S. imperialist control.

When the Japanese imperialists invaded Manila, the first line of leadership was apprehended in the city and the rest of the city cadres spontaneously fled to different points within the city and to the countryside, without any plan of organized retreat. At this point, we can see the error of Right opportunism as having grown within the Party without having been the object of critical exposure and thoroughgoing rectification movement.

Taught, however, by the immediate situation, the Party leadership held the Central Luzon Bureau Conference and organized the People's Army against the Japanese invaders and their puppet government. The Mount Arayat areas was chosen as the center of the national resistance movement and soon after, the People's Army proved its revolutionary courage and patriotism to the Filipino people.

After the Japanese pinpointed Mount Arayat as the seat of the Party and after having been frustrated in the use of captured Party leaders, like Pedro Abad Santos and Guillermo Capadocia, for making a campign of "peace and friendship," the Japanese launched a raid on Mount Arayat which resulted in the capture of many leading Party cadres and members. It was after his March raid of 1943 that the Vicente Lava leadership showed its Right opportunism by adopting the "retreat for defense" policy, a policy that tried to ride and encourage the demoralization of the Party mass following in the Mount Arayat area. It was a policy of avoiding armed struggle with the enemy or reducing the size of armed units and of making them passive. Vicente Lava personally thought that proletarian power could not be established in the countryside while the Party was not in full control of the city. The active resistance of the masses and the impractically of the policy soon exposed its bankruptcy.

Although the Bagumbali conference of September, 1944 declared the Right opportunist policy of "retreat for defense" erroneous and resulted in the demotion of some Right opportunists and in the regrouping of Huk squadrons for intensified resistance, the Right opportunist error was not thoroughly rectified and the Right opportunists retained a big say in the Party Central Committee. Furthermore, the "socialists" who had automatically become communists by virtue of the 1938 merger were not provided by the Party leadership with the correct Marxist-Leninist education. The capitulationist and renegade Luis Taruc would remain to be the general representative for a great many of them who failed to advance to the level of Marxist-Leninists.

It was in the course of the armed struggle that the masses of the people gained real power. But as American imperialist troops landed to reclaim the Philippines, Right opportunism became more prevalent within the Party and there arose the illusion that the people were tired of war and that the Party could strive for the realization of its principles under conditions of "peace and democracy" granted by U.S. imperialism and the landlords. The brutalities committed by the Military Police, the civilian guards and all kinds of American agents against the people and the unjust arrest and incarceration of the principal leaders and fighters of the Hukbalahap did not dispel the Right opportunist illusion of bourgeois parliamentarism. The Party leadership allowed the disbanding of the majority of Hukbalahap squadrons and token arms surrender were made. The Party was determined to shift back the center of its political activity to the city under the banner of bourgeois parliamentarism.

The 1946 Constitution of the Party continued to carry the black bourgeois line of revisionism by stating in its Article VIII, Section 2, "Affiliation with or participation in the activities of any group, class, faction or party which aims or acts to destroy, weaken or overthrow the democratic Constitution of the Philippines shall be punished with immediate ouster from the Party."

Until May, 1948 when the Jose Lava leadership assumed central responsibility, the Party experienced the blatant reign of Right opportunism or revisionism. During the early post-war period, the Right opportunist influence of Vicente Lava, Pedro Castro and Jorge Frianeza prevailed. Jorge Frianeza was removed from the general secretaryship and expelled for Rightism but again no thoroughgoing rectification movement was conducted to weed out the persistent roots of the errors. The Pedro Castro leadership was also denounced and replaced for Right opportunism and tailism and for advocating the development of a mass and open Party that was supposed to engage solely in bourgeois election. But the errors of this leadership were not also rectified ideologically and politically although drastic organizational measures were taken against those who took sides with Pedro Castro.

The assumption of Party leadership by those represented by Jose Lava was never attended by any thoroughgoing rectification movement. This leadership arose by mere counter-assertion that armed struggle was necessary on account of the fascist attacks against the people and their duly-elected representatives in Congress who opposed the Bell Trade Act and the Parity Amendment. This leadership automatically expected revolutionary triumph on the basis of external conditions such as the revolutionary successes of fraternal parties, the U.S. economic recession, and an "impending" Third World War and the growing split in the local ruling classes.

Because of the absence of a thoroughgoing rectification movement against the previous Rightist leadership being conducted aside from organizational repudiation, Right opportunism could still persist as a strong undercurrent or secondary aspect of opportunism even under the MMLeft" opportunist leadership of Jose Lava. Soon after its assumption of office and adoption of the line of armed struggle, it actually permitted Luis Taruc to negotiate the terms of surrender and amnesty for the people's armed forces with the Quirino government. This was another instance of an opportunist dual line that undermined the revolutionary will of the masses more than it deceived the enemy. No genuine Marxist-Leninist Party leadership would ever consider any offer of surrender and amnesty from the bourgeois state. To do so would be to commit the opportunist dualism that would only confuse the fighting masses, encourage capitulationism and serve the enemy.

The Jose Lava leadership committed mainly the error of "Left" opportunism by dogmatically assuming that the class enemies of the proletariat were weakening and splitting up all the way on a straight line and that the Party could seize power within a very short period. There was failure to recognize that, under the circumstances then obtaining and as now, a protracted people's war would have to be waged because the enemy was and is still actually strong. Because of previous failure to distribute cadres to important parts of the country other than Central Luzon, Manila, Rizal and Southern Tagalog and because of the Right opportunism during and anti-Japanese war and just after, the Party and the People's Army were not able to build upon a national scale and, therefore, were not able to unite with the people on a national scale. The Party could depend only on the people in areas covered by the Hukbalahap and the Barrio United Defense Corps during the anti-Japanese struggle. It would require a protracted period of time for the Party to convert into a revolutionary advantage the initial disadvantage of fighting for people's democratic power in an archipelago like the Philippines.

The "Left" opportunist leadership of Jose Lava failed to understand comprehensively the requirements of a people's democratic revolution. It failed to see the necessity of solid party-building, the development of rural bases on the bases of an agrarian revolution and a revolutionary national united front. If its recognized the necessary combination and correct use of these weapons, then it could have easily taken the view that people's war is protracted and painstaking.

Because of its petty-bourgeois eagerness to seize power, it instructed Party organs to put the military viewpoint in command, to make military technical articles dominant in the **HMB Bulletin**, to study and adopt the 90-week "Master Training Schedule" – a manual used by the U.S. Army and the reactionary Philippine Armed Forces, etc. These specific instances showed the utter lack of understanding of the nature of people's war on the part of the Jose Lava leadership.

The "Left" opportunist leadership of Jose Lava was marked mainly by military impetuousity and petty – bourgeois vindictiveness manifested inside the outside of the Party. What was, however, in common between the "Left" opportunism and the Right opportunism it opposed was the petty-bourgeois illusion that the people's forces could be commanded from the city and that the City of Manila, the strongest base of bourgeois state power, could be easily seized without building rural bases. There are more points to discuss under the section of military errors pertaining to the military adventurism of the Jose Lava leadership.

The Central Committee plenary session which was held by the Politburo-Out under the Jesus Lava leadership in February-March of 1951 after the capture of the Politburo – it failed to clarify fully the building of the three weapons of the Philippine Revolution; namely, Party building, armed struggle and the national united front. It obscured the basic errors of the Jose Lava leadership by superficial rationalization such as carelessness of the captured Party leaders. A rectification movement would have unfolded the ideological and political bases of the failure of the Jose Lava leadership and, thus, remove the danger of opportunism continuing in its Right or "Left" form.

After the Jesus Lava leadership assumed command, "Left" opportunism continued in the form of roving rebel tendencies on the basis of a forced dispersal of armed units. With the central command lacking in a main armed force, the dispersed armed units now subjected to massive encirclement and suppression operations of the reactionary army committed in the name of struggle for curvival or economic struggle certain individual abuses and excesses that the enemy used to their psycho-war advantages. Taking advantage of some real individual excesses of some units of the People's Army, the reactionary army systematically used reactionary troops in civilian clothes to make their own abuses and excesses and blamed them on the People's Army. A deep line of sectarianism with the Party leadership of Jose and Jesus Lava was taken advantage of by the enemy.

Deprived of effective central command over all units of the People's Army, and further burdened by the series of military difficulties exerted by the enemy and by the capitulationism and splittism of Luis Taruc and his Titoist cohorts, the Jesus Lava leadership was weighed down until, it itself, entertained Right opportunist illusions. Right opportunism of the Jesus Lava leadership became most evident in the adoption of parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle in 1957 and the disbandment of armed units under his command. This Right opportunism would continuously be further borne out by the subsequent oneman flights of principal leaders of the Party from the countryside to the city, resulting in their capture in the city. This one-man flightism resulted in the worst policy of the Jesus Lava leadership, the "single file" policy, which meant the liquidation of the collective life of the Party and the act as dissolution of a great number of Party units and armed units, thus defeating even the Right opportunist objective of engaging mainly in parliamentary struggle. In 1963, Jesus Lava tried to overcome his liquidationist policy by advocating the united front policy as the main line of the Party; but he only became deeply enmeshed in serious ideological and political errors by continuing to issue political transmissions without the benefit of collective discussion within the Party.

The militant resurgence of the Communist Party of the Philippines has been on account of the emergence of new Party cadres and re-activated Party cadres who are are now guided by the highest development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought.

At present moment, however, Lavanism remains a pernicious influence with the Party. Afflicting the Party for an exceedingly long period, without having been profoundly criticized before this present stage of the develoment of our Party, Lavanism cannot be defeated within a few weeks, months or years. It cannot be removed from the Party even if their direct representatives are overthrown from their positions of Party authority unless we combat the ideological roots of their erros. Considering the present circumstances, the dangers of "Right" or "Left" opportunism will always confront us. But those who hold on to Mao Tse-tung's thought and to the correct mass line of the Party will always maintain and heighten their revolutionary strength and will.

It should be kept in mind though that Lavaism is mainly Right opportunism and secondarily "Left" opportunism. Today some Party members over-estimate the value of legal urban-based "nationalist" mass organizations like the Movement for the

Advancement of Nationalism, and such government measures as the Magna Carta of Labor, the Agricultural Land Reform Code and others. On the other hand, there is a minor undercurrent of infantile "Left" opportunists who excessively under estimate the value of legal mass organizations and who are used to "Left" phrase mongering without actually engaging in mass work and struggle against the exploiters of their own people.

Modern revisinism has gained a foothold in Philippine society through Lavaism and through the Right opportunists. It is necessary to combat modern revisionism with the revolutionary practice of Mao Tse-tung's thought. Otherwise, the Communist Party of the Philippines will continue to suffer stagnation and reverses in the struggle for People's democratic power.

C. Military Errors

Errors in ideology and politics always lead to errors in the armed armed struggle. A party that does not seriously pay attention to this relationship is bound to fail in performing its central revolutionary task of seizing political power and consolidating it.

Armed struggle is the main weapon of the Communist Party of the Philippines in pursuing the people's democratic revolution. Without a people's army under the command of the Party, the people have nothing as Comrade Mao Tse-tung has taught us in his theory and practice of the Chinese revolution. Being in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, our Party, in Waging a people's war in the **countryside** integrate three necessary and inseparable components; namely, agrarian revolution, rural bases and armed struggle.

During the firsteleven years of the existence of the Party, 1930 to 1941, the Party did not immediately develop these three components. In 1931, it met its first concrete experience of suppression by the bourgeois state power. This bourgeois state power, with all the weapons of coercion in its hands, succeeded in creating grave difficulties for the Party for so many years.

Focusing Party work on parliamentary struggle, the merger Party of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party of the Philippines failed to make the most essential preparations for the anti-fascist struggle. The city cadres who fled to the countryside at the time of the Japanese invasion were unable to withdraw in an organized way, thus exposing the failure of the Crisanto Evangelista leadership to build up the Party with deep foundations among the peasant masses on the basic of their struggle for land which is the main content of the people's democratic revolution. There was no rural base that was well-prepared for waging a people's war against the fascists.

During the anti-Japanese war, the Right opportunist errors of the "retreat for defense" policy was essentially an error in military line. It contravened the Marxist-Leninist principle that Red power could be built up only by waging revolutionary war. The "retreat for defense" policy was nothing but a variation of the USAFFE "lie low" policy of avoiding armed struggle with the Japanese invaders and their mercenaries. This Right opportunist military line restricted the development of proletarian power, not only in the short-run but also lasting in the long run even after it was considered an erroneous policy and the Hukbalahap squadrons won victory after victory during the latter part of 1944 and early part of 1945.

After the "retreat for defense" line was abandoned, the strength of the Party and the People's Army increased by leaps and bounds. In a few month's time, the area and population covered by both increased rapidly to an extent that the Greater part of Central Luzon was under the effective leadership of the Party and the People's Army and that the People's Army could send sizeable units to established armed bases in the Southern Tagalog area.

However, because of the failure to remove its philosophical and organizational roots in the Central Committee, the Right opportunist military line would presist as a strong undercurrent and subsequently re-emerge as the main line at the end of the anti-Japanese struggle. A dual line was adopted, with the so-called "propaganda" line differing from the so-called "true" line. The so-called "propaganda" line was that the Party was publicly desirous of "peace and democracy", of participating in bourgeois politics through the Democratic Alliance and the "true line" was that it was actually keeping in reserve its armed power in the form of concealed arms cache Idealistically, deception was intended as an essential component of the strategic line. Nevertheless, while the enemy was not fooled by the token surrender of weapons by the Hukbalahap confusion was introduced into ranks of the cadres and the masses. The Party leadership failed to establish firmly the mass line as it adopted a dual line and it lost its grip on the gun.

The enemy continued to suppress the people and the Party while voluntarily the Party disbanded armed units of the People's Army under the erroneous banner of "peace and democracy" unlike in China and Indochina where the people held on to their arms. The essential fact of Right opportunism perpetuated by the Party leadership has been explained in the previous section.

Under the Jose Lava leadership, the error of military adventurism and putting the purely military viewpoint in command was perpetuated as an extreme counterdevelopment of Right opportunism. The petty-bourgeois world outlook of Lavaism was the fundamental cause of the "Left" subjectivist errors of military adventurism reporesented by Jose Lava. It did not permit the Party leadership to understand the laws of development of a people's was in Philippine society and, thus, prevented the adoption of the correct strategy and tactics.

The selfish desire to seize power in the city in so short a time as two years without laying an extensive groundwork among the people showed lack of understanding of protracted people's war. As "Left" opportunism emerged as the principal aspect of Lavaism under the leadership of Jose Lava, Right opportunism persisted as a secondary aspect ot an undercurrent. As the power of the reactionary ruling classes was estimated to be weak because it was wracked by an internal split., the Jose Lava leadership gave orders to direct fire only against Filipino puppet troops and to strictly avoid attacks against U. S. military personnel.

The underestimation of U.S. military support for the local reactionaries was "Left" opportunism but at the same time secondarily, there was the false belief that avoiding military engagement with U.S. military personnel would make the fight for the Red Army easier which was Right opportunism. This secondary Righ opportunist tendency was still a carry-over of the false Rightist belief during the anti-Japanese was that the United States would return to the Philippines in order to restore "peace and democracy" after overcoming the fascists.

Another big instance of muddled military thinking was the principal excessive and "Left" reliance on the internal split of the ruling classes and the secondary but excessive Right illusion that the bourgeois politicians, Laurel and Rodriguez, would lead revolts against the Quirino government from Batangas and Rizal in concert with the People's Liberation Army. This false was used to re-inforce the argument that seizure of Manila "soon" was possible. At this time the HMB had not yet gained enough strength to capture Manila; no more than 3,000 Red troops could be massed for the purpose, with the sure difficulties of over- straining the people's aremed strenght in all other place.

The predominating "Left" opportunist line of the Jose Lava leadership was evident in the issuance of military orders to the people's forces in the countryside from the city-based Secretariat or the Politburo-In. Even in the countryside the Politburo-Out was distant from the main military forces and relied on camouflage rather than on developing a stable rural base on which it should have relied. There was still a great gap between the Party leadership and the masses consisting of unstable areas in Central Luzon and blatantly White areas in Southern Luzon.

During this period, the notion became prevalent that the establishment of rural bases was a strange and utopian idea because the Philippines is a small country and in archipelago having no rear adjacent to and contiguous with a big friendly country. Jose Lava as general secretary dismissed arrogantly the concept of rural bases as a grandoise idea. Little was it realized that the rural base was itself the great rear of guerrilla zones. The camp of the Politburo-Out in the Laguna portion of the Sierra Madre depended merely on a hidden physical base instead of a rural base where the people's support was strong because of the achievement of an agrarian revolution and armed struggle. Little was it realized that in reality then, armed units could operate in the plains where the people's support was the strongest such as Regional Command No. 2.

The armed struggle should have been waged as a protracted people's war combined with an agrarian revolution and the development of rural bases, from which the people's Army should have advanced in a series of waves under the leadership of a Party that was already entrenched in the countryside. But a petty-bourgeois Party leadership was too much in a hurry, too impetuous to capture within so short a period the bourgeois state power seated in Manila. This petty-bourgeois Party leadership never realized that it could fight the bourgeois state power by establishing the people's power in the countryside. At the height of the adventurist folly, Party leaders would bid each other good-bye in public with: "See you in Malacañang! " This infantile talk reflected the adventurist desire of the Jose Lava leadership to move the People's Army to the city gates within a short period of time without first developing the armed power of the masses and then advancing in a series of waves from well consolidated rural bases.

While the Party headquarters in the city was distantly separated from the Politburo-Out and the latter was in turn distantly separated from the main units of the People's Army orders were brought down making the people's forces leap over unstable and unreliable areas to attack simultaneously widely separated targets, such as military camps, cities and provincial capitals. This kind of armed movements over-extended the strength of the People's Army and further strained what had already been the overstretched lines of communications and supplies. The raids of August 26, 1950 conducted by the People's Army in accordance with the "PB Resolutions" of January, 1950 demonstrated fully the adventurist impetuosity of the Jose Lava leadership. In essence, it failed to recognize dialectically the ability of the enemy to make a counter-attack that could break the over-extended lines linking the Politburo-Out to the Regional

Commands and so on and so forth. The enemy exactly did this after the August raids by pitting 25,000 troops against a dispersed people's army of a lesser number in Central Luzon, Manila, Rizal, Bicol and Panay.

A short while after the raids of August 26th conducted by the People's Liberation Army, the Party headquarters in the city was smashed systematically by the enemy on October 1950. Considering the extent of enemy success in this crackdown, the policy of rapid recruitment of Party members in the city was demonstrated to be a folly and violation of the defensive and underground requirements of urban Party work. No less than the highest organs of the Party were infiltrated by the enemy. A security officer of the Politburo, Taciano Rizal, turned out to be a traitor, a paid agent of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Soon after this, the Congress of Labor Organizations whose officials had always publicity proclaimed that they would lead a general strike in concert with the People's Army offensive in the countryside was also struck down by the enemy on January, 1951.

The failures of the military policy vis-a-vis the enmy were also paralleled by the incorrect handling of cadres and soldiers. Under the guise of "Bolshevization", the Jose Lava leadership adopted harsh methods on those who were found committing even minor errors. The imposition of death penalty on cadres and soldiers for errors occurred even where a lighter punishment would have sufficied. In metting out punishments, the life history of erring cadres and soldiers were not considered seriously and oftentimes the immediate error was isolated from the circumstances. What was mistaken for "Bolshevization" was the rules of war from bourgeois military books. This mishandling of soldiers and cadres became more aggravated as the People's Army suffered an increasing number of setbacks and tendency towards disintegration occured

As the armed struggle started to dip during the latter part of 1951, the relationship between the People's Army and the people was mishandled in a serious way. Distinctions were made between friendly and hostile barrios. The distinctions were made not for purpose of waging the correct propaganda drive to win over the people from a hostile attitude to a friendly attitude but for purposes of making retaliatory and vindictive foraging attacks even against ordinary peasants some of whose work animals were confiscated to provide food for the beleaguered soldiers of the People's Army. Production bases had been set up before in the mountains and plains but these were destroyed by the enemy because these were protected under the mechanical principle of camouflage instead of by political support of the masses. Many abuses were committed in the name of "economic struggle" as a result of desperation due to the absence of an effective Marxist-Leninist command and the failure to adopt the correct mass line. It was not fully realized that aside from being a fighting force, the People's Army was a propaganda and productive force.

It was the result of the mistakes of the Jose Lava leadership and of the counter-attacks made by the enemy that a tendency towards roving rebel bands and a degenaration of some of these bonds occured because of the absence of genuine proletarian discipline, the wanton dispersal of the People's Army and the concommittant loss of effective central command.

The Jesus Lava leadership could not correct the military adventurism of the Jose Lava leadership because it did not have any comprehensive understanding of the nature and requirements of a people's war. Because of its failure to grasp Mao Tse-tung's thought, it was never able to regroup the dispersed armed units of the People's Army which were attacked in a massive way by the reactionary army continuously from 1951 to 1955. The Jesus Lava leadership suffered the chronic disease of Lavaist subjectivism.

In 1957, under conditions of military defeat the Jesus Lava leadership took the Rightist line and adopted parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle. Jesus Lava became guilty of liquidationism when he actually disbanded armed units, including his own aremed security, and chose to live the life of a city fugitive. The individual flights of the commander-in-chief of the Party, Jesus Lava, from the countryside to the city and therir subsequent capture in the city manifested clearly the erroneous line of the Party leadership.

It has been only in the area of Regional Command No. 2, particularly in the province of Pampanga and partially in Tarlac, Bataan and Nueva Ecija where remnants of the People's Liberation Army have persisted. At the present moment, it is not those who have slavishly followed the leadership of the Lava's who are now waging the armed struggle. But, a thoroughgoing rectification of Lavaism and the capitualtionism of Luis Taruc must be waged particularly in this area. Roving rebel tendencies and practices must also be corrected here.. What is to be generated is a genuine People's Liberation Army that is under the effective command of a Marxist-Leninist Party guided by Mao Tse-tung's though, that is a weapon for agrarian revolution and that builds up stable rural bases.

It has been a disadvantage for the Party to have established its strength only in the areas of Greater Manila, Central Luzon and particularly in Southern Tagalog. Although these areas have strategic values, it is here where bourgois state power is most concentrated thoughout the archipelago. A new military strategy and tactics in line with Mao Tse-tung's thought must be adopted taking into full account the weak links of the bougeois state power, turning the achipelago from a disadvantage into an advantage for the Party and the People's Liberation Army. The development of a main military force and rural bases in Luzon other than in Central Luzon should be well considered and the other islands of Visayas and Mindanao should be utilized to disperse and disspate the armed force of the enemy.

D. Organization Errors

Organizationally the main disability of the Communist Party of the Philippines has been its failure to build up an organization that has a broad mass character and that is national in scale. Where the Party has been built the principle of democratic centralism has not been applied correctly in the organizational life of the Party, resulting in errors of sectarianism and liberalism, and commandism and tailism, because of subjectism and opportunism.

Building up a Party of a broad mass character requires a national system of Party cadres who build up a great mass following. Under the difficult conditions existing in Philippines society, it is a wise policy to build up the Party carefully; therefore, recruitment and development of a cadres must always conform to the standardsof a proletarian revolutionary party.

A Party with a broad mass character means essentially that existing Party cadres must have a big mass following through the adoption of the correct ideology, political line, and principles and method of organization. The Communist Party of the Philippines can have a broad mass character only if its cadres could lead masses of workers and peasant through revolutionary struggle and thereby increase their own strength. The Party guides the revolutionary struggle of the masses and in turn the struggle produces the best and most advanced fighters of the Revolutions who become Party members.

The Party gained strength during the anti-Japanese war only by waging revolutionary armed struggle and leading the peasant masses. During the Jose Lava leadership, the Party regained revolutionary strength for sometime until the errors of adventurism undermined the revolutionary resurgence. In this instance, it was shown that the Party could gain real mass strength only to the extent that it merged with and led the peasant masses . In a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country like the Philippines, the Party can gain strength only by arousing and mobilizing the peasant masses in line with the agrarian revolution as the main content of the people's democratic struggle. In the final analysis, the proletarian revolutionary party in the Philippines can have a broad mass character only if it gains the mass support of the peasantry, particularly the poor peasants and farm workers.

Until now, Party members are relatively over-concentrated in Central Luzon and in the Manila-Rizal areas. Even in the previous high tides of the revolutionary movement in the Philippines, the Party did not succeed in broadcasting sufficiently on a national scale the people's democratic revolution through the systematic disposition of cadres.

In the course of his long period of being a trade union leader, Crisanto Evangelista developed a small amount of relations with other trade union leaders in the Visayas. But, he himself, even as late as the latter part of the thirties, had the illusion that if the Party could gain control of Central Luzon, then Luzon would easily follow; and if the Party could control Luzon, then the whole archipelago would follow. As previously explained the party leaders who were banished to various parts of Luzon did not conciously try to build up the Party while they were in banishment.

At the beginning of the anti-Japanese war, there was an attempt to send a team of cadres to the Visayas but it was called off. During the war, the Party and the Hukbalahap were built up mainly in the single region of Central Luzon. Even in the accessible region of Southern Tagalog the Party was not able to seize leadership and initiative in the anti-Japanese war from pro-American guerilla units. After the war, the question of sending out cadres to other islands was not immediately taken up seriously.

It was only at the height of the armed struggle under the Jose Lava leadership that Party cadres were sent out to Cagayan Valley, Bicol, Panay, Ilocos and Mindanao to build up the Party. But these pioneering comrades were not able to build the Party on strong foundations and did not have sufficient time to develop armed struggle for which they had been sent there primarily because of the failure of the Party to adopt a correct political line. The main policy of rapid military victory did not allow the cadres sufficient time to develop the three requisities for people's democratic power: an agrarian revolution, rural bases and armed struggle.

During the entire period of the Jesus Lava leadership, the failure to build a national organization persisted. This leadership saw the destruction of old Party units, including the new ones established outside of Central Luzon. Even during the later part of the 1950's when legal mass organizations under the leadership of the Party could be established, there was no serious attemp made by the Party to build up legal mass organizations as the medium for Party expansion. It would only be after 1960 that, through the initiative mainly of new and re-activated old Party members, the Party would dare to push forward the resurgence of the revolutionary movement. Now the Party has started to make modest gains in building a Party of national scale.

Through a national united front, the proletarian revolutionary party which is carrying out agrarian revolution, with the ful support of the oppressed peasantry, can still broaden its support by allying with such supplementary revolutionary forces as the urban petty bourgeoisie and the patriotic section of the national bourgeoisie.

In the Philippines, the Party first experienced a united front policy when it opposed fascism during the days of the Popular Front. But during this period, the powerful influence of the petty bourgeoisie within the Party started to corrode the revolutionary will of the Party in a subtle way. During the war, the Party did put up various organizations under the principle of the national united front. The leading organizations were the Hukbalahap it self and the Barrio United Defense Corps.

After the war the Democratic Alliance was put up as a formal united front organization. But this alliance served only to support Right opportunism and allowed some bourgeois personalities to assume the leadership. The Party practically carried the sedan chair for them for sometime until they scurried away when the armed struggle become intensified.

During the Jesus Lava leadership, no genuine united front could be built up because of the failure to develop armed struggle and legal mass organizations under the leadership of the Party. At the time that Claro Mayo Recto was already spearheading a progressive type of nationalism, the Party failed to take advantage of the situation a fully because of the liquidationist policy that gravely hampered and threatened the very organizational existence of the Party.

The Party failed in many instances to combine legal and illegal struggle in its organizational work. At the time that the Party was illegalized for the first time there was no secret second line of leadership that could assume Party responsibility legally and illegally. At the beginning of the war, a second line of leadership replaced an incapacitated first line but the former had in the main been detached from mass work previously. being engaged in limited political work among urban petty-bourgeois elements

As a result of erroneous political lines, grievious organizational errors were committed. Democratic centralism did not come into full play in order to arrive at decisions.

The development of Lavaism is in itself the result of the gross violations if democratic centralism. The astounding series of Lava leaderships was the result of bourgeois maneuvers that cause a falling off and demoralization among Party cadres through a period of thirty years. Liberalism is the most vulgar forms like nepotism and favoritism for personal friends was practised in the making of assignments and promotions. The result in the making of decisions was Lavaism.

Liberalism marked the merger of the Socialist Party and the Communist Party of the Philippines. Members of the Socialist Party were taken wholesale into the Communist Party notwithstanding the membership requirement of being a communist. The first and second lines of leadership adopted a liberal attitude to Party organization as they concentrated on urban and legal political work before the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war. The liberalism in organizational work that occured during the "retreat for defense" flowed from various developments. Also, the big upsurge of liberalism and legalism represented by Vicente Lava, Jorge Frianoza and Pedro Castro, after the anti-Japanese war had dialectical connections with unrectified Right opportunist trend starting from even before the war. Jorge Frianeza advocated the complete dissolution of the People's Army and "united front" with the reactionary Roxas government; and Pedro Castro advocated the organization of a "mass party" for parliamentary struggle and the liquidation of illegal Party work. Within the Democratic Alliance, a liberal policy of allowing the prevalence of bourgeois personalities occured.

Although the main organizational error of the Jose Lava leadership was sectarianism, it perpetrated liberalism in appointing to high Party positions and recruiting into the Party persons who happened to be relatives, personal friends and townspeople of the Lava family, without benefit of undergoing the tests of proletarian struggle. Certainly, liberalism was essentially involved in the rapid recruitment policy policy in the city of Manila, a policy which allowed the penetration of the Party by enemy agents. The corner stone of this policy was personal trust. The ludicrous example of liberalism was the appointment of Taciano Rizal to a decisively important position on the narrow consideration that he bore the name of the bourgeois national hero, Jose Rizal.

Sectarianism was, however, the main error of the Jose Lava leadership while liberalism was its secondary error. Alienated from the concrete conditions of the armed struggle in the countryside, this leadership was commandist in bringing down its orders and in effect among the fighting forces in the countryside sectarian excesses occured under the cover of the slogan of "Bolshevization". Contradictions among the people and minor infractions within the Party were considered as questions in the contradiction between the people and the enemy. Whereas a policy of persuasion and leniency was required in many cases, the harshest penalties were imposed on erring Party members and Red soldiers. In the city, sectarianism was also practiced in relation to the national united front. As a result of the failure of the Democratic Alliance, the Jose Lava leadership immediately discounted the importance of a consistent united front policy towards the middle forces and also minimized the importance of legal forms of struggle.

The Jesus Lava leadership carried substantially for sometime the sectarianism of the Jose Lava resorted to the sectarian method of intimidation to put Party members into line and there were many cases of cadres executed for such reasons as the failure to implement the boycott policy towards the 1951 bourgeois elections and also on the basis of suspicion as many Party members became demoralized and passive due to unrectified errors of leadership and the massive offensive of the enemy. Even when Right opportunism prevailed and armed units were unilaterally disbanded, sectarianism took the form of coddling Party members instead of putting them into the daily class struggle. In a matter of less than two years, themain line of parliamentary struggle degenerated further into liquidationism. The flight of the Party leadership from the countryside to the city resulted in the neglect of Party leadership from the countryside to the city resulted in the neglect of Party organizations in the countryside and finally, in the disastrous liquidationist "single file" policy which destroyed in a big way the collective life of the Party and cut off lines oresponsibility between higher organs and lower organs and between the Party and its members and between the Party and the people. The Jesus lava leadership became reduced to the general secretary alone, made one-man decisions, issued political transmissions from some secluded room and made oppointment to high Party positions on the basis of blood and personal relations. During the late fifties, opportunities for re-grouping Party and armed units in the countryside were completely disregarded and parliamentary struggle itself was not properly conducted. It would only be during the early sixties that Party rebuilding and the establishment or mass organizations were effected by Party members independent of the alienated Party leadership.

Tailism was a basic characteristic of the Jesus Lava leadership. Likewise, it had also marked the previous Right opportunist leadership of Vicente Lava, Jorge Frieneza and Pedro Castro.

In the main, Lavaism is organizationally the disease of liberalism, tailism and the violation of democratic centralism and the collective life of the Party. A thoroughgoing rectification movement to weed out the ideological, political and organizational roots of Lavaism must be conducted in order to rebuild the Party in accordance with Mao Tse-tung's thought. Lavaism can still persist if no serious efforts are taken to repudiate organizationally certain elements with the Party, who are the ideological and political agents of Lavaism and who are, therefore, the political representatives of the bourgeoise with in the Party.

IV. THREE MAIN TASKS

Without a revolutionary theory, there can be no revolutionary movement. In this era where imperialism is heading towards total collapse and socialism is advancing towards world victory, there can be no revolutionary movement without being guided by the highest development of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought. In rebuilding the Communist Party of the Philippines, therefore, the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, Mao Tse-tung's thought, must be applied in the concrete practice of the Philippine Revolution: in Party rebuilding, in developing the armed struggle and in utilizing the nationaal united front in order to achieve the people's democratic revolution.

What we need to rebuild in the Philippines today is a proletarian revolutionary party that is armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought. The Philippine revolutionary movement cannot possibly advance without moving ahead with the theory and practice of the world proletarian revolution. Theworld proletaruan revolution has been continuously advancing, passing three major stages: the first stage was led by Marx and Engels by developing the theory of scientific socialism; the second stage was led by Lenin and Stalin by developing the theory and practice of proletarian dictatorship in the era of imperialism; and the third stage is now guided by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

In this era of Mao Tse-tung's thought the Communist Party ofthe Philippines cannot fulfill its goal of achieving a people's democracy first and socialism, next without applying on the concrete conditions of the Philippines Mao Tse-tung's thought and without grasping the six components oftoday's Marxism-Leninism: philosophy, political economy, social science, people's war, party building and the proletarian cultural revolution. The Communist Party of the Philippines can be a proletarian revolutionary party only if it grasps the advances in philosophy, political economy and social science contributed by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and his theory and practice of people's war, party building and the great proletarian cultural revolution.

As a proletarian revolutionary party, the Communist Party of the Philippines comprehensively differentiates itself from bogus and revisionist parties and groups by adopting Mao Tse-tung's thought and by applying it. The Party sets itself free from subjectivism, Right and "Left" opportunism and other manifestations of the black bourgeois line by adhering to Mao Tse-tung's thought in theory and in practice. Only with the guidance Of Mao Tse-tung's thought can the Party cleanse itself of Lavaism and all other ideological, political and organizational errors that have hampered and hindered the victorious advance of the proletarian revolution in the Philippines.

Mao Tse-tung's thought draws the demarcration line between the true proletarian revolutionaries on the one side and the bourgeois pseudo-revolutionaries and revisionists on the other. In an international revolutionary movement that is beset with modern revisionism directed and led by the renegade neo-bourgeois clique in Moscow, Mao Tse-tung's thought stands out to illuminate the whole workld and the Philippines and to push to the darkest corners the treasonous modern revisionist concoctions of three "peaceful" and two "wholes". Adhering to Mao Tse-tung's thought and holding firmly that the central task of a revolutionary movement is the seizure and consolidation of political power, the Communist Party of the Philippines cannot be confused by the false revisionist theory of peaceful co-existence, peaceful transition, peaceful competition, party of the whole people and state of the whole people being peddled by the Soviet revisionist ruling clique internationally and by certain elements locally. Modern revisionism is the main danger today in the international communist movement and likewise in the Philippine revolutionary movement.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolutions in the People's Republic of China, however, has consolidated a great area, an iron bastion, of the world proletarian revolution under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung's and has arisen as the epoch-making weapon against modern revisionism in the whole world and the restoration of capitalism within socialist society. The People's Republic of China serves today as a stable base area of all revolutionary peoples now surrounding the cities of the world from the world's countryside of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Mao Tse-tung's thought has taken deep roots among 700 million Chinese people and in the whole world through genuine Marxist-Leninist parties that uphold Mao Tse-tung's thought as the Marxism- Leninism of this era.

In the Philippines today, Mao Tse-tung's thought is guiding a cultural revolution within the nucleus of the proletarian dictatatorship, the Communist Party of the Philippines. A thoroughgoing rectification movement is being waged to rid the Party and its mass organizations of the failures and errors of Lavaism that are persisting ideologically, politically and organizaitonally. Lavaism is in the main Right opportunism which is the bourgeois soil for modern revisionism within the Party. The treasonous current of modern revisionism has taken roots in the subjectivist and Right opportunist line that Lavaism has perpetuated for the last more than three decades and theat the semi-feudal and semi-colonial conditions of Philippine society has encouraged. The political agents of Lavaism and modern revisionism are striving hard to cut off the armed struggle from the legal struggle by spreading slanders and lies against those engaged in developing armed struggle and against the most militant cadres of the Party.

A thoroughgoing rectification movement chiefly directed against Lavaism and modern revisionism should be carried out through to the end among cadres, following the pattern of unity-criticism-repudiation--unity. This rectification movement is a test of the ability of the Communist Party of the Philippines to make self-Criticism and to rid itself of long-standing and major errors and shortcomings that have too long undermined the Philippine revolutionary movement and deprived the people of revolutionary triumph. Without this rectification movement, Party rebuilding cannot be achieved.

Ideological building with Mao Tse-tung's thought is the first requisite in the rebuilding of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The Revolutionary School of Mao Tse-tung's Thought within the Communist Party of the Philippines is doing the greatest service to the cause of the proletarian revolution in the Philippines by spreading Mao Tse-tung's thought and by spearheading the present rectification movement. This rectification movement has to be done, especially at a time that we need to rebuild the Party on the solid foundations of Mao Tse-tung's though and the activities of local revisionist ruling clique and U.S. imperialism to spread modern revisionism, develop a city-based and city-oriented Party that is afraid of armed struggle, foster relations between the reactionary Philippine government and the revisionist renegade clique cliques of Eastern Europe and disarm the peasants politically by relying mainly on the reactionary government's "land reform" programme.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said: "A well-disciplined Party armed with the theory of Marxism-Leninism, using the method of self-criticism and linked with the masses of the people; an army under the leadership of such a Party; a united front of all revolutionary classes and all revolutionary groups under the leadership cf such a Party--these are the three main weapons with which we have defeated the enemy. These are the three main weapons that the Party had all its cadres must strive to develop in order to achieve the present main task of seizing political power.

The Communist Party of the Philippines must be rebuilt as the highest form of organization of the leading force, the proletariat. To be such, it must be armed with Mao Tse-tung's thought, the name of Marxism-Leninism is this era. By grasping the revolutionary proletarian ideology, our Party affirms its class nature in a clear-cut way; but the ultimate test lies in revolutionary practice and further revolutionary practice. It is not enough to lay down a nicely drafted programme. It is necessary to sustain it with consistent and hard-working mass work and struggle, transforming Mao Tse-tung's thought into a powerful material force by arousing and mobilizing the broad masses of the people to take revolutionary action. In other words, our Party as a proletarian revolutionary party must integrate theory and practice. Our cadres must go deep among the masses of workers and peasants. They must be well-distributed on a national scale in order to build up a nationwide Party and depart from the overconcentration of cadres in Central Luzon, the Manila-Rizal area and Laguna. The Party must concentrate on arousing and mobilizing the peasant masses, particularly the poor peasants and farm workers as the main ally of the proletariat and as the main force of the people's democratic revolution.

The Party must realize the principle of making the countryside surround the cities and put principal stress on Party work in the countryside instead of in the city; but without neglecting Party work in the latter. Our cadres must conduct their political work with the style of hard work and frugality and in the creative spirit of self-reliance and must always be ready to make self-critism and receive critism in order to improve their political work constantly. They must trust and rely on the masses, arousing and mobilizing them against the exploiters.

In the countryside, the People's Liberation Army should be constantly built up from among the exploited peasantry under the leadership of the proletariat and the Party. A programme of agrarian revolution should be implemented in order to fulfill the main content of the people's democratic revolution. To make possible and protect the gains of the agrarian revolution., the Party should develop rerual bases of the People's Liberation Army and direct a wide range of fighting areas, from stable rural bases to guerilla zones.

The Communist Party of the Philippines makes class analysis and distinguishes its friends from its enemies and among its friends., reliable friends from unrealible friends. The Party recognizes the poor peasants and farm workers as the most reliable allies of the working class. To succeed in the people's democratic revolution, an alliance of the working class and the peasantry must be develop as the basis for a national united front which includes the urban petty bourgeoisie and the patriotic section of the national bourgeoisie as supplementary allies. At the same time the Party is ever alert to the dual vacillating class character of the national bourgeoisie as a friend or enemy of the people's democratic revolution. The Party, in keeping and utilizing the national united front, realizes that it should maintain its class leadership, independence and initiative. Proletarian class leadership, independence and intiative is best maintained as our cadres constantly build up our Party and the People's Liberation Army. The national united front should be lined up primarily against the class forces of counter-revolution, the U.S. imperialists, the compradors, landlords and bureaucrat capitalists and serve the establishment and advance of Red political power. In the concrete conditions ofthe Philippines today, the Party should employ armed struggle and the national united front skillfully and likewise, legal and illegal methods and secret and open work.

Imbued with proletarian internationalism, the Communist Party of the Philippines is determined to fulfill its international obligation to fight U.S. imperialism and all its local reactionary agents, the compradors, landlords and bureaucrat capitalist, through the end. The Party assumes it as an international obligation to combat modern revisionism and resurgent Japanese imperialism, now increasingly in alliance with U.S. imperialism to keep the Philippines principally a semi-colony. The struggle of the Filipino people against these enemies of national independence, social liberation and progress is a contribution to the world wide struggle now being waged by all oppressed nations and peoples. In Asia and Southeast Asia, the Philippines has too long served as the bastion of U.S. imperialism and local reaction. If the Filipino people are to deal powerful blows against these, then they shall have assisted other oppressed nations and peoples through common struggles. The Communist Party of the Philippines is aware that all others nations and peoples fighting against U.S. imperialism and its reactionary allies are reciprocally assisting the Filipino people and working class through common struggle. The Filipino proletariat is bound by the spirit of proletatarian internationalism with all workers and peoples of the world.

B. Armed Struggle

It is a fundamental task of the Communist Party of the Philippines to give proletarian revolutionaryleadership to the peasantry. The people's democratic revolution which our Party, is waging is essentially a peasant war.. The struggle for land among the vast majority of our people is the main content of the people's democratic revolution that we are trying to achieve in our semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. The liberation of the peasantry from feudal exploitation and its mobilization as the main force of the people's democratic revolution are of decisive significance to the revolutionary triumph of the proletariat as the leading class

Since industry is not well developed in our semi-feudal and semi-colonial country, the number of industrial worker is small. The proletariat and its Party must therefore develop its alliance with the peasantry and develop the peasantry as the main force of the people's democratic revolution. Because of its exploited condition, the peasantry is the most reliable ally of the proletariat. Its massive strength provides the overwhelming popular support, the peasantry ensures the victory of the proletarian class leadership. As a proletarian revolutionary party, the Communist Party of the Philippines must rely mainly on the peasantry to conduct armed struggle and seize power. The people's democratic revolution is basically a peasant war under the leadership of the proletariat and its Party guided by Mao Tse-tung's thought.

In going to the countryside the Party must make the correct class analysis and take the correct class line. In our semi-feudal and semi-colonial society, the peasant problem constitutes the main problem both politically and economically. It is therefore necessary for the Communist Party of the Philippines to conduct thoroghgoing class analysis to be able to understand the problems of the countryside so that in giving leadership to the class struggle in the countryside it will be able to distinguish between its real friends and its real class enemies; so that it can mobilize the correct class forces to train its guns against its class enemies. The basis for class analysis is the relationship between the exploited and the exploiter and on the ownership of the means of production. By knowing the relations of exploitation we determine the economic position attitudes. Through its ownership of the means of production, the exploting classes manitain a system of exploitation. In our countryside, they maintain a feudal and semi-feudal system of exploitation. In waging the people's democratic revolution, the Party aims at overthrowing this system of exploitation by launching a peasant war against the feudal and semi-feudal exploiters. In the countryside, the main exploiter is the landlord class. This class relies mainly on feudal exploitation. It owns lands tilled by poor peasants who pay rent to them and who are further exploited in several other ways, such an usury, menial service, tributes and several others. The rich peasant stratum also engages in exploitation; a considerable part of their living depends on exploitation but the rich peasant is distinguished from the landlords in that although he owns land more than sufficient for his household, he still tills farm workers, renting out surplus lands, surplus work animals and implements, by practicing usury and other form of exploitation. The middle peasant owns a piece of land sufficient for his family; but his status ranges from the edge of bankruptcy to having a piece of land a little more than sufficient for his household needs and having other sources of income. The poor peasants and farm workers are those who have to work mainly for the landlords and be exploited by them. They are the most oppressed stratum of the peasantry and they are, therefore, the most interested in the people's democratic revolution and the most reliable allies of the proletariat. They compose the majority of the peasantry in the Philippines.

The correct line in the countryside can be implemented by arousing and mobilizing the poor peasants and farm workers mainly and by winning over the uniting with the middle peasants, especially the lower middle and middle peasants, into an anti-feudalist revolutionary united front. The rich peasants who have traditionally served as the local political agents of the landlord class in their role as the leading men in the "barrio councils," can be neutralized with the growing might of the poor peasants and farm workers and raise their prestige so that they can assume responsibility for the revolution. The Party must see to it that a revolutionary anti-feudal barrio committee, controlled by the poor peasants and farm workers under the leadership of the proletariat, must ultimately replace or take over the "barrio councils" controlled by the landlords, corrupt government officials and rich peasants.

The implementation of the class line in the countryside would depend on a painstaking remoulding of the attitudes of Party cadres toward the poor peasants and farm laborers. The Party must educate its cadres through revolutionary practice to make cadres understand that once the poor peasants and farm laborers have been aroused and mobilized they are the staunchest supporters of the revolution. We cannot rely mainly on the middle peasants. The social base of the revolution in the countryside are the poor peasants and farm laborers. The middle peasants may accept the leadership of the Party when it suits

their interest but when it will suit their interest to accept the class leadership of the bourgeoisie, they will do so. In times when reaction becomes ruthless, the middle peasants may vaccilate and may even betray the movement. It is important to keep this in mind in our mass work in the countryside among the peasantry. It is not only in the national democratic revolution that we must rely on the poor peasants and farm laborers; after the seizure of state power by the proletariat until the period of communism these strata will continue to be the social base for the consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat.

The Communist Party of the Philippines must rely on peasant revolutionary bases to defeat bourgeois state power in the countryside before capturing the cities. Comrade Mao Tse-tung has extensively shown with genius in theory and in practice how the countryside can encircle the cities in the course of armed struggle in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. The universal truth of the theory of using the countryside to encircle the city has been proven by long practice of the Chinese Revolution and has proven to be invincible. There are, however, local revisionists who reject the universal truth of this revolutionary theory and who overstress the fact that the Philippines is an archipelago, unlike China with a big contagious land area and population, with the view of obscuring and denying the basic class analysis and dialectics involved in the theory of using the countryside to encircle the city. The theory of people's war is a universal truth and applies on Philippine conditions. Because of the uneven development of politics and economy in the era of imperialism, the weak links of bourgeois state power is to be found in the countryside. The proletarian revolutionary forces should develop and accumulate its armed strength in the backward political, economic, military and cultural bastions of the peoples democratic revolution from which a protracted struggle can be waged by the People's Liberation Army in order to win over-all victory over the counter-revolutionary army. The countryside certainly provides so many times vaster an area for maneuver than the cities. In the Philippines, the area for maneuver in the city is extremely linited and development of armed revolutionary power cannot be secret. The cities are actually the bastions of bourgeois state power before the people's democratic power develop the capability of capturing them subsequent to the defeat of the counter-revolutionary army in the countryside. What makes the bourgeois state power weak in the countryside is that contracistions within the counter-revolutionary front keep on arising. By its own law of motion, whichever group in the counter- revolutionary front is ascendant would keep a big armed force in the city to maintain its city-based political power. Furthermore, the counter-revolutionary army would be spread thinly over the country in maintaining control over main communications and transportation lines. This disposition of counter-revolutionary forces would leave the widest areas of the country-side for the development of the peasant under the leadership of the proletariat. In the countryside, the Party must simple go deep among the peasant masses in order to develop the main force of the people's democratic revolution.

In line with Mao Tse-tung's thought, the Communist Party of the Philippines must conciously shift it center of gravity to the countryside. All previous Party leadership in the Philippines have suffered failures that were singularly characterized by political activity that had its center of gravity in the city of Manila. The shift from the city to the countryside means that the main force and headquarters of the people's democratic revolution should be shifted from the city to the countryside. This shift does not mean the neglect of the urban struggle but it is a matter of determining which is principal and secondary. The principal form of struggle is waged in the countryside; the secondary one im the city. It is in the countryside that the people's armed forces can take the offensive against the enemy, while in the city the revolutionary forces must take the defensive until such time that the people's armed forces in the countryside can seize the city.

Developing the people's war in the countryside entails three inseparable components; namely, armed struggle agrarian revolution and rural bases. By engaging in armed struggle and winning more battles, conditions are created for enlarging the base areas. The base areas are utilized by the people's armed forces to entrap the enemy forces, whether they are in the form of "special forces", big operations or what else that the enemy can launch. By having more base areas, there are more areas where to wage the agrarian revolution. By waging the agrarian revolution, the bases areas become more consolidated because the feudal forces and their political power are wiped out. The political power of the revolutionary forces increases as the peasants become enthusiastic and join the advancing Red Army. Armed struggle, agrarian revolution and rural bases promote each other. The people's democratic power increases in the countryside through warfare. As rural bases become consolidated politically and economically, a state within a state is created. An armed independent regime, a base government, of the proletariat is created in the countryside.

A revolutionary land reform that the Party should strive for is waging people's war should include essentially the confiscation of lands from the landlords and distribution of these to the peasants without cost. Feudal land ownership is to be eliminated withinthe base area. Pursuing the correct class line in the countryside, the Party and the people's armed forces should rely on the poor peasants and farm workers, unite with the middle peasants, neutralize the rich peasants and wipe out landlordism and promote production.

In waging tha agrarian revolution, the Party and the people's armed forces should be aware of two basic stages of development. At a stage that an area is unstable, they should make constant preparations for converting it into a base area by exercising armed power in wiping out bandits and cattle rustlers, in opposing local tyrants and in compelling lower rent and lower interest in order to weaken the enemy and mobilize the masses. As the masses are fully mobilized organizationally and ideologically and well-consolidated base area has emerged from the struggles of the masses themselves, confiscation of lands from the landlords and equal distribution of these to the peasants can take place.

The Party and the people's armed forces should trust and rely on the masses in raising high their political consciousness. They should let the masses educate themselves. Initially, they should recognize the roots of suffering among the masses; and subsequently, through struggle meetings, grievances against the exploiting classes can be poured out by the peasants to educate themselves. As the Party and the people's armed forces direct the peasant war against the three pillars of feudal power, the big landlords, the despotic landlords and the landlords in authority, the peasants gain experince in class dictatorship over the exploiting classes. Through reason and struggle meetings and through the people's courts and the rendering of sentences commensurate to the crimes of the feudal exploitersthe peasant masses become more deeply committed to the people's democratic revolution and they willingly let their best sons and daughters join the Communist Party of the Philippines and the People's Liberation Army.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has said: "The seizure of power by armed force, the settlement of the issue by war, is the central task and the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist principle of revolution holds good universally for China and for all other countries. But while the principle remains the same, its application by the party of the proletariat finds expression in various ways according to varying conditions."

The central task of the Communist Party of the Philippines is to seize political power. In waging armed struggle to achieve the people's democratic revolution, the Party must grasp Mao Tse-tung's theory of using the countryside to encircle and capture the cities and likewise his class analysis of a semi-feudal and semi-colonial country. In the Philippines, however, there is the special condition of being an archipelago that requires particular attention. While it is necessary to build up the main military force in the main island of Luzon to overthrow the bourgeois state power that is centrally seated in the city of Manila, the other islands of Visayas and Mindanao can converted from an intial disadvantage to a long-run advantage by establishing there armed fronts and rural Bases that can disperse and dissipate the counter-revolutionary aremed power now concentrated in Luzon, particularly in Central Luzon and Greater Manila. At any rate taking all other conditions, Mao Tse-tung's theory of using the countryside to encircle the city and his class analysis still holds true universally, in the Philippines, and in every significant island of the Philippines.

Comrade Lin Piao has brilliantly systematized and extended on a world scale Comrade Mao Tse-tung's theory of people's war by developing the thesis that the world's countryside, that is, Asia, Africa and Latin America, encircle the cities of the world. U.S. imperialism, the main enemy of the peoples of the world and principal guardian of world reaction is over-extended throughout the countryside of the world. It is inthis countryside of the world that the oppressed peoples, like the Filipino people, can have plenty of area for maneuver and deal deadly blows on every weakened link of the over-extended imperialist chain.U.S. imperialism is in no position to maintain even and effective strength throughout the world's countryside while it has to impose its class interests against the national liberation movements, the socialist peoples, the Afro-American people, the American working class, and even against its own capitalists rivals in so many parts of thw world all at the same time. While the manpower and resources of U.S. imperialism are limited, what is most essentials is that its aggressive class character is hated by all peoples of the world and is met by just and progressive revolutionary people's wars. In Vietnam alone, U.S. imperialism and its puppet allied troops cannot win over the valiant and patriotic Vietnamese people. In many more places, it will continue to be defeated resoundingly by revolutionary armed struggles. Armed with the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung, the peoples of the world are waging people's wars and, thus are proving the historical truth that this is the era of the total collapse of imperialism and world triumph of socialism.

C. National United Front

The national united front is a component part of the political line of the Communist Party of the Philippines. The Philippine Revolution is a revolution of the toiling masses against U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. The national united front serve this political line.

The highest task of the people's democratic revolution is the seizure of state power by armed force. The national united front must serve this central task. The Communist Party of the Philippines stands firmly wielding and utilizing both weapons of armed struggle and the national united front against the enemy. Through the national united front, the Party extends widely its political influence and gains the widest support of the masses and other progressive classes and strata as it establishes the independent strength of the leading class, the proletariat, through armed agrarian revolution supported mainly by the peasantry.

For failure to clarify and use correctly the national united front as a weapon of the people's democratic revolution, previous Party leaderships are responsible for several revisionist misconceptions regarding it. There are those who regard the national united front as the opposite of armed struggle. Violating the Marxist-Leninist theory of state and revolution, they also consider the national united front as the main weapon and parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle. Lavaism is mainly responsible for this revisionism, this treason to Mao Tse-tung's thought,

Before the outbreak of the anti-Japanese war, the Popular Front was considered by the Party leadership as merely the license for engaging mainly in parliamentary struggle; not even preparations for anti-fascist armed struggle were seriously made. During the war, the anti-fascist united front against Japan was ludicrously maintained as a "united front" mainly with U.S. imperialism and the Commonwealth government by the Right opportunists and, in this manner, Party cadres, the Red soldiers and the masses became totally unprepared for the return of U.S. imperialism and its puppet Commonwealth government. After the anti-Japanese war, the leadership of the working class and the Party in the national united front was obscured and laid aside when the Democratic Alliance, as a formal united front organization assumed the leadership of all progressive forces and bourgeois personalitiespersonally close to the Lava brothers assumed the leadership and initiative therein. The Party lost strength, initiative and independence when its leadership decided to lay down its arms and to engage mainly in parliamentary struggle through the Democratic Alliance.

Until now, these is the talse notion fostered by Right opportunists and revisionists that a national united front must always have a definite organization form like the Democratic Alliance or the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism whose unity, for the purpose of parliamentary struggle, must be preserved by all means and above all. In the broad experience of successful revolutionary movements, the national united front dose not necessarily have a formal organization. Neither is its function limited to parliamentary struggle. As a matter of fact, the best form of united front is wherein the Party is involved in any

formal united front organization in the course of either armed struggle or legal struggle it must always be prepared by having its own independent strength and initiative to meet any betrayal or compromise with the enemy that the national bourgeoisie might make due to its dual class character.

What the key question in the national united front is whether a proletarian revolutionary class leadership is at the helm of all other progressive forces fighting in common against the enemy in the armed and legal fronts. Whether there is a formal united front organization or not, the Communist Party of the Philippines must maintain its revolutionary vanguard role, its independence and initiative.

The Communist Party of the Philippines must engage in the national united front in order to tap all positive forces in the armed and legal fronts against the enemy. The national united front policy is pursued in order to expand the influence of the revolutionary armed forces, isolate the enemy and its die-hard elements and recruit the broad masses of the people into the side of the people's democratic revolution.

The special task of the national united front is to win over the middle forces and elements in order to isolate the die-hard elements. To be able to do this, the Party must have a clear and repeated class analysis, which can distinguish the middle forces and elements from the die-hard reactionaries, the principal enemies from the secondary enemies, the enemies of today from the enemies of tomorrow; and among friends, the reliable from the unreliable.

The Party's policy of the national united front is a proletarian policy concerning classes in Philippine society. In developing the national united front, we must distinguish our enemies from our friends and vice versa.

Chairman Mao has said: "Who are our enemies: Who are our friends? This is a question of first importance for the revolution . . . A revolutionary party is the guide of the masses, and no revolution ever succeeds when the revolutionary party leads them astray. To ensure that we will definitely achieve success in our revolution and will not lead the masses astray, we must pay attention to uniting with our real friends in order to attack our real enemies. To distinguish real friends from real enemies, we must make a general analysis of the economic status of the various classes in Chinese society and of their respective attitudes towards the revolution."

The national united front should be based on the alliance of the working class and the peasantry under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party of the Philippines. The national united front should include other progressive classes and strata in Philippine society which unite with the masses on the basis of a common political programme. This political programme, accepted in common by the working class, the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, should correspond with the general line and programme of the Communist Party of the Philippines. This political programme must serve to weld together the broadest unity of progressive forces and groups to isolate the die-hard reactionaries, composed of the comprador bourgeoisie, the landlords and the bureaucrat capitalists.

The programme of the Party and the national united front should include mainly the liquidation of feudalism and semi-feudalism and the free distribution of land to poor peasants and farm workers, and the nationalization of industries and enterprises owned and controlled by the foreign monopoly capitalists and the comprador bourgeoisie. This programme can be achieved fully only with the seizure of state power by the proletariat. There should be no mistaking between the strengthening of the state sector in the present economy and land reform in the bourgeois state on the one hand and the nationalization of the economy and agrarian revolution in the liberated area or in the people's democratic state on the other.

In adhering to the national united front, the Communist Party of the Philippines must maintain its independence, ideologically, politically and organizationally. It must unite with the progressive forces within the national united front but it should not surrender its fundamental class interests and those of the peasantry to the bourgeoisie. It must always conduct independent mass work, mainly among the peasants, so that it has its own political strength to realy on in any event. The national united front is essentially an instrument to win over the middle forces and elements to isolate the diehard elements.

It is in the relationship of the Party with the national bourgeoisie within the national united front that require special attention. This is primarily because the national bourgeoisie has a dual class character, one aspect of which is progressive and another, reactionary. In dealing with the national bourgeoisie we must avoid two dangerous pitfalls; namely, "Left" opportunism and Right opportunism. To dismiss the national bourgeoisie as completely reactionary is "left" opportunist and sectarian; and to regard the national bourgeoisie as completely revolutionary is to be Right opportunist and capitulationist. It is necessary at all times for the Party to adopt a revolutionary dual tactic towards the national bourgeoisie, combining unity and struggle. If the Party loses sight of the reactionary aspect of the national bourgeoisie, it would become unprepared for any betrayal of the revolution by this class. Revolutionary vigilance is required in our relations with the national bourgeoisie. If the Party loses sight of the progressive character of this class and does not recognize it as an ally within a certain period of time and to a certain limited extent, it would fail to take advantage of actual contradictions between this class and foreign monopoly capitalism and also feudalism.

In order to develop the cooperation of the national bourgeoisie the Party must have its own strength; otherwise, this class and its representatives would be reluctant to cooperate. The Party must respect the legitimate interests of all middle forces, with concessions actually granted to them without undermining the interests of the proletariat. At all times, resolute struggle must be waged against the enemies of the national united front so that trust in the Party will grow among the people and all middle forces.

The national united front has its larger extension in the international united front. All revolutionary and progressive forces that can be united against the main enemy of the peoples of the world, U.S. imperialism, should be united. Modern revisionism with its slogan of united action should be rejected as the ideology of the international scabs who are serving and seeking peace and detente with U.S. imperialism.

In the international communist movement, the biggest danger today is modern revisionism. So likewise in the Philippines the main danger is modern revisionism in the form of Lavaism and all other forms of Right opportunism. The collaboration between U.S. imperialism, modern revisionism and all forms of reaction should be continuously exposed and attacked by the international united front and the national united front.

U.S. imperialism and all other reactionaries are paper tigers. All the nuclear weapons and all the military technology of the U.S. imperialists cannot frighten us. Although our fraternal people, the Chinese people, have made the atom bomb for the defense of the revolutionary peoples, what is more important for all fighting peoples is the human factor, the surging forces of the masses under the leadership of the proletariat and the Communist Party. They are bound up in the spirit of proletarian internationalism and Mao Tse-tung's thought in the world proletarian revolution and the international united front against U.S. imperialism, modern revisionism and all forms of reaction.

Although our Party and people welcome moral and material support from fraternal parties and peoples, under the spirit of proletarian internationalism and within the framework of the international united front, we must rely mainly on ourselves first of all and wage the people's democratic revolution as part of the world proletarian revolution.

Armed with the invincible thought of Mao Tse-tung, the Communist Party of the Philippines will surely triumph and the Filipino people under the leadership of the revolutionary proletariat will achieve people's democracy first and socialism, next.

VOLUME II

GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City

10 March 1970

The AFP published last 5 February the first of a series of publications entitled "So The People May Know" in an effort to keep our people informed of the threat posed by the Communist Party of the Philippines. The first volume, entitled "Programme of the Communist Party of the Philippines", reveals Communist plans and intentions to control our country.

As admitted by the Maoist faction itself, in its "Communique of the Congress of the Reestablishment of the CPP", these new basic Party documents are "inspired by Mao Tse Tung's thought and affirm clearly that the people's democratic revolution in the Philippines can be achieved only by taking the road of **armed revolution.**" Their intention is no less than to make the Philippines another Vietnam.

This publication entitled "The Communist Movement Party Today and the Grave Threat it Poses to Philippine National Security" is the second of the AFP's "So The People May Know" series. It supplements the first volume by exposing the operational and organizational side of the local Communist scheme – actual practice in Central Luzon and in our cities to achieve the objectives of their "programme".

Since national security is the concern not only of the government but also of every citizen, it is hoped that this expose of actual Communist methods and practices will give our people a better appreciation of what the Communist Party of the Philippines really is – an organized conspiracy to overthrow our democratic system not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means and to replace our cherished institutions with a totalitarian regime subject to alien, particularly Communist Chinese, domination and ideology.

Manuel T. Yan

MANUEL T. YAN
General, AFP
Chief of Staff

THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT TODAY AND THE GRAVE THREAT IT POSES TO PHILIPPINE NATIONAL SECURITY

FOREWORD

In declassifying basic Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) documents which it had captured in Capas, Tarlac, the AFP exposed the Communist plot to seize national power. The exploitation of the current wave of student activism by a small hard-core group of extremists and radicals, drowning out the voices of the modorates of the legitimate student movement, is the most convincing proof that the Maoist plan for take-over is now in high gear. The leaders and manipulators of the radical elements in the student movement are linked to this Communist plot through the Kabataang Makabayan (KM). The leadership of Maoist faction of the CPP includes many of the KM's original founders and national officers.

Because of the lack of accurate and unbiased information, many Filipinos today have remained in the dark as to the real picture of this serious threat to our national well-being.

The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), also known as the Partido Komunista Ng Pilipinas (PKP), today seeks, as it has always sought, to **seize national power.** Its aim is to supplant our democratic system of representative government and free enterprise with a Maoist-Leninist-Marxist system of the same kind that has enslaved millions of human beings behind the Bamboo and Iron Curtains.

This ultimate objective of the Communists in our midst is amply supported by documents captured from them. For example, the basic goal of their programme for a "democratic revolution", states:

"The CPP is determined to implement its general programme for a people's democratic revolution. All Filipino Communists are ready to sacrifice their lives for the worthy cause of achieving the new type of democracy of building a new Philippines that is genuinely and completely independent, democratic, just, and prosperous . . . . . The central task of any revolutionary involvement is to seize political power. The CPP assumes this task at a time that both the international and national situations are favorable to taking the road of armed revolution . . . . ."

To achieve this, they advocate "cooperation with all organizations and groups that can help build up the national united front and isolate the die-hard enemies of the people's democratic revolution."

All these aims, concepts and guidelines are reflected in the Constitution of the emergent Maoist faction of the local Communist movement. Promulgated last 26 Dec. 1968 on the occasion of MAO TSETUNG's 75th birthday, this Party Constitution states, among others, that:

"The integration of the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism, **MAO TSETUNG's** thought with the concrete practice of the Philippine Revolution is the supreme task of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

"To defeat the US imperialists, the comprador bourgeoisie, the landlords and the bureaucratic capitalists, the Party wields the weapons of **protracted people's war** and the **national** united front.

"In waging a people's war, the Party relies mainly on the mass support of the peasantry. The Party develops the revolutionary forces in the countryside to destroy the pillars of feudalism and the armed counter-revolution there, and to encircle the cities from revolutionary base areas until the people's democratic forces are ready to seize power in the cities."

Filipino Communists end the preamble of their Constitution with the statement . . . "Let us arm ourselves with the invincible thought of MAO TSETUNG."

The pledge each member is required to make contains the commitment to "take every opportunity to propagate MAO TSETUNG's thought and implement the revolutionary line of the party."

The captured CPP documents give evidence of an accelerated Communist program to take over the country, starting with the establishment in December 1968 of a Maoist faction of the Communist Party of the Philippines. Heading this Chinese Communist-oriented group are several young intellectuals and students mostly from the KM who had previously made trips to the Chinese mainland and had become exposed to the Peking ideology. In effect these young Filipinos, such as Arthur Garcia (now the principal ideological adviser of Commander Dante's 400-man New People's Army), became the means used by the Chinese Communists to export their brand of revolution to our country.

The Communist plan to intensify their armed struggle is borne out by actual events since 1968. Depredations of dissidents in Central Luzon involving killings, kidnappings and ambushes claimed about 196 lives in 173 incidents, or more than double the figures for 1968. Likewise, the number of civil disturbances has sharply increased during the past 12 months. While many such rallies, demonstrations and strikes were carried out by peaceful groups seeking desirable reforms in government and society, all of the violent ones were manipulated by provocateurs and agitators who infiltrated the students' ranks. This is true of the January 26th, January 30th, February 18th and March 3rd riots. Radical elements exploited these demonstrations by riding on and eventually gaining control over many of these peaceful student organizations with legitimate issues for reform. Thus they managed to create serious distrubances and even temporary paralyzation of normal civilian activity in parts of Manila.

Indeed, the Communist movement in the Philippines is still very much alive today. After overcoming a number of crises in the past, including one which brought the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) to the brink of total defeat following its attempt to seize power in the early 1950s, the movement has recovered and is once again pursuing the revolutionary path with renewed energy and high expectations for success.

This exposie of the Communist menace is intended to provide the people with basic facts, particularly the veiled intentions of the local Communist movement and to: eliminate speculation among the public as to the true nature of the threat; provide the people with facts to better understand the threat; and generate closer cooperation between the Government and the Filipino people in the fight against Communism.

I. THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES

In spite of their supposed adherence to the Communist principle of "democratic centralism", PKP leaders do not always see eye to eye on matters concerning the formulation of strategy and tactics. This has resulted in serious factionalism within the Party. Since its inception in the early 1930s, the PKP has repeatedly been wracked by internal strife and dissension even at times when Party unity was badly needed. The substantive matters over which the PKP leaders often disagree are the following:

1. Divergence in the interpretation of Communist theory and practice under local conditions;
2. Conflicting estimates of the situation in the determination of the existence or absence of a "revolutionary" situation; and
3. Struggle for power among the leaders.

Significantly, every time inner party conflict takes place, the PKP always finds itself divided into at least two opposing factions, each usually counting on a substantial number of adherents, in spite of the fact that PKP members are supposed to impose upon themselves iron discipline to serve the interests of the Party.

The local Communist movement today is divided into two opposing factions: the Maoist-oriented "reestablishment Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its military component – the New People's Army (NPA) otherwise known as the Military Arm-Maoist (MA-MAO), and the traditional PKP faction and its new military organization – the Army ng Bayan (AB). These two groups are believed to be still sufficiently separated by deep-rooted differences in ideological orientation, in strategic and tactical concepts and in leadership as to preclude the likelihood of their total reconciliation in the immediate future. However, both pursue the same ultimate objective – the overthrow of the Government by armed revolution. The two factions and their respective front organizations cooperate closely on common projects such as the direction of student demonstrations in the Greater Manila area.

A. THE MOIST FACTION (CPP/MA-MAO); ITS PLANS AND POLICIES

The members of the Maoist faction, on one hand, are dedicated advocates of the Maoist concept of the "armed struggle" and are avid adherents of Mao's dictum that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun." They believe that the situation is now ripe for the implementation of the "armed struggle" to overthrow the Government. Their concept envisions the gradual taking of control of the countryside to isolate the populated areas. They plan to expand both their legal and armed activities simultaneously throughout the country. The Maoist faction is directed by a 22-member Central Committee, and spearheading its organizational activities of a militant youth organization whose leaders are the leading personalities of the Maoist faction itself.

The CPP/MA-MAO claims that its two main enemies are US imperialism and democratic feudalism. To defeat its enemies and attain its ultimate objective of seizing power, it employs the armed struggle with the "parliamentary" struggle playing a complementary but secondary role. Accordingly, the Party advocates the employment of the Maoist concept of the "protracted people's war", or "war of national liberation."

Hand in hand with this political strategy is its military organizational concept which envisions the creation of four types of fighting units for the MA-MAO, namely: Regular Mobile Forces; Guerrilla Units; Militia or Self-Defense Corps; and Armed City Partisans.

Although the MA-MAO under Commander Dante is still in its formative stage, it has already attained greater notoriety in Central Luzon than other dissident groups. It has an estimated armed strength of 400 men, about 400 "combat support" elements and a mass support of some 41,000. Its three main missions, are to:

1. Engage in party rebuilding – in addition to building up its fighting force – by organizing party branches at all levels of command and to assist in the propagation of Communist (Maoist) doctrines.
2. Carry out agrarian revolution, build rural bases and advance the armed struggle by exerting efforts to mobilize the peasant masses either as part of the MA-MAO or as a mass base.
3. Assist in building up a "national united front" by drawing workers and peasants in an effort to draw them, together with other militant elements of society, into a "United Front" against the Government.

In the course of the "protracted people's war", each type of MA-MAO fighting unit is to perform definite tasks, namely;

For the Regular Mobile Forces – Defend the rural bases and destroy the government forces on a big scale.

For the Guerrilla Forces – Defend the guerrilla zones, prepare for the emergence or advance of Regular Mobile Forces, and create new guerrilla zones.

For the Militia or Self-Defense Corps – Defend the masses in local areas without separating themselves from daily productive work.

For the Armed City Partisans – Perform special tasks of disrupting governmental activities and punishing (assassinating) those considered as traitors in cities.

The general guidelines for the various components of the Maoist faction are clearly defined in its "Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution". Some of these general guidelines are the following:

GENERAL GUIDELINES

1. Destruction of the forces of US imperialism and feudal oppression of the Philippines;
2. Establishment of a people's democratic state and a coalition or united front government;
3. The main content of the people's democratic revolution is the struggle for land among the peasants;
4. The foreign policy of the Philippine bourgeoisie government is dictated by the internal reactionary classes and US imperialism; and

5. In the determination therefore of foreign policy the people's democratic government shall be inspired by the principle of proletarian internationalism. **Communist China shall be considered as the bastion of the world proletarian revolution and as a reliable friend of all oppressed people including the Filipino people.**

These guiding principles are treated in greater detail in what the Maoists call a "Special Programme". The following are a few of them:

IN THE POLITICAL FIELD

1. Attach, isolate and destroy the bourgeois reactionary state, the US imperialists, the landowners and all local tyrants until their doom;
2. Establish an armed independent regime and develop the people's ability in the conduct of government in the course of armed struggle; and
3. Cooperate with all organizations and groups that can help build up the national united front.

IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD

1. Outlaw bureaucrat capital and all property gained through corrupt and criminal means;
2. Help the workers to conduct strike successfully; and
3. Expose the deceptive and reactionary character of the Magna Carta of Labor, the Agricultural Land Reform Code and other such measures pretending to support the economic and social struggle of the exploited masses.

IN THE MILITARY FIELD

1. Organize and train units of the People's Army;
2. Wage a war of annihilation;
3. Cooperate with all other armed groups or movements fighting against imperialist and feudal oppression;
4. Destroy the military units of the reactionary government and of US imperialists and capture useful military equipment; and
5. Campaign against US military bases and all treaties with the US.

IN FOREIGN POLICY

1. Expose the United Nations as a tool of US imperialism and their revisionist renegade accomplices in the crime of neo-colonialism;
2. Oppose such regional arrangements as the Asian Development Bank, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian and Pacific Council (ASPAC), and other such arrangements that reinforce the SEATO

and other long-standing instruments of US imperialism; and

3. Develop firmest relations with Communist China, Albania and all revolutionary governments'

According to the Communists, the conditions both internationally and locally are excellent for the implementation of their general and specific programmes.

B. THE TRADITIONAL PKP/AB GROUP; ITS PLANS AND POLICIES

The traditional faction is more deliberate in the conduct of its activities. While it believes it can attain its ultimate objective only through violent means, it feels the current situation does not warrant emphasis on the armed struggle. It therefore advocates the "parliamentary" struggle for the present. Its military arm, the Army ng Bayan, concentrates on organizational expansion. It has an armed strength of about 100 men with about 130 "combat support" elements and a mass support estimated to be about 37,000.

Today the traditional PKP group is still attempting to attain its three-point strategic objective set forth under its policy of Filipinism" first enunciated in 1956 which consists of the:

1. Establishment of a "Filipinistic Government, i.e., a government not subservient to foreigners, especially the US;
2. Establishment of a "New Democracy" (Dictatorship of the Proletariat) through the armed struggle and seizure of state power; and
3. Consolidation of state power, stabilization of the dictatorship of the proletariat by eliminating reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries.

By implementing the "parliamentary" form of struggle complemented by limited armed struggle, the traditional PKP faction hopes to strengthen itself and prepare the ground for the eventual seizure of state power through a violent armed revolution. Its expansional effort is still limited to Central and Southern Luzon where activists belonging to some MASAKA chapters and released/former HMBs are utilized for recruitment. A 31-member Central Committee directs the affairs of the traditional faction of the CPP.

In the meantime, Party workers are enjoined to widely use united front tactics, improve the ideological consciousness of cadres, intensify agitation and propaganda activities and expand mass organizations. It is now active in the field of subversion involving practically all segments of society, namely:

labor/peasantry; youth/students; professionals/ intellectuals; government agencies and civic organizations. Its penetration into most sectors of Philippine society, including those at higher intellectual and professional levels, accounts for its sizeable mass support.

C. THE HMBs

Another military aggrupation, the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, or HMB for short, is currently not considered to be a part of any of the two Communist political factions, although both factions are trying to win over the rank-and-file members of the HMB. At the moment, the HMBs have been denounced by the CPP as a "party-less' organization which has already lost its ideological moorings. Led by Pedro Taruc and Commander Sumulong, it has an armed strength of about 265 men, with "combat support" of about 200 and a mass base of approximately 43,000. It presently devotes its attention to protecting its political interest and business ventures in the vicinity of Clark Air Force Base.

II. CURRENT COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES

To To achieve their objectives, the Communist pursue the following activities which may be categorized into two general overlapping fields – insurgency and subversion.

A. INSURGENCY

Communist insurgent activities are generally confined to Central Luzon and, to a certain extent, its peripheral areas. These activities generally include terroristic operations such as ambuscades, liquidations or kidnappings. Concurrent with these depredations activities, the armed groups now operating mostly in Central Luzon are engaged in intensified expansion and recruitment activities. Expansion activities in other regions such as Northern Luzon, Southern Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao have also been noted.

Communist insurgents have killed from 1962 to 1968 a total of about 298 victims. Insurgent activities during the period 1962 to 1965 remained relatively low-keyed, resulting in an estimated 78 persons killed (1962 – 19; 1963 – 14; 1964 – 28 and 1965 – 17 killed). Since 1966, however, Communist insurgent depredations showed a marked increase. From 1966 to 1968, Communist insurgents killed 220 persons (1966 – 78; 1967 – 69; and 1968 – 82 killed).

By 1969, violent incidents involving dissidents more than doubled compared to 1968. During the year 1969 alone, they were responsible for a total of 173 terroristic incidents resulting in 196 killed, 37 kidnapped, and 103 wounded, in contrast to 1968 figures of 81 incidents resulting in 82 killed, 27 kidnapped and 19 wounded.

For the first two months of 1970 alone, there have been 42 dissident-initiated incidents resulting in 54 killed, 1 kidnapped and 35 wounded. It is expected that Communist terror tactics will continue to be intensified in accordance with the new policy of the Maoist faction – the pursuit of the armed revolution – particularly in the rural areas. (See Annex A.)

VIETCONG TYPE INSURGENT ACTIVITIES

The MA-MAOs insurgent activities and operations have increasingly reflected Chinese Communist influence. This is a result of the increase in the number of Filipino cadres surreptitiously visiting Communist China. Since 1968, various individuals infiltrated into Communist China to undergo 3-month training sessions. While in China, Filipino communist cadres receive training in sabotage techniques, guerrilla warfare, Viet-Cong style tactics, the thoughts of MAO, and techniques of mass action exploitation, including the use of terror tactics in populated areas.

Significantly, Viet-Cong type tunnels were discovered in June 1969 in Capas, Tarlac where voluminous documents belonging to the Maoist faction were captured. Later, other tunnels were discovered – one in Barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac and in the mountains of Botolan, Zambales. Communist insurgent operations and techniques are expected to become more sophisticated and refined should the number of their cadre trained in Communist China increase.

B. SUBVERSION

Communist subversive activities on the other hand, are conducted either overtly or covertly. The most significant are the following:

1. Infiltration of legitimate groups and government agencies and creation of front organizations.

Both Party factions aim at infiltrating organizations among the peasantry/labor, student/youth, and professional/ intellectual sectors as bases for agitation, propaganda and organizational work and as source of recruits. Local government agencies, especially those in Central Luzon, are also targets for infiltration, penetration, and projection to assure protection of their local activities.

There are indications that new legal fronts have been formed while many others have been infiltrated and are being used as screens for their illegal activities.

Some of these front or infiltrated groups are very well-known nationalist organizations. Unfortunately, a majority of their members are probably unaware of the Communists among them.

Through Communist cadre manipulation, these front organizations have become involved in the staging of several riotous demonstrations and rallies. They serve as focal points for other activities designed to advance the interests of the Communist movement.

Communist-infiltrated and front groups strongly believe that a relentless war must be waged against feudalism, fascism and imperialism. To them, feudalism is typified by the current land tenancy problem, social injustice and the gap between the rich and poor; fascism is exemplified by the use of armed might to suppress civil liberties; and imperialism is best proved by the continued existence of US bases in the country. Leaders of some of these groups believe in the inevitability of violence, and if social injustice and economic hardship continue to persist, in the inevitability of revolution.

2. Political Indoctrination, Agitation and Propaganda

Political indoctrination, agitation and propaganda activities are subversive instruments widely used by local Communists to convince the masses there is a need for a change to a revolutionary-type society. Some of the current issues being exploited by the movement include:

a. Graft and corruption in the government;
b. Economic difficulties, such as the rising cost of living, poverty and unemployment;
c. Failure of the government in the implementation of the Land Reform Code;
d. US imperialism and its influence over Philippine political and economic policies;
e. Alleged abuses of AFP and police personnel; and
f. The government as a tool of vested interests.

Veiled with strong nationalistic appeals, a number of these issues have gained some degree of public acceptance.

Communist Propaganda Themes

The intensity of Communist propaganda activities in support of their indoctrination and agitation drive in the Philippines increases or decreases according to the fortunes of the local Communist movement. The present proliferation of Communist literature and the increasing audacity of suspect personalities in the field of propaganda, particularly in bold press releases, may be considered a reflection of their current strength.

The rising tide of student/youth activism and labor and farmer unrest provides the Communists with a favorable opportunity to exploit. Wherever there is student/youth agitation, they seize the opportunity to mouth nationalist slogans, most of which are strongly flavored with Maoist jargon.

Communist propaganda themes vary depending upon the target group. Propaganda materials beamed towards the youth concentrates on fiery nationalist idealism which is very appealing to the young. Those intended for the laborer and farmer sectors concentrate on economic problems and poor working conditions.

Additionally, the Communists distort the Government and the AFP's intentions, especially in Central Luzon, downgrade the achievements of our democratic processes and institutions, and harp on our dependence on the US for economic and military assistance. These themes find adherents not only from among intellectuals but also among the students, farmers and workers.

RADIO PEKING

Radio as a propaganda vehicle, also plays an important part in the Communist propaganda drive. Radio Peking now beams toward Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, regular broadcasts in English and Mandarin on different frequencies, night and day. Additionally, Radio Peking beams a special broadcast in Pilipino that is clearly received in Northern Luzon and partly up to Bulacan and the Greater Manila area. Themes in these broadcasts seldom vary, and usually deal on local Philippine developments, Mao's thoughts, his economic accomplishments, US imperialism and Soviet revisionism. Local Philippine developments discussed are usually those of a negative or derogatory nature and only those events of propaganda value to the local Communists or Communism in general are exploited and commented upon in detail. Peking's analysis and interpretation of these developments are highly distorted and biased. In fact, the New China News Agency, Red China's official press organ, and RAdio Peking have been gloating over the destruction and violence that have accompanied student demonstrations in Manila during the past several weeks.

3. Recruitment and Training

Both factions of the local Communist movement are intensifying their recruitment and training activities. Both factions are concentrating on peasant/worker, student/youth and professional /intellectual groups for this purpose. Priority is given to the recruitment of the young, promising student leaders, intellectuals and professionals. There is ample proof that the CPP, especially the MA-MAO faction has been conducting the ideological brainwashing of students in high schools, colleges and universities, particularly in government educational institutions. Training in

Viet-Cong style terror tactics is given to selected student radicals in Central Luzon by MA-MAO leaders.

4. **Participation in Elections**

Increasing Communist involvement was noted during past national elections. Communist election activities are designed mainly to help into office cnadidates who could be sympathetic to the CPP's cause. The local elections of 1971 would likely see intensified Communist participation and both factions may be expected to sponsor delegates to the forthcoming Constitutional Convention.

III. OTHER FACTORS COMPOUNDING THE COMMUNIST THREAT

Other factors also serve to compound the Government's effort to combat Communism. The impression of lawlessness and violence generated by sensationalized press/radio/TV reporting not only undermines the people's trust in the government but is also utilized by dissident elements to promote insurgency.

The peace and order situation is likewise adversely affected by the increase in the quantity of loose firearms and the incidence of crime.

There is an estimated total of 89,000 loose firearms all over the country as of December, 1969 as compared to some 56,000 in May 1968. The quantity has not only increased by 33,000 in the span of 19 months, but the quality of loose firearms has also improved due to the smuggling into the country of modern automatic weapons. Most of the violent election incidents, Communist insurgent activities, and other forms of criminality are perpetrated with the use of these firearms.

Criminality on the other hand, has been better controlled in the past two years with the organization of the METROCOM in coordination with the local police forces in the Greater Manila area where two-thirds of the country's crimes take place. However, the high incidence of crime still adversely affects the overall peace and order picture.

And finally, certain economic and sociological problems bear directly on the problems of Communism. Some of them, particularly the economic and sociological factors in depressed areas like Central Luzon are clearly being exploited by the local Communists to gain adherents from among the workers, farmers and student groups. Workers and farmer-tenants are especially susceptible to Communist exploitation of economic issues while student/youth and professional/intelectual groups are unwittingly influenced by Communist slogans that are cleverly coated with strong nationalist appeals.

IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

With the mushrooming of legitimate mass movements spearheaded by our youth today, the Communists have found new fields to exploit. They adopt the old method of sowing fear and apprehension through the application of terror.

Communist subversive and terroristic activities are best reflected in the violence that accompanied the 26 and 30 Jan. 70 demonstrations and the destruction to private and public property on the night of 18 Feb 70. The demonstration in front of Congress last 26 Jan 70 was peaceful until certain leftist elements instigated the violence by attempting to harm, no matter how minor, the very symbol of the highest authority of the land – the President. Again, the 30 Jan 70 demonstration at Malacañang was orderly in the beginning and the students were preparing to terminate the event with the singing of the national anthem when radical elements initiated violence by capturing a firetruck, mauling its occupants and using it to ram the gates of Malacañang. These acts – committed by a group of militant elements carrying placards bearing "DANTE for President" – prove premeditation and pre-planning on their party. Moreover, these acts suggest that the Maoist faction has already organized what they term "City Partisans". These are the elements that specialize in city operations, such as supporting strikes, engaging in educational work, and initiating violence in mass activities. During the tumultuous incidents of the past few weeks, there have been persistent reports of armed dissident elements proceeding to the Manila area to exploit the situation. The combination of these dissidents from Central Luzon and the armed City Partisans needs to be watched by the AFP and local police forces.

V. APPRAISAL

The local Communist movement – which includes all its splinter groups – poses the most dangerous threat to Philippine national security today especially in the field of subversion. The traditional and Maoist factions have achieved organizational gains and continue to undertake infiltration activities, agitprop and other forms of subversive activity. Should the two factions manage to unite, the threat could considerably increase.

The recent release of some of the die-hard Politburo members whose convictions have not been mellowed by incarceration is a psychological victory for the movement. Their influence upon either faction is expected to be eventually felt as soon as they reestablish their past connections.

While intense personal rivalry among the leaders of the three Communist insurgent groups has served to hamper their efforts, the insurgents have so far managed to retain the capability to conduct terrorism, agitation and propaganda, recruitment, intelligence and expansion activities in certain areas where they have long been entrenched.

And finally, unhampered by morals and ethics and having little regard for human life and traditional values, the Communists have no qualms about utilizing devious and unlawful methods which they employ with skill and refinement. Characteristic tenacity and skill in the conduct of subversion is a major factor behind Communist determination to carry out their objectives to a successful conclusion. Clever and beguiling, they are quick to exploit prevailing conditions. This flexibility in which the Communists excel is best demonstrated by the violence that accompanied the most recent activities. It indicates a new Communist pattern – terrorism in populated areas. It calls for the encouragement of mass activities involving students, workers, farmers and other sectors in order to create opportunities for serious disturbances and riots. It is clear that the Communists hope to generate a feeling of insecurity and lack of faith in the ability of the government to maintain law and order and provide security by: 1) seriously disrupting peace and order especially in populated areas; 2) creating a feeling of fear and panic among the populace; and 3) disrupting normal activity, such as economic production; transportation, and other day-to-day civilian activity.

The AFP and other law enforcement agencies continue their round-the-clock vigilance over this Communist threat to our nation's well-being. The success of our effort to counter, and eventually eliminate, Communist subversion and insurgency can be assured only with the people's support and cooperation.

HMB/MA-MAO VICTIMS

1962 - 1969



⁂ -HMB/MA-MAO BEGINNING 1969

NOTE: THE FIGURES EXCLUDE PERSONS WOUNDED AND
KIDNAPPED, BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN LIQUIDATED
BUT WHOSE DEATHS COULD NOT BE CONFIRMED.

VOLUME III

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City

13 March 1970

FOREWORD

This publication, "The Communist Protracted Struggle in the Philippines" is the third of the AFP's "So The People May Know" series. It is a chronoligical account of the Party's past activities and is intended to give our people a historical perspective of what the Communist Movement has been undertaking for the last 40 years – a determined protracted struggle to destroy our democratic system and cherished institutions.

Although it has been outlawed three times by the three branches of our Government during its short existence because it engaged in activities inimical to our country's national well-being – by the Judiciary (Supreme Court) in 1933, the Executive (President Roxas) in 1948, and by Congress through Republic Act 1700 in 1957 – the Communist Party's determination to pursue its objectives to a successful conclusion has never changed.

This supplement to the first two volumes (I-"Programme of the Communist Party of the Philippines," and II-"The Communist Movement Today and the Grave Threat It Poses to Philippine National Security") is being published to provide our people with a working knowledge of what has happened in the past in order to better understand the threat posed by the Communist Party today and therefore be more aware of what to expect of the Communist Party in the future.

Manuel T. Yan

MANUEL T. YAN
General, AFP
Chief of Staff

THE COMMUNIST PROTRACTED STRUGGLE IN THE PHILIPPINES

EARLY PLANS AND POLICIES

The Partido Komunista (PK) was formally inaugurated November 7, 1930 at Plaza Moriones, Tondo, Manila (Annex A, Original PK Leadership). The major political issue at that time was independence from the United States and the PK exploited this issue to its own advantage, by harping on complete Philippine independence and the overthrow of "American imperialism" in the country even as it condemned capitalism and the exploitation of the masses. The Party eventually hoped to establish in the country a Soviet form of government under its leadership.

In the pursuit of its objectives, the PK moved to solidify labor, unify the workers and peasants, intensify the class struggle, and encourage the laborers and peasants under PK leadership to seize political power. The PK immediately started its work, first in Manila then gradually fanned out to Central and Southern Luzon. An intensified recruitment program was launched to augment the Party's initial strength of some 3,000 members. Leading cadres including Emilio MACLANG, Dominador GALVEZ, Saturnino BRIOSO and Florencio BABBAO were sent to Moscow for further training and indoctrination. The **Titis** (Spark), the official Party organ, greatly helped the PK's education and propaganda efforts.

At the outset, the PK was a legal organization freely participating in the country's political activities. It had two front organizations, the Lipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas (LPMP) led by Jacinto MANAHAN, and the Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas (KAP) led by Antonio D ORA. However, the open preaching of violent revolution and the overthrow of established government by the PK, combined with militant mass activ ities, forced the authorities to act. Leading Party leaders were arrested. Thirteen of them, including Crisanto EVANGELISTA, Jacinto MANAHAN, Dominador AMBROSIO, Guillermo CAPADOCIA, Lucio PILAPIL, Catalino MONROY and Enrique TORRENTE' were found guilty of sedition by the CFI of Manila on 14 Sept. 1931. With the exception of PILAPIL, these PK leaders were also found guilty of illegal association. The court further declared the PK and its allied organization, the Katipunan ng mga Anak-Pawis sa Pilipinas (KAP) as illegal associations.

PK TACTICS AFTER ITS OUTLAWING

Following the outlawing of the PK and pending the final Supreme Court decision, the Communist International suggested that the Party exploit the arrest of PK leaders as a basis for initiating a mass united front movement involving mass protests, agitational campaign through the mass media, and a general strike, if feasible. It further urged the PK to prepare itself for underground activities.

The Party succeeded in forming two major groups – the Workers and Peasants Defense Society and the National Unemployed Committee – to serve as its link to the mass bases. The Party continued to engage in intensive agitation, propaganda and organizational activities. Mass rallies and demonstrations involving farmers and workers groups took place in Bulacan, Nueva Ecija and Laguna.

However, the Party could not fully implement the actions suggested by the Communist International because a major internal rift developed among top Party leaders, Crisanto EVANGELISTA and Jacinto MANAHAN, who clashed over the question of who should be considered as the "proletariat" to assume the leading role in the revolution. MANAHAN, supported by Juan FELEO, asserted that the peasants should assume this role. On the other hand; EVANGELISTA, backed by CAPADOCIA, took the position that factory workers should be considered as the proletariat. A Chinese representative in the POLITBURO supported EVANGELISTA's position, giving the labor leaders a majority. MANAHAN accepted the decision with reservation and played up the issue among the peasants. The divisive effect of MANAHAN's action led to his being charged with "treachery against the laboring class and the party". He was subsequently eased out of the POLITBURO and Central Committee. Not long after, he was expelled from the Party on charges that certain activities he organized were subsidized by President Quezon.

On 26 October 1933, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Manila Court of First Instance on the illegality of the PK and the sentence meted out to its leaders. As a result of this, demoralization and confusion prevailed in the PK rank and file. Party membership dropped by more than 50 per cent.

In an effort to prevent the possible disintegration of the PK, the Party resorted to united front tactics, riding mostly with the Socialist Party of the Philippines (SPP) in its mass activities.

The United front with the SPP was further supplemented with other similar activities geared towards political action. While previous emphasis was on "united front from above".

Prior to the 1935 elections, the Partido Komunista, through a front group called the Toiler's League, coalesced with the Socialist Party and Republican Party. The coalition was known as the "Coalition of the Oppressed Masses". In 1936, the PK effected a "united front from above" around the anti-fascism issue, with other political parties notably the National Socialist Party of General Emilio AGUINALDO, the Democrata Party of Juan SUMULONG, the Republican Party of Gregorio AGLIPAY, and the Sakdalista Party of Benigno RAMOS. This aggrupation constituted the "Frente Popular". The PK, however, gave too much emphasis on the "class struggle" and thus alienated the other parties of the Front.

In its "united front from below", the PK in 1936 formed front groups including the "League for the Defense of Democracy", "Friends of China", "Philippine Youth Congress", and the "Congress for Democracy and Collective Security".

In 1938, shortly after the imprisoned PK leaders were granted pardon by President QUEZON, the PK formally merged with the Socialist Party of Pedro ABAD SANTOS. The merger assumed the official name "Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP).

The communists continued their united front activities after the PK-SP merger. In no time, however, the PKP, suffered serious internal feuds as the two merging parties – the PK and the SP – had differences in theory and practice. The Party was in such a state of affairs when the Pacific War broke out in December 1941.

WARTIME STRATEGIC AND TACTICAL POLICIES

The PKP's anti-fascist united front activities greatly enhanced the Party's efforts to identify itself with other segments of the community during World War II.

When the Japanese attacked the Philippines, the PKP Politburo called an emergency meeting and decided to:

1. Send a 12-point memorandum to President QUEZON and US High Commissionar SAYRE, reiterating its anti-Japanese stand and urging the formation of a national united front against Japan and the waging of guerrilla warfare against the Japanese;
2. Strengthen the PKP organizational set-up to insure continuity of leadership in the Party in case of capture or death of its leaders;
3. Establish local governments in areas not occupied by the Japanese;
4. Organize an anti-Japanese "united front";
5. Prepare for guerrilla warfare; and

6. Decentralize by sending Party leaders to the different provinces and regions.

The memorandum was ignored by both President QUEZON and US High Commissioner SAYRE. Despite this, the PKP started working on the formation of an Anti-Japanese Front Committee. But while the Party was working on the organization of this committee, ranking PKP leaders including Crisanto EVANGELISTA and Pedro ABAD SANTOS were arrested by the Japanese in January 1942. The Party's "second front" under the leadership of Dr. Vicente LAVA took over the leadership of the PKP. After assuming the position of Secretary-General, LAVA immediately organized the Central Luzon Bureau (CLB). Plans for the organization of guerrilla groups were drafted and implemented with the help of Chinese guerrillas organized from among the Chinese in the Philippines.

BIRTH OF THE HUKBALAHAP

The formal organization of the Hukbalahap on 29 March 1942 in Bo. Batibat. Concepcion, Tarlac, marked the beginning of the PKP armed struggle against the Japanese. The choice of the name for this military outfit was calculated to attract as many followers and supporters as possible. At first, Luis TARUC wanted to name it "People's Liberation Army". But upon the recommendation of a Chinese adviser in the PKP Military Committee, the name "Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon (People's Army Against the Japanese), or Hukbalahap was adopted.

Chinese Communist influence on the local communist movement was strongly felt throughout the war years. Aware of the superiority of their Chinese counterparts in the theory and practice of communism, Filipino Party leaders agreed to the Chinese proposal of having Chinese advisers in key PKP/Hukbalahap organs. As Secretary-General, Vicente LAVA had two Chinese advisers. Luis TARUC had one in the Military Committee and Primitivo ARROGANTE had one in the PKP Educational Department.

These Chinese Communist advisers greatly influenced the formulation of PKP plans and policies. On the advice of the Chinese Communists, the Hukbalahap published a guidepost titled "The Fundamental Spirit of the Hukbalahap" which was patterned after the "Fundamental Spirit" of the Chinese communists. Also, when the Hukbalahap headquarters established a Political and Military Training School in May 1942 in the mountains of Arayat, Pampanga, Chinese Communist officers from the Chinese mainland were smuggled into the Philippines to serve as instructors in the school. A colonel in the Red Chinese Eighth Route Army handled the training on guerrilla warfare tactics. **The Fundamental Spirit of Guerrilla Tactics** by MAO TSE TUNG and CHU TEH, and Edgar SNOW's **Red Star Over China** served as references in this school.

Realizing that no movement could thrive without the support of the people, the PKP/Hukbalahap took some bold steps to strengthen its hold on its mass base – the peasants. The PKP set up its own "government" and strengthened the barrio organizations through the formation of the Barrio United Defense Corps (BUDC). The Hukbalahap rapidly grew in strength and succeeded in rallying a sizeable number of people behind its struggle against the Japanese. To rally support around the BUDC, two PKP mass organization – the Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas (KPMP) and the Aguman Ding Maldang Tagapagobra (AMT) or General Workers Union – were dissolved. The BUDC functioned efficiently especially in Central Luzon. It effectively organized rural communities to help the Hukbalahap in its operations and even assumed local government functions to include meting out justice, performing police functions.

The PKP exploited the BUDC-Hukbalahap teamwork to disseminate communist doctrine. At every opportunity the Huks gathered the people and lectured to them on communism. Each party member and each Huk soldier were made propagandists.

From 1942 to March 1943, the PKP/Hukbalahap followed a policy of offensive against Japanese forces no matter how small the scale. Harrassed, the powerful Japanese forces launched operations against the Hukbalahap stronghold in Mt. Arayat in March 1943 and in areas suspected of giving the PKP support. The operation caused havoc and confusion among the rank and file of the PKP, the Hukbalahap and its mass following.

THE OUSTING OF VICENTE LAVA

Reacting to the adverse situation, the PKP adopted a "retreat for defense policy". The size of the active armed units was reduced and the bulk of its armed forces was ordered to retreat to mountain bases and the Party went deep underground. Later on, however, certain members of the Party objected to the adoption of the "retreat for defense" policy. They asserted that there never was an "ebb in the revolutionary tide" but rather a reaction of the Japanese to stop the "revolutionary flow". As a result, inner Party conflict again developed, culminating in the removal of Vicente LAVA, who was responsible for the "retreat for defense" policy.

A three-man secretariat, composed of Pedro CASTRO, Primitivo ARROGANTE and a Chinese Communist known as Comrade "C", took over the Party leadership.

At that time, the Americans were about to return to the Philippines and the defeat of Japanese was almost a certainty. Hence, the PKP began to plan its projected relations with the returning government-in-exile. The Party decided to forge a coalition with the Commonwealth government in keeping with the united front tactic, while establishing local governments in towns and provinces under its control. Upon landing of the US forces, the PKP attempted to seek recognition of its provisional governments including those set up by Jesus LAVA in Laguna, Castro ALEJANDRINO in Pampanga and Juan FELEO in Nueva Ecija where these communists declared themselves as "governors". However, the American authorities refused to recognize them and instead arrested leading Huk leaders including Luis TARUC and Castro ALEJANDRINO for seditious activities. These Huk leaders were released months later but only after many of the Huk units were disarmed and disbanded.

CONSOLIDATION AND REALIGNMENT OF FORCES

Having been rebuffed in its bid to forge a coalition with the OSMEÑA administration, the PKP was forced to adopt the "legal" form of struggle. As soon as Manila was cleared of the Japanese, the Politburo transferred the Party headquarters to the city and started the publication of a newsette, the **Katubusan**. Pedro CASTRO, the new PKP Secretary-General, took a bolder step by publishing **Ang Komunismo**, as the Party organ. Legal front organizations were also formed such as the Philippines Newspapers Guild (PNG), the Congress of Labor Organizations. (CLO), the Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM), and the Democratic Alliance (DA). Through these fronts, the Party was able to extend the sphere of its influence to different segments of the country.

As part of its political action, the Party actively participated in the 1946 elections through the NP-DA coalition. Six DA candidates for representatives won in the elections, namely: Luis TARUC and Amado YUZON of Pampanga; Dr. Jesus LAVA of Bulacan; Jose CORDO and Constancio PADILLA of Nueva Ecija; and Alejandrino SIMPUACO of Tarlac. The winning DA congressional candidates, however, were not allowed to take their seats in Congress on the charge that they won the election through fraud and terrorism. Feeling that they would not be able to serve their term in Congress, Luis TARUC and Dr. Jesus LAVA rejoined their Huk units in the field and the PKP began building up its armed strength.

The worsening situation prompted the government to adopt a firmer policy against the dissidents. Known Huk lairs in Central Luzon were saturated with troops forcing the dissidents to disperse and lie low.

The government's "hard line" policy against the dissidents, forced the PKP Secretariat composed of Pedro CASTRO, Jorge FRIANEZA and Geruncio LACUESTA to direct the Huks in the field not to resume the armed struggle. The Secretariat emphasized the "legal struggle" and the formation of an open mass party.

However, Jose LAVA, then head of the powerful Organization Bureau of the Party and backed up by the Hukbalahap, favored giving emphasis to the armed struggle. LAVA, supported by y the peasant leaders and the Hukbalahap, worked for the ouster of the labor leaders identified with them were removed from positions of leadership. Later, Pedro CASTRO, Geruncio LACUESTA and Felixberto OLALIA were expelled from the Party upon the instigation of Jose LAVA.

HUKS DECLARED ILLEGAL

The Huks continued to create serious peace and order disturbances prompting President ROXAS to declare illegal the Hukbalahap and its allied group, the Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM) on 6 March 1948. However, President ROXAS died a month after and his successor President QUIRINO, adopted a policy of attraction. He offered general amnesty to the Huks and members of the outlawed PKM. Aware of the tactical advantages that the Huks could gain from the proposed amnesty proclamation, the PKP permitted Luis TARUC to accept the amnesty offer. Before accepting amnesty, however, PKP leaders agreed on the following points:

1. That the main forces of the revolution consisted of the alliance of the workers and the peasants with the workers assuming the leader role;
2. That the object of the direction of the main blow was the Nacionalista Party and not the Liberal Party; and
3. That the main form of struggle to be given emphasis was the armed struggle.

It is very evident, therefore, that when the Party allowed Luis TARUC to accept the 1948 amnesty grant, it had no intention of stopping its insurgent activities. Subsequent developments proved that the Communists merely intended to fool the government. Luis TARUC was allowed to come down from his mountain hideout, was accorded a hero's welcome, was allowed to take his seat in Congress as representative of the second district of Pampanga and was given his two years' backpay and other emoluments. Allowed to circulate freely, TARUC delivered speeches in Congress and in rallies where he glorified the Hukbalahap and the PKM. When the deadline of the amnesty period was about to expire, TARUC once again took to the hills, alleging that President QUIRINO failed to live up to his commitments. Soon after, hostilities between the Huks and the Philippine Constabulary (formerly the Military Police Command) were resumed.

BIRTH OF THE HMB

Realizing that the name of the Hukbalahap had become obsolete with the surrender of Japan, the PKP on 7 November 1948 decided to change the name of its military arm to **Hukbong Magpapalaya ng Bayan** (HMB), or People's Liberation Army.

DECLARATION OF A REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION

The political instability and the slight deterioration in the economic situation that followed the 1949 elections led the PKP leaders into believing that a revolutionary situation existed.

Accordingly, the PKP Politburo met in January 1950 and mapped out its courses of action which would attempt to exploit the "revolutionary situation" and develop it into a "revolutionary crisis". Their timetable set the target date for seizure of state power on May 1, 1952.

Following this conference, the PKP started hectic preparations for the seizure of state power. Steps were taken to expand the Party, its mass organizations and the HMB on a nationwide scale.

The HMBs in the field conducted simultaneous raids and ambuscades in different towns in Central and Southern Luzon. So well scattered were the enemy offensive operations that for a time the government had to garrison and secure key towns before effective retaliatory measures against dissidents could be launched.

PKP/HMB SETBACKS

But the government realized soon enough the gravity of the enemy threat and took steps to stop the enemy before it could gain further in strength. The designation of an energetic and sincere Secretary of National Defense in the person of Ramon MAGSAYSAY further boosted the government effort. The PKP suffered a serious setback on 18 October 1950 when the AFP's Military Intelligence Service succeeded in busting the Manila-based Politburo resultinng in the arrest of top PKP leaders including the incumbent PKP Secretary-General, Jose LAVA. This was followed by the exposure of the leading PKP front organization in labor, the Congress of Labor Organizations. In the field, relentless military operations were undertaken against the dissidents, forcing them to retreat to their mountain bases and leading to their isolation from the masses most of the time.

In spite of the heavy reverses they were encountering at every point, PKP leaders refused to admit that the shift of emphasis to the armed struggle was premature. In early 1951, the Party held an enlarged Central Committee conference somewhere in the Sierra Madre mountains and approved several resolutions still based on its previous premise that it could seize power by May, 1952.

Clearly, the Party at this stage failed to make a more realistic appraisal of the overall situation. The series of reverses it suffered after the declaration of a revolutionary situation in 1950 failed to convince the Party theoreticians that the situation was not yet ripe for a shift of emphasis to the armed struggle. Instead, the Party continued giving emphasis to the armed struggle in its bid to seize political power.

Subsequent developments found that PKP/HMB fighting a defensive armed struggle. While it managed to staged coordinated raids in Pangasinan, Pampanga, Zambales, Bataan, Quezon and Camarines Sur, it continued to sustain heavy losses. The initial PKP/HMB attempt to expand in Mindanao was foiled with the capture of the members of PKP/HMB expansion group in the area headed by Feliciano MACAPAGAL. In the Visayas, Regional Command No. 6, which had operational jurisdiction over the area, completely collapsed with the killing and capture of top PKP/HMB leaders in Panay to include Guillermo CAPADOCIA, the Politburo Supervisor of the Command.

TARUC's PEACE POLICY

It became clear by the end of 1951 that an "ebb in the revolutionary tide" had developed but Jesus LAVA, the PKP Secretary-General insisted in giving emphasis to the armed struggle.

Some Politburo members led by Luis TARUC questioned the continued employement of the armed struggle contained in what is known as the "OED Memo". TARUC also suggested a shift in emphasis to the "legal and parliamentary struggle" but Jesus LAVA refused to heed this suggestion.

The TARUC group circulated this memo among other cadres even before it was presented to the Secretariat. Because of this act of "usurpation of prerogatives" by subordinates, the group composed of Luis TARUC, Peregrino TARUC and Ignacio DABU was tried in **absentia** by the Secretariat on the charges of "factionalism, careerism, anarchy, and violation of democratic centralism". Luis TARUC was suspended from the Politburo, his brother Peregrino was expelled from the Party while DABU was let off with a serious warning. Luis TARUC was eventually expelled from the Party in February 1954 after he supported the reelection bid of President QUIRINO in the November 1953 elections, in defiance of the standing PKP policy of boycotting the presidential candidates in that year's elections.

Alfredo SAULO, propaganda chief of the PKP Educational Department, shared TARUC's view regarding the inadvisability of the continued implementation of the armed struggle in the light of existing realities. He became one of the most articulate critics of the LAVA leadership.

Following Luis TARUC's surrender, Alfredo SAULO took up the cudgels and expounded on TARUC's view in a document entitled "Memorandum on Our Present Tactical Policy and Other Tasks of the Moment". This document criticized the prevailing Party policy and proposed that the "legal" form of struggle be given more emphasis than the armed struggle. The group declared that the primary and immediate tasks at the "moment" were: to preserve the "cadres" which were the most important tools of the revolution; to attract the masses to work for peace and freedom; and to form front organizations that would work for the overthrow of US "imperialism".

Alfredo SAULO's attack on the LAVA leadership widened the cleavage in the Communist camp. Possibly fearing that the LAVA faction would have him killed, SAULO sought asylum in the Indonesian Embasssy in Manila in 1958.

THE POLICY OF "FILIPINISM"

In 1956, the PKP adopted a so-called "peace" policy based on the 5 principles of peaceful co-existence to which Communist countries adhere. However, the PKP emphasized that "peace" does not mean the absence of conflict but rather emphasized that true peace can be attained only when the proletariat takes over state power. The Party also adopted the policy of "Filipinism" to give a nationalist motif to its anti-American posture.

The various phases of its so-called "New Democratic Revolution" to carry out this "Filipinism" policy were:

First: Establishment of a "Filipinistic government" and removal of American influence and US bases;

Second: Establishment of "New Democracy" (Dictatorship of the Proletariat) through the armed struggle and subsequent seizure of state power;

Third: Consolidation of state power, stabilization of dictatorship of the proletariat by elimination of reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries.

Prior to 1956, the Party set the establishment of "New Democracy" as the "minimum program" (immediate objective) and the establishment of Socialism leading to Communism as the "maximum program" (ultimate objective). Changing conditions, however, convinced the PKP that these objectives could be more easily attained by riding on the crest of nationalism and the expected rising "anti-imperilist" consciousness among the people. Hence, the Party decided to work for the establishment of a "Filipinistic government" as the initial objective, largely through the legal and parliamentary struggle.

Accordingly, Party members and symphathizers were urged to:

a. Advance the issues of nationalism and anti-Americanism;
b. Through united front tactics, gradually imbue their members with Filipinism. The PKP slogan at that time became "Establish a Filipinistic Government to Overthrow the Pro-American Government".

Meanwhile, the continued existence of the PKP and its activities was deemed to constitute a clear danger to Philippine national security. The PKP was therefore adjudged an organized conspiracy to overthrow the government not only by force and violence but also by deceit, subversion and other illegal means with the intention of establishing a totalitarian form of government. In view of this, Congress enacted RA 1700 in June 1957 which outlawed the PKP and its allied organizations. Following the enactment of the law, some 1,716 communists surrendered to the Government. These developments, however, did not deter the local communists from pursuing their objectives.

As the 1957 elections neared, Party members were urged to take all possible steps, including election participation, to work for the establishment of a "pro-Filipino" administration. The PKP adopted the slogan "Place in power a pro-Filipino administration". However, the Nationalist Citizens Party (NCP) ticket which the PKP supported, lost in the elections.

Nevertheless, the PKP viewed the results of the 1957 presidential elections with optimism. While the NCP ticket lost in the elections, Communist leaders claimed that the votes they garnered represented the true nationalist elements in the country which was considered sizeable enough. Political Transmission (PT) No. 15, which the Party issued in 1958, urged Party workers to intensify their recruitment activities, and give emphasis to the following propaganda themes:

1. Struggle against imperialist domination;
2. Fulfillment of the country's liberation;
3. Economic progress through industrialization;
4. Attainment of true political freedom – the establishment of a "pro-Filipino government"; and
5. Belief in socialism.

By 1959, the real objectives of the PKP in exploiting the issue of nationalism became clear. It was planned that as nationalism became widely accepted, the Party would drop all the pretenses of working for the establishment of a "Filipinistic Government", and would use nationalism as an issue in the class conflict. To attain this, the Party planned to:

1. Unite all nationalist movements into one organization;
2. Organize and educate the workers, then align them with the nationalist movement; and
3. Enable the working class to seize leadership of the nationalist movement. PT No. 16 issued late that year urged Party members to agitate for the promotion of nationalistic aims and to enter into an alliance with nationalist reformists and convert them into revolutionaries.

As the year 1960 set in, the Party started to express concern over the disruption of its campaign for class-oriented nationalism. PT No. 17 issued in that year noted with apprehensions that the "imperialists and friars" had seized the initiative in advocating nationalism allegedly to suit their own interests. Nevertheless, the Party urged its members to continue exploiting the issue of nationalism as a vehicle for educating the people on socialism.

Two years later, the PKP tacitly admitted that it had failed to channel Philippine nationalism along desired lines allegedly because the "friars and imperialists" had "subverted" the nationalist movement. The Party, through PT No. 18 issued in late 1962, called for a gradual reemphasis on the armed struggle without slackening the legal and parliamentary struggle. This more militant policy was repeated in 1963 thru PT No. 19. Party members were enjoined to create "united fronts" with various classes and groups for the attainment of educational and organizational objectives on the basis of:

1. Anti-imperialist struggle;
2. Agitation for agrarian reforms; and
3. Campaign for civil liberties.

The years following 1963 saw the successive emergence in the country of several mass organizations, notably the LAPIANG MANGGAGAWA (now the SOCIALIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES) among the workers; the MALAYANG SAMAHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA (MASAKA) among the peasantry; the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN (KM) among the youth/students; and the MOVEMENT FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF NATIONALISM (MAN) among the intellectuals/professionals. The PKP has exerted all-out effort to infiltrate, influence and utilize these organizations in promoting its radical brand of nationalism. The Party thus comouflaged its "nationalist" struggle and its campaign to propagate the class struggle by riding with these organizations to avoid public suspicion. Communists and "fellow travellers" who joined these organizations worked for the following objectives: these organizations worked for the following objectives:

1. The adoption of a neutralist foreign policy;
2. Recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations with all nations regardless of their political ideologies;
3. Repeal of the Parity amendment;
4. Repeal of all existing RP-US military agreements and the removal of the US bases;
5. Repeal of all existing RP-US military agreements and the removal of the US bases;
6. Withdrawal of the Philippines from other military alliances such as the SEATO;
7. Abolition of JUSMAG and other military missions in the Philippines;
8. Removal of USIS, USIA and the Voice of America which "breed hatred towards socialistic democracies";
9. Non-involvement of the Philippines in the South Vietnam crisis; and
10. Passage and enforcement of nationalization laws.

These issues constitute the basic PKP concept of "anti-American imperialist struggle". Today, emphasis is gradually being shifted to include the "anti-feudal", "anti-fascist" struggle, which would likely be shifted to the "class struggle".

CURRENT TRENDS

The local communist movement today remains divided into two opposing factions: the traditional PKP faction which is basically Marxist-Leninist-oriented although it professes to be a nationalist communist movement, and a Maoist faction which is very openly Peking-oriented. These two factions are apparently operating independently of each other, although they pursue similar objectives – the seizure of political power. In the conduct of their activities, the factions employ different and conflicting strategy and tactics, but their activities in many instances combine and complement each other.

The Maoist faction is more aggressive. adhering closely to MAO's concept that "political power grows out of the barrel of a gun". Although it is accused by other communist elements of "left adventurism" – i.e. of being seizure of power-oriented – the Maoist faction maintains that its approach to revolution, tailored to the agricultural setting in the Philippines, is valid. It maintains that a protracted armed struggle designed to slowly and gradually control the countryside and isolate the cities is the correct approach to the attainment of their objectives.

In accordance with its theoretical concept, the Maoist faction is now intensifying its activities in the field of subversion and insurgency, conducting terroristic operations in the countryside, particularly in the Northern Pampanga-Southern Tarlac area. Its military arm, the New People's Army (NPA) under Commander DANTE, otherwise known as the MA-MAO (Military Arm of MAO) is intensifying its efforts to organize MA-MAO forces in other parts of the country, which it expects to convert into successive "Tarlacs". Its major front organization among youth/students – the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN (KM), many of whose organizers and national officials are believed to be top leaders of the CPP Maoist faction – will probably be its vehicle for such armed expansion in other provinces.

The traditional PKP faction, on the other hand, is understandably more cautious because of its long history of failures Even in the face of insults by the Maoists of adhering to "revisionism", "awaitism" and "railism", leaders of the traditional faction have generally resisted the temptation of turning "Maoist". The traditional faction still adheres to their "parliamentary struggle" with the "armed struggle" playing a secondary role.

In the meantime, traditional faction cadres are enjoined to widely use "united front" tactics, improve the ideological consciousness of the masses, intensify agitation and propaganda activities and infiltrate or organize front mass organizations embracing practically all segments of society: labor/peasantry, youth/students, professionals/intellectuals, government agencies and civic organizations.

The military arm of the traditional PKP faction – the ARMY NG BAYAN (AB) – is still in its formative stage. Its activities are concentrated on expansion and recruitment utilizing activists belonging to some MASAKA chapters and released/former HMBs.

APPRAISAL

The history of the Communist movement in the Philippines has been and will probably continue to be a history of intrigue, struggle for leadership, deceit, and intellectual dishonesty. Notwithstanding its adherence to such high-sounding platitudes as "democratic centralism" and "dialectical materialism", and its practice of "criticism and self-criticism", the local Communist movement has proved unpalatable to Filipino society in general.

It can be safely said that in the last 40 years of the PKP struggle, many of its cadres have remained divided in the theoretical approach to the seizure of power, specifically on the question of when to give emphasis to the armed struggle and other violent means. The PKP as a whole, however, has gained considerable experience in the employment of the "legal and parliamentary struggle". This could best be explained by the fact that this form of struggle is best suited under the framework of our country's legal system and democratic processes. PKP carefully planned and skillfully executed activities conducted along the "legal and parliamentary" form of struggle are difficult to counteract without inviting accusations of infringement of the provisions of law and the Constitution. In addition, there exist certain social, economic, and political realities in the country which have contributed to the development of a favorable climate for Communist subversion. The moves from some quarters to obtain amnesty for Communist dissidents as well as to legalize the PKP and its insurgent arms are indeed favorable to the Communist's "parliamentary" struggle and tend to weaken the Government's efforts to combat subversion and insurgency.

This historical account of the strategy and tactics employed by the local communists clearly shows that both factions believe they can attain their objective – the seizure of political power – only by means of a violent revolution.

Thus, the main point of controversy between the two factions is on the formulation of a "correct revolutionary theory". Both factions appear to tolerate each other – implementing their plans independently and going to the extent of cooperating with each other to realize common objectives even as each criticizes the other.

The nature of the threat posed to national security by one faction differs from that of the other, only in degree. The threat posed by the traditional faction is mainly subversive in nature, its activities being mostly confined to subversion. The threat posed by the Maoist faction is, for the moment, mainly subversive combined with supporting small-scale armed activities, generally designed to protect its organizational gains.

Evidently, should the two factions unite, and their activities be fully coordinated and further intensified, the Philippines may be brought to the brink of a revolutionary crisis unless all sectors – public and private – unite in a common determined effort to thwart the plans of the Communists in our midst.

How long the PKP leaders will remain divided is hard to predict. Assumption of leadership by one leader or set of leaders recognized and acceptable to both factions strengthen the movement. If this happens, we can expect the communist threat to assume more serious proportions.

The PKP's struggle for power is not only protracted but unending. This is exemplified by the defiant declaration of Jose LAVA, upon emerging from 20 years behind bars, that: "I entered prison as a Communist and I will go out as a Communist".

ANNEX A

ORIGINAL PARTIDO KOMUNISTA (PK) LEADERSHIP

A. Members of the Central Committee	Occupation
Crisanto EVANGELISTA	Printer
Felix CAGUIN	Printer
Arturo SORIANO	Printer
Mariano P. BALGOS	Printer
Jose QUIRANTE	Employee
Jacinto MANAHAN	Farmer
Juan FELEO	Farmer
Silvino TABLAN	Employee
Alejandro ESPAÑOLA	Farmer
Antonio DE ORA	Lumberman
Norberto NABONG	Electrician
Guillermo CAPADOCIA	Cook
Jose VENTURA	Cigar maker
Sotero SANSON	Lumberman
Patricio DIONISIO	Newspaperman
Mariano PINGOL	Lumberman
Balbino NAVARRO	Cigar maker
Angel MESINA	Cigar maker
Hugo RETAGA	Merchant Marine
Saturnino BRIOSO	Merchant Marine
Andres FABIAN	Cigar maker
Cirilo HONORIO	Slipper maker
Urbano ARCEGA	Slipper maker
Cenon LACANIENTA	Cigar maker
Cirilo BOGNOT	Newspaperman
Nicolas DE GUIA	Plumber
Andres PADUA	Lumberman
Juan LAGMAN	Railway worker
Enrique TORRENTE	Electrician
Maximo MACATANGAY	Cook
Andress SANTIAGO	Cigar maker
Teofilo ESPIRITU	Cigar maker
Co Sing Liat	Chinese representative
Ping	Chinese representative
CO Keng Seng	Chinese representative

B. MEMBERS OF THE POLITBURO

Crisanto EVANGELISTA
Antonio DE ORA
Jacinto MANAHAN
Juan FELEO
Felix CAGUIN
Urbano ARCEGA
CO Keng Seng

VOLUME IV

VOLUME IV

CHINESE COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City

31 May 1970

FOREWORD

In its desire to give the people a better working knowledge of the primary threat to national security – Communism – the AFP has published a series entitled "So The People May Know." Three volumes in the series have already been released, all dealing primarily with the Communist movement in the Philippines. In these volumes, the sinister role of foreign Communist elements, particularly the Red Chinese, was mentioned, but only in brief terms. To augment the information on this aspect, the AFP has prepared this fourth volume: "Chinese Communist Subversion in Southeast Asia."

This new volume portrays in broader perspective Communist China's long-term and short-range objectives to dominate and control our part of the globe, and the strategy and tactics she uses to attain these goals. It reveals how much of the unrest and dissidence that exist against established governments in Southeast Asia today is the result of Peking's exportation of her own brand of revolution – protracted "wars of national liberation" which have invariably tried to take over genuine nationalist movements in the countries of the region.

Developments in Southeast Asia in recent years show clearly that the most effective weapon weiled by Comunist China to establish her influence in the region is **subversion**, together with its concomitant aspect of **insurgency**. It appears to be her best avenue to realize her objectives without risking open confrontation with more powerful rivals. Southeast Asia, with its teeming is indeed the ideal locale where Communist China can advance the Maoist cause with greater chances for success and at lesser risk and cost.

This volume depicts the pattern of Chinese Communist subversion in Southeast Asia. It exposes the fact that the internal conflicts during the past three or four decades in the countries of the region, including the Philippines, are not accidents of history, but are largely the result of Peking's grand design to establish dominance over the peoples of Asia.

A special Annex has been appended to this volume to show the similarity of the objectives, policies, strategy, insurgent operations, subversive activities, agitation-propaganda and related clandestine actions ofthe Communist parties in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. Even cursory analysis reveals the master blueprint from which all these local Comunist movements have drawn their ideological impetus, training doctrine, and tactical direction. The Marxist-Leninist international conspiracy, first fomented by Soviet Russia, and in recent decades, taken over and spearheaded by Mao's aggressive leadership, has indeed spread its tentacles throughout Southeast Asia.

Perhaps with a closer insight of this potent threat to national security, the Filipino people would appreciate much greater vigor and zeal, what the Government and its various agencies and instrumentalities are doing today to safeguard and preserve our national integrity and independence.

Manuel T. Yan

MANUEL T. YAN
General, AFP
Chief of Staff

MAO LOOKS AT THE WORLD

. . . "The banner of mankind's revolutionary war is the banner of mankind's salvation. A war waged by the great majority of mankind and of the Chinese people is beyond doubt a holy war, a just war, a most lofty and glorious undertaking for the salvation of mankind and China, a bridge to a new era in world history, and a lighthouse which shows the way to a new world." . . . . MAO TSE TUNG

(From "Problems of Strategy in
China's Revolutionary War")

CHINESE COMMUNIST SUBVERSION IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

INTRODUCTION

Communist China regards Asia as her "exclusive sphere", a region which Communist China wishes to convert into a "buffer region." This position has placed her at variance with the Soviet Union, the other leading Communist power in the world. This remains an important issue in their ideological quarrel. While Communist China seeks to communize Asia under her leadership, her attention at present is focused on Southeast Asia (SEA). This interest in SEA stems from a compound of historical relationships, ideological considerations, demographic similarities, geographic propinquity, cultural affinities, and economic motives.

The Chinese have had a long history of relations with the peoples of SEA. In earlier centuries, this relationship ranged from indirect rule and tributary-suzerainty to outright conquest and occupation. In subsequent periods, a new aspect was added to this relationship – the massive immigration of Chinese from mainland China to neighboring region. Today, the overseas Chinese are a common demographic feature in SEA countries. It is not surprising therefore that Communist Chinese leaders should seek to restore Peking's old influence in the region and endeavor to exclude rival powers, principally the US and the USSR, from gaining ascendancy in SEA.

Communist China's ambitions in the region are further bolstered by her belief that the smaller neighboring countries should fall within her sphere of influence just as the small republics of Central America move in the orbit of the United States, and the countries of Eastern Europe are sattellites of the Soviet Union.

Of the traditional areas of interest to Red China, Southeast Asia is the area where her chances for success in advancing the Communist cause are greatest. Political, economic and social conditions obtaining in the region make it highly vulnerable to Communist penetration and ideological expansion.

Historically, most of the countries in SEA gained their independence only after the Second World War. Distrust and hostility toward Western colonialism therefore still persist, and Communism subtly presents itself as the region's "hope of salvation." Communist China works to win the support of these countries in the name of "peace" and "friendship". At present, Peking has diplomatic ties with Burma and Laos, and trade relations with Singapore. Until recently, Red China also maintained relations with Cambodia and Indonesia.

Geographically, the countries of SEA share a common border with or are territorially adjacent to the China mainland. Faced with the threat of major Chinese Communist aggression, a number have chosen to follow a neutral or non-aligned policy vis-a-vis the world power blocs. Peking, in turn, exploits this psychological vulnerability by pressuring such Asian nations into supporting China's policies in international politics while, at the same time, claiming to respect their independence.

CHINA'S OBJECTIVES IN SEA

Communist Chinese leaders of today have not altered their long-term goal – to establish global hegemony by seeking world power status, implementing a phased conquest of Asia, wresting leadership of the international communist movement from the USSR and isolating the Western powers.

Its short-term objectives remain the same – to supplant or neutralize Western, specifically US influence; block or expel Soviet influence; and gain leadership of the national Communist movements in Southeast Asia.

In more specific terms, Communist China's immediate objective in SEA is to overthrow the legitimate governments in the region and supplant them with Peking-type governments. Her main instruments to carry out this objective are the Communist parties (which significatly are mostly Peking-oriented), legal or illegal, in the respective target areas. These include: The Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) in Indonesia; Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) in West Malaysia; the Communist Party of Burma (White Flag and Red Flag factions); the Singapore branch of the Communist Party of Malaya; the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) which leads the National Front for Liberation in South Vietnam; the Communist Party of Thailand; and the Partido Komunista ng PIlipinas (PKP) and its front organizations in the Philippines.

IMPORTANCE OF SEA TO COMMUNIST CHINA

To Communist China, control of SEA would be a giant step towards achieving her long-range goal of communizing Asia and the world. Her principal targets in this scheme are Vietnam, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and thePhilippines,

The strategic significance of SEA to Red China is obvious. Control of SEA militarily will add much to China's weight in the calculation of the international balance of power. In addition to providing China with a geographic buffer zone against external aggression, the area would be an ideal stepping stone for expansion towards India in the West and Australia and New Zealand in the South Pacific. Economically, the rich raw-material potential of SEA will add substantially to China's economic wealth and give her access to materials of which she has little supply. The rice surplus potential of Burma, Cambodia, South Vietnam and Thailand, in addition to their other natural resources, are badly needed by Communist China. Indonesia possesses the richest oil deposits in SEA. Malaysia is the top producer and exporter of rubber and also possesses abundant valuable mineral deposits. Moreover, SEA can become a market for China's "cheap" industrial output and can serve as a show window for her "achievements."

In addition, the presence of over 14,000,000 overseas Chinese spread out in SEA are potential sources of recruits for subversive activity. Many of them, especially those with relatives in the Mainland, are coerced into conducting ChiCom infiltration and subversive activities in SEA.

Communist China's specific interests in each of the target countries vary, although her general aim is still the communization of each and the establishment therein of satellite governments according to the Mao design.

South Vietnam is the testing ground for Communist China's concept of protracted warfare or "wars of antional liberation." The presence of American and other Free World forces in that country provides fuel for ChiCom propaganda against alleged US "imperialist aggression" towards SEA and Communist China. Laos, whose northern frontier borders China, provides a strategic avenue of approach for ChiCom encroachment into the region. Its jungle-covered terrrain is ideal for the surreptitious infiltration of Communist cadres and material into South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand. In spite of recent massive blows by combined South Vietnamese and US forces against Communist sanctuaries in her eastern borders, Cambodia still constitutes a vital link to the Communist supply routes to the south.

Thailand, centrally located in mainland SEA, is a keystone in the Western forward defense in the region. A Communist take-over of the country would critically threaten the positions of the Free World in SEA. On the other hand, Chinese control over Burma would certainly facilitate Peking's maneuvers against India.

In the Malay Peninsula, Communist attempts to seize Malaya (now part of Malaysia) during the decade of the fifties failed. Control of Malaya would have made the fall of Singapore to Communism inevitable. It would have given the Communists control of the Straits of Malacca, one of the most important waterways in the world, a loss to the West comparable to the loss of either the Suez or Panama Canal.

In Indonesia, Red China almost succeeded in establishing a Communist regime had not the abortive 1965 Communist-led coup been smashed by theIndonesian Army. Had this Peking maneuver been successful, Indonesia would have constituted an ideal springboard for Communist expansion towards Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines.

COMMUNIST CHINA'S SOUTHEAST ASIAN FOREIGN POLICY

Communist China's Southeast Asia policy seeks to establish in the countries of SEA Communist regimes subservient to Peking – a "belt of pliant states" that will not be opposed to ChiCom interests. The general approach in her quest for hegenomy in SEA is, however, characteristically cautious. This is the misleading part of Communist China's foreign policy for her seemingly peaceful overtures are merely fronts for her real, aggressive intentions. Diplomatic trade, cultural or other friendly ties are, in fact, instruments utilized to achieve China's real purpose – Communist domination of SEA.

It is in this activity, the treacherous exploitation of "calls for fraternal brotherhood" under a cloak of friendly diplomacy, where China's duplicity and bad faith are best exposed. For under this facade of "friendly collaboration", Communist China obstinately clings to her hardline policy of "revolutionary violence" and vigourously encourages the carrying out of communist-inspired revolutions in the target countries of SEA. During the Ninth Party Congress last April 1969 and in subsequent official statements or communiques, ChiCom leaders reiterated Peking's inflexible policy of supporting and indirectly taking part in armed revolutionary struggles against the established governments of SEA.

The urgency and reality of the threat posed by Communist China's militant foreign policy assumes more serious proportions since in most of the target countries, conditions of political change, economic hardships and social inequities favor Communist subversion.

RED STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Communist China's general strategy for the communization of Southeast Asia is infiltration and subversion under the guise of friendly diplomacy. Basically, however, Communist China's subversive tactics against each target country vary according to the situation obtaining in each of them.

Generally, Communist China has diplomatic relations with professedly "neutral" states such as Burma and Laos and has trade relations with Singapore. The establsihment, however, of diplomatic relations or economic ties is merely a step to facilitate Communist China's real intention – the ultimate communization of these states. Thus, while openly expressing solidarity and sympathy with the governments of Laos and Burma, she supports active insurgents or terrorist elements engaged in open armed revolts against established authority. In Singapore, on the other hand Communist China utilizes her trade relations with that island government as a cover for subversive activities, targetting mainly Singapore's predominantly Chinese population which virtually controls a substantial portion of its economy. In the case of the anti-Communist countries of Thailand, South Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines, Peking strives to create political and economic chaos to weaken the countries, supports the local Communist movements and encourages armed overthrow of the established governments.

PATTERN OF CHICOM MILITANT POLITICAL ACTIONS

The discernible general pattern in Communist China's militant political action in SEA today is the penetration or infiltration of government and private agencies and institutions. These include educational institutions; government agencies, institutions and services; youth and student organizations; peasant, labor and workers' unions; the Armed Forces and other law-enforcement agencies. The Chinese Communists also strive to exploit the various ethnic minorities and the Chinese sector of each target country.

The student activism in Indonesia and Malaysia in 1966 to 1968 were initially Communist-instigated. The current youth and student unrest in the Philippines and lately in South Vietnam, likewise, are suspected to be Communist-inspired or Communist-influenced.

Communist China actively promotes the growth of Communist parties or factions in each target country. Significantly, most of the identified Communist parties or splinter groups in SEA are predominantly Peking-oriented and serve as vehicles for Communist Chinese subversion in their respective areas. To assist the armed revolts of such parties to overthrow existing legitimate governments in SEA, Communist China provides ideological and theoretical guidance and assistnace in the form of arms, fund and even special personnel. Additonally, Communist China trains selected cadres from the different Asian countries in guerilla warfare and the various techniques of subversion. These cadres are trained either in Maniland China or in their own country with ChiCom or ChiCom-trained local instructors. The former method is especially true for Thailand, Malaysia, Burma, Laos, South Vietnam and the Philippines. Lately, military operations in the Philippines and Indonesia have uncovered Maoist schools for training Communist cadres.

In the field of subversion, Communist China has grasped and is exploiting the tremendous value mass communication plays in the battle for the "hearts and minds" of the masses. Thus, Peking employs to the maximum mass media (press, radio and TV) to reach the most vulnerable targets – the peasants, farmers, workers, students, and intellectuals. Moreover, infiltration of schools and universities in the different countries of SEA has increased, as may be gleaned from issues propagated by the different student groups. These generally reflect Communist propaganda lines and slogans on both international and national issues such as "US imperialsim," "feudalism" and "fascism."

Moreover, Peking, realizing the fearsome repercussions that mass protest activites have on the internal stability of existing governments, vigorously encourages the conduct of all forms of mass protest activity, ranging from the mildly passive to moderately militant to the radically violent. This tactic becomes even more effective when legitimate dissenters, particularly student idealists and genuine nationalists, become unwitting tools of ChiCom and local Communist provocateurs.

ACTIVITIES OF COMMUNIST PARTIES IN SEA

It is significant to note that in SEA, the Communist parties or splinter groups are illegal, exceptin Laos. All of these are obviously being utilized by Communist China for subversive activities in the region. In brief, the Parties' activities are as follows:

LAOS

The Lao Communist Party operates through its political front organization – the Lao Patriotic Front or Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX). The NLHX's military arm is the Lao People's Liberation Army (LPLA), commonly known as the Father Lao. It receives from Communist China arms and other logistical support. Chinese Communist troops and engineers have constructed roads into northern Laos through which the ChiCom supplies are coursed. Because of this assistance and the presence of North Vietnamese military forces in Laos, the Fathet Lao has succeeded in occupying and controlling more than half of Laos.

CAMBODIA

In Cambodia, the Pracheachon (People's Party), a splinter

Communist group that has been declared illegal, has been supported by Peking. Communist China, through covert subversive activities, supported the sporadic armed rebellions in certain areas of Cambodia in 1967, particularly in Battambang province, despite Peking's close diplomatic ties with Phnom Penh before the fall of Sihanouk. In 1969, then Premier SIHANOUK charged that the Khmer Rouge (Khmer Reds), another Communist group influenced by North Vietnamese Communists, was infiltrated by Chinese Communists and was receiving ChiCom arms and ammunition through merchants ships calling at the port of Sihanoukville.

BURMA

There are two identified Communist factions in Burma – the Communist Party of Burma (White Flag) and the Communist Party of Burma (Red Flag). The BCP receives propaganda support as well as financial and logistical assistance from Peking. China further provides military training for its cadres who also enjoy "sanctuary" privileges in South China. The BCP has no known specific or separate military arm. The Party itself apparently undertakes its own anti-government military operations. The Chinese Communists are also known to conduct subversive activities among Burma's tribal groups, such as the Kachins, independent of the activities of the BCP. In the northern areas adjacent to China, Chinese Communist troops mingle with Burmese tribes and train and lead these insurgent elements.

SOUTH VIETNAM

The South Vietnamese Communists – the Viet Cong (VC) – receive military and economic aid from Communist China, directly or through North Vietnam. They undertake subversive activities in collaboration with the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) elements who have infiltrated into the South. South Vietnam, however, is a special case in point since the armed revolution being conducted by VC/NVA forces has reached the "mobile warfare" stage where large-size conventional Communist military units engage SVN government forces in open warfare. The sufferings ofthe people because of the massive aggression by VC/NVA forces in South Vietnam is too well-known to be described in detail here.

MALAYSIA

The Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) and the Sarawak Communist Organization (SCC) are the main instruments of Chinese Communist subversion in Malaysia. The CPM is represented in Peking by its Malaysian National Liberation League (MNLL), which issues propaganda and policy statement for CPM.

Penetrated groups or front organizations are the Labor Party of Malaysia (LPM) and the Partai Ra'ayat Malaya of West Malaysia and the Sarawak United People's Party (the major Chinese party) in East Malaysia. Both the CPM and SCO are currently exploiting racial or communal problems in addition to economic and political grievances as a vehicle for rebuilding power and prestige. Maoist propaganda materials have recently been discovered and confiscated by the Malaysian Police during raids on several Labor Party branches. These, together with other articles confiscated by government forces and the various Maoist. slogans being used, attest to Chinese Communist infiltration of the local Communist groups.

SINGAPORE

While there is no formal Communist Party in Singapore a Singapore branch of the CPM is known to exist. Chinese financial establishments, mass media and social organizations are the principal vehicles of Chinese Communist subversion in Singapore. The Communists work through the Barisan Socialist Party (BSP), the largest known opposition party in the island state. It espouses, among others, the same long-term aim as the Communist Party of Malay, namely, the establishment of a Peking-oriented Communist state composed of West Malaysia (Malaya) and Singapore. While there is no positive evidence of direct control by Peking over the BSP, the group's propaganda material closely follows the Peking line.

THAILAND

The Communist movement in Thailand is led by the outlawed Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and its military adjunct, the Supreme Command of the People's Liberation Army of Thailand. The CPT is definitely pro-Peking, adheres to the Maoist concept of "armed struggle" and mouths Peking propaganda slogans. In addition, the subversive activities of Communist Terrorists (CT) in the provinces adjacent to the Thai-Malaysia border and in the Northeast region adjacent to Laos enhance the Communist cause in Thailand. In many ways, insurgent and terrorist operations in Thailand parallel those of the PKP in the Philippines.

INDONESIA

In Indonesia, the outlawed PKI continues to spearhead the Communist movement although on a much reduced scale. Its main pre-occupations at present include: (1) engage in party rebuilding; (2) carry out agrarian revolution, build rural bases and mobilzie the peasant masses; and (3) assist in building up a "national united front." It also organizes its military arm into four groups; regular mobile forces; guerrilla forces; militia or self-defense corps, and armed city partisans. Here again, the missions and organizations cited parallel closely those of the MA-MAOs in the Philippines.

CONCLUSIONS

The obsession of Communist China in Southeast Asia is to destroy the old order and supplant it with a Communist system, preferably of the Chinese or Maoist type. In pursuit of this goal, Peking avoids direct armed confrontation but primarily employs the more subtle, but perhaps more effective method of subversion combined with insurgency, utilizing the following general techniques:

a. Exploitation of prevailing national issues or grievances to foment widespread discontent in the form of social and political unrest;

b. Maximum utilization of the mass media for propaganda purposes;

c. Encouragement and support of local Communist movements and "fronts";

d. Encouragement and support of local insurgents' armed struggle;

e. Intensification of infiltration and penetration of the labor/peasant and student/intellectual sectors, particularly trade unions and institutions of learning; and

f. Encouragement of civil disturbances, student radicalism and militant mass protest movements.

It can be said that the emerging and developing nations of Southeast Asia have firmly and decisively rejected the Communist way of life. Only in captive North Vietnam and partially in Laos has a Red-oriented regime been successfully established. Cambodia, until recently a Peking sympathizer expelled Mao's implanted representatives and is currently engaged in a vigorous campaign to destroy all vestiges of ChiCom influence in its midst. The Philippines, Malaysia, South Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia continue to resist Red China's political and economic blandishments, while Singapore tolerates ChiCom's trade missions under a watchful eye. Certainly, all these encouraging developments point to the growing political maturity of the nations and peoples of Southeast Asia in that they have seen through and are resisting Red China's **new imperialism** and are now forging ahead with their own concepts of nationalism and independence.

PREFACE TO ANNEX A

This Annex depicts in more detail the pattern of Communist subversive and insurgent activities in various countries of Southeast Asia. By pointing out the very close similarity in concepts and techniques employed by the different local Communist movements to those espoused by Communist China, it exposes a heretofore not generally known fact – that the influence Peking exerts upon the Communist Parties of the countries of Southeast Asia is very significant. This is no coincidence. It is part of an insidious and determined Chinese Communist campaign to dominate all of Asia by overthrowing existing governments in the region and replacing them with Maoist-type regimes subservient to Peking.

The information pertaining to Party objectives, strategy and tactics contained in this Annex is taken from captured Communist Party documents.

COMPARISON OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

I OBJECTIVES/POLICIES OF THE LOCAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENTS

A. Long-Ranges

1. **Philippines**
   To seize state power and establish a Communist government.
2. **Indonesia**
   To seize state power.
3. **Malaysia**
   a. West Malaysia- To established a Peking-oriented Communist State in West Malaysia.
   b. East Malaysia - To separate East Malaysia from the Malaysian Federation and establish a Peking-oriented "Government of North Kalimantan".
4. **Singapore**
   To establish a Peking-oriented Communist State of Malaya and Singapore.
5. Thailand
   To establish a Communist regime in Thailand.

B. Short-Range

1. **Philippines**
   To prepare the "basic forces" of the revolution and create "revolutionary conditions" favorable for the seizure of power.
2. **Indonesia**
   To seek legality, consolidate Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) remnants, and create a revolutionary mass in preparation for PERJUTA (people's armed struggle).
3. **Malaysia**
   To penetrate political parties, trade unions, schools and cultural organizations with special emphasis on winning over the non-Chinese population.
4. **Singapore**
   To overthrow the government by "extra-parliamentary" means by penetrating political, social and ethnic minority groups.
5. **Thailand**
   To destroy the people's faith in the government; sever Thailand's association with the West; and gain the people's support for the Communist cause.

II. NATURE OF THE MOVEMENTS:

A. Philippines

The movement presently consists of two factions each having its own military arm and claiming to be the real Communist Part of the Philippines. Both factions believe in the employment of violent revolution as the ultimate means to seize political power, but differ in orientation and tactical policy. Today the Traditional faction believes in the primacy of the "parliamentary struggle" over the armed struggled advocated by the Dissenting Maoist faction. The latter closely adheres to Mao Tse-tung's concept of the Communist struggle. A third group - the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB) - still claims to be Communists. It used to be the military arm of the Communists Party of the Philippines (CPP) until denounced by both factions for allegedly veering away from doctrinal Communist activity. It is now considered a separate Mafia-type outlaw gang whose primary objective is the protection of its business interests in Central Luzon.

B. Indonesia

PKI policies and activities in the post-Sukarno period are currently governed by a new program of action entitled "The Programme of the Communist Part of Indonesia for People's Democracy in Indonesia". This "programme" envisions the party to be of the Lenin type, combining legal and illegal operations with the use of a strong armed forced, and mobilizing the unity of will and action of the people.

C. Malaysia

The CPM and SCO, having been declared illegal, appear to have declined as effective organizations because of their lack of popular appeal. However, CPM remnants in West Malaysia have established themselves successfully in remote areas along the Malaysian-Thai border and have sent their representatives to Peking. In East Malaysia, SCO activities are currently low-keyed. However., should the political or economic situation deteriorate and racial tensions mount, the Communists' efforts to mobilize mass support in Malaysia may once more be favored.

D. Singapore

The Chinese in Singapore, particularly those that have recieved a Chinese education, continue to be targets of ChiCom subversion. However, the Government's stability and a national anti-Communist posture are major factors that are expected to contain the Communist threat.

E. Thailand

Unlike the factional nature of the Communist movement in the Philippines, the Communist movement in Thailand appears to be united behind the leadership of the outlawed Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) and its military arm, the Supreme Command ofthe People's Liberation Army of Thailand. Its plans and policies are definitely pro-Peking and adhere to the Maoist concept of the "armed struggle". The eviction of American influence is the main theme of their nation-wide propaganda drive.

III. INSURGENT ACTIVITIES

A. Philippines

1. Nature of Insurgent Operations

Communist insurgent activities are generally confined to Central Luzon, principally in the provinces of Tarlac and Pampanga, and in the peripheral areas of Zambales, Bataan, Bulacan, Pangasinan and Nueva Ecija. Cagayan Valley has lately become a target for expansion.

These activities generally include organization of insurgent units in rural areas; attraction of former insurgents back into the movement; recruitment and training of new members; procurement of equipment and supplies; terrorist activities such as kidnapping and liquidation of uncooperative persons; and other limited military operations including ambuscades, robberies, raids and intimidations.

From Jan. 1966 to Feb 1970, the dissidents initiated some 453 violent incidents. Victims who were killed during the same period total about 460. A resurgence of terroristic activities has been noted with 1969 casualty figures more than doubling those of 1968.

2. Personnel and Logistics

The Communist have an approximate insurgent strength of 700 armed regulars. Lately, the Maoist faction gave priority to recruiting the young, those about to be drafted for military training, student and youth leaders in urban and rural areas, and new ROTC graduates. The insurgents possess around 850 firearms. The acquistitions of M-16 rifles and other modern weapons has lately improved their firepower.

The insurgent forces obtain their supplies and funds primarily from the regulat quotas and contributions imposed upon business establishments, landlords, wage earners and tenants in dissident áffected areas. Some influential businessmen and politicians are suspected to be contributing financial support. Complementing these are proceeds gathered through regular fund-raising activities such as raffles, benefits dances, bingos, etc. Legitimate business ventures are also entered into to augment their funds. Some of their activities such as pilferage, robbery, ambuscades and raids are geared to increase their firearms supply.

3. Insurgent Tactics

The insurgent forces generally employ hit-and-run tactics and their operations are generally intended only to show that they are still a potent force to reckon with. They employ terror tactics to coerce the people in isolated areas into supporting their movement either actively or passively. They are organized into small but highly mobile groups to evade detection. They seldom defend terrain and avoid staying in one place for long periods. When detected and pursued, they withdraw. They fight back only when cornered. Although they readily use hills and forested areas as operational bases or sanctuaries, they also mingle with the civilian populace, where their safety can be assured by their supporters and sympathizers. Many have found sanctuary in urban centers where government punitive measures are harder to employ.

B. Indonesia

1. Nature of Insurgent Operations

PKI insurgent activities are primarily geared toward rebuilding a revolutionary mass base imbued with Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theories and concepts of "wars of national liberation". These largely include armed propaganda, agitation, intimidation and infiltration of various groups, hand-in-hand with efforts to organize guerilla units or squads in various areas.

At present, however, only small insurgent groups exist in Indonesia. Significant among these are the Pasokan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara (PARAKU) and the Pasokan Guerilla Rakyat (PGRS), the two armed wings of the Sarawak Communist Organization (SCO). Of the two, the PARAKU is better organized. The PGRS has recently been reduced to ineffectiveness by successful Indon Army operations. PARUKU's insurgent activities -- concentrated mainly along the Kalimantan-Sarawak border -- are generally limited to ambuscades of local security patrols, intimidation, sabotage and other acts bordering on banditry. Aggressive Government countermeasures and a positive program of rebuilding the national economy have whittled down much of the dissidence in Indonesia.

Personnel and Logistics

Indonesian Communist insurgents draw recruits from gullible villagers, Party members who have gone underground, released detainees who are expected to experience difficulty in rejoining society, disconted overseas Chinese and local ethnic minorities, particularly the Dayaks.

Although ChiCom and Soviet influences are strong within the PKI, there is no evidence to show resumption of direct ChiCom or Soviet logistical support to Indonesian Communists since the abortive coup of 1965. Todya firearms and supplies are obtained primarily from symphathizers and from sabotage activites directed againsts communication and transportation facilities and supply depots of ammunition, weapons and foodstuffs.

3. Insurgent Tactics

The PKI today utilizes "Armed Fronts and Sectors" and guerilla squads for increased mobility. Guerilla squads operations are launched against targets away frpm their bases but within their authorized areas of operation. Armed propaganda is carried out by gathering people for indoctrination while other groups carry out sabotage activities.

In higher echelons of the Party, the PKI, has centralized command to some degree but has completely decentralized command at lower levels. It further requires its cadres to integrate with the peasants.

C. Malaysia

1. Nature of Insugent Operations

Communist terrorist activities include ambuscades, sabotage, assassination and intimidation. In addition to training youths in guerilla warfare in the border area camps, they have set up Party schools elsewhere in Malaysia and engage in re-indoctrination of their members. Terrorists are most active in the Malay-Thai and Sarawak Indon borders. Relentless police operations have prevented the CTs from regaining their former strength.

2. Personnel and Logistics

There are an estimated 800 armed Communists in Malaysia. They draw their supplies from their sympathizers in the jungled, border areas and generate other from their terrorist activities.

3. Insurgent Tactics

Malaysian insurgent employ hit-and-run tactics against police patrols and outposts. To disrupt the Government campaign against them, Communist insurgent conducts ambuscades in isolated area. Their attempts to exploit racial tensions and the communal issue have largely failed.

D. Singapore

The Communist in Singapore are not yet capable of implementing a policy of armed struggle.

E. Thailand

1. Nature of Insurgent Operations

Communist insurgent activities generally include ambuscades of small government patrols, raids against small police outpost, kidnapping of uncooperative village and provincial officials, smuggling in the border areas, occasional sabotage of isolated government installations, particularly in the remote areas. Collection of intelligence and local procurement of supplies and funds are basically related to these activities.

Since August 1965, when the Thai Communists started their "armed struggle", a significant number of people have already been killed or kidnapped. These activities assume added significance in the light of reports that Thai insurgents plan to attack northern Thailand with ChiCom, NVN and Pathet Lao support. The reports becomes more credible considering that ChiCom road-building activities into northern Laos have enhanced Communist infiltration into northern Thailand. In addition, some of the 2,000 Communist-indoctrinated Thai-born Chinese have reportedly re-infiltrated back into Thailand. The Government effort to suppres Communist terroristic activities has been enhanced by the integration of civil-military-police operations at all levels.

2. Personnel and logistics

Thai Communist insurgents number around 3,000. Aside from native Thais, other sources of recruits include: the more than 30,000 North Vietnamese refugess in northeast Thailand; the disgruntled Mao tribesmen in the North; and dissident Thai Moslems in the South. Thai insurgents are also potentially capable of being reinforced by Pathet Lao, North Vietnamese or ChiCom elements through Laos. Although these foreign forces are believed to be their main sources of military logistics and medicines, Thai insurgents procure most of their food supplies and related items locally.

In Southern Thailands, remnants of Malaysian Communist Terrorist (CT) elements that shuttle back and forth thru the Thai-Malaysia border are supported by some Chinese and Moslem residents in the area.

3. Insurgent Tactics

Thai insurgents use hit-and-run tactics and avoid encounters with superior government forces. Operations are generally intended to "demonstrate their presence and increasing strenth" and to afford their political arm opportunities to hold rallies and lectures in isolated villages. They also conduct limited but simultaneous operations in widely scattered areas in the hope of forcing the Thai Government to disperse its forces.

IV. SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

A. Philippines

1. Political Action

The Communists exploit legitimate mass activity and utilize front organizations in various sectors for the main purpose of presenting their basic issues to as wide an audience as possible. While successful development of front organizations and penetration of other target organization is very desirable, maximum dissemination of their basic issues is still a major objective. The mushroooming of press releases carried by the different mass media from self-styled spokesmen of numerous but spurious organizations claiming legitimacy (who mouth closely Communist slogans) attest to this. The current main effort appears to be to foment discontent and bring about a so-called "crisis" leading to a "revolutionary situation." It is also expected that the local Communist movement will sponsor delegates to the forthcoming Constitutional Convention in an effort to incorporate as much of their concepts into the new constitution to be drafted.

Subversive activities – based on the "Five-Year Plan" of the Traditional faction and the "Programme of Action" of the Maoist faction – are geared mainly towards the overthrow of the Government. Student//youth demonstrations are being exploited primarily to rally the masses, particularly the peasants and laborers, to their cause. Communist Chinese support in this field is best indicated by the daily Radio Peking broadcasts in Filipino.

2. Front Organizations

Several front organizations from among the youth/student, worker/farmer and intellectual/professional sectors are being used as screens for illegal activities and focal points for overt Party activities designed to advance the interests of the movement. These front organizations have been responsible for the staging of most of the demonstrations and rallies in the past five years.

3. Penetration of Target Groups

Both Party factions continue to infiltrate peasant/labor, student/youth and intellectual organizations. These serve as bases for the conduct of agitation, propaganda and organizational work as well as their sources of recruits for their military arms. Local government agencies, especially those in Central Luzon, are also targets for infiltration, penetration and projection to assure protection of local activities.

4. Other Factors

Compounding the threat posed by the subversive political activities of the local Communist movement is the current wave of unrest in the population centers of the country in the form of mass protest activities in the face of current economic difficulties.

The Communists encourage all forms of mass dissent since they have found them convenient vehicles for enhancing their own objectives. The Communists utilize small bands of mobile hard-core provocateurs to initiate violence and turn legitimate mass protest activities into riots in order to evoke forceful governmental law-enforcement measures. By misrepresenting the Government's response as suppression of legitimate dissent and at the same time riding on and exploiting the issues and grievances of different sectors of society, the Communists aim to win various protest groups to their cause, and to turn the people against the Armed Forces and other law-enforcement agencies.

B. Indonesia

1. Political Actions

PKI covert and overt political actions are geared mainly towards attaining the PKI's immediate objectives while at the same time neutralizing Government countermeasures. To complement para-military activities in the countryside, PKI members are organiziang in the cities armed city partisans (REKOSTRA or Strategic CAdre Squads) and mass-action elements for covert and overt operations in urban areas. Banned since March 1966, PKI attempts to seek legality anew are not expected to prosper.

2. Front Organizations

Despite the continued flow of propaganda support from Peking, not much is known of the Communists' efforts towards exploiting front organizations. After it was declared illegal, new efforts toward the formation of a national united front in the country were began. Current PKI formulated guidelines governing activities of front organizations require that such activity be within the framework of labor/workers action.

3. Penetration of Target Groups

The Government and Civil Service, the Armed Forces, political organizations, social organizations, and ethnic and minority groups are still the major targets of Communist penetration in Indonesia. PKI interests in some political parties with leftist sympathizers is expected to continue.

Little is known of PKI penetration of Indon social organizations but many PKI sympathizers are believed to be among the people of Chinese extraction. PKI continues to attempt to gain the support of ethnic and minority groups in the outer islands.

C. Malaysia

1. Political Action

Malaysian Communist policy today calls for abandoning the constitutional struggle and boycotting the parliamentary system including elections. It currently pays attention to developing an atmosphere of illegal militancy, a policy called for in a document published by the Malayan Peoples Socialist Front in Perak entitled "The Party's Future Line of Struggle and its Strategies." Chi-Com propaganda is beamed to Malaysia's population in both Malay and Chinese languages from a powerful station believed to be in Yunnan province in South China.

The SCO in East Malaysia, on the other hand, is involved in a "Constitutional Struggle", attempting to infiltrate or penetrate political parties to secure legitimate representation in the legal institutions of the State. In this field, it has allegedly achieved some penetration of the Sarawak People's Party (SUPP), the major Chinese party.

2. Front Organizations

The Communist United Front has been the cornerstone of the SCO's subversive efforts towards penetrating all strata of society in East Malaysia. In 1964, the North Kalimantan National Liberation League (NKNLL) was established "to provide a Communist organization that shall cover Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei and which will maintain links with other liberation movements".

3. Penetration of Target Groups

In West Malaysia, Communist cells established in Chinese high and middle schools account for the strong Communist influence in many Chinese schools. In East Malaysia, on the other hand, the SCO places considerable emphasis on "racial work" which is educational, political or social in nature and calculated to win over the sympathies of the indigenous people, particularly in the rural areas. It conducts its activities through illegal youth and farmer front organizations.

The Malaysian Communists have also devised a different approach towards Islam to garner mass Malay support. The Communists now preach the spurious doctrine that Islam and Communism share the same ideals and therefore the two should unite in pursuit of a common goal, i.e., the so-called "liberation" of Malaya. This concentrated effort to drive a wedge between the Malay masses and the Government is being directed by the Central Department of Malay Work (CDMW) of the Communist Party of Malaysia.

A Communist document seized in 1965 outlined the aims and functions of the student movement. It also revealed the student activists' participation in the overall revolutionary movement and indicated its coordination with those of the labor and peasant movements.

D. Singapore

1. Political Action

The main issue of the Barisan Socialist Party (BSP) include the demand for the reintegration of Singapore with Malaysia, denunciated of the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) for allegedly serving the interests of foreign governments, and calls for the abolition of the National Service Act. To achieve this, the BSP attempts to promote demonstrations or campaigns of protests. The Partai Rakyat Singapore (PRS), a small party of little political significance associates itself with the BSP on most issues.

2. Propaganda

The BSP resorts to both Chinese and English publications to spread propaganda and to house-to-house distribution of leaflets. Occasional variety concerts and exhibitions are held to publicize particular causes. The BSP also has been an active supporter of strikes. Peking radio propaganda is likewise received in Singapore.

3. Penetration of Target Groups

The Communists continually attempt to penetrate the Chinese middle schools and the universities. Four companies incorporated in Communist China – the Bank of China, the Kwangtung Provincial Bank, the Taiping Insurance Company and the China Insurance Company – have branches in Singapore. There are also nine Communist Chinese emporia established and operated by local businessmen, specializing in the sale of products from Communist China, which are well patronized because of their low prices.

E. Thailand

1. Political Action

Communist political actions are directed mainly against the new Thai Constitution. They tried but failed to sabotage the Feb. 1969 national elections. Propaganda and agitation activities – based on the 1961 Immediate Policy of Twelve Points and the 1968 Immediate Policy of Ten Points – are geared chiefly towards the overthrow of the Government and the eviction of US influence (troops and bases particularly). They also call for full cooperation in their "people's war" and appeal to farmers, laborers and other members of the Thai social strata not to be deceived by the Government's rural development programme. CPT programmes and policies are broadcast mainly through the clandestine radio "Voice of the People of Thailand". The Communists also covertly distribute propaganda pamphlets to various groups in the towns and countryside through the postal service and during village rallies. The ChiCom press – particularly the CCP organ People's Daily, its theoretical journal the Red Flag, and the Peking Review – also devote considerable space to anti-Thai propaganda.

2. Front Organizations

Four Major ChiCom-created front organizations have lent support to the Communist movement in Thailand. These are the Peking-based Thai Independence Movement (1964) and the

Thailand Patriotic Front (1965); the Thailand Federation of Patriotic Workers (1965); and the Thailand Patriotic Youth Organization (1966). Other front organizations such as the Patriotic Teachers' Group, the Thai Monk Group, and the Patriotic Combatants' Group have been mentioned in Communist propaganda media.

3. Penetration of Target Groups

Communist penetration of the various target groups has so far been generally limited. They have, however, been successful in infiltrating the ethnic and minority groups, especially the Meo tribesmen in the north and the predominantly Muslim population in the south. Meanwhile, Communist cadres are reportedly seeking to join political parties following the promulgation of the new Constitution.

ANNEX B

Country	Pro-ChiCom Faction	Splinter/Neutral/Nationalist Faction	Total Estimated Membership	Status Legal or Illegal	Relations w/ Com China	Relations w/ USSR
BURMA	Communist Party of Burma (White Flag)		From 2,000-5,000 regulars with 300-500 irregulars	Illegal	Diplomatic	Diplomatic
		Communist Party of Burma (Red Flag) (Trotskyite)	200 regulars with clandestine support of unk strength	Illegal		
CAMBODIA		Pracheachon (People's Party) Communists work through this Party)	Unknown	Illegal	None	Diplomatic
INDONESIA	Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI)		3,000,000 (in 1965)	Illegal	None	Diplomatic
LAOS		Lao Communist Party or Laotian People's Party. Operates thru the Neo Lao Hak Xat, a legal political front organization	100	Operates legally thru the NLHX	Diplomatic	Diplomatic
MALAYSIA	Communist Party of Malaya (in West Malaysia)		400	Illegal	None	Diplomatic
	Sarawak Communist Orgn.		3000			
PHILIPPINES	Communist Party of the Philippines (Maoist)	Partido Kommunista ng Pilipinas (Traditional faction)	2,000	Illegal	None	None
SINGAPORE	Communist Party of Malaya (Singapore Branch)		4000	Illegal	Trade	Diplomatic
S. VIETNAM		People's Revolutionary Party (PRP) leads the National Front for Liberation of SVN. NVN directs guerilla war through the NFLSV. International Communist movement deals directly with Hanoi in matters of material and medical aid. PRP is considered a segment of the NVN Lao Dong (Workers Party)	Unk but hard core political force of 40,000	Illegal	None	None
THAILAND	Communist Party of Thailand		Unk	Illegal	None	Trade

ADDENDA

USSR DENOUNCES RED CHINA'S EXPANSIONISM

"As early as 1954, a short history of contemporary China was published in Peking with a map describing Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Burma, Malaysia, Thailand, part of India, the Ryukus Islands, the Sulu Archipelago as parts of Chinese territory grabbed by Imperialists.

"But the Chinese strategists are totally indifferent to the real interests of those Asians as they urge to start a people's war.

"The border dispute between India and China has been going on for over 10 years and Peking's demagogues are now endeavoring to interfere with India's internal affairs, calling for civil war and creating so-called liberated zones.

"Chinese agents were in conspiracies in Bhutan and Sikhim, and even Nepal has fallen prey to Chinese interference with Maoist stirring up disorders in the little Himalayan Kingdom.

"In Northern Burma, Maoist-inspired rebels were harassing the local administration and army units and Chinese have crossed the border to join in these harassing attacks.

"From time to time, threats are made against Laos . . . and in the midst of their cultural revolution Maoist agents tried to start trouble in Cambodia. Their interference was so crude that (Prince) Norodom Sihanouk had to protest and recall his ambassador in Peking.

"By harnessing their adventuristic policies on some segments of the Communist and National Liberation Movement, Peking leaders are leading it to defeat. Such has been the case in the Philippines, in Malaysia and, quite recently in Indonesia.

"The expansionist policies of Mao and his group are alien to Communist principles and they constitute a severe threat to peace."

. . . . by M. Ukraintsev
in the Novoyo Vremya (Soviet
New Times), 5 June 1970.

VOLUME V

COMPARISON OF COMMUNIST SUBVERSION AND INSURGENCY IN SOUTHEAST ASIAN COUNTRIES

[illegible]

[illegible] EXPANSIONISM

[illegible] Contemporary China was published [illegible] Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, [illegible] Thailand, part of India, the [illegible] of Chinese territory [illegible]

[illegible] indifferent to the real [illegible] people's war.

[illegible] China has been going [illegible] are now endeavoring [illegible] calling for civil war [illegible]

[illegible] to Bhutan and Sikkim, [illegible] interference with Maoist [illegible] Kingdom.

[illegible] were harassing the [illegible] Chinese have crossed the [illegible]

[illegible] against Laos . . . and in [illegible] tried to start [illegible] so crude that (French) [illegible] recall his ambassador in [illegible]

[illegible] policies of some segments [illegible] Movement, Peking [illegible] been the case in the [illegible] in Indonesia.

[illegible] his group are able to [illegible] a severe threat to [illegible]

[illegible]
[illegible] VESTNIK (Soviet
[illegible], 3 June 1970

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GENERAL HEADQUARTERS
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City

21 October 1970

FOREWORD

This paper is the fifth of the AFP'S "SO THE PEOPLE MAY KNOW" series. It seeks to clarify the meaning of the term "legal or parliamentary struggle" as employed by the local Communist movement.

The phrase "legal or parliamentary struggle" has been widely misunderstood. Many usually regard this form of struggle as an attempt by the Communists to attain their ultimate objective of seizing state power through peaceful and legal means. Some are even inclined to believe that with this form of struggle, the Communists endeavor to pursue their ideology on a higher plane and in a more civilized manner and thereby test the actual validity of the present order. A few even entertain the fond hope that with this concept of struggle, the Communists will eventually abandon the bloody field of armed revolution in favor of a revolution of the mind to effect a peaceful, gradual transition from one political system to another.

Nothing is farther from the truth, for in theory and in practice, legal or parliamentary struggle is nothing but a tactical maneuver by the Communists to gain short-term goals by means of legal activities. This form of struggle is therefore no more than a temporary expedient that takes advantage of a country's democratic processes for the furtherance of Communist ends. It takes advantage by skillful exploitation of the country's legal and constitutional procedures to weaken or undermine the values upon which members of society derive strength and purpose in life. **In effect, "legal or parliamentary struggle" is a form of subversion of the most insidious and deceptive variety.**

One important point that should always be borne in mind is the fact that the Communist's legal or parliamentary struggle is not an abandonment of its ultimate objective. This is not the case, for the Communists themselves believe that the only sure path in their bid to capture state power is armed revolution. Legal or parliamentary struggle is resorted to only as a means to bring the movement to a better vantage position preparatory to the launching of a large-scale armed revolution.

It is therefore hoped that this paper will help our people, especially those in decision-making and policy-formulating positions at both local and national levels in both the private and public sectors, and those who are actively involved in the task of countering the Communist menace, in meeting the challenge of this particular aspect of Communist tactics – the legal or parliamentary form of struggle.

In order to substantiate the warnings and emphasize the danger signs herein presented, several captured Communist Party documents such as its Political Transmissions, hitherto considered as SECRET, have been declassified. The recent serious setbacks suffered by the local Communist movement with the capture of HMB Commander Sumulong and the death of HMB Supremo Pedro Taruc may well usher in a new shift in Communist strategy and tactics, to include a re-emphasis of the legal or parliamentary struggle.

Manuel T. Yan

MANUEL T. YAN
General; AFP
Chief of Staff

PART I

THE PKP LEGAL OR PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE

GENERAL

Tactically, the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP) employs two basic forms of struggle, each complementing the other: (1) the legal or parliamentary form of struggle and, (2) the military or armed struggle. The Party employs these two forms of struggle but in varying degrees of intensity as dictated by the prevailing situation.

The Party keeps close watch on the prevailing conditions and makes periodic estimates of the situation, ever watchful of indications of a shift in the revolutionary tide. The Party believes that a "revolutionary ebb" exists when conditions are unfavorable to the movement; hence, the policy of retreat is adopted and the legal or parliamentary form of struggle is given emphasis. A "revolutionary flow" exists when conditions are favorable and accordingly an offensive policy is adopted and the movement then emphasizes the armed struggle without necessarily slackening the legal or parliamentary struggle. (For a more detailed discussion of the PKP concept of legal or parliamentary struggle, A – The Legal Struggle.)

OBJECTIVES

In pursuing the legal or parliamentary form of struggle, the PKP is under no illusion that it can attain its ultimate objective – the seizure of national power – solely through this form of struggle. The Party, which strongly adheres to the Marxist-Leninist principle of Communist struggle, believes that it can achieve its ultimate objectives not through peaceful means, but through a "violent overthrow," or armed struggle. Hence, the Party's legal or parliamentary struggle is mainly intended to attain certain limited objectives deemed necessary for the creation of conditions favorable for the launching of a successful armed revolution. These limited objectives mainly are as follows:

1. To provide legal cover for illegal activities;
2. To prepare the ground for illegal struggle;
3. To bring the masses to a revolutionary fever; and
4. To destroy the will of the so-called "ruling class" especially at the moment of the crisis.

Sometimes, however the legal or parliamentary form of struggle is resorted to for wuite a different purpose as what the

PKP did at the height of its power in 1949-1950 – to demonstrate, in practice, to the masses that this form of struggle is "ineffective and bankrupt" insofar as the attainment of the overall PKP objective is concerned, while at the same time makes these same masses understand that the issue of Communist revolution can only be decided by means of a violent armed overthrow. (For more details on the nature and objectives of the legal or parliamentary struggle, see Annex B – Organizational Notes)

MECHANICS

The PKP, owing to its illegal status, has devised an elaborate operational appartus in the conduct of its legal and parliamentary struggle to avoid interference by government authorities.

Communist Party elements who are employed in this legal or parliamentary form of activity are called "legal cadres." These are members who have not yet been identified and pinpointed as Communists, hence they can come out openly in our free society and work secretly for the Party.

Other Party elements who have been found to be useful in this field of activities are the "legal workers." These are non-Party members who actively but secretly work for the movement along the line of the legal and parliamentary struggle. These elements are especially useful for infiltration purposes because they usually occupy key positions in legitimate organizations and agencies, including government offices.

Unlike, the armed struggle, the legal or parliamentary form of struggle is carried out on a much broader area of operation and its targets embrace practically all segments of society, namely: labor/peasantry; youths/students; professionals/intellectuals; government agencies; public information media; civic organizations; employees and business groups.

Some of the principal PKP legal or parliamentary activities are:

1. Creation of front organizations

A front organization is usually formed through the initiative of the Party, utilizing not only "legal cadres" and "legal workers," but also unsuspecting persons of good intentions. Controlled from behind by the Party, this kind of organization, once organized, becomes a tool of the Communist Party and may perform delegated task to include the following:

a. Serve as an instrument of PKP policy without overt participation by the Party;

b. Provide legal cover for the Party's illegal activities;

c. Establish and maintain access to the sources of power in society;

d. Pave the way for agitation and propaganda activities, recruitment and intelligence operations; and

e. Draw out possible sources of financial and other forms of material assistance.

To hide its subversive nature, a front organization usually espouses or rides on legitimate and worthy causes, adopts an appealing or attractive name, enlists unsuspecting prominent personalities as sponsors or leaders, and takes in non-Communists to form the majority membership.

2. Infiltration of legitimate groups

There are two types of infiltration employed by local Communists: ideological infiltration and physical infiltration.

Ideological infiltration is carried out by resorting to all forms of propaganda to influence prospective targets. The main idea is to create a feeling of discontent among the target groups, thus bringing about a situation that renders them vulnerable to communist maneuvers.

Physical infiltration, on the other hand, is carried out by utilizing legal cadres and legal workers who are given the task of working within a target group, singly or in groups, so as to obtain intelligence; sabotage efforts of officials, institutions and private citizens against the spread of Communism; create misunderstanding, confusion and demoralization; and propagate the cause of the Communists.

An organization which has been successfully infiltrated by Party workers can be utilized in a manner similar to a front organization although on a more limited scale. But once an organization falls under the Party's dominant control, it can be easily converted into a front organization. In fact, the Party prefers this method of converting an existing legitimate organization into a front rather than take the trouble of organizing a new one.

The PKP is quite explicit in stating its current principal motive in infiltrating legitimate groups. The Party has noted that majority of the masses favor peaceful, parliamentary struggle. Hence, most of the reserves for the legal and parliamentary struggle are admittedly found in the legal organizations with which the masses prefer to be identified. "These are the organizations we must look for, control and indoctrinate," the PKP has declared. "It is here where we can spark them, lead them and give them a new hope in seeing that the road to reform is through revolution . . ."

In general, PKP infiltrated/controlled and front organizations have common characteristics, namely:

a. Presence in the organization of PKP personalities;

b. Espousal of issues similar to those that are being sponsored by the PKP;

c. Staging of or participation with other groups in rallies, demonstrations and other forms of mass action, jointly or individually, in line with the PKP agitation and propaganda drives;

d. Noticeable absence of a strong anti-Communist posture; and

e. An intense anti-Government or anti-establishment attitude.

3. Agitation and propaganda drives

From the PKP point of view, agit-prop should generally start with issues directly related to the individual concerned, gradually developing towards issues that concern national welfare. Agit-prop activities are undertaken mainly "to lead the agitated to want for an organization which is of a revolutionary type."

In general, Communist agit-prop lines revolve around such legitimate and popular issues as nationalism, anti-colonialism, anti-US imperialism, anti-feudalism, anti-bureaucratic capitalism and anti-fascism.

4. Election and legislative participation

The PKP holds a negative attitude towards the country's electoral system as well as other peaceful instruments for change under our constitutional processes. It maintains that no fundamental social, sconomic and political change can be achieved through elections. Nevertheless, the PKP has actively engaged itself in election activities as a part of its "parliamentary struggle."

Such election participation, however, is not necessary solely for the purpose of electing PKP-supported candidates. This is only a secondary objective. The primary objective of the Party in participating in election activities is to enable the movement to present the basic issues it sponsors to the widest audience and to spot among the masses susceptible and militant persons who can be recruited to the revolutionary movement. "Much can be gained by the revolutionary," the Party once declared, "if it has the correct orientation regarding the role and significance of election struggle, and if it chooses the proper methods, election struggle is a very effective vehicle for spreading revolutionary propaganda (couched in legal terms) and expanding revolutionary organization." (See Annex C: The PKP on Election Participation.)

Although the PKP gives only secondary importance to the victory of its candidates during elections, some winning candidates who have been supported by the PKP contribute materially, financially and morally to the welfare of the Party. There have been instances when certain municipalities, cities or portions of some provinces fell under the virtual control of the PKP because of officials who were installed as such through the help of the Party. At the national level, Congress is considered a major target by PKP political activities as it is a strategic point where the PKP can exert influence in the formulation of government policies especially thru legislation.

Moreover, the PKP has a special purpose for sponsoring winning congressional candidates as it maintains that such PKP-supported candidates "would be of greater service to the people and to the movement as propagandists and organizers than as legislators per se." A winning PKP congressional candidate, according to the Party, may file a good bill that may redound to the general welfare of the masses. The congressional committee concerned may reject the bill, but this should not stop him from filing the bill. "His job will be to get wide publicity for his bill; to acquaint the masses about it; to persuade them to struggle collectively in favor of the bill, to facilitate the organization of these masses."

CPP/MA-MAO VIEWS ON THE LEGAL OR PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE

The dissenting faction of the local communist movement which calls itself the "re-established" Communist Party of the Philippines is a Peking-oriented Communist group. It has a military unit of its own called New People's Army otherwise known as Military Arm – Maoist (MA-MAO for short). This faction strongly adheres to the Maoist concept of Communist struggle; hence, it gives more importance to the role of the armed struggle in its bid to seize national power. For convenience, however, the group also undertakes certain activities that can be easily categorized under the legal and parliamentary form of struggle, but such CPP/MA-MAO activities are comparatively limited in scope and are closely related to the group's armed or insurgent activities.

For instance, the CPP/MA-MAO concept of the united front tactic is quite different from that of the traditional PKP. From the CPP/MA-MAO point of view, "national united front" means the alliance between the working class and peasantry through armed struggle with the urban petty bourgeoisie lending support directly or indirectly. Another type of united front which the CPP/MA-MAO has conceived is the so-called "revolutionary anti-feudal united front." This is supposed to be effected in the countryside by uniting the urban workers with the rural farm workers, and later on with the well-to-do and nationalistic farmers for the purpose of neutralizing the rich landowners. Such revolutionary "anti-feudal united front," according to the Party, will serve as the basis of agrarian revolution, armed struggle and the building of revolutionary areas. (See Annex D: Main Tasks of the Party)

Other forms of legal struggle in which the CPP/MA-MAO is now actively engaged include agitation and propaganda, infiltration of legitimate groups and formation of front organizations. While these activities are undertaken with a semblance of legality, they are nevertheless geared towards the armed struggle. For instance, the group's agitation-propaganda lines which generally revolved around the issues of "US imperialism," "domestic feudalism," "fascism," "bureaucratic capitalism" and the struggle for "national democracy" are patently designed to sway the minds of the people towards armed revolution. Also, the group's allied organizations especially its major fronts within the youth/student sector such as the Kabataang Makabayan (KM), appear to be spearheading the CPP/MA-MAO military expansion efforts particularly in the countryside.

Today, the CPP/MA-MAO is exerting utmost efforts to exploit the current waves of youth/student activism even as it views with satisfaction the recent series of violent yout/student rallies and demonstrations in the Greater Manila area. There are even clear evidences that the CPP/MA-MAO, through its front groups/individuals, was the principal instigator of these violent rallies and demonstrations.

Significantly, in one of the CPP/MA-MAO documents captured by AFP elements on 12 June 1970 at Bo. Bautista, San Pablo City, the Party urged the students to:

1. Make a living study and application of Marxism-Leninism-Mao Tsetung Thought and the Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution (See Annex E: Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution).
2. Raise the level of revolutionary consciousness and practice among the students throughout the country.
3. Go to the workers either in places where they work or live and assist them to assume the revolutionary class leadership;
4. Go to their respective towns or barrios, if they have any, and promote the revolution in the countryside and on a nationwide scale; and
5. Wage a protracted people's war on the basis of mass work against US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucratic capitalism.

On the proposed youth/student work among the masses, the same document directs the youth/student elements to:

1. Create propaganda teams each of which is to be composed of at least three members; and
2. Make each team assume the task of arousing the students and workers in a well-defined area in the city, or the students,

peasants, farm workers, the national minorities and fishermen in a well-defined area in the provinces.

In giving the foregoing directions, the Party hopes to gain the following:

1. The mass work of youth/student propaganda teams in urban areas and provinces close to Manila will result in bigger and more articulate demonstrations and powerful strikes, while the mass work in the rural areas is expected to arouse the people to engage themselves in armed activities leading towards revolution.

2. Youths/students who have formed themselves into propaganda teams but are not yet CPP members, could be approached by the Party for recruitment or for "cooperation on the basis of what they have already contributed to the national democratic revolution."

Significantly, during the entire summer period following the closing of school year 1969-70, members of leftist radical youth/student groups formed themselves into small teams, each composed of three to five members, and fanned out to different parts of the country to undertake "politicalization" drives among the masses in the rural areas. These so-called "politicalization" drives, however, have been found out to be largely agit-prop and organizational drives to help sway the minds of the people into a revolutionary attitude. (See Annex F: CPP/MA-MAO Position on Current Youth/Student Activism and Annex G: CPP/MA-MAO Attitude Towards the Traditional PKP Group)

UNITED FRONT TACTICS

In the implementation of the various forms of legal and parliamentary struggle, the PKP usually resorts to united front tactics whenever feasible. This enables the movement to form alliances between the PKP (either directly or through the use of front groups/individuals) and various groups or classes of people. This is one way of giving certain PKP undertakings a badge of respectability and legitimacy. It also enables the Party to have its influence felt in the various segments of society and at the same time prevents the isolation of the Party from the masses.

There are two distinct types of united front tactics: the "united front from below" and the "united front from above." Both types have the same aims in so far as the PKP is concerned.

In the "united front from below," the alliance is made between the PKP and the peasants, the workers and other members of the target organizations. The immediate purpose of this type of united front action is to develop among the mass followers/members of target organizations a feeling of unrest and to incite them to engage in revolutionary activities along the desired PKP lines. Sometimes in pursuing this form of united front action, the Party attempts to drive a wedge between the leaders of target groups and their mass followers/members by denouncing the former as tools of capitalism, US imperialism, feudalism, friarism, etc. The idea behind such deceptive moves is for the PKP to win the leadership of the masses and channel their activities to desired directions.

In "united front from above," the PKP seeks an alliance with the leaders of a target group. This is usually resorted to when the Party does not have sufficient strength and undertakings. The aim of fomenting a revolutionary atmosphere is temporarily set aside in favor of the immediate objective of self-preservation. The alliance forged under this type of united front action, however, is only temporary and designed to suit the Communists' interests. Any time the Party may break the alliance if such action will be to the advantage of the Party.

Of the two types of the united front tactics, the "united front from above" is more easily adaptable to the legal and parliamentary struggle. The other type is usually applied in connection with the armed struggle. Nevertheless, the two may be interchanged depending upon the existing situation. (See Annex H: PKP Concept of the United Front)

APPLICATIONS

The mechanics of PKP legal or parliamentary struggle has remained substantially the same from the time it was first employed by the movement. However, minor variations were effected by Party leaders during the various stages of its struggle. This is understandable since the legal or parliamentary form of struggle is only a tactic involving a number of activities, and as such it has to be revised from time to time to suit changing local and international conditions. In the following discussions, the changing patterns of PKP legal or parliamentary struggle during the different periods of its history can be easily gauged.

A. Pre-World War II Period (1941)

At the onset when the Party was formed in November 1930, the PKP was a legal organization, freely participating in the country's political activities largely undertaken through the legal or parliamentary form of struggle although at that time, the Party had already committed itself to the cause of Communist armed revolution. The Party's activities during the period were mostly composed of agitation and propaganda drives chiefly in the forms of mass meetings and demonstrations; formation of front groups and election participation which were implemented largely through united front action.

For its agitation-propaganda drives, the Party chose to exploit to the maximum the burning political issue of the time: Philippine independence from the United States. Even in its original constitution and by-laws, the PKP defined that its immediate aims were complete Philippine independence and the overthrow of "American imperialism."

Realizing the difficulties it was facing in the pursuit of its objectives, the Party made an urgent call for unity, mutual cooperation and a strong united front of laborers and peasants under the leadership of labor "whose guiding agency in the struggle is the Party." Incidentally, a world-wide economic depression took place during the period resulting in extreme economic difficulties here and abroad. Aware of the propaganda value of the situation, PKP leaders immediately seized the initiative in exploiting to the maximum the prevailing conditions. Posing as the "true champion" of the suffering masses, the Party took to task the legitimate Filipino leadership under Quezon and Osmeña, pointing to the depression and the suffering of the peopleas proofs of the inadequacy of the so-called "capitalistic system." Consequently a good number of dissilusioned people unwittingly rallied behind the Communist movement, and the Party's initial strength of some 3,000 swelled by an impressive marging. The Party even succeeded in enlisting the support of at least two major peasant and labor organizations: the Kalipunang Pambansa ng mga Magsasaka sa Pilipinas (KPMP) and the Katipunan ng mga Anak Pawis sa Pilipinas (KAP) which formed the left and the right wings of the Party, respectively.

The subsequent outlawing of the PKP and inprisonment of its top leaders for sedition and illegal association greatly demoralized the PKP rank and file. This development, instead of putting an end to the PKP activities, however, only served to teached the local Communists to be more sophisticated in the conduct of the legal or parliamentary form of struggle. The Party continued conducting intensive agitation-propaganda activities and in no time it succeeded in forming two allied groups: the Workers and Peasants Defense Society and the National Unemployed Society.

Up to this point, the PKP's united front action was mainly geared towards "united front from below." During the succeeding years, however, the emphasis was shifted to "united front from above." For instance, the PKP, through a front group called the Tailors' League, coalesced with the Socialist Party and the Republican Party in 1935. Known as the "coalition of the oppressed masses," the PKP-SP–RP– coalition put up its own presidential candidate in the 1935 elections. In 1936, the Party forged a united front with the Frente Popular through which it succeeded in attracting other political parties, to include the

National Socialist Party of Gen Emilio Aguinaldo, the Democratic Party of Juan Sumulong, the Republican Party of Bishop Aglipay, and the Sakdalista Party of Benigno Ramos. There were also several front groups which were also successfully formed by the Party, namely: The League for the Defense of Democracy; Friends of China, Philippine Youth Congress; and the Congress for Democracy and Collective Security.

The most significant achievement made by the local communist workers in so far as united front action is concerned was the formation of the PKP-SP merger in 1938. This eventually enabled the outlawed original PKP to come to the surface anew with a touch of legality inasmuch as the SP had always been a legitimate political party.

At that time, the Pacific War was already in the offing and the possible Japanese offensive in Asia was becoming more and more imminent with each passing day. To get the most advantage out of the prevailing situation, the PKP in an apparent attempt to project itself into the public limelight as a truly patriotic movement, called for the formation of a national united front against "fascism" even as it made an urgent calls for cooperation among all patriotic forces in defense of national security, peace and democracy.

B. World War II Period (1941-1945)

When the Japanese attacked the Philippines, the PKP reiterated its anti-Japanese stand and formally proposed to the government the fornation of a national united front against Japan. Refusing to be an instrument of the Communist deception and double-dealings, the government ignored the proposal and the Party took to the field to carry on its own anti-Japanese struggle.

The organization of the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa Hapon, or HUKBALAHAP, by Party leaders marked the beginning of the PKP aremed struggle. But even the Party's initial armed struggle had the semblance of "legitimacy" for the HUKBALAHAP was originally conceived as a patriotic movement committed to the defense of the country against the Japanese invaders. This is the primary reason why the Huks during the wartime period; succeeded in rallying behind it a sizeable membership and mass support especially from among the peasantry of Luzon. The situation, therefore further strengthened the Party's position because it was portrayed that the HUKBALAHAP was no more than a people's struggle against the Japanese invaders.

With the start of the liberation of the Philippines, it became imperative for the PKP to consolidate and maintain the gains it made during the wartime period. Accordingly, in keeping again with the united front tactics, the Party decided to forge a coalition with the returning Commonwealth government. Party leaders even agreed to send a HUK contingent to help the Philippine-American forces in the liberation of Manila. To further strengthen its position in the countryside, the Party even went to the extent of putting up "provisionals Soviet provincial governments" in some provinces under their strong influence and sought American recognition. Unfortunately for the movement, the Americans refused to recognize PKP leaders who had declared themselves "governors" of certain provinces. Some of them were even arrested, incarcerated - but later on released by American authorites - for usurpation of governmental functions.

C. Post-Liberation Period (1946-1948)

The eventual defeat of Japan and the restoration of the exiled Philippine government removed from the HUKBALAHAP any valid reason to continue its armed activities. Besides, the people had grown tired of bloody conflicts during the war years even as they were now busily engaged in the task of reconstruction from the ravages of war. Accordingly, the PKP, having been rebuffed in its bid to forge a coalition, with the Osmeña administration, adopted anew the legal or parliamentary struggle as the main form of struggle for the moment. This, however, did not mean that the armed HUKBALAHAP had been disbanded. It remained intact all the time, conducting terroristic activities in the countryside.

And so from the field, the PKP moved to Manila where it launched a sustained, nation-wide agitation-propaganda drive, chiefly exacerbating and exploiting the disillusionments and frustrations of the Pilipino people during the post- liberation period. While the newly-born Philippine Republic was preoccupied with the serious task of nation building and reconstruction, the Party busily engaged itself in the task of undermining the people's faith in the government, trying to foment among them the seeds of social unrest and violent revolution.

The Party's chief propaganda vehicles at this time were the two Party publications -- the **Katubusan** and the **Ang Komunismo** which contributed in no little amount to the dissemination of PKP agitation and propaganda. And to further extend the sphere of communist influence to the different segments of the community, the PKP formed several front groups most important among which were the Philippine Newspapers Guild (PNG), the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), the Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid (PKM), and the Democratic Alliance Party (DA). Through the efforts of these front organizations, notably the PKM and the CLO, the PKP mass following especially among the laborers and the peasantry expanded rapidly.

In the field of politics, the Party successfully maneuvered the unsuspecting leaders of the Nacionalista Party to form an NP–DA coalition during the 1946, election season. Consequently, six DA congressional candidates including Dr. Jesus LAVA of Bulacan and Luis TARUC of Pampanga won the election.

The subsequent return of Jesus Lava and Luis Taruc to their respective Huk units in the field marked the resumption of increased Huk armed activities not agaisnt any foreign invaders, but against the legitimate government which the PKP tried to overthrow. Towards the end of the period, the legal or parliamentary struggle was totally relegated to the back-ground as the armed struggle became the main form of struggle. To emphasize the shift in its tactical policy, the Party reorganized the HUKBALAHAP into the Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan (HMB), or People's Liberation Army, to serve as the PKP military arm. The stage had now been set for the launching of an armed revolution.

D. The Period of Armed Struggle as the Main Effort (1949-1952)

The years 1949-1952 saw the PKP desperately engaged in a sustained armed struggle to topple down the government. The new policy, however, did not win for the movement any decisive military victory. On the contrary, it only exposed itself prematurely to the punitive action of the government and awakened the people's conciousness to the Communist menace.

The successful infiltration of PKP/HMB cadres into positions of influence in government, labor unions, newspapers, magazines, educational institutions and othet key organizations is evident fron the attached Annex I: Infiltrations by Captured/ Surrender PKP/HMB Leaders. Several of those who have already been released from long prison sentences continue to be active in the local communist movement, attesting to the dedication of these hard-core Party members in their pursuit of PKP long range objectives.

By 1952, certain PKP leaders led by Luis Taruc severely criticized the current Party policy and proposed that the Party's tactical policy be reshifted to the legal or parliamentary struggle mainly by infiltrating legitimate groups including the AFP; conduct of demostrations, peace negotiations, strikes, etc., and the formation of front groupa. The Party leadership would not listen to the proposal, but in 1953 it adopted the so-called PKP "anti-war policy" (the Party thought then that a major global was was imminent) which was substantially similar to Taruc's peace policy," At any rate with the implementation of the anti-war policy. the PKP actually started de-emphasizing the armed struggle in favor of the legal or parliamentary struggle.

E. From Armed to Legal or Parliamentary Struggle (1953-To Date)

As early as 1952, the PKP, after analyzing the prevailing situation, become convinced that an ebb in the revolutionary tide was in exixtence. Ordinarily, this kind of situation calls for the adoption of the legal or parliamentary form of struggle as proposed earlier by Luis Taruc. But it appeared that the Party leadership, perhaps, out of a desire to protect the pride and prestige of those who were responsible for the Party's "adventurist" policy of armed struggle during the years 1949-1952, could not readily effect the necessary shifting of tactical policy from the atmed struggle to the legal or parliamentary form. The movement had therefore to devise ways and means to effect the change in tactical policy without giving any hint that a fatal blunder had been committed during the previous years.

The adoption of the "anti-war policy" was only the first step towards the return to legal or parliamentary struggle. This was followed in 1956 by the adoption of the so-called "policy of Filipism" which set the following objectives of PKP struggle. in the order of their priorities

First: Establishment of a "Filipinistic government," that is, a government not subservient to foreigners especially the United States

Second: Establishment of a "New Democracy" or "National Democracy" through the overthrow of "imperialist feudal power."

Third: Establishment of Socialism leading to Communism.

Under this concept, the first objective the establishment of a "Filipinistic government" – was supposed to be achieved through the legal or parliamentary form of struggle using the issue of nationalism as its rallying point. The Party failed to attain this objective, but it succeeded at least in re-extending the sphere of its influence to the different segments of the community through agitation-propaganda drives, infiltration of legitimate groups, election participation and organization of front groups.

The effectiveness of the legal or parliamentary struggle in regaining lost ground was felt anew. So the Party evolved more grandoise plans to prepare the movement for "a long and protracted struggle." In 1960, the Party defined the following as the immediate tasks of the Party.

When RA 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Law was passed in 1957, the PKP urged PKP/HMB members in the field who had no pending cases before the court to "surrender" and take advantage of the grace period provided by the law during which a PKP/HMB members who surrenders will be immediately released if he is not facing any criminal charge before the court at the time of surrender. The idea behind this PKP move was to convert surrendered/released PKP/HMB members into "legal cadres" for employment in the legal or parliamentary struggle.

1. Re-orientation of illegal cadres on matters concerning the legal struggle. (Illegal cadres are identified Party members who can neither surface nor work openly for the movement.)
2. Preparation and training of legal cadres and legal workers for the legal form of struggle.
3. Formation of legal or front groups

Meanwhile, the united front tactic was given special emphasis to enhance the Party's activities among various classes and groups especially on matters involving the struggle against U.S. imperialism, agitation for agrarian reforms, and the campaign for civil liberties. "Every Party member," the PKP declared, "must be a member of an organization – workers, peasants, professional, student, youth, etc., for economic, political, cultural, social or civic purposes – must be the prime movers, if not the recognized leaders. The task of leading these organizations falls on the shoulders of the Party cadres concerned."

Attempt were also made to effect united front from above with the highest office in the land. In 1963, Dr. Jesus Lava, then the incumbent PKP Secretary-General, sent several letters to President Macapagal offering PKP cooperation for the purpose of effecting joint action on certain undertaking especially on the following:

1. Implementation of the Land Reform Code.
2. Pursuit of the Philippine claim to Sabah including government support to the Kalimantan Utara Revolution, or the right of the people of Sabah to self-determination.
3. The government drive for moral regeneration.
4. The move to bar businessman from engaging themselves in politics, either directly or indirectly.

President Macapagal would not allow his administration to become an instrument of communist deception and double-dealing, so he ignored the PKP proposals. But this did not discourage the Party from pursuing united front action on the widest possible fields of activity.

In connection with the government agrarian reform program, it appeared that the PKP was deeply disturbed by the passage and initial implementation of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Such PKP apprehensions on the after-effects of the Code to the local Communist movement was not without foundation, for the

Party has always been aware that any effective reform in the basic socio-economic structure of the country is bound to draw the people away from the revolutionary movement. It will be recalled that when the PKP declared the existence of a revolutionary ebb in 1952, the Party did not fail to mention that "one reason for the ebbing of the revolutionary tide was the number of reforms, especially economic reforms, effected by the government from the time of President Quirino. The masses have been won by these reforms and they eventually drifted away from the revolutions."

Accordingly, although the PKP did not believe that the Agricultural Land Reform Code would eventually solve the basic socio-economic problems of the country, the Party nevertheless moved immediately to exploit the Code to its own advantage. The Party laid down the following guidelines for the projected PKP participations (through joint action) in the implementation of agrarian reforms.

1. Organize the peasant masses, especially the tenants, or join already organized peasant groups.
2. Invite other peasant groups to plan and act in concert with the PKP.
3. Explain to the peasant the provisions of the Agricultural Land Reform Code. Explain also the dangers of its misimplementation in order that the peasants may be persuaded to manifest their demands - through petitions, resolutions, demonstrations, strikes, etc., – for the proper implementation of the Code.
4. The pesant organization should be the basic unit for the implementation of the Code.
5. Obtainand help project peasants' demands under the Code.
6. Make small peasant groups as nuclei of farmers' cooperatives.

Meanwhile, although the PKP objective of establishing a "Filipinistic government" through legal or parliamentary struggle still remained a failure at this point, the Party kept on exploiting the issue of nationalism in the field of agitation- propaganda. It became clear, however, that the Pkp concept of Filipino Nationalism always involves "anti-American imperialist struggle."

By and large, it can be safely stated that the shift of PKP tactical policy in 1953 from the armed to legal or parliamentary struggle prevented what could have been a total disintegration of the Party. Today, the Party is still pursuing the policy with the hope that it will hasten the creation of conditions favorable for the "revolutionary flow" of Communism and the subsequent attainment of a "revolutionary crisis" which would be the signal for the launching of a nation-wide armed revolution.

APPRAISAL

In theory and in practice, it is very clear that the so-called legal or parliamentary form of Communist struggle is not a sincere attempt to resolve Filipino national problems through peaceful means which recognize and respect the rule of law. At most, this form of struggle, is no more than a sinister device designed to attain certain Communist ends at the expense of our democratic traditions; it is an insidious measure that seeks to destroy the accepted social and moral values of our people, undermine their faith in the present democratic social system and eventually lead them to the path of civil war.

Indeed, this devious form of Communist struggle is a clever blending of superficial legality with substantial illegality. So efficient and so baffling is this Communist concept of struggle which is being carried on in practically all segments of the community and in every field of our country's endeavors that at times public reaction towards it borders on nonchalance and indifference. The Communist are so adept at skillfully utiliaing as their protective shiled the very same democratic processes whch they themselves are seeking to destroy. It is quite difficult for the layman to understand how such a ruthless ideology (which in the first place does not believe in individual rights and freedom), could manage to pose without any scruples, as the most ardent advocate of civil liberties and equality. Such a self-contradicting stance only serves to confirm the deceptive nature of Communist tactics especially in its so-called legal or parliamentary form of struggle.

Over the years, the local Communist movement appears to have gained substantial headways in the employment of the legal and parliamentary struggle. This could be partially explained by the fact that as has been noted, this form of struggle is being pursued within the framework of the country's legal system and democratic processes. It has therefore become an extremely difficult task for the authorities to counteract the legal or parliamentary form of Communist struggle, particularly in the face of apathy and unconcern in some segments of our society.

In addition, the existence of adverse social, economic and political conditions inherent to a developing and growing nation like the Philippines has considerably enhanced the agitation and propaganda efforts of the local Communist movement.

Nevertheless, it is believed that the gains that the local Communist movement has made in the pursuit of its legal or parliamentary struggle are mainly psychological in nature which have yet to be transformed into concrete revolutionary forces. It is also true that the PKP and the CPP/MA–MAO have made considerable headway in their agitational and propaganda efforts by exploiting some agit-prop lines which are generally valid and legitimate issues that readily find favorable responses even from non-Communist sympathizers and the public as a whole. PKP infiltration of the news media has also enhanced their agit-prop effort.

It will be noted that up to the present, the local Communist movement still refuses to define clearly and concisely before the people that the struggle it is waging is a Communist-inspired struggle against the established political system and social order in our country. The Communists would rather prefer to hide their true ideological color and activites behind such impressive but deceptive phraseology as "New Democracy," "Nationalist Democracy," the "Unfinished Revolution of 1896," and many other shibboleths that are calculated to mislead the people and rally them behind the Communist movement.

Communist subversion, through the use of legal or parliamentary form of struggle as the Party's main instrument outside of Central Luzon, indeed, poses a more dangerous threat to national security than its employment of limited armed struggle or insurgency for the following reasons:

1. Legal or parliamentary activities are conducted by legal cadres and legal workers within our democratic system. These legal cadres and legal workers are adept at infiltrating the government and organized groups in the community through which they attempt to spread the poison of their ideology. They are favored in this respect by the inhibitions and restraints imposed by the Bill of Rights which all national security forces and law-enforcement agencies must respect and obey.

2. The local Communist movement has greater capabilities to conduct legal or parliamentary activities. In terms of intellect, numbers, training, access, and overall effect on public attitude, subversive cadres outweigh the armed insurgent forces.

3. In extent, legal or parliamentary activities are conducted all over the country, insurgency is generally confined to Central Luzon and part of Isabela province at present.

4. Legal or parliamentary struggle -- in other words, subversion -- directly threatens the social and political stability of the State, thereby having greater adverse effects on the country as a whole, while armed struggle such as the one being conducted in Central Luzon affects primarily the peace and order situation in the region.

The legal or parliamentary struggle will doubtless be pursued by the local Communist movement in connection with the coming Constitutional Convention.

Aide from supporting candidates for delegates who are sympathetic to their cause, the Communists can be expected to attempt to introduce changes that will favor the eventual adoption of Marxist-Leninist patterns and doctrines. It is therefore hoped that the elected delegates will be careful not to allow Communist subversive elements to introduce or practice their techniques of "legal or parliamentary struggle" during the Constitutional Convention. (Annex J: Stand of CPP on 1971 Constitutional Convention.)

PART II

Having presented in PART I the objectives, mechanics, views of the local Communists, united front tactics, actual application and lastly, an appraisal of the legal or parliamentary struggle in the Philippin setting, PART II attempts to explain communist forms of struggle in general. It also touches on the international application of this form of struggle.

PART II

FORMS OF STRUGGLE

COMMUNIST STRATEGY AND TACTICS

Communist "classics" such as the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tsetung contain the fundamental principles of Communism. These principles to a great extent are accepted by all Communists. The works of the "master" teach and advocate the overthrow and destruction of government by force and violence. Lenin, Stalin and Mao especially repudiated "peaceful means." In his book **Problems of Leninism**, Stalin defined strategy and tactics for Communism as follows: "Strategy is the determination of the direction of the main blow of the proletariat at a given stage of the revolution, the elaboration of a corresponding plan for the disposition of the revolutionary forces, the fight to carry out this plan throughout the given stage of the revolution. Tactics are the determination of the line of conduct of the proletariat in the comparatively short period of the flow or ebb of the movements, of the rise or decline of the revolution; the fight to carry out this line by means of replacing old forms of struggle and organization by new ones. Tactics are a part of strategy, subordinate to it and serving it."

Communist strategy is therefore essentially to dominate by armed conflict. Tactics may change but strategy is constant. Lenin, in his **State and Revolution**, emphasized by possiblity of peaceful co-existence between the Communist and non-Communist worlds. But Lenin stressed that "One or the other must conquer; a number of terrible clashes is inevitable" – meaning that communism is incompatible with any other system, thus making violence unavoidable.

Communist tactics are dictated by expediency and current needs. The two most frequently employed are the frontal attack and the united-front or "peace" tactics. These two and their varioations have been utilized by Communists a number of times. For instance from 1935 to 1939, the Communist International, acting under instructions from the Soviet Government, ordered foreign Communists to transform themselves from wild-eyed revolutionaries into respectable "liberals" ostensibly interested in social reform and the defeat of Fascism. This was the era of the "united front," during which Communists untilized the Trojan horse technique to bore from within. They infiltrated labor unions, university faculties, editorial boards, and governmental bureaus. Communists were instructed to enter into coalitions with "liberals" and reformers until they had acquired enough power and prestige to cast aside their pretence of cooperation.

BASIS OF LEGAL OR PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE IN COMMUNIST DOCTRINE

The Communist movement, from the days of Lenin, believes that the parliamentary system is an obsolete phenomenon. Marxists are supposed to not only accept the reality of class struggle but agree that it can be resolved only through the dictatorship of the proletariat – by a one-party, non-parliamentary system in which all power is exercised by the Communist party. They are to remember that coalitions or agreements with other political parties and splinter groups, whether socialist or not, can never be more than temporary and tactical accommodations for limited objective. Parliamentary activity must therefore never be allowed to absorb the energies, compromise the principles or restrict the freedom of action of Communist parties. Where this danger (rightism) arises they must either quit coalitions in which they are being reduced to impotence or absorb and weaken the other parties, moving steadily towards single-party rule.

The other extreme known as leftism paves the way for Communists to compromise on principles to gain tactical ends and is acceptable. Many doctrinaire Communists take their proclaimed principles so literally that they are unable to summon up enough mental flexibility to appear to go back on their principles, whatever the advantages to be gained. Thus, leftism gives Communists a flexible weapon with which to lean on when they deviate from the orthodox line. The classic formulation of leftism was given by Lenin in his **Left Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder (1920)**. He said that "to reject compromise on principle is childish," and demanded that Communists should learn "how to combine the strictest loyalty to the ideas of Communism with an ability to make all the necessary compromise – to tack, make agreements, zigzags, and retreats."

THE LEGAL STRUGGLE

Legal or parliamentary struggle consists essentially of legitimate methods undertaken by Communists in their drive for power. Although not specifically defined in Communist doctrine it has become associated with those forms of communists activities activities designed to achieve short-term gains through legal or legitimate means. United front tactics, peaceful coexistence, infiltration, and efforts to gain legitimacy through court litigations are the more notable forms of this Communist tactics.

Like most political groups which aim to secure positions of influence in society, communists exploit the existing political and social institutions such as elections, churches, religion, labor unions, the press, etc., with the unique aim to subvert or destroy such institutions as universities and churches. The latter institutions exert enormous influence on society because of their cultural roles devoted mainly to the uplift of men's minds. Churches generally stand as a bastion against corrupting ideas and influences. Other economic and political institutions are just as vital.

The aims of the legal struggle are:

1. To enable the Communists to recoup losses and gain more following.
2. To serve as as a cover for intensified illegal activities;
3. To demonstrate to the masses that as far as major communist objectives are concerned, the "legal" form is not as effective as the "armed" struggle.

The "legal" struggle, as applied by the communists, takes advantage of all legally permissible activities such as:

Petitions: – Leading or joining delegations handing petitions to government officials, e.g., the President of the Philippines, Cabinet members, Congressmen/Senators, governors, mayors, on matters concerning the different problems of the people. Its real purpose is to embarrass the administration in its failure to cope with the multifarious problems of the country.

Demonstrations: – Joining student groups, labor unions and civic organizations and agitating them to demonstrate against such issues as graft in the government, the use of the Armed Forces in non-military duties, slowness in agricultural reform, compartmentalized justice, etc. Their tru aim is to stir up and divide the people.

Letter-writing: – (stereotyped letters or otherwise) – Urging organizations and/or individuals to write letters asking for redress of the grievances from the government, e.g., writing to the press against the oppressive activities of a landlordand suggesting purchase of the land, or investigation of the landowner to solve the problem.

Support of non-party personalities or organizations: – Exploiting tothe party's advantage issues defended by non-Communist personalities or organizations. Example: supporting any-politicians of national standing in his opposition to the sending of troops to Vietnam, taking part in discussion of issues on bases; or supporting legislation to lessen the effectiveness of the anti-subversion law.

Forming or joining legal organizations: – Forming organizations supposedly for nationalistic purposes but actually to serve the aims of the Party. Joining legal organizationslike labor unions to undermine the structure of said organizations and conduct illegal activities such as sabotage and terroristic activities, etc.

These activities are implemented through the process of

infiltration and **subversion.** Social and political groups which are primary targets to be infiltrated and subverted are the following:

1. Labor unions
2. Established churches
3. The Armed Forces
4. The Educational system
5. Transportion industry
6. Press/Radio/TV services
7. Youth organizations.

Labor unions: - Communist agents with instruction to infiltrate into the key positions of big nationwide unions usually gain admissions in to a "local"or a branch of a big union as common workers, and by sheer hard work are able to gain the notice of their fellows. They are very considerate to the ordinary members and generally give indications that they are men to be trusted. In due course they become very active in union matters, in discussions of benefits for workers. Because they have a good command of parliamentary procedures they can easily influence the flow of discussions by introducing leading questions, filibustering, etc. After giving sufficient notice that they are articulate and well able to lead the local union, the agents get elected to important positions.

After some time, the entire union is faced with several issues. The non-Communist leaders inform the membership of their plans to get more benefits and raises from the eemployers. But they also indicate that these things do not get by easily and that they are not to expect them. These are honest words from honest men. The common workers, on the other hand, are immediately electrified by the prospects of more pay and privileges. Oftentimes, the honest labor leaders do not get all of the expected concessions and things soon begin to boil as far as the common workers are concerned.

At this stage, the Communist agents may enter the scene. They stir the workers. They suggest that new elections be held, with the aim of winning said elections and establishing themselves in the leadership, vice and the non-Communist leaders. If they are successful, they can incite the workers to stage strikes, accompanied by a propaganda campaign. When a transportation company is shut down by mass strike, the whole community suffers. But the Communist agents and their propagandists tell the community to blame the capitalists for the sorry situation.

However, when the Communists feel that they cannot aggrandize power, they usually throw their support to other leaders who then become indebted to them. But if they succeed in lordingover the unions, they can make the workers politically conscious by discussing political issues which have something to do with the workers' economic plight.

Established Churches: – In Soviet Russia, the Party suppresses all religious activities. But because the people have hungered for religion, the Partythought it best toinstall a puppet Church, where most of the priests are Communist agents trained in seminary work.

In Czechoslovakia, the battle against religion is being fought in the schools, where the pupils are taught to hate the institutions of their fathers and verily dance on the graves of their ancesters. Example: Once, a school teacher asked her wards to recite the Lord's Prayer. After the invocation, she said, "You have just asked God to give you your daily bread. Now let us see if God will really send you some. Nothing appeared. Then she said, "Let us ask Stalin our great father to give us food." After the children had invoked the "divine" grace of the great Stalin, twomen appeared on the door bearing baskets of candies and fruits.

In countries outside the Soviet Union and its satellites, infiltration is carried out byseemingly well-meaning persons who ask the priests and pastors to let them speak during the service for some worthy cause that would benefit the poor and underprivileged. Usually, these persons who are trained Communist speakers open their speeches with short prayers and Biblical quotations. Then they ask the congregation to do something concrete instead of merely attending Church services. The speaker then slips the name of an organization (a front) which does good deeds and charity work for Christ. The speech is invariably effective, since the speakers have had the permission of the minister. However, most of the front organizations mentioned are short-lived; others are resilient and able to perform their roles over long periods.

The Communist campaign against the Church takes manyother forms. One, Communist agents seek admission into seminaries. In practicising their profession, they give comparisons between Christianity and Communism, more or less favorable tothe latter thus catching the unwary flock. Another recent example is the printing of a large poster in The Philippine Collegian, the UP Student Organ, offering a P30.000 reward, dead or alive for JESUS Christ, who is portrayed as a subversive with 12 bodyguards.

The Military: – Communist agents also seek to infiltrate into military and police organizations. Their aim is to subvert these organizations by disaffecting slowly and gradually the loyalties of the men in uniform. Once admitted, the agents become "good soldiers," mastering almost everydetail of military work. These agents, who must be considered to be highly intelligent, work among the common soldiers and form "soldiers" committees" ostensibly to relieve thedrabness of army life bydiscussions on an intellectual plane. Economic and sociological issues are mulled over in these committees: The purpose of such activities is to arouse a political consciousness in the soldiers.

The agents of work do not expect spectacular results immediately. Rather, they patiently hope to convert their soldier-contacts and in all seriousness win the latter's friendship and loyalty by doing favors for them and exchanging intimate details of each other's life. Traps and compromising situations are laid for the soldiers bythe use of money, women and other enticements. When a Communist agent succeeds in penetrating the inner-most secrets of a solider's life, a step in his campaign is achieved. The preliminarydiscussions of economic and politicalissues are carried through in private life with even greater acumen and fierceness as time goes on. The soldier-convert may also be asked tosay bad things about military life and his superiors to discourage prospective servicemen and trainees. He is also asked to paint in bold relief the evils of war and the moralquestions involved in bearing arms as a result of which innocent civilians may be harmed.

The Educational System: - The educational system of any country exerts a tremendous force in moulding the outlook of students and in forming their basic attitudes towards life.

A Communist-oriented professor of sociology or political science, for instance, can influence his students in such a way, by giving a comparative treatment of social movements and great political events, taking care to emphasize the economic aspects of political affairs. By emphasizing the role of technology and economic organization in warfare and in international dealings, the Communist professor brings his student one step nearer to a consideration of Marx's economic theories, especially the "theory of surplus value."

Economics, however, is a subject in which almost everybody is concerned - housewife, baker, economist, industrialist, etc. But the Communist-leaning professor is distinguished by over-emphasis on the class warfare between labor and capital. He also calls for a drastic reorganization of the economic structure in wuch a way that economic goods are distributed to men according to their needs and ability. He compares Communism and Christianity or any other well-organized religion. He says that both have the same spirit of charity and humanity. Unwary students can be caught by this elaborate association of widely distinct ideologies.

It is in the sphere of philosophy and natural science that an adept Communist-sympathizing professor can mislead his students. In philosophy, he impresses his students with his ability to grasp abstract issues and reduce them to a simple law - the dialectics. This form of reasoning was first developed and employed by the German philosopher George Hegel. But it was Karl Marx who applied it in his theory of class struggle. A Communist-leaning professor of philosphy would naturally want to teach dialectics because this logical system fits nicely into Communist theory of history.

In the realm of natural science, Communist professors can be very effective. Natural science is itself not a very "sciency" subject, since great scientists differ in their own philosophical views. It is not surprising that Einstein admits metaphysical elements in his thinking (meta, form the Greek, means **beyond**, above) for which Lenin denounced his Theory of Relativity (because the theory cannot be explained by, or be reconciled with, dialectical materialism).

The control of student governments, organization and newspaper is a primary objective of Commununist agents on the campus.

Transportation Industry: - Communists realize the importance of gaining control over transportation unions in their worldwide undertaking of inciting men to revolution. If they could gain control over said advantage. A delay in the arrival of food-stocks could mean a matter of life and death to the nation. Or, again, think of the repercussions in a nation's economy whenever the mass of workers and employees who depend on public transportation cannot go to work for lack of jeepney, bus or taxi services. The recent series of land and air transport strikes are examples of crippling mass actions that seriously affect both individual house holds and the nations's economy. Transport unions are therefore prime targets for Communist intiltration, subversion then control.

Press/Radio/TV Services: - A Communist agent in the tri-media can be of great value in the legal or parliamentary struggle by performing the following among others:

1. He can launch a propaganda campaign (in a less obvious manner, of course) in conjunction with one that is being undertaken by open party members;

2. He can criticize a nation's economy and blame the capitalists or their business ethics for the resulting dire economic situation; or

3. He can masquerade as a crusader for the under priveleged and be a "nobly noble" writer and go after graft and corruption as a starter, then blame politicians and the nation's leader for the unemployment problem.

As a cultural aficionado, he can criticize the sterility of a given country's artistic life and casually mention the achievements of

Communist Art and Science. Or, he can be a political analyst. In this capacity he can discourse on various economic and political theories, at the same time presenting the attractive aspects of Marxist-Leninist-Maoist theories in suchı a way not to arouse the reader's suspicion as to his allegiance. He is facile at destructive criticism and character assassination, but seldom offers workable solutions to common problems. If there are liberal or reformist writers in the same media organization, the Communist agents find easier acceptance by his colleagues and audience as a legitimate crusader himself.

Youth Organization: – Youth organizations are usual and easy targets for Communist infiltration. Unless the leaders are highly conscious of the subtle tactics of Communist agents in infiltrating into student groups, the infiltrating Communist cadre finds a relatively easy time in gaining admission into a student organization. He can start his campaign as a "model" followerand as a very enthusiastic worker. In time, he can become a leader with a large following, or at least, he can convert a few recruits for the Party. Youth/student groups are especially susceptible to fall sway under Communist blandishments, half-truths and sloganeering.

We find youth movements highly conscious of politics in have-not countries, which must perforce depend on foreign assistance for their economic survival. In these countries, therefore, it is not surprising to find youth organization very rabid and aggressive.

The Russian and Chinese Communist Parties are well-organized and well-financed in the matter of inducing youthand student leaders from foreign countries to vistit or train at the centers of the Communist World- Moscow and Peking. Under the guise of youth festivals, cultural exchanges, international conferences, etc., such young leaders are indoctrinated ın and become captives of the Communist system.

THE ARMED STRUGGLE

"Armed struglle" is open revolution. It is usually launched when there appears to be a revolutionary flow leading to the development of a revolutionary situation.

The aims of the armed struggle are:

1. To hasten the belief of the masses that the armed struggle is the only solution on their desire to improve their conditions;
2. To demonstrate Communist strength to the skeptical peasants and workers in order to win them to its side; and
3. To take over the reins of the government and carry on its consolidation and expansion.

If the "Armed struggle" is successful, the communist gain control of society and they proceeds to reorganize it along return to the legal struggle and continue their infiltration and subversion activities. The armed struggle of the PKP is described in detail in previous volumes I, II, III and IV of this series.

PARLIAMENTARY STRUGGLE BY FOREIGN COMMUNIST PARTIES

Communist parties essentially are organized for political action designed to inaugurate a worldwide communist social order by seizing and exploiting political power and economic resources in conformity with a pattern introduced in Russia in 1917. Outside Russia, Communist Party leadership followed Russian direction for 30 years until Yugoslav Communists demanded autonomy in decision making in 1948 and refused to accept the USSR as the "fatherland".

Communist Parties are characterized by their strongly-beliefs traced in orgin to the doctrines of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels byt modified and developed by their successors. Among these are:

1. Belief in the superior productivity of a state planned economic system over private enterprise;
2. The necessity of state ownership of productive resources to prevent exercise of economically derived political power by private individuals or corporations;
3. Organization of land used by communities;
4. Propagation of atheism; and
5. **Impossibility of obtaining power except by violence.**

In adopting these principles to their various needs, the parties have taken into consideration the special economic and political conditions existing in the countries in which they are active. Programs are changed from time to time as conditions demand but the ultimate objective remains the same.

Where Communist parties have not achieved power or where power, although achieved, has not become absolute, goals are often compromised, as in Poland in 1956, but basic aims are reasserted when possible. To advance their cause in states where power could not yet be seized, Communists seek membership in mass organizations, notably youth/student organizations, labor unions, social and cultural associations, professional/intellectual groups, military forces, and the government bureaucracy, attempting to weaken the society from within before taking over completely as in Czechoslovakia in 1948. Communists essentially deny the possibility of achieving their goals through parliamentary procedures and seek power through violent revolution, although where such tactics attract little support, conventional election campaigns and other democratic processes are supported until violent seizure of power seem feasible.

YUGOSLAVIA

The Yugoslav Communist Party under Tito's leadership adopted a program in 1958 deviating from traditional Moscow theories. It **denied** the absolute necessity of revolution to achieve power for the working class in non-Soviet states. It envisaged working-class assumption of power through democratic processes as capitalism decayed and entered into a phase called "state capitalism." It also rejectedd as dogmatic Moscow's concepts of the steps necessary to transform society in a state under Communist Party control to a condition of complete Communism.

UNITED KINGDOM

British workers, though class conscious, support the socialism of the Labor Party so that Communist have not made deep inroads in Britain. Communists at maximum strength held two parliamentary seats in 1945, lost them in 1950 and were not represented in 1959. In 1966 interest ebbed further. Similar lack of interest existed Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

GERMANY

German Communists failed to gain control of the Constituent Assembly in 1919. They regained power slowly increasing their representation in the Reichstag from 4 seats in 1920 to 62 in 1924, 77 in 1930 and 81 in 1933. Adolf Hitler suppressed the Party. It remained underground and reemerged with the military defeat and partition of Germany in 1945. With Soviet support, Communists became the master in East Germany. In West Germany, the party was declared illegal.

ITALY

Italian Communists won 13 parliamentary seats in 1921 but were suppressed by Benito Mussolini after 1924. They did not reappear until after Italian military defeat in WW II. In 1948, they joined a leftist popular front which polled 40% of the vote. In 1966, the party split under pressure of the Sino-Soviet rift and its Socialist allies turned away leaving it divided and isolated.

FRANCE

French Communist joined in 1934 with Socialists and Radical Socialists to create a leftist popular front to oppose rightists. This coalition won the 1936 elections but Communists refused to accept positions in the government. Capitalizing on the goodwill won in resisting Germans, the Communist Party emerged in France after WW II as one of the three major parties. Ministerial posts were held occasionally but after the victory of Gen. Charles de Gaulle's party in 1958 and the reorganization of the electoral system, Communist strength dropped to 10 seats. Further loss of prestige occurred in 1966, after De Gaulle was received enthusiastically in Moscow for his anti-war policy. Today, the French Communist Party is even shunned by student radicals who condemn its “bourgeois” character.

USSR

The Bolshevist faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party, at the congress of 1903, prepared a program which was redrafted after the Russian revolution of 1905 to incorporate the experience of the party. It was revised again in 1919, following the practical experience of the party in governing the new state. The 1919 revision remained the basic program until Stalin’s death in 1953, after which it was replaced by a new one in 1961. The 1919 version analyzed the capitalist system of economy in Marxist terms and heralded the liberation of society from recurring depressions ans oppression by social revolution, brought about by the dictatorship of the proletariat and its vanguard, the Communist Party. The 1961 program’s principal innovation was to decalred ended the phase of proletarian dictatorship. Both Communist Party and Soviet state were heralded as representing the entire people. In foreign policy the 1961 program established the principle of “peaceful coexistence” characterized by continuing ideological struggle with capitalism byt shunning outright military measure likely to cause world war. Stalin first defined the term “peaceful coexistence” in 1926 to describe a maneuver designed to lull con-Communist nations into a false sense of security. Coexistence said Stalin, was to be encouraged only until such time as the Communists had sufficiently renewed themselves to take the offensive. He said that coexistence implies “temporary agreements with the capitalist governments in the sphere of industry, trade and diplomacy.”

COMMUNIST CHINA

In contrast to the Soviet Party’s program, the Chinese Communist Party’s program was frequently modernized. In its 1956 version the Chinese party demanded application of Marxism-Leninism in a flexible and creative way, developing theory by integrating what it called the universal truths with China’s revolutionary practice. In this connection, MAO has emphasized the waging of “people’s wars” and “wars of national liberation” in undeveloped countries following the example set by the Communist victory in China through armed struggle.

UNITED STATES

An example of the legal struggle undertaken by a Communist Party is the case of the Communist Party of the US. It waged a long legal battle against the registration requirements of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950. In 1961 the US

Supreme Court upheld the Act but the party continued to resist. In 1965, the Supreme Court rejected the 1950 acts requirements that individual Communists register as violating the Fifth Amendment. The previous year, the Supreme Court declared the prohibition of foreign passports to all Communists without consideration of degree of engagement in party affairs as unconstitutional. Emboldened by these legal victories, the Communist Party held a congress in 1966 and announced resumption of open activities.

The US. Communist Party declared itself in 1966 "a revolutionary party whose aim is the fundamental transformation of society." Through application of Marxist-Leninist political theory it seeks to install the working class and its allies in power through exercise of the **electoral and legislative** process, stimulated by pressures exerted through "strikes, boycotts, demostration, sit-downs, sit-ins and others."

THE LEGAL STRUGGLE (SUBVERSION)

INTRODUCTION

Our subject is "the legal struggle". It is one of the forms of struggle in a revolution. As a form of struggle, it is a part of tactics. It is utilized in relation to and support of the other forms of struggle, like for example – the illegal struggle.

In other words, if tactics is analyzed in comparizon with the over-all forces of the ebb flow of the revolution, the legal form of struggle is given more emphasis depending on the organizational work, especially in relation to revolutionary activity.

The orientation of the Party is the only true picture of existing situations. When there are changes in the situation it is imperative that there will also be changes in the interpretation of the Party and the Party line will emanate from this orientation. The tasks sent out to be implemented which are considered the cream of our organizational work in the implementation of the Party line there is a need for the proper orientation in analyzing the objective conditions, to insure the proper implementation of the tasks in relation to existing conditions.

It is the intention of these "tasks" to provide the proper orientation to comrades, especially the legal cadres with regards to their participation in this form of struggle. We should have the proper interpretation of legal struggle. There is a need for applying our knowledge of the theory in pursuing the tasks promulgated by the Party. It is also the intention of these tasks to encourage our comrades to study the methods by which legal struggle can be carried out especially with regards to the surfacing of legal workers and cadres as regards their organizational activities which is the true line in our present activities.

This present guide cannot repalce 'our Organizer's Guides sent out every now and then. This paper is in accordance with said Organizer's Guides so as to give guidance to our comrades in various as well as related ways in connection with our tasks in consonance with the capabilities of the respective comrades.

I. ORIENTATION

In 1952, our Party sent out an analysis that there is an ebb in the revolution. At the same tine an opinion was forwarded by the Party to out comrades that there will be a "long and protracted struggle." The Party has explained the significance on the need of adopting the legal form of struggle. As a proof of this, a circular

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* *This is a repring of an original PKP document issued by the PKP in late 1960 as a supplement of* **Political Transmission No. 17.** *PT is the official PKP (Traditional Faction) Policy organ.*

was sent advising the comrades on the need of utilizing legal cadres as the primary tasks in connection with organizational activity in this new form of struggle.

The first reason behind the revolutionary ebb is the sudden illusion of the masses, lacking in understanding, of the political and economic situation and believing that prosperity could be obtained thru parliamentary means. This was due to the alleged clean and free elections conducted by the puppets of American imperialists. We believe that there is a change in the economy. We believe in the true orientation of the Party. Likewise also believe that the Marxist-Leninist principle should be reconciled with the practice and new forms of struggle. Likewise, we have to appraise our ability to lead and also our understanding of the true situation inside and outside of the country if we have the right interpretation of the political situation and the proper orientation of organization at the present time. We should be able to analyze and exploit our assets especially in the legal field where there is a need to give our greatest support to be carried out by the masses.

In the implementation of the legal struggle, while giving it "major emphasis", it does not necesarily mean that we have to neglect the illegal form of struggle. This is wrong. The proper use on the different forms of struggle should be interrelated and complementary. Emphasis on one form will depend on the existing situation and strengthening one form to complement the other.

It is significant to mention here the mistakes of the opportunists of the Second International in connection with their use of the legal form of struggle. It is not the use of the legal struggle which is wrong but the lack of the other forms of struggle. They relied without complementing it with illegal or armed struggle. The dreamt of subjugating capitalism (the highest form of imperialism) with only the peaceful method of struggle, legal and parliamentary. It is also important to mention here the weaknesses of our legal form of struggle to serve as lesson in our future work.

Lenin taught us "After the proletariat have learned to advance during the revolutionary flow, they should also learn to retreat during the revolutionary ebb in order to round up their knowledge in all forms of struggle."

This teaching is very significant to all revolutionaries. To our comrades with shallow understanding of the theories on the various form of struggle, the defensive form is construed as treachery and passivity. But the true revolutionary retreat can be implemented as active retreat. In other words the Party will reserve the illegal members and cadres in preparation for the appropriate situation calling for their utilization. Meanwhile, it will utilize the legal cadres which is complementary to the overall revolutionary activity. It is at this period where the illegal workers and cadres are put deeply underground.

It is also at this period when the greatest emphasis should be given to legal forms of struggle. Hence the major responsiblity of comrades in the recruitment of legal cadres and workers.

We are sure that there will soon be a revolutionary flow. The primary political and economic problem of the people cannot be solved. The experiences of the people acquired thru various situations will give them strength. Our knowledge of the situation will be greater than them masses and our job is to put the masses closer to the cadres. It is our job to guide the masses in preparation for the revolution.

Let us open the eyes of the masses to the validity of our objectives in order to utilize the masses as out reserves when the final revolution will come under our guidance to victory.

The Party has apprised us on the existing objectives conditions which are signs that there will soon be a flow in the revolution.

These objectives conditions were explained in previous political transmissions especially PT No. 9 and PT No. 17. In addition to these symptoms, developmemts outside the country influence a great lot the conditions obtaining inside.

With these new developments, there are two points which we have to consider so we do not deviates from the Marxist-Leninist line; first, the need for a shift to a new dialectics approach in preparation for the qualitative change and vice-versa. While it is true that there are various signs of a shift to the revolutionary flow as brought about by sparadic signs, there is a strong need to help bring about or hasten the objective conditions of a revolution.

LEGAL WORKERS AND LEGAL CADRES

The legal workers and legal cadres that we have exposed should carry the burden of legal activities which will also give a tremendous help in organizaing our armed members or revolutionary activities.

In order to succeed in this kind of activity (legal struggle) we should utilize with extreme care and understanding the following factors:

1. The re-orientation of our illegal cadres, from OBs up regarding legal struggle.
2. Preparation and training of legal workers and legal cadres.
3. Formation of legal organizations (fronts).
4. Leadership training of legal cadres in organizational activity.
5. The teaching of legal organization (fronts) on the technique of illegal activity to liberate the country.

These five factors will be explained in the succeeding test.

II. TRAINING OF OUR "ILLEGAL" CADRE IN CONNECTION WITH THE "LEGAL STRUGGLE:

This instruction does not mean that we must train our "illegal cadre" so that they will also be the ones who will head the illegal portion of the fight in the barrio, the town, the province or the city. We (it is outside of this) will orient them with regards to the different methods and forms of the legal struggle so as for them to have a new better orientation. It is for this reason that we must include our illegal cadres in the training.

The present situation calls for a new orientation. The current situation calls for new and improved understanding of the struggle. Lenin taught us that it is this kind of orientation which will give us self-confidence for a better perception of the current and natural event surrounding us; this is the only thing that will give help to any practical work as it shows how and in what direction any given action will lead to, not only for the present but also in the future.

Yes, nobody can deny that we cannot produce, must less activate, legal workers and legal cadres if we cannot fully comprehend the objectives and the methods of legal struggle. Because of this, it is imperative that we give a complete orientation of our illegal cadre with regards to the priority of this struggle within our organization.

Thorough orientation in legal struggle can be divided as follows:

1. Understanding of the existence conditions:
    a) National and International situation (Ref. -PT)
    b) Various matters which would be pushed through to give a wider attention to the legal struggle.

The current situation (objective condition) within our country has been against us and in favor of the enemy. We saw that the tide of the revolution subsided.

The means we use in the struggle will not change. It is just that we are going to give continued emphasis to the legal struggle. We shift emphasis. It must be clear to every member that the main means of struggle and the armed component which would cut the imperialist control in the Philippines -- is not being nullified. This is the correct Marxist orientation and understanding. While we transfer the bigger attention to the legal struggle through indoctrination in better and improved knowledge of military science (combat and technical efficiency).

We cannot deny that the military force of the puppet government which the imperialist American controls has grown stronger that our own. This is the reason why the enemy has been able to wrest the initiative from us in the armed fight, and this is one of the reasons for the ebb of the revolutionary tide. Still another reason for this ebb is the economic reforms which the American imperialists forced their puppet to adopt from Quirino, Magsaysay, Garcia and presently Macapagal. These reforms gave the illusion to the mass that they would be able to enjoy a better way of living under the puppets.

In short, the majority ofthe mass (especially the most backward) was won by the puppet through these reforms; they drifted away from the revolution. While we say that reform is a by-product of a revolution, we should not also lose track of the fact that the enemy can also launch its own reforms not necessarily because of us. We must not be over confident in underestimating the enemy reforms and the effect of those reforms on the mass.

The majority of the mass believes in peaceful, parliamentary struggle. In short, they believe in gaining more through legal struggle. Due to this, most of the reserves for the legal form of the fight are found in the legal organizations. The mass would rather be identified with these legal entities. These are the organizations we must look for, control and indoctrinate. It is here where we can spark them, lead them and give them a new hope in seeing that the road to reforms is through revolution – drive the imperialists, in order to attain true prosperity, peace and freedom.

The Reforms (Tactics) of the Enemy:

We already stated that reforms is a by-product of a revolution. We are aware though that it is not reform which will primarily solve the immediate problems of the mass. But the level of our thinking and knowledge is way above that of the mass (many of whom are still too backward). It is not enough for us to say this truth. We must know not only why the enemy enunciated a particular reform as part of its program but also what it hopes to accomplish and how it intends to capitalize on these reforms.

It is not customary for the American imperialist to initiate reforms. If there are reforms, they are the products of the minds of his puppets especially RM. If at all the Americans would only have reforms made to favor them – not because these are for the good of the mass. No, if the enemy will not launch these reforms, the conditions will be detrimental to the Americans. Why? The sual role of the enemy from Roxas, Quirino up to RM commonly now as "iron-hand". The American imperialists realized that if he puppet governments will not adopt reforms the movement headed by our Party will grow and spread stronger and more stable. The enemy was forced to give reforms because it saw our strength in our fight for the people. In plain words, whatever the enemy is doing is attributable to the militant struggle of the mass.

ORGANIZATION NOTES

On Agitation:

a. Issue
   1) Unemployment, poverty, free land of landless, better sharing, etc, American Imp. Exploitation of peasant, workers, middle classes.
   2) High prices, scarcities, etc.
   3) Injustice to any individual, group or class, committed by individuals, groups, classes or by any of the agencies of the government.
   4) Terrorism, violence, intimidation against individuals, groups, classes.
   5) Civil liberties.
   6) Grapft and corruption.
   7) Oppression by US base personnel of Filipinos and all other issues, whether concerning individual, group or class, whether local, provincial, national or international, capable of inflaming passions.

b. Priorities in agitation

   Generally start with issues directly related to the individual concerned, gradually developing towards those issues that concern national welfare. In short, begin from the particular and end with the general.

c. Agitation should only be a preliminary to organization.
   1) Agitation should lead the agitated not duly see the need for, but also to want organization.
   2) Organization should be of the revolutionary type.

   Recruits should be made to see the futility of "changes'. by administration of the bankruptcy of the existing electoral system, and the impossibility of real change for the better except thru armed struggle and overthrow.

**This a complete reproduction of one of the documents seized from former PKP Sec-General Jesus LAVA when he was captured in Manila in May 1964.*

3) Likewise, sjow need for legal fronts, to camouflage revolutionary organizations and activities.

Legal Organizations and Struggle

- a. Emphasis should be given to:
  - 1) Moral courage-non-squealing, even in the face of the most brutal form of torture.
  - 2) Spirit of self-sacrifice.
  - 3) If goods have been found on him, to own up everything, and not involve others.
    - a) prepare a false name for his recruiters
    - b) Claim that propaganda material found in him were received thru the mails.
    - c) Deny that he has recruited anybody yet, except when his recruit is definitely known to have been instrumental in his apprehension.
- b. Training is an imperative in illegal work:
  This should involve:
  - 1) Theoretical--ideological
  - 2) Organizational:
    - a) agitation
    - b) organization
    - c) activities
  - 3) Tactical
    - a) military
    - b) political
  - 4) Underground
    Methods, techniques, etc.
  - 5) An understanding of the general strategic objectives such as those concerning:
    - a) The classes most dependable as main force, and the classes as secondary force
    - b) Areas most ripe for agitation and organization
    - c) Ares most strategic for guerilla warfare
    - d) Methods most appropriate for specific areas, during specific periods, and for specific tasks.
- c. Main objectives of liquidation should be well understood
  Among the most inportant are:
  - 1) To free a locality from spies, thus facilatating organization and training.
  - 2) To save a comrade who may be apprehended.
  - 3) To eliminate the most arch reactionaries those directly resposible for vicious suppression. These persons can be landlords or their overseers, politicians, or military men.
  - 4) To instill fear into Americans in and out of bases:

These may involve military and civilian personnel of the US government, or ordinary American citizens.

5) To create confusion in the ranks of the ruling class or classes to prepare the ground for revolutionary takeover, when the conditions are ripe for this.
6) To eliminate trairors and all those responsible for the capture or death of comrades

On Relation of Legal Forms to Illegal Forms

a. General aims of legal forms:

1) To serve as fronts for illegal forms
2) To prepare ground for illegal struggle
3) To bring the masses to the revolutionary position
4) To destroy the will of the ruling class, esp. at the moment of the crisis.

In times of extreme reaction, legal forms would be used primarily as legal fronts for illegal forms. This is because legal struggles which can be interpreted by the ruling class as having revolutionary tendencies may be immediately suppressed ruthlessly, in which case, the masses involved in the organization and struggle would generally recoil. However, when there are indications that certain legal struggles can be undertaken without danger of immediate suppression, such struggles must be undertaken without danger of immediate suppression, such struggles must be undertaken, since, these would prepare the ground for illegal struggles, and may well bring the masses, after a series of struggles, to the revolutionary position.

During periods of lesser reaction,many kinds of legal organization and struggle are possible are possible and may succeed in their objectives if properly led. However, when kadres who are able to move about legally are very scarce, extreme care should be taken so that these kadres are preserved.

In times of broader freedom, as is the case in France, or England, or even Japan, almost all forms of legal organization and struggle can be undertaken.

During periods of revolutionary turmoil, when the ruling classes have become confused, legal forms can be taken advantage of even in the face of suppression. During such periods, government repression will only compel the masses to take the revolutionary position.

The second and third objectives of legal forms -- i.e., the preparation of the ground for illegal struggle, and bringing of the masses to the revolutionary position involves not only struggle, but also educational political education. Agitation, propaganda, in conjunction with experience gained in struggle is the only means by which sound political education is obtained. Agitation and propaganda, for purposes of giving political education to the masses should concern not only the broader issues of nationalism, or land for the landless, but the more specific issues of direct concern to the masses. All actions of the government, whether this be by the President should be subjected to scrutiny and basic criticism, to show the relation between the masses' specific needs to the arbitrary actions of the government. Ditto, the use of scabs by employers, the use of police agencies to escort scabs, to break strikes, etc. Failure of Congress to pass a higher minimum wage; or a sliding wage scale based on cost of living; on lowering prices, etc. should be pinned on the shoulders of the President and Congress (as the case may be). Failure to solve the unemployment situation can be attributed to the class(anti-workers) orientation of the government, which prevents the government from establishing the greatest number of important nationalist enterprises.

Etcetera, ad infinitum. All these to be related to US. Imp. exploitation of the Filipinos.

Participation in elections is only one of the forms of legal struggle. Such participation should not delude the kadres nor the masses into believing that fundamental social, economic, and political changes can be effected thru such means in the context of the present national and international conditions. The primary objective of the revolutionary movement to present the basic issues to the widest audience (propaganda and education); to scout for the most honest, sincere, and militant among the masses who can be recruitedto the rev. movement. Under existing conditions, the victory of the individual candidates takes a secondary position to the above aims.

Attempts should be made to achieve victories, particularly in key positions and key areas, but not as the sacrifice of the first-named objectives. If some of our candidates win without attaining the first objective, the election struggle can be considered as mainly a failure. If on the other hand, the first objective is attained, even if all candidates lose the election struggle can be considered as successful in the main. To attain the two objectives would mean a complete success.

b. General aims of illegal forms
    1) To rally more and more militant masses to illegal mass organization and mass actions. To expand the mass base, of the armed struggle.
    2) To provide as many recruits for the guerilla army in the field.
    3) To organize and expand commandoes in cities and towns to obtain as many arms as possible.

4) To soften, and otherwise prepare the ground for general mass action with a view of capturing political power thru massive mass demostrations, insurrection, and a liberation armed force.

This last will involve sabotage of enemy facilities; ambush of enemy personnel; infiltration of the enemy to demoralize its ranks (both military and political); annihilation of enemy units -- in or out of the cities, etc.

To provide the legal screen for attaining the above illegal objectives should be the main function of legal forms for tne immediate present. This is subject to change based on the developements, and legal forms amy be used more extensively as the situation permits it.

Classes or strata to be given emphasis:

1. Peasant-- esp. landless and small owners
2. Workers-- including unemployed and esp. the low salaried.
3. Employess-- esp. unemployed and low-salaried and techinicians
4. Students-- for purposes of:
   a) recruiting leaders from them
   b) recruiting technicians
   c) organizaing a mass movement of students
5. Small owners, vendors, etc.
6. Professionals--teachers, writers, technicians, etc.
7. Army--particularly among the low rank officers and rank and file. Any discontent among the officers or rank and file must be taken advantage of to win over recruits. (Activities of these recruits must be confined within the army. Their contact outside the army should be limited to the recruiter.)

As situation demands, we may use single file, or soldiers committees as forms of organization in AFP.

Be sure however, that in case the recruits decide to become instrument of the enemy in counter espionage, they cannot inflict damage to our other organization.

PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES OF POLITICAL WORK IN THE HMB

1. Carry thru the policy of the party in the HMB.
2. Rally servicemen around the CP.
3. Educate them in the spirit of Marxism-Leninism and loyalty to the Filipino people; in the fundamental spirit of the HMB.
4. Insure and broaden the unity of the HMB and the people.
5. Work for the strengthening of discipline.

6. Rally HMBs to the task of military and political training and to acquire skill in the use of new techniques and weapons, or to discover and perfect them.
7. To perform their military duties and orders and instruction of the command.
8. To teach the HMBs and lead in the furtherance of organizational objectives among the masses.

THE PKP OF ELECTION PARTICIPATION (EXTRACTS FROM PKP POLITICAL TRANSMISSION NO. 18 ISSUED IN 1961)

"That real freedom of this country (which is the basic pre-requisite to economic development, mass prosperity, and broad democracy) cannot be attained thru election processes (in the foreseeable future).

This may well be considered the most significant conclusion that can be deducted from the particularities of the Philippine situation.

Marx once wrote that when the bourgeoies has managed to gain power in a democratic republic (.e. democratic in form), becomes well-high impossible to dislodge it thru that electoral process. (To be sure, Marx also pointed out that it was possible for the proletariat to gain power thru relatively peaceful means when socialist countries already encircle capitalist states.) What Marx said about a democratic republic and the bourgeoise may well be applied to the Philippines.

Where two major political parties with almost similar ideological orientation (being controlled by the same class or classes) habe come into being, and have subsequently commanded the allegiance of the bulk of the people; where elections are regularly conducted in a relatively peaceful way; where a change in men and administration parties (not of state power) has been made possible thru regular election processes; where laws favoring the major parties and discriminating against third parties. (particularly ideological enemies) are in existence; and especially, where propaganda has become the virtual monopoly of these classes holding state power; where American intervention is a common place affair, it may take a miracle to overthrow existing bourgeois state power thru the electoral process. (And this miracle is possible when socialist encirclement has been achieved.)

This is not to say that participation in election struggles is a waste of time and energy, and therefore useless. Much can be gained by the revolutionary if it has correct orientation regarding the role and significance of election struggles, and if it chooses the proper methods. Election struggle is a very effective vehicle for spreading revolutionary propaganda (couche in legal terms) and expanding revolutionary organizations. The revolutionary may be able to elect a few of its candidates. But even these elected officials would be of greater service to the people and to the movement as propaganda and organizers than as legislators perse. (For instance, a CP Congressman may file the best bill as far as the masses are concerened-in Congress, but this will have no chance of even getting out of Committee. This should not deter him from filing his bill. His job will be to get as wide publicity for his bill, to acquiant the masses about it, to persuade them to struggle collectively in favor of the bill; to facilitate the organization of these masses, etc.)

The primary aim of the movement in participating in election struggles would thus be to promote propaganda and organizational goals."

MAIN TASKS OF THE PARTY

To seize political power through armed revolution, the CPP cites three major tasks that the Party should undertake, namely:

1. Party Rebuilding

The PKP must rebuild itself along the Marxist-Leninist line "whose acme in the present era is MAO TSE–TUNG's thought." Accordingly, the Party must:

a. Identitfy, expose and reactify past and present mistakes, praticularly the errors of subjectivism in ideology, error of "right" and "left" opportunism and violation of democratic centralism;
b. Weed out modern revisionism, liberalism and sectarinism;
c. Ideologically mobilize Party members and the masses based on the teachings of MAO TSE–TUNGS:
d. Reorganize the Party based on the principle of democratic centralism;
.e Develop a complementary relationship between the struggle in the city and that in the countryside but principal emphasis should be given on the development of armed struggle in the countryside:
f. Master the handling of its two weapons; armed struggle and united front; and
g. Put out a new Party Programme and Party Constitution reflecting the theory and practice of Marxism-Leninism, MAO TSETUNG thought and the Filipino people.

2. Army Rebuilding

To gain stature, the CPP must have a People's Armny. The People's Army is the principal weapon of the Party and armed struggle is the main form of struggle. Hence, the Party must:

a. Build up a revolutionary army that is loyal and obedient to the Party and whose main support ans source of Red soldiers is the peasantry. Such revolutionary army (People's Army) must weld the alliance of the working class and the peasantry through the armed struggle:

b. Wage an armed struggle or a people's war, with due regard to the implementation of an "agrarian" revolution that fulfills the struggle for land among the peasant masses."

c. Establish in the countryside an "armed independent regime.;

d. Place the urban revolutionary activities, both legal and illegal, mainly in defensive position until the People's Army in the countryside is ready to seize the cities;

e. Take the strategic line in the armed struggle of making the countryside encircle the cities by defeating the enemy in the countryside before taking the cities.

f. Develop the PKP's main armed forces in Luzon, using the Visayas and Mindanao for diversionary purpose;

g. Arouse and mobilize the poor peasants, lower middle peasants and farm workers, unite with the niddle peasants while neutralizing the rich peasants.

h. Establish rural bases of military operation and expansion work;

i. Arouse, mobilize and involve great masses of the people in the armed struggle; develop close revolutionary intimacy with the mases; and

j. Start laying the groundwork for a more intensive and extensive people's war in selected areas in the countryside and in the whole archipelago.

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* *This is a summarized extract from a major CPP/MA––MAO document seized in Sta Rita, Capas, Tarlac on 9 June 1969 during a raid of a suspected CPP/MA–MAO underground training center. Simialar copies of this document were also seized from Arthur GARCIA's group in Victorias, Negros Occidental on 30 July 1969, and Nilo TAYAG's in Bo. Bautista, San Pablo City on 12 June 1970.*

3. United Front Building

To create a genuine national united front, the CPP must maintain its independence and intiative "by developing a strong People's Army that is correctly guided by MAO TSETUNG's thought." To achieve this end, the CPP must:

- a. Undertake a class analysis of the Philippine society to determine the Party's friends and enemies, its reliable and unreliable allies;
- b. Forge an alliance between the working class and the peasantry through armed struggle (this is the basis of a national united front against US imperialism);
- c. Adopt a dual tactic in dealing with the national bourgeoise which has a dual character - revolutionary and reactionary; and
- d. Relate the Party's revolutionary efforts to the world proletarian revolution led by Red China, Albania and other Marxist-Leninist parties armed with MAO TSETUNG's thought.

PROGRAMME FOR A PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION IN THE PHILIPPINES*

The immediate general programme of the Filipino people and the Communist Party of the Philippines is a people democratic revolution and the long term maximum programme is socialism. It is dishonest, demogogic and utopian to insist that socialism is the immediate goal under conditions that the people are still dominated and exploited by US. imperialism and domestic feudalism.

GENERAL PROGRAMME

1. Destroy the Force of U.S. Imerialist and Feudal Oppression in the Philippines;

National sovereignty and democracy can never be obtained without the destruction of the forces of US imperialism and domestic feudalism whose basic interests lie in the continued national and class enslavement and exploitation of the Filipino people. The over-riding interest of the Filipino people now is to fight for national liberation and people's democracy. They must take the road of armed revolution to defeat the armed counter-revolution; and all patriotic and progressive classes, parties, groups and individuals must be aroused and mobilized to isolate and then destroy the power and influence of the bureaucrat capitalists and all their political and armed agents. The political power and influence of these exploiters can be isolated, destroyed and replaced by both waging the armed struggle and building up the national united front. As a proletarian revolutionary party, the Communist Party of the Philippines should not be tied down by legalist and parliamentary struggle. The party should concentrate on building up the people's democratic power in the countryside before seizing the cities and simultaneously on descrediting the monopolization of political power by the bourgeoi s political parties, like the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the like, which actually prepetuate the same single party of class interests.

Extracts From CPP/MA –MAO document seized in Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac, on 9 June 69. A similar copy of this document was also seized in Bo. Bautista, San Pablo City, on 12 June 1970. This was also reprinted in* **Ang Bayan, *The official organ of the CPP/MA–MAO, and in a recent issue of* **The Philippine Collegian.**

2. Established a People's Democratic State and a Coalition or United Front Government;

The ultimate goal of the people's democratic revolution is the establishment of a people's democratic state and a coalition or united front government. The people's democratic state is under the leadership of the working class and it includes the participation of all democratic classes, i.e., the workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie. Its government is in the form of a coalition or united front of all democratic classes. In the course of the protracted people's war, a national liberation front may be created to combine all available forces and elements to isolate and destroy the enemy and prepare for a democratic coalition government cannot yet be established, the masses of workers and peasants under the proletarian revolutionary leadership can establish an armed independent regime in the countryside where they shall learn to govern themselves, defend and advance their independence and democratic gains and manage well their relations with all friends and sympathizers. The armed independent regime is the nucleus of the People's Democratic Republic of the Philippines.

3. Fight for National Unity and Democratic Rights:

The firmest national unity founded mainly on the basis of the class interest of the workers and peasants must be created. On this popular basis, all patriotic and progressive classes, groups and individuals shall enjoy political and economic rights that U.S. imperialism and feudalism have deprived then of. Individual initiative and enterprise on the part of fisherman, handicrafts-men, intellectuals, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie shall be respected, encourage and assisted. All efforts shall be exerted by the state, cooperative and private sectors to provide every citizen a decent livelihood. All democratic classes, groups and their membets shall enjoy all such democratic rights as freedom of domicile, person, thought, belief, religion, speech, assembly and the like in a democratic bill of rights. The interest and rights of overseas Filipinos shall be protected; they shall be allowed to have the amplest contact with their kith and kin in the Philippines or to retyrn from the United States or elsewhere.

4. Follow the Principle of Democratic Centralism:

The national government shall have central authority over the local governments at various levels. The national government. however, shall base its decisions on the needs and aspirations of the broad masses of the people and the lower levels of government. This is centralized leadership based on democracy and democracy guided by centralized leadership. At every level of the government (barrio, municipality, city or district, provincial, regional), there shall be elected representative bodies where decisions are taken democratically for every corresponding area. A lower representative body shall be subordinate to a higher representative body. Any part of the government shall be subordinate to the People's Revolutionary Congress which represents nationally the sovereign Filipino people. In all elections or voting on any question, the rule of the majority shall be followed.

5. The People's liberation Army;

There can be no people's democratic state without a People's Army whose principal and most essential function is to defend and secure it. The People's Army, composed mainly of soldiers from the peasantry, must be under the leadership of the working class and the Communist Party of the Philippines. The most pressing tasks of the People's Army now is to defeat and destroy the reactionary imperialist-created and imperilist-supported Armed Forces of the Philippines and all other kinds of armed power in the hands of the exploiting classes and the reactionary state at all levels. The people's democratic government can be established only with the triumphant advance of the People's Army. The People's Army shall be a fighting force, a propaganda force and productive force closely linked to the masses of the people. It constantly strengthens itself ideologically, politically and organizationally with Mao Tse-tungs's thought. The armed strength of the People's Army includes its regular mobile troops, the the guerrilla units, and militia the self-defense corps and armed city partisans. The party should see to it a that troops are well-provisioned and the welfare of the families of fighters are well taken cared of.

6. The Land Problem:

The main content of the people's democratic revolution is the struggle for land among the peasants. The people democratic revolution must satisfy the basic demands of the poor peasants and farm workers for land. The agrarian revolution is the necessary requirement for the vigorous conduct of the armed struggle and the creation and consideration of revolutionary bases areas. Land shall be distributed free to the landless. Unsury and all other feudal evils shall be wiped out. Plantations and estates already efficiently operated on mechanized basis shall be convertedinto state farms where the agricultural workers shall establish proletarian power and provide themselves with better working and living conditions. In the whole countryside, mutual aid teams and mutual labor exchange systems shall be created as the intial step towards higher forms of agricultural cooperation. Through agricultural cooperation, production shall be raised and well-planned, the sale of produce shall be assured at the best price possible and welfare services guaranteed. The higher purchasing power of the peasantry shall enable the ceaseless · expansion of industrial production. The basis of the national economy shall be agriculture because it fulfills the goods and raw materials requirement of expanding industrialization and mainly the peasantry absorbs the products of industrialization.

7. The Problem of Industry:

Foreign monopoly capitalism and feudalism which have hindered the growth of national industry are firmly opposed by the people's democratic revolution. All efforts towards the growth of national industry as the leading factors of the economy shall be mustered by the people's democratic government. There shall be three sectors in the national economy; the state sector, the cooperative sector and the private sector. All major souces of raw materials and enery, all heavy and basic industries and all nationalized enterprises, shall be run by the state sector. The private sector run by the patriotic entrepresneurs and merchants shall be given assistance and support by the people's democratic government. All peasants, fisherman and handicraftsmen shall be encouraged to organize themselves into cooperatives so as to increase their productivity and assure themselves of a ready market. While building up to the state and cooperative sectors of the economy as factors of proletarian leadership and socialism, the people's democratic government shall encourage and support all private initiative inlindustry so long as this does not monopolize or adversely affect the people's livelihood. The people's democratic government shall exercise regulation of capital only to protect the people's livelihood and guarantee a people's democracy.

8. The Problem of Culture, Education and the Intellectuals:

A people's democratic cultural revolution is necessary to rid the nation of the stultifying dominance of imperialist and feudal culture and education. It must advance instead a national, scientific and mass culture truly serving the interest ofthe people. It shall see to it that the educational system and the mass media are securely in the hands of the people's democratic forces. Education at all levels shall be free, irrespective of class, religion, sex or color. It shall promote the national language as the principal medium of communication in Philippine society. It shall give full encouragement and support to scientific experiment and technological progress. It shall see to it that the national language, art and literature shall be given revolutionary content and relate the revolutionary struggles or workers, peasants, soldiers and other participants of the revolution,Old forms as well as forreign forms of art and literature may be adopted so long as they shall be given revolutionary content. The working class assumes leadership in the field of culture and education in line with its leading revolutionary role. But it welcomes wholeheartedly the support of intellectuals for the revolution. All democratic intellectuals are given all the opportunity to serve the people and remould their owm thinking. While freedom of thought and religion shall be accorded respect it shall see to it that this freedom it not systematically employed to resist the people's democratic revolution or hurt the people's interests. In the course of the protracted people's war, the Party shall transformed backward villages into cultural bastions of the Philippine Revolution. Illieracy and superstition among the masses shall be wiped out and the scientific spirit of Marxism-Leninism, MAO TSETUNG's thought, shall prevail.

9. The Problem of National Minorities:

National minorities in the Philippines have been abused and grossly neglected. U. S. imperialism, the local reactionary government and the Christian churches have too long regarded the national minorities as mere objects of bourgeois charity and Christian proselytization. The four-million people belonging to the national minorities, especially those of Mindanao and Mountain Province, can be powerful participants in the revolutionary overthrow of U.S. imperialism and feudalism. The bourgeois government, reactionary scholars and Christian chauvinists talk loud about national integration but they stand in reality for the exploiting classes that are the main sources of abuses and oppression. The main concern of the national minorities is land; the abuses of landlords, loggers and land grabbers and their exploitation in mines and plantations. A new type of leadership, a revolutionary one, must be encouraged to rise among them so as to supplant the traditional leadership that has failed to protect them and has merely contributed and participated in their exploitation, With regard to naturalized Filipinos and foreign nationals, the class approach must be firmly taken so as to do away with "Malay racism and chauvinism." Residents or citizens of Chinese ancestry are very often the target of racist and chauvinist attacks launched by U.S. imperialists, modern revisionist, and other local reactionaries in line with their anti-communist and anti-people policy The Koumintang comprador bourgeoisie should be thoroughtly exposed and attacked for its class position and for the fact that it is an accomplice the U.S. imperialism, modern refisionism and all reactionaries.

10. The Problem of Foreign Policy:

The foreign policy of the Philippine bourgeois government is dictated by U.S. imperialism and the internal reactionary classes The diplomatic relations and foreign trade of the Philippines is monopolized by the United States, together with its reactionary allies like insurgent imperialist Japan. Relations with revisionist states have been initiated only because of the permission granted by the United States which recognized modern revisionism as its chief accomplice in maintaining neo-colonialism throughout the world, including the Philippines. The U.S. imperialists and the modern revisionists are maintaining all-around cooperation to save puppet states like the bourgeois reactionary state in the Philippines. The only true basis for an independent and active foreign policy is the overthrow of the internal power of U.S. imperialism and its local lackeys in the Philippines, and the abroagation of all treaties, executive agreements and statutes that define "special relations" with the U.S. government and its imperialist allies. The people's democratic government shall give moral and material support to the revolutionary movements of oppressed peoples abroad and shall maintain the firmest alliance with genuine socialist states like the Poeple's Republic of China and the People's Republic of Albania. It shall be inspired by the principle of proletariat internationalism and guided by the policy of the international united front. It regards the People's Republic of China as an iron bastion of the world proletarian revolution and as a reliable friend of all oppressed peoples, including the Filipino people.

SPECIFIC PROGRAMME

Our general programme will remain unchanged during the entire stage of the people's democratic revolution. But from phase to phase during this general stage, our specific and immediate demands shall change.

Hereunder are our specific and immediate demands:

1. **In the Political Field**
   a. Attack, isolate and destroy the bourgeois reactionary state, the U.S. imperialist, the landlords and all local tyrants until their doom in our country;
   b. Establish the armed independent regime and develop the people's ability in the conduct of government in the course of armed struggle.;
   c. Purge our ranks of modern revisionists and all other

opportunities who sabatage our revolutionary effort, and expose the bankruptcy of bourgeois legalism and parliamentarism;

d. Campaign for a people'sdemocratic constitution and demad the revocation of provisions inthe bourgeois constitution, laws, executive agreement, and treaties that are reactionary;

e. Expose the curtailment of the political rights of workers, peasants, intellectuals and patriotic citizens who fight against foreign and feudal oppression, and allow the free operation of or support every democratic party or mass organization;

f. Fight the rise of fascism and the use of murder and threats against the people and their revolutionary and democrztic leaders and organizations.

g. Punish the evil gentry and corrupt government officials and subject them to public trial by the people's court whenever possible:

h. Replace or re-organise the barrio councils and promote and leadership of the poor peasants and farm workers through revolutionary barrio councils;

i. Cooperate with all organizations and groups that can help build up the national united front and isolate the die-hard enemies of the people's democratic revolution; and

j. Assure low-ranking officials and rank and file employees in the bourgeois government that they shall be re-integrated in the people's democratic government so long as they do not participate directly in the commission of public crimes and so long as they secretly cooperate with the revolutionary movement.

2. In the Economic Field

a. render ineffective the Parity Amendment, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, the Economic and Technical Cooperation Agreement, the Agreement Relating to Entry Rights of American Traders and Investors, the Agricultural Commodities Agreement and the Investments Incentives law and all other such legal instruments that bind our country economically to U.S. imperialism and all its local lackeys, and reject the old and new loan agreement made by the bourgeois reactionary government, including the "aid" agreement;

b. Encourage the people and the national bourgeoisie to make a self-reliant economy and at the same time confiscate foreign goods that depress or eliminate the local producation of goods by patriotic Filipino citizens while urging the broad masses of the people to boycott imperialist business and consumer good;

c. Outlaw bureacrat capital and all properly gained through corrupt and criminal means;

d. Help improve the livelihood of workers, peasants, farmers, workers, fishermen and handicraftsmen by exercising price control in base areas and providing work for the unemployed and underemployed; and organize the peasants, fishermen and handicraftsmen into elementary cooperative units (mutual aid teams and labor exchange system) and support every movement for the economic emancipation of the people;

e. Compel the reduction of rent and interest rates in guerrilla zone and abolish rent in the liberated areas, abolish exorbitant taxes and miscellaneous levies and establish a consolidated progressive tax, not exceeding two per cent of produce and also a fair business tax from the petty and the nationals bourgeoisie;

f. Help the worker in the factories, mines plantation, transportation lines and offices to conduct strikes successfully;

g. Expose the deceptive and reactionary character of the Magna Carta for Labor, the Agricultural Land Reform Code and other such bourgeois measure pretending to support the economic and social struggle of the exploited masses;

h. Protest and encourage Filipino-owned commerce and industry by providing market guarantees, protection, credit and tax relief;

i. Support the national minorities in their fight against landlords, land grabbers, mining companies, logging concessionaires and plantations; and

j. Safeguard the people's health and expand medical services.

3. In the Military Field

a. Organize and train units of the People's Army; armed propaganda teams, guerilla units, regular mobile troops, militia and armed city partisans;

b. Campaign against the U.S. military bases and U.S. military assistance and all treaties (U.S.-R.P. Military Bases Treaty, Military Assistance Pact and Mutual Defense Treaty, the SEATO, etc) that bind the reactionary government and army to the U.S. imperialists, and also against the anti-democratic intent of "civic action," the "Peace Corps" and other counter-insurgency projects of the U.S. imperialists;

c. Destroy the military units of the reactionary government and of the U.S. imperialists and capture useful military equipment;

d. Punish the spies and all subversive agents (especially members of the CIA and DIA) of U.S. imperialism and their local reactionary cohorts;

e. Campaign against the drafting of the youth, workers and peasants for military camp training and service and also against the PMT, ROTC and the Philippine Military Academy because of their reactionary orientation;

f. Eliminate cattle rustling and piracy, banditry and all other activities that prey on the poor;

g. Destroy the terror squads like the Home Defense Corps, the Monkees and the like, and disarm the bodyguards of bureaucrat capitalists, civilian guards of landlords and strike-breakers;

h. Organize the oppressed national minorities to take up arms against imperialist and feudal oppression;

i. Wage a war of annihilation but exercise leniency on captured so as to demoralize the enemy; and

j. Cooperate with other armed movements or groups fighting against imperialist and feudal oppression.

4. In the Cultural Field

a. Develop a national, scientific and mass culture responsive to the needs and aspirations of the Filipino people;

b. Campaign against imperialist and feudalist or Church control and influence over the educational system and mass media;

c. Propagate the national language as the principal medium of instruction and communication;

d. Develop a people's democratic culture and put revolutionary content in art and literature while combatting the decadent literature of "universal humanism", pessimism, escapism, class reconciliation and all other pernicious bourgeois trends;

e. Combat Christian chauvinism against the national minorities;

f. Support the progressive movements and actions among students, teachers and all intellectuals;

g. Guarantee the better livelihood of teachers and other staff members of educational institutions and guarantee academic freedom;

h. Respect the freedom of thought and religious belief and use patient persuasion in gathering support for the people's democratic revolution and;

i. Fight for free education at all levels and wipe out illiteracy and superstition among the masses and rouse them to a revolutionary and scientific spirit.

5. **In the field of Foreign Policy**

a. Base Philippine foreign policy on the Filipino people's sovereignty and self-reliance, and cooperate with all friendly revolutionary peoples, governments and movements on the basis of mutual respect and benefit;

b. Fight against all the unjust treaties and agreements imposed by U.S. imperialism;

c. Develop the firmest relations with the People's Republic of China, Albania and all revolutionary governments;

d. Support the revolutionary struggles of all oppressed peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America; and all neighboring oppressed peoples of Vietnam, Laos, Indonesia, Thailand, Kalimantan Utara, Malaya, Burma, Korea and others;

e. Expose the United Nations as a tool of U.S. imperialism and their revisionist renegade accomplices in the crime of neocolonialism;

f. Oppose every treacherous maneuver of all revisionist states and parties in their collaboration with U.S. imperialism;

g. Resist the attempts of U.S. imperialism to make use of Japan and the revisionist renegade cliques led by the Soviet Union as tools in the exploitation of the Philippines;

h. Oppose such "regional" arrangements as the Asian Development Bank, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC), and the like that reinforce the SEATO and

Communist lines. But if the armed struggle fails, the Communist other long-standing instruments of U.S. imperialism in the region;

i. Campaign against the imperialist advisers and survey missions in the bourgeois reactionary government; and

j. Follow the spirit of proletarian internationalism and the policy of the international united front.

ANNEX F

CPP/MA-MAO POSITION ON CURRENT YOUTH/STUDENT ACTIVISM

(Extracts from CPP/MA-MAO documents seized 12 Jun 70 in Bo. Bautista, San Pablo City)

". . . . . The militant January 26th demonstration on the real stage of the nation is a great milestone not only in the revolutionary mass movement. Although the main protagonist in the militant action was the students, there were contingents of militant workers and peasants who joined the students in revolutionary solidarity.

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"The January 26th demonstration should be the inauguration of a nationwide campaign to make the students aware of the real state of the nation and the despicableness of fascism and to enmass them to the fold of the national democratic revolution. Ideological, political and organizational preparations should constantly be made to launch bigger mass actions taking national proportions against US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

"In cities, the revolutionary student activists and masses should develop the strongest worker-student alliance. As the national crisis bred by the fascist puppet regime of Marcos is fast worsening, the students and workers should always join up the launch mass aactions against their oppressors and exploiters. All reactionary attempts to split up or draw away the students from each other or the students from the workers and other progressive sectors of the population should be vigorously rebuffed.

"To the countryside, the students must also go in order to

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(Extracts from the document: "ON THE JANUARY 26th DEMONSTRATION) link themselves up with the biggest democratic force in the country, the peasantry. They must make rural investigations and participate in the peasants struggle as already demonstrated by quite a number of students. The initial requirement for the truly progressive student masses is to make rural investigations and mass work in conscious preparation for fuller participation in the uncompromising armed struggle against the tyrants of this society.

"The guide for taking the road of national democratic revolution is the Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution of the Communist Party of the Philippines."

".....We note with pride that the militant majority of the demonstrators of January 26 and 30-31 were the student youth. We urge them to seek further the support of workers, and peasants, contingents of which were in the demonstrations. It is by enlarging and ensuring the support of the workers and peasants for the militant mass demonstrations of the student youth that the struggle for national democracy can be waged more effectively.

"We urge the students to undertake the following:

"1. Make a living study and application of Marxism–Leninism–Mao Tsetung Thought and the programme for a People's Democratic Revolution;

"2. Raise the level of revolutionary consciousness and practice among the students throughout the country;

"3. Go to the workers either in places where they work or live and assist them to assure the revolutionary class leadership;

"4. Go to your respective towns or barrios, if you have any, and promote the revolution in the countryside and on a nationwide scale; and

"5. Wage a protracted people's war on the basis of mass work against US imperialism, feudalism and bureacrat capitalism.

"The student youth can take full advantage of the fact that they come not only from every area in Greater Manila but also from every province in the whole country. They are in a very good position to promote revolution throughout the land and they have the ability to learn from the masses and concentrate their concrete learning into revolutionary demands under the theoretical guidance of Marxim-Leninism–Mao Tsetung Thought and the Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution.

"A particular from of organization that the students can adopt is the propaganda team (of as least three members) which assumes the specific task of arousing and mobilizing the students, peasants, farm workers, the national minorities and fishermen in a well-defined area in the provinces.

"The mass work of student propaganda means in urban areas and in provinces close to Manila will result in bigger and more articulate demonstrations and more powerful general strikes. The mass work of student propaganda teams in the province will create the best conditions for getting hold of a gun and fighting the armed counter-revolution successfully.

"The minimum that can be done by the student youth is to shatter the superstructure, of the semi-coloniial and semi-feudal society. For them to engage in a cultural revolution or revolutionary propaganda is of decisive importance in the national democratic revolution. They can assist in building up the proletarian revolutionary leadership and the national democratic orientation. They can isolate the enemy diehards in such instructions as the various organizations, the mass media, business chambers, schools, churches, yellow trade unions, bogus peasant associations, and the whole gamut of the imperialist and feudal culture that are now opposing the main current of the militant mass demonstrations of January 25 and 30-31 and a are seeking to uphold the present reactionary system.

"The student youth who take the initiative of forming their propaganda teams should be confident that many others are doing the same. If they are not yet members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, they shall certainly be approached by the Party for recruitment or for cooperation on the basis of what they have already contributed to the national democratic revolution. The student youth should feel confident that there are cadres of the Communist Party of the Philippines at every strategic point in the whole country and among them are former students who have remouled their thinking and are now in the crucible of the revolutionary armed struggle. They must realize at this early stage that to propel a revolutionary mass movement there must be a revolutionary party at the core to serve as the standard-bearer of the revolutionary theory."

(Extracts from the document: "TURN GRIEF INTO REVOLUTIONARY COURAGE AND MILITANT UNITY FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRACY")

CPP/MA-MAO ATTITUDE TOWARDS THE TRADITIONAL PKP GROUP

(The following Extracts from a CPP/MA-MAO document seized 12 June 70 in Do. Bautista, San Pablo City, show not only the CPP/MA-MAO antipathy to the "LAVA counter-revolutionary revisionist clique" (referring to the leadership of the traditional PKP faction), but also some intimate details on the current PKP activities in the youth/student sector.)

". . . . . In accordinace with the instruction publicly made by Francisco Lava, Jr. in a pompous speech before the enlarged meeting of its national council last November 30, the Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino (Free Union of Filipino Youth) held its second national congress on Janauary 25.

"Elected as chairman was Ruben Torres, a young bureaucrat in the UP Law Center which is an instrument of US imperialism for legal research and for rigging up the constitutional convention. Also elected as general secretary was Romeo Dizon, a scion of the LAVA revisionist clan and employee of the reactionary state.

"The leadership of the MPKP was changed because the Lava counter-revolutionary revisionist clique speaking through Francisco Lava, Jr. wanted "officers who can get more publicity in the metropolitan newspapers. radio and television."The previous officers were castigated for being cowardly and slow in getting publicity in the bourgeois press.

"The new set-up in the MPKP has further repelled the rebellious youth. It carries the old characteristic of Lava revisionist organizations which is that of havinb bureaucrats in the reactionary government and clansmen of the Lava's assuming the top posts. It must be recalled that even while holding top posts in the old merger party Vivencio Lava was a bureaucrat in the Bureau of Science; Jesus Lava was a member of the reactionary congress and Jose Lava was a bank examiner in the Philippine National Bank.

"This old characteristic has been a definite factor in their counter-revolutionary revisionism. Always thinking of preserving their comfortable bureaucratic positions in the reactionary government, they become bureaucrats in their own "revolutionary" organizations and make a living out of compromises with the class enemies.

"Francisco Lava, Jr. who is reported to be a major "political heir" of the Lava counter-revolutionary revisionist clique is also presently a high-salaried bureaucrat in the Court of Appeals. The president of the Lava faction in the MASAKA, Romerico Flores, is also a bureaucrat in the office of the provincial registrar of the Commission of Elections (Comelec) in Bulacan.

"Since its re-organization, the MPKP has specialized iin bringing a handful of people to demonstrations, sounding off pompously through press releases and sabotaging the advance of the revolutionary youth movement at every step.

"In meetings of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines the MPKP tried vainly to exculpate the Marcos puppet reactionary regime of its bloody role as the fascist puppet of US imperialism and also to oppose the patriotic assault of the people on the US embassy.

"In press interviews already given by Jose and Jesus Lava, it is extremely clear that the local counter-revolutionary revisionists are trying to go along with the US-Marcos conspiracy to use them and their Soviet social-imperialist masters in the vile attempt to deceive and exploit the people further.

"This is not the first time that the Lava counter-revolutionary revisionist clique tries to sabotage in a big way the revolutionary mass movement. It was responsible for the agreement between US imperialist officials and the old merger party just after the anti-Japanese war of resistance to convert the Hukbalahap and the BUDC into a veterans' league (Huk Veterans' League) and into a legal peasant organization (Pambasang Kaisahan ng Magbubukid), respectively, and to let the officers of the old merger party and the people's army run of apply for high posts in the puppe reactionary government."

(Extracts from the document: "SPECIAL
RELEASE ON CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS")

ANNEX H

PKP CONCEPT OF THE UNITED FRONT (EXTRACTS FROM POLITICAl TRANSMISSION NO. 19 ISSUED IN 1963)

The necessity for a united front with various groups and classes for the attainment of general and/or limited goals has now become more urgent. The C. P. P. must extricate itself from its long standing isolation; it must launch some form of joint action with various groups having similar or allied objectives. It is now necessary that a group aims to achieve exactly the same goals as the CPP. This is almost impossible to expect. Basis for common fronts and activities may be general or limited, depending on the nature and character of the group's objectives

The most fundamental basis for common action is necessarily anti-Americans imperialism – since the present stage of our revolution is national democratic (anti-imperialist, anti-feudal); since the principal stumbling block to the progressive development of the nation and the welfare of the working classes is American imperialsim. The attainment of real independence and democracy would be the primary objective of this common front. Any group that is fighting or is prepared to fight US imperialist domination of the Philippines should be persuaded to plan and execute common activities with the CPP or its mass organization. It does not matter whether the groups' other objectives are diametrically opposed to ours. (For instance, it may be for private enterprise, it may be against land reform, it may even be anti-CP).

The next fundamental basis for united action is agrarian changes–anti-feudalism and predemocracy Any group that seeks to change the feudal social relations–the change ranging from mild to radical–should persuaded to join in a concerted move to effect the desired change. It should not matter whether the group is indifferent to the anti-imperialist struggle, or is even partial to US imperialism. The important thing is to act jointly with this group towards the attainment of our common objectives.

Another important basis for united action is the fight for civil liberties. These are groups fighting for the civil liberties of limited entities. While our fight for democratic rights encompass the whole population, this should not deter us from joining groups fighting for the civil liberties or particular elements. For instance, whom the rights of some workers are infringed upon, we should take steps to initiate or to join any action designed to struggle for their rights. When the nationalists are deprived of their democratic rights, it is our duty to fight with them. And so on.

Freedom is indivisible and the loss of Freedom of the group would inevitably lead to the loss of freedom of other groups. Even when the groups involved are concerned only with their own interest it is still to the interest of freedom in general and of the general population that we join in the struggle.

"There are many limited objectives which could produce beneficial results when taken up jointly. We will mention a few:

- 1.) Economic projects –
  - a) Home industry in a cooperative way
  - b) mutual aid groups
- 2.) Some cultural objectives –
  - a) the use of Filipino in all spheres of activity
  - b) publication of some worthwhile paper in Filipino
  - c) organization of cultural grroups – dramatics etc. – that could give educational and entertainment to the masses.
- 3.) Public works projects –
  - a) building of cultural centers, liberties athletic centers.
- 4) Organization of mutual defense units –
  - a) anti-bandit groups, etc.

And many other which the cadres on the spot can determine.

Joint action may be formal or informal, open or covert, but in all case, Party participation is not exposed to the general public. The purposes of joint action must be closer to all of us, lost we fail to see the weeds for the trees.

What do we want accomplished in seeking joint action for general goals:

1) To bring the general goals into focus. In case of anti-imperialism, for instance, to educates the masses on the imperialism and its nefarious, exploitative activities in the Philippines;
2) To organize masses in pursuit of the general goals, lead them in various forms of struggle, etc.
3) To train our cadres in leadership and generalship in strategy and tactics, etc.
4) To recruit the best among the group for Party membership.
5) To put up a common paper which would project the aims, activities, struggles, problems and achievements of the joint action.
6) To expose the enemies of the people, the demagogous, Americans ganets, etc.

"Joint action for limited goals have the following among its objectives: –

1) To achieve for the group the limited goals sought for
2) To give these groups experience in organization, struggle, common action.
3) To develop them into politically conscious (even class conscious) individuals and groups who may eventually be persuaded to accept the general goals of the movement.
4) To give training to our kadres in leadership and struggle.
5) To build the individuals and groups into organizations that could become important links in the whole chain of the movement.
6) To choose the best, and recruit into the Party.

"How do we propose, for instance, to implement our joint action in the matter of agrarian reforms?

1) Organize the peasant masses, esp. the tennants, or join already organized peasant groups.
2) Invite other peasant groups to plan and act in concert with our organization.
3) Explain the provisions of the agricultural reform code.
4) Make them understand the dangers of misimplementation in order that the peasants may be persuaded to manifest their demands – thru petitions, resolutions, demonstrations, strikes, etc. – for proper implementations.
5) The peasant organization should be the basic unit for the implementation of the law. This is one demand the peasants should make – not only to give due consideration to their wishes but to give them actual participation in democratic implementation.
6) Obtain peasants' opinions on weaknesses of the law – required payments, peasant debts to usurers, etc. – Encourage wide and lively discussions, and formulate ways of making known and getting approval of, the peasant demands. Coordinate these demands of various peasant groups in different provinces in order to compel acceptance of these demands.
7) Make peasant groups as nucleus of cooperatives among tenants – cooperative planning, farming, marketing, consuming.
8) And many others, bearing in mind the objectives of joint action for limited and general goals.

"In line with this policy of forging united fronts with various groups in the basis of general/and/or limited goals, the Party General Secretary sent the President several letters.

1) Outlining the Party positions on land reforms, moral regeneration, labor legislation, armed and peaceful struggle, etc

2) Expressing the Party views on the fundamental questions of American new colonialism in the Philippines.
3) Offerring cooperation and united actions in all fields where there is agreement in principle.
4) Calling for political realignment (assuming that the President is sincerely veering leftward) based on the criterion of progress (progressive, conservative, reactionary).
5) Suggesting the freeing of all imprisoned comrades as necessary first step to unhindered cooperations a cooperation or even alliance which would, among other things, organize the vast masses to struggle in support of all the principles, policies, and measures agreed upon.

The sincerity of the President's profession for the welfare of the common man, his moral courage and resolutions in the face of certain opposition by US imperialism and friarism – can be gauged from his subsequent actions in response to our call.

In the meantime, Party kadres are enjoined to seek united actions with some groups with which we can find common fronts can only be successful when the party has organized masses of peasants, workers led by Party kadres. It is basic in Marxism-Leninism (which is applicable to the Philippine setting) that the basic force in the present stage of the revolution is the alliance of the workers and peasantry. It is this alliance that would enter into (or even compel by virtue of its organized strength) a united front with other classes or groups. This most fundamental truth imposes on Party kadres the important task of organization and leadership. Every Party member must be a member of an organization – workers, peasants, professional student, youth, women, etc., for economic, political, cultural, social, or civic purposes – and must be one of the prime movers, if not the recognized leader. The task of leading these organizations to struggle, to expand, to politicalize, and to enter into united action with other groups or organizations falls on the shoulders of the Party kadres concerned.

This task imposes upon the Party member the responsibility of acquiring the necessary knowledge of Marxist-Leninist theory and practice, in underground activities, in organizational techniques, in methods of leading struggles, etc. Members who feel that they do not need these weapons will find themselves unable to perform and accomplish the above tasks. They will move and set in a shiftless manner, without direction, without inspiration, greatly limiting their effectiveness and minimizing their contribution to the common endeavor.

ANNEX I

INFILTRATION BY CAPTURED/SURRENDERED PKP/HMB LEADERS

NAME	POSITION(S) HELD IN THE PKP ORGANIZATION	FORMER POSITION(S) OCCUPATION(S) IN GOVERNMENT/CIVILIAN OFFICES
JOSE LAVA	Sec-Gen of the CPP Member of Central Committee Supervisor, Technical Group	Clerk, Bureau of lands Employee, Phil National Bank Bank Examiner, Bureau of Banking
JESUS LAVA	Central Committee, Member National Congress of 1946 Elected to the Politburo 1947 Political Commissioner of PKP-HMB combined forces Sec-Gen of PKP after OCtober 1950	Physician Instructor, UP "Free Philippines" contributor Elected Municipal Council of Bulacan, 1938-41 Elected Congressman for 2nd District of Bulacan in 1946 under DA-NP
ANGEL BAKING	Head, technical Group and the Special Warfare Div, GHQ, PKP Member, Translation, Curriculum & Analysis	Editor, Philippine Collegian 1940-41 Pensionado of the Bureau of Lands 1937-41 Instructor, UP College of Engineering '41-44 Associate Editor, Phil. Weekly 1945 Lecturer in Economics, Finance & Mathematics Baguio Colleges 1946-1948 Instructor, Arellano Univ, 1946-50 Officer, Dept of Foregin Affairs-1950
ALREEDO SAULO	Member of Central Committee and Chief, Educational Depattment, PKP	National Secretary, CLO; Pre-War Associate Editor, Monday Mail; Writer and Commentator, Japanese Domci News Agnecy: Editor in Chief, the Star Reporter
CELIA M. POMEROY	Education Director (ED) of Central Luzon Chairman. School Div, NED Member, Editorial Board "Katubusan", CPP newspaper Chairman, Youth Div.,	Teacher, Malabon Standard High School, 1934 Examiner, Bureau of vil Service, 1936

RAMON ESPIRITU	Member, Politburo Chairman, National Finance Committee Member, Military Committee PB and SEC Superivisor of the National Communication Department	Vice-President, Congress of Labor Organization (CLO) 1949-51
FEDERICO BAUTISTA	Member, National Finance Committee Member, Military Committee Chief of Intelligence, GHQ, HMB	Member, ECLGA (guerrilla outfit)
PEREGRINO TARUC	Chairman of the PKP National Education Department Regular Member of the Central Committee and the Politubro Sec, Pampanga Provincial Committee Director of Stalin University, Mt Makiling, Laguna	Teacher, Laguna High School Sec, Democratic Alliance for Pampanga
CASTRO ALEJANDRINO	Member, CPP Central Member, POLITBURO Chairman of the Military Department and Commander-in-Chief, HMB	Mayor, Arayat, Pamapnga 1940
FELICISIMO MACAPAGAL	Member, Manila City POLIBURO Alternate member PKP Organizer in Mindanao area Regional Commander, Southern Luzon Instructor; Stalin University.	Tailor Organizer, MASAKA
DOMINGO CASTRO	POLITBURO Supervisor, RECO No. 2 Head, National Courier Dept. CPP POLITBURO Member, PKP	Farmer Secretary, Kapaisanang Pambansa ng Magbubukid sa Pilipinas (KPMP)
MATEO DEL CASTILLO	Member; Polib POLITBURO Chairman, Finance, Div., CPP	Medicine and Drug Distributor before WWII Member, Guerilla Movement in Central Luzon under Col. Anderson.

GUILLERMO CAPADOCIA	POLITBURO SUPERVISOR Of RECO No. 6 Writer & Editor, "KALAYAAN" and "Titis," CPP newspaper	Vice-President, Congress of Labor ((CLO) Chairman, Committee on Education, Info and Research, CLO Adviser, Phil Stage and Screen Workers Member, Phil Newspaper Guild President, Batong-buhay Cooperative Association.
FELIXBERTO OLALIA, Sr and DIEGO/DIEGO LISTO/ ANDRES/BADONG	Rank of Lt Col. HMB Organization Vice-Cmdr. Manila-Rizal Sector during the Japanese Occupation	Sec of the Union de Chenilero Y Zapatero de Filipinas, 1920-1925 Pres of the Union de Chenilero y Zapatero de Filipinas 1925-1930 Vice Pres of the Collective Labor Movement (CLM) 1939-40 Gen Sec of the Manila Labor Council (MIC) (1940-41) Member of the Allied Intel Bureau, 1943-45 CLO National Treasuere 1945-47 Nat Pres of the Katipunan ng Mga Kaisahan Manggagawa (KKM) 1949-51 Chairman of the 1st Nat Labor Movement Conf, 1951
SIMEON RODRIGUEZ	Mbr, Natl Finance Committee, POLITBURO CPP Treasurer	Newspaperman (at the time of arrest 18 Oct 1950)
*POTENCIANO LOPEZ Cmdr SANDOVAL/ POTEN/PAT	Ldr. HMB Flying Unit of FC (FIELD Command) No. 102, RECO No. 10	Organizer, Laguna Chapter of MASAKA
*ANDRES BAISA Jr y MEDINA & BEN/ANDY	Mbr, Trade Union Div (TUD), CPP Mbr, District Committee, RECO No. 3	Employee, Philippine Refining Company Mbr (PRC) 145-47 Mbr, Congress of Labor Organization (CLO) 1947-50

* *These men are again facing Criminal charges of Violation of the Anti-Subversion Law, (RA 1700) under GC 110-SP, filed at CFI, San Pablo City on 15 Sep 1970.*

STAND OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHIILIPINES ON THE 1971 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

PART I – MAOIST FACTION

One of the documents captured by government authorities in a suspected CPP/MA-MAO hideout at Bo Bautista, San Pablo City on 12 June 1970 is the official position paper by the CPP Maoist faction which is entitled "The Correct Orientation on the 1971 Constitutional Convention", and signed by Chairman "Amado GUERRERO" for the CPP Central Committee.

Following are extracts from said documents:

> "The essential nature of the Philippine Constitution since the very start has been its being an instrument of national and class oppression and exploitation. It is a constitution designed to synthesize and synchronize the interests of US imperialism and those of the local ruling classes under the camouflage of pious bourgeois populist expressions and the myth of self-government."
>
> "The main task of all proletarian revolutionaries and all those who adhere to the people's democratic revolution is to expose and oppose the 1971 constitutional convention as a farce. In doing so, focus must be put on questions of substance. These questions can be drawn from the Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution of the Communist Party of the Philippines. By raising the most important questions involving the national freedom and democratic rights of the people, the 1971 constitutional convention can be more easily shown up as a mere pretense to deceive the people once more.
>
> "The constitutional convention will certainly fail to liberate the Filipino people from US imperialism and such other oppressors and exploiters as the compradors, the landlords and the bureaucrat capitalists. It is only through an armed revolution that these can be overthrown by the workers, peasants and all patriotic and progressive strata of this society and that a new democratic constitution can be effected to sum up the correct relations and express the true aspirations of the people without being shamed and frustrated by clever provisions and escape clauses that in practice negate the most bombastic preamble and the most pious declaration of principles.
>
> "During the constitutional convention, mass actions assailing the basic reactionary pattern of convention deliberations will even be more important than the speeches and debates made by those few in the minority who will seem to be patriotic and progressive within the convention hall. Those few in the minority who will make positive actuations in the constitutional convention will be proven worthy of admiration only to the extent that they can expose and oppose both the covert and overt maneuvers of the reactionaries to use the constitution as another instrument for oppressing and exploiting the people. However, the moment that they start

> arranging compromises with the reactionaries they become the object of our just contempt. All those who will sign the final draft of the constitution despite all its counter-revolutionary provisions will only affirm their opposition to the true national and democratic interests and aspirations of the Filipino people.
>
> "Before, during and after the 1971 constitutional convention, the Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution is the guide for taking the correct road of armed revolution. Only after an armed revolution has overthrown the exploiters with their oppressive laws can the Filipino people convene a revolutionary congress to draft and ratify a constitution that truly expresses their sovereign and democratic interests and aspirations.
>
> "The Lava revisionist renegades are condemnable for helping the bare-faced counter-revolutionaries spread the false illusion that a constitutional convention can be the occasion for a peaceful putsch or that all legal possibilities can be exhausted. The reactionary state may favor them with more liberties and bigger opportunities for relations with their revisionist masters, the Soviet social-imperialists. But the true proletarian revolutionaries correctly view the constitutional convention as another swindle perpetrated on the people.
>
> "We should cease to be duped by the counter-revolutionary idealist cliche that "those who have less in life shall have more in law." Laws are deliberately passed by the foreign and local tyrants of this society precisely to deceive and oppress the broad massed of the people. What is pompously called the 'rule of law' by the reactionaries is nothing but their own class rule."
>
> "For the Central Committee
> Communist Party of
> the Philippines"
>
> "AMADO GUERRERO
> Chairman"

A translation of the position paper in Tagalog entitled "Ang Tanang Pagpapaliwanag sa Pansaligambatas na Kombensyon sa 1971", which was issued by the Kabataang Gabay ng Bayan and supposedly signed by a member named "Brigida ROSALES", was also among the documents captured in San Pablo.

At least two CPP front organizations also have echoed the official Party stand in their pronouncements. These organizations are the Kabataang Makabayan and the Socialist Party of the Philippines.

The KM through its national spokesman Luzvimindo DAVID announced on 8 Aug. 1970 its policy on the Constitutional Convention. According to DAVID:

> "The Constitutional Convention is nothing but a farce to be used by reactionary ruling classes and groups . . . to create the illusion that they are for genuine change and are fighting for a

> democratic aspirations of the Filipino masses . . . They have every means to dominate and rig the convention to legalize their exploitation and oppression of the people.
>
> "The most that progressive delegates can do is to raise the issues of national democracy and expose the farcical character of the convention. To effectuate genuine changes for the benefit of the people demand the pursuance of the national democratic struggle to the end."

SPP National Chairman Ignacio LACSINA, during an interview with a writer of **The Nation** conveyed the impression that real and effective changes can not come solely through the Convention and that the new constitution would simply reflect the existing power structure in the country. According to him, the development of a truly democratic power structure de facto is the sole guarantee of a truly democratic society.

SPP Secretary General Felixberto OLALIA likewise expressed that "what we need is a complete overhaul of the system. Constitutional methods have fallen short of the expectation of the people, the desired changes have not materialized."

In spite of the negative attitude of the CPP Maoist faction to the Constitutional Convention, certain personalities identified with the Party have filed their certificates of candidacy. This could mean that in certain areas, the Party is not strictly enforcing its policy on the convention.

PART II – TRADITIONAL FACTION

The CPP Traditional Faction has not taken a formal stand on the Constitutional Convention. However, a recently captured draft statement of the party states the following:

"STATEMENT OF PARTIDO KOMUNISTA NG PILIPINAS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION

> Fearing the wrath of the oppressed masses, American imperialism and the Filipino oligarchy would now try to placate them by throwing a sop of constitutional reforms. The Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PNP) views the forthcoming Constitutional Convention as a desperate attempt to resolve the growing internal contradictions of neocolonialism and to preserve the illusion about the neocolonial system's capacity for self-rectification.
>
> PKP maintains that neocolonialism cannot be destroyed and a people's democratic republic cannot be created through constitutional reforms. Never will American imperialism and its local allies surrender their economic and political power peacefully, without resorting to the use of state violence. The Filipino workers, in

alliance with the peasantry and other progressive forces, must therefore organized and arm themselves for the overthrow of the existing state machine and crush the violent opposition of the exploiting classes. As Marx said, "The Working class cannot simply lay hold of the ready-made state machinery and vield it for its own purposes. The task is to build a political structure upon a new foundation, upon the democratic power of the people.

It is imperative for the people to understand that no amount of "statutory guarantees", like the ones advocated by reformist groups and now embodied in the Charter Act, will exclude partisanship from the Constitutional Convention. Formulating a basic law is a political process and politics necessarily involves conflict of class-partisan interests. The delegates of the Constitutional Convention will represent the interests of definite sectors of society, and it is inevitable that the draft constitutiona that they will adopt and present for popular ratification will reflect their class perspectives.

As a Marxist-Leninist party, PKP consistently anchors its policies on specific issues upon a scientific assessment of objective reality. Unlike the vociferous band of renegades and **agents-provocateur** who are trying to impose a left-adventurist line on the national democratic movement, PKP does not confuse what ought to be for what actually exists. While striving actively and systematically to generate a revolutionary situation in the country, it does not delude itself into believing that such a situation is already with us. It recognizes the deepening contradictions in the neocolonial system and the mounting discontent of the masses. Nevertheless, it frankly admits that up to this stage the internal contradictions of the ruling classes have not reached a critical degree such as to render them incapable of wielding state power. While it is an incontrovertible and welcome fact that an ever-increasing number of people have become cynical of the regular elections, the reports of PKP cadres who are working in different places all point to the conclusion that a vast majority still have faith in the Constitutional Convention as a means of bringing about the desired changes.

The fact that the Constitutional Convention in the context of the present alignment of forces will never realize the ultimate goals of the national democratic movement is not sufficient ground to adopt a policy of boycott. As Lenin repeatedly stressed, the boycott line is correct only when a significant part of the downtrodden population has already lost faith in the possibilities of reforming the status quo. When such condition does not exist, it is obligatory for the revolutionary party to participate for the purpose of educating the backward strata of the masses.

There are two ways of participating. One is to put up a slate and persuade people that, if the candidates in the slate are elected fundamental change could be achieve without the necessity of armed struggle. PKP emphatically rejects this alternative as reformist, revisionist and dishonest. Instead of raising the level of political consciousness, it would definitely retard political consciousness and help the ruling class in deceiving the people.

The other form of participation which PKP considers to be the most realistic under existing circumstances is designed to help the masses learn from life itself, through their own experience, the futility of parliamentarism, of constitutional reforms. In implementing this, four concrete steps are suggested:

(1) Support candidates who include in their platforms and actually campaign for the basic goals of the national democratic movement. It is **not enough** for them to promise that, once elected, they will carry the voice of the movement in the Convention. The campaign is a more important vehicle for political education than the Convention debates.

(2) Distribute leaflets and organize teams of hecklers and agitators for the joint rallies sponsored by COMELEC. The objective is to instigate discussion of basic national issues, specifically to expose the bankruptcy of conservatism and the futility of reformism.

(3) Organize mass rallies during the Convention to demand elimination of Parity, rejection of the "vested rights theory", confiscation of big landholdings and properties of American monopolies, removal of the government's power to restrict the rights of political dissent and industrial strikes, etc.

(4) Since the Convention delegates will represent the vested interests in a neocolonial society, they will surely ignore these demands. Therefore, it is necessary to prepare the campaign machinery for a "NO" vote in the plebiscite.

What Lenin said of parliamentary institutions in general is applicable also to the forthcoming Constitutional Convention, this being a specific type of parliamentary institution. According to Lenin in **Left-Wing Communism, an Infantile Disorder**, parliamentarism is "historically obsolete" only in the sense that "the epoch of bourgeous parliamentarism has come to an end, and the epoch of the dictatorship of the proletariat has begun." In many countries, however, parliamentarism has "**not yet** become politically obsolete"; and therefore "participation is **obligatory** for the Party of the revolutionary proletariat, precisely for the purpose of awakening and enlightening the undeveloped, downtrodden, ignorant peasant masses.

When do bourgeois parliaments become "politically obsolete"? To this question Lenin replied: "only when the proletariat and its allies have gained the capacity to disperse them." Before that, Lenin warned, "you **must** work inside them, precisely because in them there are still workers who are stupefied by the priests and by the desolateness of village life; otherwise you run the risk of becoming mere babblers."

Sadly, there is a lot of babblers in the Philippine national democratic movement today who imagine themselves to be the only genuine revolutionaries. They have won the applause of the reactionary press by their persistent mouthing of ultra-revolutionary slogans which, in effect discredit the entire movement by creating a reputation of irresponsibility, even of sheer idiocy. These characters, consisting mostly of petty-bourgeois intellectuals, find great pleasure in trying to denigrate the PKP with malicious charges and false historical accounts. They out do the psychological warfare unit of the fascist armed forces in vilifying PKP leaders who have sacrificed so much in the liberation struggle. Even the dead are not immune to their poisonous slanders.

According to these babblers, armed struggle is the only legitimate form of struggle under all conditions. Without bothering to evaluate the objective and subjective conditions in the country, they condemn PKP's Marxist-Leninist line of combining legal and non-legal forms of struggle as "revisionist", although in practice they also indulge in student elections to gain places of prestige and influence, and use the most despicable methods to ingratiate themselves with some bourgeois senators and newspaper publishers. Right now they profess to boycott the elections for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, while giving secret support to "friendly" candidates.

The test of a genuine Marxist-Leninist is not the ability – or the license – to mouth ultra-revolutionary phrases, but the capacity to analyze concrete situations and to act decisively in every situation so as to advance the fundamental objectives of the revolutionary movement.

On the basis of first-hand reports from cadres who work daily among the masses of workers and peasants, PKP is convinced that illusions about the possibilities of reforms through the Constitutional Convention are still widespread. In other words, this specific type of parliamentary institution is not yet "politically obsolete". It is therefore obligatory for the PKI, as the vanguard of the movement, to participate in it, but its participation should be so conducted as to educate, awaken and enlighten the masses on the bankruptcy of the neocolonial state and the necessity of struggling for a people's democratic republic.

Get hold of the country's weapon and turn it against him!

Implement the Leninist principle of overcoming parliamentarism through the parliamentary struggle!

Turn the Constitutional Convention from a means of resolving the contradictions of neocolonialism into a means of sharpening the contradictions among the ruling classes .

Adopted by the POLITBURO
PARTIDO KOMUNISTA NG PILIPINAS"

PART III – MASAKA FLORES FACTION (TRADITIONAL)

The MASAKA-FLORES FACTION issued a declaration that one of its primary objectives is to work for the "triumph of the people's will in the forthcoming Constitutional Convention." The declaration was contained in a manifesto issued by the group during its provincial convention in Cabanatuan City last February 1970.

However, it has failed to define what is meant by the "people's will". It could be inferred that the "people's will" referred to its none other than its advocacy of a more tolerant attitude towards the so-called liberal elements in the country and the relaxation of what they consider as repressive measures curtailing the rights of the citizens. Such repressive measures include the Anti-Subversion law.

Celebrating "MASAKA DAY" on 19 September, the MASAKA (Flores) issued the following declaration on the constitutional convention:

> "Ka-alinsabay ng pag-gunita sa araw na ito bilang "MASAKA DAY" ng MALAYANG SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA ay nagpapahayag ng kanyang paninindigan ukol sa kombensyong pang-saligang Batas na kakaharapin ng mamamayang Pilipino. Ang paghahalal ng mga delegado sa kia-10 ng Nobyiembre 1970 at ang pagsisimula ng kombensyon sa ika-1 ng Hunio 1971 ay malaganap na usapan sa kasalukuyan. Marami pa sa masa ng sambayanan ang umaasa at naniniwala na sa pagbabago ng Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas ay malulutas ang mala-lang sakit ng lipunang Pilipino? Malulutas ang paghihirap ng taong bayan? Malulutas ang suliranin ukol sa pambansang demokrasya at ang kalagayang neo-kolonyal ng Pilipinas? Ngunit ang MALAYANG SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA ay nagaalinlangan sa katuparan ng pag-asang ito ng bayang, lalo pa't ating iisipin na tayo ay kontrolado ng mga dayuhang imperialista sa pamamagitan ng kanilang monopolyong kapital. Pipilitin ng mga "vested interest" na makapagpasok ng mga pagbabago sa ating Saligang Batas na lalong maglilingkod sa kanilang kapakanan. Ito ang malaking panganib na nakaamba sa buhay at ari-arian ng masang nagnanais ng pagbabago. Upang ang bayang Pilipino ay makatiyak sa lalong ikabubuti ng Saligang Batas na siyang buhay at kaluluwa ng ating lipunan, kinakailangan na magamit ang kapangyarihan ng taong bayan. Kinakailangan ang ganap na pagbabago ng ating Saligang Batas na naalingsunod sa pangangailangan ng isang maka-bagong lipunan. Ito'y nasasalalay sa mga kinatawan na maka-bayan na mahalal na hindi mabibili ng salapi at kapangyarihan ng mga dayuhan at mga reaksyonariong Pilipino na walang pangiming nagkakanulo sa kapakanan ng ating bayan. Mga kinatawan na magmula sa piling ng masa na nakauunawa at nakadarama sa kalagayan at pangangailangan ng nakararaming mamamayan.

Sinasang-ayunan ng MALAYANG SAMAHANG MAGSASAKA ang isang ganap na pagbabago sa hugis o porma ng ating pamahalaan. Isang pamahalaang "parliamentary" na ang mga kinatawan ay magbubuhat sa bawa't sektor ng ating lipunan na ayon sa kanilang mga gawain at ang bilang ay batay sa kanilang dami. Isang bansang ganap na nagsasarili sa politika, ekonomya, kultura at militar na malayo sa dominasyon ng mga dayuhan. Isang bansang malayang makipagkaibigan, makipagkalakalan at makipagpalagayang pang-diplomasya sa lahat ng bansa sa daigdig na walang pagtatangi. Isang bansang industrilisado na may maka-bagong lipunan at maligaya ang mga mamamayan. Isang lipunan na iniiralan ng pambansang demokrasya na ang lahat ng kapangyarihan ay para sa taong bayan.

Kaya't sa araw na ito ang MASAKA ay matapat na nananawagan sa lahat ng mamamayan na nagnanais ng maka-bagong lipunan para sa isang pambansang pagkakaisa at pakikibaka para sa ikabubuti ng masang Pilipino. Magkaisa tayo alang alang sa kinabukasan ng susunod na salin ng ating lahi. Ibagsak natin ang kapangyarihan ng mga dayuhan na nagsasamantala sa loob ng lipunang Pilipino at itatag natin ang isang lipunan na nauukol para sa taong bayan.

VOLUME VI

Republic of the Philippines
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
Camp General Emilio Aguinaldo
Quezon City

31 May 1971

FOREWORD

The upsurge of student activism during the past two years has resulted in serious civil disturbances in major urban centers of the Philippines. In view of the historical pattern of Communist infiltration and exploitation of student movements throughout the world, student activism in the Philippines today has become a problem that requires more serious attention on the part of the Government and of the private sector, especially of parents. Although comprising only a small minority of the entire Filipino studentry, the Communist-influenced group is persistently and determinedly magnifying social, economic and political problems to discredit the Government with the end in view of destroying our democratic way of life by whatever means. Accordingly, they have initiated or instigated the most violent demonstrations in the history of student activism in the country.

Presently, the threat to internal stability posed by student activism emanates primarily from Communist exploitation of the radicals. If left unchecked, therefore, the radicalization of the whole movement can jeopardize the country's stability for it will likely undermine government efforts to maintain peace and order.

In this study, student activists have been classified as moderates and radicals based on their respective objectives. The moderates, who are also called reformists, appear to be genuinely motivated by the need for reforms to strengthen the democtratic system. The radicals, on the other hand, are those who advocate sweeping and violent changes to the extent of overthrowing the present system of government by force of arms.

Student protests against the imbalances in the social structure and shortcoming of the Government have grown more and more militant and unrestrained. It becomes imperative, therefore, to examine the forces and factors propelling the students to engage in mass action in order that a correct appraisal of this phenomenon may be made and appropriate remedial measures be evolved.

This paper, the sixth volume in the AFP's "So the The People May Know" series (I — Programme of the Communist Party of the Philippines; II — The Communist Movement Today and the Grave Threat It Poses to Philippine National Security; III — The Communist Protracted Struggle in the Philippines; IV — Chinese Communist Subversion in Southeast Asia; and V — Communist Legal or Parliamentary Struggle), is thus prepared primarily to present the why and wherefores of student activism in the Philippines.

(*Sgd.*) **JUAN PONCE ENRILE**
Secretary

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COMMUNIST EXPLOITATION OF STUDENT RADICALISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

I. GENERAL

A. *BACKGROUND* (Annex A: Historical Background of Student Activism in the Philippines)

The studentry is the most volatile element of Philippine society. It presently consists about one-fourth of the entire population. Although this group appears fragmented and the majority, uncommitted, the whole sector is dynamic and militant in seeking basic social reforms. The Filipino student activists are basically conservative compared to their counterparts elsewhere in the world. Generally, they are not prone to violence.

The present student ferment is both a manifestation of the worldwide student/youth movement and a reflection of the growing impatience with the *status quo*: As can be seen in the tactics of the student demonstrators, the students appeared influenced by student activism in the US, Latin America, and Europe. The issues they exploit, however, are rooted in the country's pressing social, economic, and political problems. The movement appears spurred by the popular clamor for basic reforms to alleviate the plight of the majority of the people.

Unfortunately, these aspirations for social, economic, and political reforms have been evidently subverted by communist elements. By employing fifth-column tactics such as infiltration, agitation and propaganda, the communists have succeeded in influencing the student ferment. This is clearly manifested in the use of communist jargon, inflammatory and even seditious language, and character assassinations by the various front organizations.

By and large, the proximate cause of the student unrest is the widespread discontent engendered by the alleged commercialization of education as reflected in the following issues the campus activists have raised:

1. lower tuition fees
2. better school facilities
3. academic reforms
4. academic freedom
5. freedom of the campus press
6. autonomy of the student council
7. recognition of basic student rights
8. competence of faculty staff

The contributing causes of aggravating effect are the pressing national problems that can be broken down as follows:

Political

1. graft and corruption
2. "compartmentalized" justice in favor of the rich
3. inadequate implementation of laws
4. credibility gap between government leaders and the people

Socio-economic

1. wide gap between the rich and the poor
2. floating rate of the peso
3. increasing prices of basic commodities
4. low wages
5. unemployment
6. underemployment
7. housing
8. peace and order

These issues appear to have more relevance and acceptability to the stock issues of the radicals — "imperialism", "fascism", and "feudalism" — which are communist jargon.

B. *ACTIVISM IN 1970*

The year 1970 was marked by the increased use of mass activities in the form of demonstrations, rallies, and strikes to register protests and to effect immediate government action on various issues. About 300 demonstrations and rallies took place throughout the country from January to December on a wide range of campus and national issues as the dissenters discovered the effectiveness of such mass action. However, only about 20 of these were marred by violence, with a total casualty of nine killed and more than 200 injured.

Practically all the violence during the year were instigated by *Kabataang Makabayan* (KM) members who first introduced the use of molotov cocktails at the demonstration in front of the US Embassy on 29 December 1969. Such improvised weapons of the demonstrators were initially prepared by the Tondo KM Chapter under the supervision of Eugene GREY, Antonio ROBLES, and Antonio TAYCO. Other KM chapters subsequently developed the pillbox, which was proved to have more destructive power than the molotov cocktail.

The use of force and the imprudent reaction of some law enforcers in the face of provocation or taunting by the student demonstrators during some of the encounters have underlined charges of "fascism" against the authorities. Although the law enforcers involved apparently "lost their cool" and reacted in self-defense, the resultant deaths and injuries tended to further anger and embolden the students; particularly the radicals, to fight back or retaliate.

The most violent and destructive student riots, both in terms of casualities and properties destroyed, were the doings of a few seasoned agitators. Small but highly trained mobile groups of radicals have manipulated peaceful rallies and demonstrations to create tension and excite the crowd to a high degree of intensity. It is likewise known that some radicals habitually take drugs like Madrax and LSD before scheduled mass activities. The majority of the Tondo KM members who participated in the January demonstrations were dope addicts who were organized into a group called PR 1896 AD (*Pagpapatuloy ng Rebolusyon 1896, Anak Dalita*).

Communist influence was strongly manifested in the language and actuations of the demonstrators during the 26 and 30 January demonstrations. The manner in which the riotings were conducted showed planning and some form of leadership which controlled and directed the demonstrators. Subversive elements have also exploited the evident popular discontent by abusing the freedom of expression and utilizing the mass media to channel the discontent towards the furtherance of their own cause.

RADICALS

Early in 1970, the radicals led by the Movement for a Democratic Philippines (MDP) embarked on a psychological offensive through mass protest activities and politicalization of the masses.

However, their violent demonstrations from January to March so as to involve the uncommitted sectors of society, particularly labor and peasantry, apparently resulted in further alienating the people they hope to win over to their side. The destruction the demonstrators left in their wake and the involvement of suspect personalities identified with the Maoist faction have generated widespread apprehensions.

In line with their efforts to involve the public who have remained unresponsive to Communist jargon of "imperialism, feudalism, and fascism", the radicals later shifted to the exploitation of popular issues centered on perennial economic problems. They agitated for a general economic strike by the workers against the rising prices of basic commodities without corresponding wage increases. In several instances, they also joined hands with the moderates in articulating public sentiments against the hiked transportation fares, against those involved in the Bantay incident, the blacklisting of student activists, and lately the widespread indignation over the increased prices of POL products, to regain public sympathy.

The arrest of KM National Chairman Nilo TAYAG in June and the subsequent exposure of the KM as a Communist front organization temporarily hampered the activities of the radicals. Apparently, to replace the faltering image of the MDP and to extend its influence to other schools outside GMA, the radicals have set up a new organization — the Student Alliance for National democracy (STAND). Together with the MDP, KM, and other suspect organizations, STAND has placed itself on the forefront of student activism since its formation in November.

MODERATES

The National Union of Students of the Philippines (NUSP) initiated the first massive demonstration of 1970, timed with the opening of the Republic's 6th Congress on 26 January, to demand for a non-partisan Constitutional Convention in 1971. The rally, however, was infiltrated by radical elements who turned the erstwhile peaceful demonstration into one of the most violent student riots the country ever experienced.

Like the radicals, the moderates have also been integrating with the masses and politicalizing them on national problems, with the end in view of mobilizing them to exert pressure towards the solution of these problems.

From April to early November, the moderates engaged in a countrywide expansional and politicalization campaign on various issues including the importance of the 10 November election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. Most notable for their expansional and agitational activities among the masses were the NUSP and Young Christian Socialists of the Philippines (YCSP) among the *sacadas* in the Visayas, the KHI RHO among the farmers in Southern Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao, and YCSP among the settlers in Davao. Largely through the pressure of the politicalized masses, they hope to effect a change in the apathetic attitude of the government to the root causes of the present social ferment. The **LAKASDIWA** deliberately disrupted Congressional proceedings last May allegedly to awaken government officials to the need for decisive action on vital issues.

C. *DEVELOPMENT IN 1971*

The upward trend of mass protest activities was noticeable during the first five months of 1971. The number of rallies and demonstrations from January to May totalled 126 compared to 95 for the same period in 1970. The number of student casualties likewise increased. Eight students were killed in the rash of violent demonstrations in January and February 1971, as compared to the total of nine students killed for the whole 1970. Two more were killed during the Labor Day demonstration in front of Congress.

The resurgence of violence early in the year was linked with the transportation strike against the increased prices of POL products. In Greater Manila, for the first time, KM and *Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan* (SDK) members resorted to putting up barricades purportedly in support of the striking drivers. Notable among the KM members arrested for erecting barricades was MIT student Bendix CHAN, a Chinese. CHAN together with brothers Philip and David WONG are presently facing deportation proceedings for indulging in political activities detrimental to the national interest. The trio for a time worked for the Chinese Commercial News.

At the University of the Philippines (UP) in Diliman, the radicals blockaded and controlled the university for ten days (2-11 Feb.), and created a "provisional Directorate of the Diliman Commune" under the leadership of Student Council Chairman Ericson BACULINAO. The "Diliman Commune" published the *Bandilang Pula* as its official organ and used DZUP for propaganda purposes.

Earlier, Maoists led by MDP Sec.-Gen. Julius FORTUNA and STAND Chairman Crispin ARANDA organized the *Tagapag-ugnay ng Progresibong Tsuper, Estudyante at Kabataan* as a united front of radical students and moderate groups. Subsequent developments showed that KM and SDK protests were not confined to the oil issue but stretched to include "US imperialism". In UP, the jeepney strike was relegated to the background when the radicals began denouncing "police brutality" and the violation of academic freedom. The attempts of the radicals to gain complete control of the student-driver alliance ultimately resulted in the break-up of the united front.

Late in March, six adventurous students of the Mindanao State University in Marawi City grabbed the limelight when they successfully executed the first hijacking incident in the history of student activism in the country.

Three members of the group — Daniel LOBITAÑA, Fructuoso CHUA, Jr. and Domingo BASKIÑAS — are confirmed to be members of the KM. Significantly, the KM vehemently denounced the hijacking and claimed that such activities are excluded from the organization's present program of action. KM Sec.-Gen. Luzvimindo DAVID stated that "hijackings are only adventurist methods of protest which do not consider the interest of the masses as primary but rather puts daring and audacity in command." He, however, stressed that the daring action "has served to expose the bankrupt and bigoted foreign policy" of the government.

The directive of PC Chief Brig. Gen. Eduardo GARCIA on 14 May, calling for a stricter implementation of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code against inflammatory speeches during mass actions, has been fully exploited by the radicals and their propagandists. By cashing on the general reaction which interpreted the GARCIA order as another scheme to muzzle dissenters, the radicals held a series of demonstrations to magnify their charges of fascism against the Government.

D. *POLARIZATION OF THE MOVEMENT*

Based on their objectives and tactics, student protesters are generally classified as moderates and radicals. The moderates reject the use of destructive force or violence and greatly rely on persuasion although at times they resort to violation of law to elicit action, to achieve their ends. In contrast, the radicals advocate the use of force, violence, intimidation and coercion as means of attaining their objectives.

The radicals, however, can be further classified as Maoists and Traditional based on their differing approach to the implementation of their objective, which is the overthrow of the present government. The Maoists emphasize the use of armed struggle while the Traditionals believe in the parliamentary struggle. The most significant among the Maoists are the KM, SDK, MDP and STAND.

The *Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino* (MPKP), the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation, Philippines Inc. (BRPF), and others allied with the Traditional faction who have banded together under the *Pambansang Kilusan ng Paggawa* (KILUSAN) have ostensibly shied away from Maoist-sponsored mass activities because of the latter's penchant for violence.

Like the radicals, the moderates, consisting of the NUSP, National Students League (NSL), YCSP, LAKASDIWA, KHI RHO Movement, *Kapulungan ng mga Sandigan ng Pilipinas* (KASAPI) and others, articulate the ills of society and agitate for changes but within the constitutional framework and established political system. They still believe that the present setup is not entirely hopeless and peaceful reforms can be ultimately achieved.

However, certain elements within the moderates can also be considered revolutionary because they believe that violence is inevitable if solutions to current problems and the reforms they are seeking are not instituted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention.

II. THE RADICALS

A. *LINKS WITH THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT*

Communist interest in the student movement dates back to the period immediately after the formation of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in 1938. Cognizant of the idealism and dynamism of the students, leaders of the then nascent CPP started trying to recruit student leaders for party work.

However, the first real effort of the communists to infiltrate and subvert the students was made early in 1951. This resulted in the formation of several Communist-dominated or controlled organizations. Through a detailed resolution passed during the Party's Central Committee Conference in March 1951, the *Kaisahan ng mga Kabataang Komunista* (KKK) or the Communist Youth League (CYL) was ordered formed for the purpose of organizing the Filipino students and youths to support the Party. The CYL was supposed to attract the best of the youth who might be brought closer to the revolutionary movement by involving them in a group interested in social problems.

After the CYL, Communist planners infiltrated the National Student Movement for Democracy (NASTUM), seeing it as another vehicle for "mass organization at the student level," to be composed of the College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEG), Student Councils Association of the Philippines (SCAP), and Conference Delegates Association (CONDA). How the NASTUM could be exploited for Communist purposes was succinctly expressed by a leftist student leader:

> *"The College Editors Guild (CEG), the Student Councils Association of the Philippines (SCAP) and the Conference Delegates Association (CONDA), given a leadership, vision and responsibility, can be forged into the Propaganda Movement of the present. The CEG, composed as it is of youthful writers from some 70 learning centers all over the country, can provide the new Propaganda Movement the necessary theoretical force. The SCAP, made up of supposed leaders of action with presumed support in their respective campuses, can be the action arm of the movement. The two annual national conferences convoked by the CONDA can be transformed into serious congresses to pass upon the theories or programmes hammered out by the theoretical department (the CEG) for implementation by the action arm (the SCAP)."*

NASTUM subsequently controlled the student movement up to 1956. During the period, Communist cadres tried thru NASTUM to develop promising students who could help in the CPP's propaganda and organizational activities.

Beginning 1957, several Socialist-oriented organizations emerged but the more notable ones were the *Kataastaasang Katipunan ng Kabataang Pilipino* (KKKP), composed of selected students who believed in socialism, and the Social Democratic Movement (SDM), a splinter group which broke away from the KKKP. The Communist hierarchy hoped to employ KKKP members as propagandists and exploit SDM members for agitation and propaganda work. However, these organizations failed to gain adequate support from the studentry so they slowly faded away.

As the Socialist-oriented student/youth organizations faded from the scene in the late 1950s, the Student Cultural Association of the University of the Philippines (SCAUP) emerged in November 1960, largely through the efforts of Jose Ma. SISON. From the very start, SISON planned to make the SCAUP "the core of the movement which would engage in propaganda and organization work for change in Philippine society, capitalizing on nationalism". SISON envisioned that eventually, he would win over the nationalist student organizations, convert them into the organizational arm of SCAUP, and establish a mass base among the students.

In October 1962, SCAUP leaders organized the Alliance for Socialist Advance (ALSA) as the national version of SCAUP. ALSA was a secret organization. In strongly worded language, ALSA announced its revolutionary tasks:

> *"The Alliance for Socialist Advance takes upon itself the tasks and responsibility of preparing the workers, together with other democratic elements, for a new social order of their own making . . . Thus, all educational efforts are to be exerted in order that they may be prepared for a massive revolutionary organization."*
>
> *"The Alliance for Socialist Advance works for a party of a new type. It strives to contribute to the formation of an overwhelming socialist party and movement in the whole archipelago."*

The avowed objectives of ALSA further underlines the CPP's need for the student/youth sector's assistance in the communization of the country. The CPP initially utilized the students in its education and propaganda efforts and later exploited the most militant among them for organizational activities.

B. *FRONT ORGANIZATIONS*

Most of the communist-influenced/controlled student/youth organizations claim nationwide membership but their members are concentrated in Greater Manila Area (GMA) and some chartered cities. These organizations are also aligned according to the factionalism in the Communist Party of the Philippines which developed as early as 1967. The most active are the Maoist fronts led by the KM (Annex B: Constitution of the Kabataang Makabayan). This group includes the SDK (Annex C: Saligang Batas ng Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan), MDP (Annex D: Charter of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines), STAND, SCAUP, and other organizations in schools and universities. The major fronts of the Traditional faction of the CPP in the student/youth sector are the MPKP (Annex E: Saligang Batas ng Malayang Pagkakaisa ng Kabataang Pilipino) and the BRPF (Annex F: By-Laws of Bertrand Russel Peace Foundation).

The alignment of the radical students into the Maoist and Traditional faction is more evident in GMA than elsewhere in the country. The keen rivalry between the two factions over the leadership of the radicals is particularly noted at UP, Diliman, where they have been vying for the support of the uncommitted students. In some provinces, however, the front organizations of these two CPP factions do not reflect the CPP split. As such, they often undertake joint activities.

The KM, the most significant and the biggest organization with about 200 chapters throughout the country, was organized by Jose Ma. SISON based on the concept of ALSA. Among the KM planners were key leaders of the SCAUP and the progressive students of Lyceum of the Philippines and members of the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU).

To dramatize its birth, the KM was launched on 30 November 1964, the birth anniversary of Andres Bonifacio. In his inaugural address, SISON projected Andres Bonifacio as a young revolutionary activist who "acted in concert with his people in armed struggle against tyranny . . ."

Subsequently, the KM launched an extensive expansion and recruitment program among the students and youth "for the common cause of national freedom and democracy against feudalism and imperialism". Complementing this effort, it also sponsored and instigated mass protest activities on a wide range of national issues.

KM leaders were among the organizers of the BRPF in 1965, the Movement for the Advancement of Nationalism (MAN) and the Socialist Party of the Philippines (SPP) in 1967. The KM became an affiliate of the newly-formed SPP in May 1967. SISON became SPP Deputy Chairman, while other KM leaders were assigned key positions in the SPP Executive Committee. Although only an affiliate, the KM overshadowed the SPP in expansional efforts.

In the later part of 1967, the KM was beset with factional rifts and dissension, resulting in the break-off of a large group which formed the MPKP and the expulsion, in early 1968, of a rebel group which later formed the SDK.

The MPKP became the youth arm of the Traditional faction. The SDK later gravitated towards the Maoist camp which tends to confirm earlier speculations that it was purposely formed by the KM to infiltrate the MPKP.

After the 1969 national elections, KM and SDK leaders attempted to overcome this factionalism with the formation of the MDP, which was conceived as a coordinating body of all "progressive" organizations. Briefly, the MDP's paramount objectives are:

1. To propagate the nationalist movement;
2. To consolidate all progressive sectors of society into a united front; and
3 To isolate the reactionaries.

The MDP made an impressive debut on 29 December 1969 with a violent demonstration in front of the US Embassy and ushered in 1970 with a series of the most violent demonstrations the country ever witnessed. However, it gradually lost the cooperation of the Traditional-oriented and other groups under its banner. It became increasingly KM-dominated, and ultimately retrogressed into just being another KM front.

STAND, which was formed 7 November 1970, is another brainchild of radical leaders identified with the Maoist faction. Its avowed objective is to fight for "national democracy" and reforms in Philippine society. Closely toeing the Maoist line, the organization has already sponsored two demonstrations. Both ended in violence.

C. *THE KM AND THE CPP*

The Communist hold on the KM crystallized in December 1968 when SISON and other young communists, who favored the aggressive doctrines of MAO Tse-tung, broke off from the Party and convened a "Congress for the Re-establishment of the Communist Party of the Philippines." The "Programme for a People's Democratic Revolution" adopted by this Congress, which gave legitimacy to the CPP Maoist faction, is along the KM line.

SISON, who supposedly relinquished the chairmanship of the KM to Nilo TAYAG, took charge as chairman of the "Re-established CPP". He, however, retained power over the KM in his capacity as Chairman of the KM Consultative Council.

By March 1969, Jose Ma.SISON alias Amado GUERRERO succeeded in negotiating an agreement with a band of second generation HMBs under Bernabe BUSCAYNO (alias Comdr DANTE), resulting in the formation of the New People's Army (NPA). SISON, as head of the re-established CPP, provided the ideological guidance to DANTE's group, which serves as the Party's military arm.

The existence of links between the KM and the CPP Maoist faction has been given added credence by the following developments:

Some of the documents captured by the AFP in an NPA tunnel in Bo. Sta Rita, Capas, Tarlac, on 9 June 1969 established the fact some of the founding leaders of the NPA and the so-called "re-established Communist Party of the Philippines," notably Jose Ma SISON (Amado GUERRERO) and the late Arthur GARCIA, were also the principal founders of the KM.

Other documents recovered from Sta Rita which further showed the links between the KM and the CPP are the following:

1. Pictures of certain KM leaders, notably Arthur GARCIA, undergoing military and guerrilla warfare training in Communist China. Some of the pictures showed the different steps in laying booby traps and detailed diagrams of Chinese Communist tunnels (Vietcong style). Incidentally, NPA tunnels found in Sta Rita were similar to those depicted in these pictures. The late Arthur GARCIA was considered to be the No. 2 man in the NPA when he was killed by henchmen of Comdr DANTE on 28 February 1970.

2. Files of filled up KM application forms most of which were marked "approved" with the signature of KM founder Jose Ma. SISON.

3. List of KM personalities identified with SISON group, many of whom are members of the Central Committee of the Maoist faction of the Communist Party of the Philippines.

A group of armed men figured in gun battles with the local police in Victorias and in Cadiz, Negros Occidental, on 30 July 1969 and 1 Aug. 1969, respectively. Two of the captured members of the group — Apolinario GATMAITAN and Vivencio SANTOYO — later implicated KM members Herminigildo GARCIA IV, Mila Astorga GARCIA, Manuel COLLANTES, Primitivo BUAGAS Jr, Philidore QUINCO and the late Arthur GARCIA as among the NPA organizers in the Visayas.

Another case in point is that of Leoncio CO, a former KM Secretary-General. CO is now facing charges of violating Section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Law before the Tarlac Court of First Instance, committed as follows:

> "That on or about May 1969 to December 5, 1969, in the Municipality of Capas . . . the above-named accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously became an officer and/or ranking leader of the Communist Party of the Philippines, an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the Government of the Philippines by means of force, violence, deceit, subversion, or any other illegal means for the purpose of establishing in the Philippines a totalitarian regime and placing the Government under the control and domination of an alien power, by being an instructor in the Mao Tsetung University, the training school of recruits of the said New People's Army, the military arm of the said Communist Party of the Philippines."

At the time of his capture on 4 March 1970, CO was also assigned with the group charged with the duty of preparing CPP/NPA documents and publications to include *Ang Bayan*, the official CPP-Maoist organ.

On 12 June 1970, a raid was conducted by AFP troopers on a suspected dissident hideout in Bo. Bautista, San Pablo City, resulting in the capture of Francisco PORTEM alias Kiko GONZALES, a member of the Lyceum KM Chapter, and the seizure of voluminous documents, three high-powered fire-arms, several rounds of ammunition, and some 20 bundles of explosives which were brought to the barrio by KM National Chairman Nilo TAYAG and Francisco PORTEM. TAYAG, hiding under the alias Romeo Reyes/Romy, was arrested in the nearby Bo. Concepcion a day before the Bo. Bautista raid.

TAYAG was subsequently accused of pursuing subversive and seditious activities in San Pablo City by recruiting members for the NPA and by inciting the people to overthrow the government in favor of a communist regime. The Tarlac Provincial Fiscal accused TAYAG of engaging in:

> "Rebellious conspiracies and riots to overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means, . . . on several occasions within the Province of Tarlac, the accused conducted meetings and/or seminars wherein the said accused delivered speeches instigating and inciting the people to unite, rise in arms and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, by force, violence, deceit, subversion and/or other illegal means; and towards this end, the said accused organized, among others, a chapter of the Kabataang Makabayan in Barrio Motrico, La Paz, Tarlac, for the avowed purpose of undertaking or promoting an armed revolution, subversive and/or seditious propaganda, conspiracies, and/or riots and/or other illegal means to discredit and overthrow the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and to establish in the Philippines a Communist regime."

Among the documents captured in Bo. Bautista, San Pablo City were:

1. CPP/NPA revolutionary publications, teaching/stud- materials, pronouncements, manifestoes, and the like many of which were subversive in nature.

2. Propaganda leaflets, manifestoes, official pronouncements of the KM and its fraternal organization, notably the SDK, MDP, SPP, and MASAKA (OLALIA faction). These groups' agitational and propaganda lines clearly reflect the CPP MA-MAO stand on the issues of national democracy, US imperialism, feudalism, and fascism.

3. Books on Communism, including Lenin's *Selected Works*, which were found to have been borrowed or stolen by Ramon SANCHEZ, a member of the KM National Council, from the library of the Congressional Economic Planning Office, where he was previously employed. Significantly, SANCHEZ, a former professor of the Philippine College of Commerce, was one of the personalities identified by barrio resident as frequenting Bo. Bautista together with Nilo TAYAG and Francisco PORTEM. SANCHEZ, who is the subject of a warrant of arrest for violation of RA 1700, is still at large.

All of the above clearly show that the KM, SDK, and MDP are being used by the NPA as spearhead in its expansion drive and as fronts for propagating the Maoist line.

In other places where NPA expansional activities have been reported, as in Laguna, Camarines Sur, Leyte and Samar, such undertakings go hand in hand with KM organizational works. Marco BADURIA, a local KM leader and NPA member, supervises both NPA and KM expansion and organizational efforts in Camarines Sur, particularly in Tigaon and neighboring towns.

The KM-SDK occupation of the UP campus in Diliman last February under the leadership of Ericson BUCALINAO, UP Student Council Chairman and a top KM leader, is another example of CPP/NPA-KM collaboration.

The KM has also infiltrated top posts in the student councils of several colleges and universities in Manila. The student organs of these institutions are likewise affected, many of them serving as mouthpieces for straight Maoist propaganda. However, the indictment of Nilo TAYAG and the subsequent exposure of the KM as a Maoist front organization reflected adversely on the activities of the KM and its affiliates.

D. *PLANS AND OBJECTIVES*

The principal goal of the radical students, both Traditional and Maoist, is to help destroy the established system in preparation for a communist takeover. The attainment of this goal is largely predicated on the existence of a revolutionary situation. So, such a condition must be created where there is none or accelerated where there are developing signs.

While sharing similar objectives of ultimately seizing national power preparatory to the establishment of a communist regime, the two factions differ basically in their approach to carry on the struggle. Likewise, they differ markedly in their immediate goals. The traditional faction is for the preparation of the basic forces for the armed struggle but the Maoist is for the immediate launching of a revolution. This difference stems from their respective appraisal of the obtaining situation. For the present, the Traditional faction entertains doubts about the advisability of using force to attain its objectives, believing that there is no revolutionary situation that exists.

The Maoist faction is more precise regarding the goals of student activism. Jose Ma. Sison's much publicized article on student power has clearly defined the student sector's roles in the present struggle. SISON contends that the students, being a minority social group, cannot successfully initiate lasting changes in the present system; they must integrate with the struggle of the masses. However, the students can play a vanguard role in a cultural revolution patterned after that of the Red Guards of Communist China but their ultimate goal is to merge themselves with the masses.

E. ISSUES

For these more politically-concious radical groups who are committed to revolutionry changes in the status quo, the issues they generally drum up are "imperialism", "feudalism", and "fascism". According to a UP study on student unrest, these are defined as follows:

Imperialism refers to all forms of foreign domination in Philippine society. These conditions include:

1. Maintenance of US bases and presence of American troops within Philippine territory;
2. Influence of JUSMAG over internal security matters;
3. Refusal by US base authorities to surrender base personnel responsible for the killing of Filipinos to Philippine courts;
4. Colonial pattern of the Philippine economy;
5. Dependence of the sugar industry upon "quota" preference in the US market;
6. Domination of the monetary and credit system by a combination of foreign banks and international cartels; and
7. Dominance of foreign interests in the manufacture and distribution of fuels, in mining and mineral products, import and retail trade.

Feudalism describes the conditions in Philippine agriculture characterized by:

1. Ownership of large tracts of land by few families;

2. Share tenancy system of cultivation, making the tenants subservient to the landlords.

3. Inefficient agricultural system, resulting in low productivity, inadequate supply of basic staples and high prices for the consumers; and

4. Exploitation of agricultural workers.

Fascism means conditions involving:

1. Government reliance on the armed forces in dealing with popular unrest like the fomation of para-military units;

2. Politicalization of the armed forces by training the military to take over civilian functions and by the exploitation of the various services for partisan politics;

3. Existence of private armies; and

4. Use of police and the armed forces in dealing with mass activities.

Lately, the radicals have also started exploiting more specific issues popularly considered as valid and legitimate in line with their efforts to elicit public support. In many instances, they have joined labor strikes by denouncing unfair labor practices and demanding wage increases and better working conditions.

F. *ACTIVITIES*

The overall activities of the radical students are geared towards the promotion of the local communists' immediate and long-range objectives. Efforts are also exerted to identify or merge the students' mass activities with parallel movements in labor and the peasantry. Broadly, these can be classified into: 1) organization and expansion; 2) politicalization; and 3) agitation and propaganda.

Organization and Expansion

The KM is the most aggressive among the radicals in the field of organization and expansion. It claims to have countrywide membership. This is attributed to the fact that organizational and expansional activities have been its primary preoccupation for the past six years: it practically undertakes barrio-to-barrio recruitment drive. This has paid off with the formation of about 200 identified chapters from Northern Luzon to the Sulu Archipelago: 144 of these are in Luzon (56 in GMA): 39 in the Visayas, and 17 in Mindanao-Sulu.

Trailing behing the KM in organizational and expansional work are the SDK followed by the MPKP and the BRPF. The SDK and the MPKP have just started organizing chapters in the Visayas and the Mindanao-Sulu area.

To augment their membership, radical student organizations also organize front or fraternal organizations. Target groups are usually the farmers and laborers. For the KM, this organizational effort is largely undertaken by Organizers and Lecturers Group (OLG) of the Educational Department.

Politicalization

Politicalization activities of the militant student organizations are usually in the form of conferences, seminars, open forums, summer camps, teach-ins, and the like. These are usually undertaken to complement expansional and organizational work as well as to raise the ideological consciousness of its members in particular and the masses in general.

Although teach-in's are ordinarily held throughout the year, the KM, SDK, MPKP and other militant organizations concentrate in mass activties during summers. They often synchronize plans in the politicalization of the masses in the rural areas which actualy means educating the masses on the stock issues of "imperialism", "feudalism", and "fascism" and making them realize that these are the root causes of the country's socio-economic and political problems.

Primary targets of militant politicalization are the farmers and the laborers whom the radicals consider the most oppressed and exploited sector of society. Thus the militants are notably intensifying their politicalization activities among the farmers in Central Luzon, the farmers and fishermen of Southern Luzon, and the sacadas in Visayas, particularly in the islands of Panay and Negros, where the radicals consider the obtaining economic conditions as deplorable. The presence of organized KM chapters in the area and the existence of well-organized labor and peasant unions highly vulnerable to ideological exploitation have favored the militants' politicalization campaign. Target groups in Mindanao include the small settlers and the ethnic minorities.

Agitation and Propaganda

The militants often carry out their agitational and propaganda work through protest activities, such as demonstrations, rallies and strikes, as well as in the production and distribution of manifestoes, pamphlets, resolutions, "Kartilyas" and the like.

The KM is particularly notorious for initiating or instigating most of the demonstrations, rallies and strikes staged by the student/youth sector since 1965. Significantly, these activities have risen sharply from a total of 85 in 1969 to about 300 in 1970, almost two-thirds of which were radical-inspired.

Maoist influence is quite revealing in the general pattern of the recent riotous demonstrations inspired by the radicals, particularly the KM/MDP. Demonstrators were organized into small groups under different leaders and fled in different directions, also in small groups, when confronted by anti-riot elements. They were later observed to regroup at certain definite rallying points. They also had first aid stations and a command post.

III. THE MODERATES

A. *COMPOSITION*

The term moderate is used here broadly, covering a wide range of student/youth organizations from the nationalists to the socialists and some with militant tendencies. But they all share in common abhorrence for violence and they are great believers in the democratic way of life. Some are increasingly becoming militant, though, as their fear about the future is intensified by the seeming hopelessness of the present.

Student activists have twice disrupted congressional proceedings and "invaded" the office of Justice Secretary Vicente ABAD SANTOS to dramatize their demands. The first student invasion of Congress occurred 19 May 1970 when LAKASDIWA members stirred a commotion in Congress allegedly "to awaken government officials to the needs of the people . . . since it seems that lobbying and rational arguments, pickets and demonstrations cannot move them to decisive action on vital issues." Again last 13 April, members of the KASAPI grabbed the headlines when they took the floor in Congress and demanded a public accounting of the funds reported to have been transferred by Malacañang to the House of Representatives for the 1970 election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention. KHI RHO and LAKASDIWA members briefly occupied the Department of Justice 22 October 1970 to demand justice in the Camilo SABIO case* in Tagum, Davao del Norte.

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* — SABIO was the lawyer of a poor couple involved in a land case. SABIO and the couple were ordered imprisoned when they disobeyed a local court order lifting the barricade protecting the couple's land from illegal use of a wealthy logger.

Moderate students, fortunately are the majority, appear greatly inspired and influenced by militant members of the clergy who are likewise sincerely interested in basic social reforms. This small group of the clergy, particularly the Jesuits, are fully aware that student activism can be a potent force for a peaceful social revolution if properly channeled and directed. Significantly, it is remarkable that the biggest and most influential moderate organization, the NUSP, draws the bulk of its membership from sectarian schools.

Among the oldest of contemporary moderate student organizations are the:

1. College Editors Guild of the Philippines
2. Student Councils Association of the Philippines
3. Conference Delegates Association

The CEG was organized on 25 July 1931; uniting the official student publications of the different educational institutions in a federation to promote student participation in molding public opinion and foster closer understanding among student members. It has an estimated membership of 800 from 98 schools.

The SCAP was established on 30 September 1946 primarily to foster independent thinking, intelligent discussion and dynamic action on vital matters affecting the students, as well as prepare them as responsible citizens. Its membership was limited to the highest student governing bodies of the member colleges and universities.

The CONDA is a non-partisan and non-sectarian organization formed in 1948 by YMCA and YWCA members to prepare the youth for unselfish, constructive and progresive leadership; encourage student leaders in the discussion of vital national issues; and help in the formulation of sound public opinion. It is composed of student leaders (council presidents, college editors and officers of fraternities and sororities) from 100 colleges and universities throughout the country. In January 1961, a group of disgruntled CONDA members walked out from the organization's annual convention and formed the Confederation of Student Leaders of the Philippines (CSLP).

These organizations had spearheaded the student movement during their heyday. When they became targets of communist infiltration, they gradually weakened and consequently lost leadership of the student movement. As these organizations receded to the background of student activism, the NUSP picked up the leadership of the movement.

The NUSP was organized in December 1947. It presently claims a total membership of about 400,000 students from 97 schools throughout the country. Its avowed objective is to insure a "faithful representation of responsible thinking and sentiment of the Filipino youth regarding issues of national and international importance." Suspect personalities have been exerting efforts to undermine the organization. This was manifested in the walkout staged by some elements who protested the re-election of Edgar JOPSON to the NUSP presidency last December. The NUSP dissenters have formed their own bloc but they have not openly stated if they will remain within the NUSP camp or they will resign from the organization. Meanwhile, the De La Salle College Student Council has resigned from the NUSP, accusing that the organization is perpetuating a particular political ideology which allegedly removes the "unity in diversity" of student activism.

Closely collaborating with the NUSP in the crusade for reforms are several nationalist student organiztaions that cropped up in the late 1960s — LAKASDIWA, BARANGAY, YCSP, KHI RHO Movement — and the NSL, an association of student councils of state colleges and universities. The dissenting faction of the NSL is identified with the radical left.

The YCP is generally believed to be youth arm of the Christian Socialist Movement (CSM). It was founded in December 1967, three months after the establishment of the CSM. Presently, the YCSP claims a membership of about 5,000 students with approximately 10,000 mass base.

The moderates have formed fraternal organizations to synchronize their activities and consolidate their forces in order to effect more tangible results. These include the PAGKAKAISA, Operation Bantay, Operation PAGBABAGO, and *Kapulungan ng mga Sandigan ng Pilipinas* (KASAPI).

Three of the most militant in the group are the KHI RHO Movement, the youth arm of the Federation of Free Farmers, the LAKASDIWA and lately the KASAPI. The first two have exploited mass activities to the maximum to project their specific demands. The KHI RHO and the YCSP have formed an *ad hoc* organization, the Youth for Land Reform (YLR), to coordinate the group's participation in rallies and demonstrations. Like the NUSP, the LAKASDIWA is basically influenced by the clergy.

B. *PLANS AND OBJECTIVES*

The fundamental objective of the moderate is to change the existing order peacefully or through "non-violent militancy" by initiating social, economic, and political reforms. Initially, these students would want to help restore confidence in the government. They believe that this can be easily achieved if national leaders would only demonstrate in deeds their sincerity by introducing basic reforms to solve the country's social problems.

They, therefore, look forward to the Constitutional Convention to formulate solutions to pressing problems in the educational, social, economic and political fields. They are, hopefully, confident that these reforms will arrest the deteriorating situation.

Should the Constiutional Convention prove useless in providing solutions to these problems, there are strong indications that some of the moderate organizations might ultimately join forces with the radicals in the "parliament of the streets."

C. *ISSUES*

The issues raised by the moderates can be classified into the short-range, which includes specific grievances, and the long-range which calls for basic changes in society. Short-range issues frequently exploited by the group center on academic reforms, excessive school fees, graft and corruption, land reforms and the like.

By espousing specific issues directly affecting the people, they have gained the support and sympathy of the masses. Among these were demands for a non-partisan Constitutional Convention, amendment of the minimum wage law, justice for the victims of the Bantay incident, ban on the importation of luxury goods, land for the landless and others which are considered valid and legitimate.

In the Ilocos region, the moderates are particularly concerned with the plight of the tobacco farmers, the victims of injustices, and the peace and order situaion in the area. They have persistently called for the abolition of the tobacco subsidy, claiming that the money allocated is actually pocketed by those in power. They have also been unrelenting in their crusade to seek justice for the victims of the burning of two barrios in Bantay, Ilocos Sur.

The moderates in Southern Luzon play up the need for outright implementation of development projects, including improvements in the Philippine National Railways. In the Visayas, they champion the cause of the sacadas. They ask for socio-economic measures, specifically the release of public lands to thousands of settlers, to ease the sufferings of the sacadas, farmers and setllers.

In Mindanao, the moderate activists bravely expose land-grabbing cases involving influential individuals and vested interests. They have also launched a campaign for the dispensation of social justice for all.

D. *ACTIVITIES*

Activities of the student moderates generally parallel those of the radicals. Similarly, these can be classified broadly as follows: organization and expansion politicalization, and mass work (agitation and propaganda). Their respective approach and techniques, however, contrast sharply. Unlike the militants, the moderates undertake specific steps to ventilate valid and legitimate grievances.

In the field of organizational and expansional activities, the moderates are not as aggressive as the radicals since they do not have to exert efforts to recruit members.

The moderate students are quite active in politicalization and mass work. Volunteers set up work camps and actually live and integrate with the people in their target areas, and learn from them their problems. In many instances, the student volunteers involve the people in the construction of community projects. They · also undertake "work-ins" in the slums, factories, government offices and farms. During such sessions, the students saturate their audience with talks about nationalism, encourage them to solve their own problems, educate or politicalize them on significant national issues, and recruit potentials for their respective organizations.

Mass protest activities such as pickets, rallies and demonstrations, are usually resorted to in emphasizing their issues and demands. The NUSP, YCSP, LAKASDIWA, and KHI RHO Movement have forged an "action alliance" to coordinate their mass activities. They usually hold pickets and "sit-ins" to press legislation on their specific demands — banning of luxury goods, promotion of profit sharing between capital and labor, and others.

IV. APPRAISAL

Gauged from the achievements of the student activists in general, the moderates apparently outscore the radicals in performance. Largely by agitating for basic reforms within the democratic processes and by holding protest activities peacefully, the moderates have solely been instrumental in focussing attention to specific issues of public interest. They have been likewise responsible for uncovering social and political ills nobody dared expose before the advent of militant student activism.

It is quite reassuring to note that majority of the student activists are for peaceful reforms and that they are hopeful that the Government can institute the necessary changes to alleviate the plight of the masses. Barring drastic changes in their leadership or unexpected successful infiltration by radical elements, the moderates will most likely remain committed to work for reforms peacefully.

However, should the Constitutional Convention fail to formulate or consider solutions to socio-economic problems and the Government remains unresponsive to vital issues that require immediate solution, there are indications that they might ultimately resort to the use of force in pursuing their demands. Activities of the LAKASDIWA, KASAPI KHI RHO and the NUSP, like the "invasions" of Congress and the Justice Department, have amply provided a general insight as to how radical they can become, short of the outright use of force, in the prosecution of their objectives.

Despite all criticism including alleged muzzling of dissenters levelled against the Government by the radicals, the fact that the activists, or anarchists among them, are allowed to act as they please and attack the Establishment itself are healthy signs of a working democracy. The growing incidence of protest activities, some culminating in violent public disturbances, is likewise a manifestation of democracy in action.

The radicals, particularly the ideologically oriented ones, have become either witting or unwitting agents of subversive elements. They have instigated bloody riots, which more often than not, ended in wanton destruction of property, broken limbs, and loss of lives. The radicals invariably taunt the law enforcers with foul language, making the latter "lose their cool." The ensuing clashes, such as the 1 May 1971 incident have been fully exploited to dramatize the radicals' charges of fascism against the police and AFP elements.

Behind the scenes, the Communists have been exploiting the student ferment to draw support of the workers and the farmers, who have so far remained largely uncommitted. The Communists have also expanded their stock issues of imperialism, fascism and feudalism to include economic problems in their efforts to identify their interest with those of the masses. At the same time, they have taken advantage of every opportunity to sustain their efforts to build up a revolutionary situation. Accordingly, they have initiated and instigated a series of violent mass actions presumably to arouse the revolutionary consciousness of the people. It is encouraging to note, however, that their target groups have remained unresponsive.

Summing up, a graphical presentation of the various student/youth organizations may be as depicted in the following spectrum.

Based on their respective ideological orientation, these groups can be categorized accordingly from the far left to the far right.

The Communist-oriented organizations or radical leftists are found on the left side of the spectrum. They generally favor a complete change in the present order by the use of violence. In contrast, those at the right of center favor reforms within the present system.

Those at the center and left of center of the base represent the majority of the studentry. This group has so far remained generally averse to the use of force and violence in their agitation for basic reforms. This could indicate an over-all trend towards reform by peaceful, Constitutional means despite manifestations of growing impatience about government indifference or inaction on vital issues of national interest.

SPECTRUM OF STUDENT ACTIVIST ORGANIZATIONS


MOST VIOLENT
KM
MDP
UPNC
SCAUP
MAKIBAKA
STAND
NSL
LEADS
SDK
MPKP
SKAP
BRPF
OTHER RADICAL GROUPS
MAOIST COMMUNIST
TRADITIONAL COMMUNIST
TRADITIONAL COMMUNIST
KASAPI
SKIT
KHI-RHO
YCSP
LAKASDIWA
CSLP
NSUP
NSL
OTHER REFORM GROUPS
CONDA
CEG
SUCCOR
LEFT
CENTER
RIGHT
IDEOLOGICAL ORIENTATION

LEGEND

NUSP	NATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
NSL	NATIONAL STUDENTS LEAGUE (PORTIA ILAGAN)
KM	KABATAANG MAKABAYAN
NSL	(MAOIST)
SDK	SAMAHANG DEMOKRATIKO NG KABATAAN
KHI-RHO	CHRIST (GK)
YCSP	YOUNG CHRISTIAN SOCIALIST OF THE PHILIPPINES
MDP	MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC PHILIPPINES
KASAPI	KAPULUNGAN NG MGA SANDIGAN NG PILIPINAS
MPKP	MALAYANG PAGKAKAISA NG KABATAANG PILIPINO
BRPF	BERTRAND RUSSEL PEACE FOUNDATION
STAND	STUDENT ALLIANCE FOR NATIONAL DEMOCRACY
CSLP	CONFERENCE OF STUDENT LEADERS OF THE PHILIPPINES
CONDA	CONFEDERATION DELEGATES ASSOCIATION
CEG	COLLEGE EDITORS GUILD OF THE PHILIPPINES
SKIT	SAMAHAN NG KABATAAN SA IKAUUNLAD NG TSUPER
SKAP	SAMAHANG KABATAAN ANAK-PAWIS
SCAUP	STUDENT CULTURAL ASSOCIATION OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES
UPNC	UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES NATIONALIST CORPS
SUCCOR	STUDENTS UNITED CRUSADE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
LEADS	LEAGUE OF EDITORS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY
MAKIBAKA	MALAYANG KILUSAN NG BAGONG KABABAIHAN
⬚	COORDINATING BODY
▭	SIZE OF BLOCKS REPRESENT RELATIVE STRENGTH

ANNEX A

HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF STUDENT ACTIVISM IN THE PHILIPPINES

The current student activism is not a novelty of the present. It can be traced back to almost a century ago. But then, it was not as militant as the movement of today. It is notable, however, that nationalism has always been a strong motivating factor in student activism.

A recent study of student activism in the country revealed that the first student movement — the *Juventud Escolar Liberal* — was launched in 1869 at the University of Santo Tomas when the students started discussing national issues and criticizing the government. The movement was later suppressed as the liberal atmosphere of the period suddenly became oppressive with the establishment of a constitutional monarchy in Spain in 1870. Nevertheless, the students remained undaunted and persisted in their campaign for reforms which climaxed in the revolution against Spanish rule.

The students appeared more active during the American regime as manifested in the formation of numerous organizations agitating for independence. As student activities became relatively militant, the Philippine Commission promulgated the Sedition Law prohibiting the Filipinos from advocating independence for the Philippines.

Despite government restrictions, several student organizations cropped up from 1901 to 1934 and about 20 demonstrations were recorded for the same period. The most significant organizations of the time were the Associacion Escolar de Filipinas, the Inter Alumni Association which became the National Civic League, the National Federation of Students, and the Young Philippines which later merged with the Nacionalista Party.

The frequency of mass protest activities was likewise greater during the American rule. The first student demonstration, led by Carlos P. ROMULO, against the alleged inability of a Filipino to head the University of the Philippines occurred in July 1918. The biggest recorded demonstration of the period took place on 12 July 1931 when about 250,000 students and youths massed in front of the Legislative building asking for independence The first recorded violent demonstration also took place in 1931 when students of the Cebu High School stoned the school building to register their protest against a policy of their principal.

During the Japanese occupation, the students were relatively inactive in view of the curtailment, if not outright suspension, of civil liberties. They did not remain passive though. The more militant among them went underground and helped in the eventual liberation of the country.

The major student organizations formed after the war were the Conference Delegates Association (CONDA) and the Student Councils Association of the Philippines (SCAP). Together with the College Editors Guild of the Philippines (CEG) which was organized in 1931, SCAP and CONDA led the student movement until the mid 1950's. These organizations gradually receded from the scene as their leaders became targets for recruitment of local communist leaders.

Communist efforts to influence the student movement later resulted in their infiltration of the National Student Movement for Democracy (NATSUM), a confederation of the CEG, CONDA and SCAP. NATSUM leaders were believed to have helped substantially in the election of the late Ramon MAGSAYSAY to the Presidency. NATSUM participation in the elections was later to be used as a lever to obtain concessions from the Administration. The communist hold on the student movement, however, weakened as the power struggle among the Party leaders deepened. Consequently, leftist-oriented student organizations were temporarily relegated to the background until the upsurge of militant activism in the late 1960's.

Meanwhile, the increasing frequency of student demonstrations and rallies, particularly from 1959-1969, was considered a general acceptance of mass protest activities as a political weapon to ventilate grievances. From 1946 to 1969, 213 student-initiated rallies and demonstrations were recorded. So far the longest recorded demonstration in the history of student activism, which lasted for 57 days, was staged by the moderates spearheaded by the Laymen Association for Post Vatican II reforms (LAPVIIR) from June-July 1969.

CONSTITUTION OF THE KABATAANG MAKABAYAN (KM)

PREAMBLE

We, all Filipino youth, in order to establish an association which shall work directly for the interests and welfare of the youth and which shall participate militantly in the political life of the nation in pursuit of the principles and objectives stated hereunder, hereby proclaim and ordain this Constitution.

Article I — *Name and Headquarters*

Sec. 1—The name of our association shall be *Kabataang Makabayan.*

Sec. 2—Its flag shall be the *Katipunan* flag.

Sec. 3—Its headquarters shall be in Greater Manila or anywhere else as may be decided by the Executive Board.

Article II—*Principles and Objecives*

Sec. 4—The Kabataang Makabayan shall:

a. endeavor to unite all Filipino youth for the common cause of national freedom and democracy against feudalism and imperialism;

b. act vigorously to enhance and develop militant and patriotic leadership among the youth, reminding them of their revolutionary heritage and militating them to the urgent task of national liberation, genuine land reform and planned industrial progress in the spirit of self-reliance;

c. participate in the formation of labor unions, peasant associations, student and teachers' movement and other organizations that are in line with the cause of national democracy;

d. encourage the full utilization of democratic and civil rights among the youth and all citizens;

e. cooperate with all progressive sectors of the population and promote the historic mission of the working class and the peasantry in bringing forward the Filipino nation from a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society to a new one that is just and prosperous, ruled by the people's democratic power:

f. seek directly the formulation and programming and implementation of measures that are immediately or ultimately to the benefit and welfare of the youth;

g. demand employment as a necessary and fundamental right demandable from the state, and fight for better working conditions, higher compensation, cheaper and better housing, free health services, more effective social insurance, and more extensive and bigger recreational and cultural allowances;

h. demand the expansion and nationalization of the public school system and free vocational training, and promote the nationalization of all media of education and information;

i. propagate the national culture and the national language (Tagalog-based Pilipino) and put stress on technological and scientific training in conjunction with national development efforts;

j. seek the wise use of leisure time and the improvement and expansion of cultural, sports and other recreational facilities;

k. participate or lead in relief work, community improvement projects and other civic activities;

l. cooperate with all student and progressive youth organizations, whether special or general in character, in the achievement of concrete projects and attainment of mutual purposes and interests; and

m. foster friendship, solidarity, mutual understanding cooperation among the youth of the world, especially with those in Asia, Africa and Latin America who are struggling against colonialism, imperialism and neo-colonialism which destroy and stifle the opportunities of youth for self-development and which foist exploitation and war upon youth.

Article III—*Membership*

Sec. 5—Any Filipino citizen, below the age of forty, who subscribes to the principles, objectives and current decisions of this association shall be eligible for membership therein. Those members who have reached the age of forty shall become honorary members of the organization.

Sec. 6—Upon proper application and compliance with the requirements which the association may thereafter prescribe, the applicant may become accredited member of the association.

Sec. 7—All members in good standing shall be entitled to equal rights.

Sec. 8—Any member shall be liable for suspension for non-fulfillment of the obligation incumbent upon a member of the association.

Sec. 9—Membership may be lost by resignation or expulsion. Any member shall be liable for acts of disloyalty or acts inimical to the association.

Sec. 10—No member may be suspended or expelled without due process.

Sec. 11—Admission, suspension, resignation and expulsion of a member shall be decided, administered or enforced by the organ or unit of the association directly involved, subject to right of appeal to the National Council.

Article IV—*Affiliation of Organizations*

Sec. 12—Any Filipino youth organization of whatever scope may seek affiliation with Kabataang Makabayan, provided such an organization shall formally manifest acceptance of the KM Programme and Constitution.

Sec. 13—Affiliated organizations at any level shall be directly responsible to the Executive Board or any special body created to direct them.

Sec. 14—Affiliated organizations shall be responsible for the fulfillment of the obligations of its members to the Kabataang Makabayan and shall make periodic reports on its membership, educational work and finances.

Sec. 15—The members of an affiliated organization shall be regarded as individual members of Kabataang Makabayan provided that they fulfill the requirements set in accordance with Article 111 of this Constitution.

Sec. 16—All affiliated organizations of equal scope shall be entitled to equal rights.

Sec. 17—In case of disaffiliation by any organization, individual membership shall be retained provided loyalty to the Kabataang Makabayan is shown by the individual member.

Article V—*The National Congress*

Sec. 18—Supreme authority in the association shall reside in the National Congress.

Sec. 19—The National Congress shall:

a. hear and approve the reports of the National Council and other central organs of the association;

b. review, amend and endorse the Constitution, Programme, and general policies of the association; and

c. elect the National Council and other necessary central organs.

Sec. 20—The National Congress shall be held once in two years provided that no extraordinary circumstances shall arise to warrant delay or earlier convening.

Sec. 21—The announcement of the Congress and its agenda shall be made at least two months in advance.

Article VI—*The National Council*

Sec. 22—Between meetings of the National Congress supreme authority shall reside in the National Council.

Sec. 23—The National Council shall elect from among its members the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, General Secretary and National Treasurer of the association.

Sec. 24—The number of National Council members-at-large should not exceed the limit set by the National Congress.

Sec. 25—The National Council shall:

a. formulate and adopt policies and measures which shall be binding upon the association until revised, annulled or endorsed by the National Congress;

b. appoint additional ad-interim members of the National Council provided that the number of those so appointed shall not exceed the simple majority of the incumbent Council; and

c. prepare the agenda of and convene the National Congress.

Sec. 26—The National Council shall meet at least once a year.

Article VII—*The Executive Board*

Sec. 2—Between meetings of the National Council supreme authority shall reside in the Executive Board.

Sec. 28—The Executive Board shall include the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, General Secretary and National Treasurer.

Sec. 29—The Executive Board shall meet as often as the Chairman considers necessary. Any four members of the National Council elected by the National Congress may request the convention of the Executive Board.

Article VIII—*Powers and Duties of Executive Officers*

Sec. 30—The Chairman shall:

a. be the official spokesman of the association;

b. convene and preside over the meetings of the National Council and the Executive Board; and

c. represent the association in all official functions in which the association may participate.

Sec. 31—The Vice Chairman shall succeed the Chairman in case of the latter's death, absence, disability, resignation, or impeachment, until a new Chairman shall have duly qualified.

Sec. 32—The General Secretary shall:

a. be the Executive Officer of the association;

b. execute, administer or otherwise enforce all decisions of the association;

c. organize and head the National Secretariat;

d. supervise and coordinate the activities of the departments under the Secretariat.

Sec. 33—The National Treasurer shall:

a. be the custodian of all funds and properties of the association;

b. deposit the funds of the association in a reputable and established bank in the name of the association, which shall be designated by the Executive Board;

c. collect or otherwise cause the collection of duties and assessments from members;

d. keep a record of all collections and releases of funds and treasury of the association;

e. post a bond, the amount of which shall be paid from the treasury of the association.

Sec.34—Aside from their duties as members of the Executive Board, the other members shall perform such other duties as the Executive Board may assign to them.

Article IX—*The National Secretariat*

Sec. 35—The National Secretariat shall take charge of the daily activities of the association.

Sec. 36—The National Secretariat shall be composed of the General Secretary, Secretary for Organization, Secretary for Education and Secretary for Finance.

Sec. 37—The Secretary for Organization shall supervise and coordinate all organizational activities of the association. He shall:

a. supervise and coordinate the activities of the regional organization departments;

b. advise the General Secretary on all matters involving organizational activities and problems of the national association as well as its regional organs;

c. organize and head the Organization Department which shall assist him in his work.

Sec. 38—The Secretary for Education shall supervise and coordinate all external and internal information and educational activities of the association. He shall:

a. supervise and coordinate the activities of the regional education departments;

b. advise the General Secretary on all matters involving information and educational activities and problems of the national association as well as its regional organs;

c. organize and head the Organization Department which shall assist him in his work.

Sec. 39—The Secretary for Finance shall:

a. act as disbursing officer of the funds of the national association;

b. check and verify all income and expenses of the association;

c. certify every financial report of the National Treasurer;

d. advise the General Secretary on financial activities and problems of the national association;

e. organize and head the Finance Department which shall assist him in his work.

Article X—*The Chapter*

Sec. 40—The basic unit of the association shall be established according to place of work, study or residence where there are at least five members.

Sec. 41—The chapter shall:

a. propagate the principles and objectives of the association and carry out its current decisions;

b. pay constant attention to the needs and interests of the youth and make timely reports to higher organs of the association;

c. recruit members, collect membership dues, check and verify records of members and enforce discipline among them;

d. organize the sale and distribution of suitable publications; and

e. educate the members and organize their studies and discussions.

Sec. 42—The chapter shall elect from among its members a Chairman. a Vice-Chairman, a Secretary, a Treasurer and a Public Information Officer.

Sec. 43—The chapter officers shall hold office for a term of one year.

Sec. 44—The chapter shall meet at least once a month.

Article XI—*Municipal, Chartered City, District, Provincial and Regional Councils*

Sec. 45—All chairmen of chapters within a municipality shall be members of the Municipal Youth Council.

Sec. 46—All chairmen of chapters within a chartered city shall be members of the City Youth Council.

Sec. 47—All chairmen of Municipal Youth Councils and City Youth Councils within a district shall be members of the District Youth Council.

Sec.48—The officers of District Youth Councils within a province shall be members of the Provincial Youth Council.

Sec. 49—The officers of the Provincial Youth Councils within a region shall be members of the Regional Youth Council.

Sec. 50—Greater Manila shall be considered as a special region.

Sec. 51—The Council at each level shall generally function for the enforcement of policies, rules and regulations of the association.

Sec. 52—The officers of the Council at each level shall be the Chairman, Vice Chairman, Secretary, Treasurer and Public Information Officer.

Sec. 53—All members of the Council at each level shall hold office for a term of one year.

Sec. 54—The Council at any level shall meet at least once a year and as often as necessary on its own initiative but with the knowledge of a higher council or higher organ or upon the direction of a higher council or higher organ of the association.

Article XII—*Funds*

Sec. 55—Every applicant for membership shall, upon submission of his application, pay an application fee of one peso.

Sec. 56—Every member shall pay a regular membership fee of six pesos a year or fifty centavos a month unless the Executive Board decide otherwise in special cases.

Sec. 57—Special assessment may be levied upon members based on their ability to pay.

Sec. 58—Unconditional donations may be accepted.

Sec. 59—Fifty per cent of application fees and membership dues collected by the chapter shall go to the National Treasurer for general expenses of the national organization, while the other fifty per cent shall be apportioned to the local units of the organization upon the direction of the Executive Board and the National Treasurer.

Sec. 60—Local chapters may raise funds for its own local purposes or for the national organization. In either case, special and regular reports must be made to the National Treasurer and the Executive Board.

Sec. 61—The Executive Board shall have the power to inquire into the financial activities of the various units of the association and take steps necessary to insure the proper accounting and use of funds of the association.

Article XIII—*Amendments*

Sec. 62—This Constitution may be amended by a majority vote of the National Congress.

As Amended by the Third National Congress.

Inclosure to ANNEX B

DRAFT PROGRAMME OF KABATAANG MAKABAYAN

KABATAANG MAKABAYAN is inspired and guided by the patriotism of the Filipino youth who united and led the people in the Philippine Revolution of 1896 against colonial and feudal oppression and exploitation. It is further inspired and guided by the most advanced ideas of the toiling masses of the world who are waging revolutionary struggles against imperialism, social imperialism and all reaction.

Kabataang Makabayan is committed to the resumption and completion of the Philippine Revolution of 1896 which was frustrated by U.S. imperialism at the turn of the century. The Filipino people are no longer faced only with feudalism perpetrated under the Spanish colonial regime. They are now suffering under the oppression and exploitation of U.S. imperialism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism,

Kabataang Makabayan is committed to raising the Unfinished Revolution into a national democratic revolution of a new type. Its political aim is the complete overthrow of U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism and the establishment of a national democratic society. In order to achieve this aim, it will continue to uphold the leadership of the working class in the national democratic movement, with the massive support of the peasantry and in unity with the intelligentsia and the progressive national bourgeoisie. All efforts of Kabataang Makabayan shall continue to be exerted to arouse and mobilize the masses towards the achievement of their national and democratic aspirations.

KM and the National Democratic Struggle

Since its founding in 1964, the Kabataang Makabayan has assumed leadership in the Second Propaganda Movement and has led the Filipino youth in fighting for full national freedom and democracy for the broad masses of the people. KM has spearheaded a widespread propaganda movement after its destruction at the hands of the opportunist misleaders of the movement.

The history of Kabataang Makabayan is the history of the widespread resurgence of anti-imperialist and anti-feudal consciousness among the broad ranks of the Filipino people. The launching and continuous advance of KM was undertaken with the upsurge of the national democratic movement and the cleansing of the ranks of the movement with the isolation and repudiation of the old opportunist misleaders.

In the late 1960's when significant victories were achieved in cleansing the movement of subjectivist ideas and Right opportunist elements, a widespread expansion was carried out that led the consolidation and emergence of already established as well as of new worker, peasant, student and youth mass organizations strongly united under a correct and revitalized leadership.

The great strides taken by the movement went alongside with the upsurge and steady advance of the agrarian revolution in the countryside. This was supported by the spreading out of the activists of KM and other mass organizations to the provinces to spread the message of the cultural revolution. The activists likewise spread to the factories to organize labor unions and firmly unite with struggle of the working class. In their home grounds in the cities and schools, the activists intensified propaganda and organizational work and were able to consolidate their forces for the national democratic revolution.

The first quarter storm of 1970 led by KM and other youth organizations is a clear fruition of the hard propaganda and organizational work launched by the movement in the second half of the 1960's. It is also a clarion call for more militant and massive revolutionary actions in the coming months and years.

Kabataang Makabayan pledges to continuously lead the Filipino youth in fighting for the attainment of full freedom and democracy for the broad masses of the Filipino people in combatting imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. In order to achieve its national democratic objectives, KM is determined to continue integrating into the movement the revolutionary vitality and keenness of young workers, young peasants, students, young teachers, young professionals and all other young men and women who compose the great majority of our people.

The Filipino youth have a great and glorious revolutionary tradition. They united and led the Filipino people in the Philippine Revolution of 1896 which was frustrated by a new type of colonialism, U.S. imperialism. It was in this Unfinished Revolution that tens of thousands of Filipino youth sacrificed their lives to overthrow the tyrannical Spanish colonialism. It was the Filipino youth who rose and put up a continuing fight against the oppressive rule of U.S. imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucrat capitalism.

It is the legacy of Spanish feudalism and the scourge of U.S. imperialism and bureaucrat capitalism that are the causes of poverty, unemployment, reactionary education. poor health and living conditions, crime and decadent culture which afflict the whole country and the youth at this critical stage of our national history.

U.S. imperialism is the principal enemy that perpetuates not only its unjust rule but also the rule of landlordism and bureaucrat capitalism. It is the principal enemy of the Filipino people and, therefore, it is likewise the principal enemy of the Filipino youth.

In our semi-colonial and semi-feudal country, Kabataang Makabayan perceives the irreconcilable contradiction between national democratic interests and the combined interests of imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. On one side are aligned the broad masses of our people, composed of the working class and peasantry, to which the vast majority of the Filipino youth belong; the urban petty bourgeoisie, the national bourgeoisie, composed of Filipino businessmen interested in a self-reliant economy and in naionalist industrialization. On other side are aligned the imperialist, their comprador-bourgeois agents, the big landlords and the corrupt bureaucrat capitalists.

It is the chief task of the Filipino youth and its vanguard organization, Kabataang Makabayan, to continue arousing and mobilizing the masses for the national democratic revolution; to continue actively forging an invincible unity of all progressive classes and groups to advance further the struggle for national liberation in all field — political, economic, cultural, social and military — and against the principal enemy, U.S. imperialism, and to lead the peasantry to win the substance of democracy in genuine and thoroughgoing land reform directed against the pervasive power of landlordism.

It is the responsibility of the Filipino youth and its vanguard organization, Kabataang Makabayan, to take the lead, march in the forefront of the revolutionary ranks and firmly integrate with the revolutionary struggles of workers and peasants and all other oppressed classes and groups against the unjust and intolerable classes and groups against the unjust and intolerable rule of reactionary classes.

1. *General Politics*

The Filipino people are now saddled with a vicious counter-revolutionary dictatorship of the comprador landlord-bureaucrat capitalist classes. This dictatorship perpetuates the conditions of imperialist and feudal exploitation that keep the masses of the people in poverty and misery, perpetuates their national and class oppression.

The juridical form of this counter-revolutionary dictatorship is the reactionary puppet state, which employs both liberal deception and fascist violence to perpetuate imperialist and feudal rule. It has rigged-up a so-called democratic system that is actually monopolized by the big landlords, big compradors and big bureaucrat capitalists. It has unleashed army, police and para-military units to viciously attack the revolutionary people in the cities and in the countryside.

Kabataang Makabayan is committed to unremittingly expose the rottenness, mendacity and hypocricy of liberal democracy, whose principal function is to mask the treason, corruption and brutality of the reactionary puppet state. Kabataang Makabayan repudiates the present oligarchy's democracy for the sake of that democracy which alone deserves the name — people's democracy.

The limits of national, class and individual freedom are determined by the property relations in society. Where the masses of the people are dispossessed by imperialist and feudal exploitation, there their freedom is bound to remain extremely narrow, restricted and truncated. Liberal or bourgeois democracy, which postulates the right of a minority to exploit the majority, consecrates power and political rights in the hands of the exploiting minority. Only by overthrowing the reactionary bourgeois state can the people institute the correct class relations which would enable them to gain the full measures of freedom.

The masses are denied any real power or substantive democratic rights in the bourgeois state system that the domestic reactionaries successfully learned to operate under imperialist tutelage. The comprador-landlord-bureaucrat capitalist classes exercise joint control of the present electoral process and of government institutions, and they effectively monopolize and manipulate the various rights and freedoms which they hypocritically proclaim for all.

Nevertheless, through correct political struggle, the masses can build their own independent power as they militantly seize upon their democratic rights. Kabataang Makabayan is dedicated to building people's democratic power. In this epic endeavor, it is always prepared, together with all the revolutionary youth, to undertake the extra-legal as well as work, and to operate within and without the limits of bourgeois legality.

The strategic aim of the people's democratic struggle is the seizure of state power. Kabataang Makabayan shall fight for the establishment of a people's democratic republic, where state power defends and advances national and democratic rights, to replace the present reactionary puppet state, which only serves imperialist and feudal interest.

The reactionary ruling classes can never be expected to give up their power and privileges peacefully. The revolutionary youth, therefore, with Kabataang Makabayan as its vanguard.must be prepared to wage whatever of forms struggle may be rendered necessary. He must also exercise constant vigilance against those ostensibly revolutionary organizations which attempt to way lay the national democratic movement into an opportunist political line.

KABATAANG MAKABAYAN denounces the constitutional convention as a farce and a counter-revolutionary scheme to deceive the people into swallowing the idealist nonsense that radical social changes can be achieved in our semi-colonial and semi-feudal country even while the reactionary political power has not as yet been defeated or destroyed. Only after the national democratic revolution has been won can a genuine people's constitution be successfully carried out.

The constitutional convention is a big reformist ploy of the ruling classes to salvage themselves from the present unprecedented Philippine crisis. Kabataang Makabayan is determined to expose and oppose their sinister plans by leading patriotic mass actions against their continuing national betrayal.

2. *Economic Affairs*

The deteriorating economic and social crisis attests to to the lopsided and sporadic development of the national economy that is under U.S. imperialist and feudal control. Increasing prices, declining value of the peso, mounting internal and external debts, inflation and nagging dollar shortage are symptoms of the economic crisis that the fascist puppet state is unable to alleviate. The intensification of semi-colonial and semi-feudal exploitation by U.S. imperialist and the domestic ruling classes in adjusting to the aggravating world crisis of capitalism has made more acute the suffering and hardship of the broad masses of workers and peasants.

Faced with the increasing fury of the people's wars in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and beset with economic and financial crisis, student rebellion and the black revolt, U.S. imperialism seeks to recoup its losses at home and in countries liberated from imperialist exploitation by squeezing out more super profits from its semi-colonies like the Philippines. Fearful of the Filipino people's raging opposition to unequal treaties and agreements that will expire in 1974 U.S. imperialism has redoubled its efforts to perpetuate iniquitous neo-colonial relations in new legal instruments with deceptive catch phrases.

The combination of economic and military power is utilized by U.S. monopoly capitalism to maintain reactionary political power in league with local compradors, landlords and bureaucrat-capitalists. The colonial exchange of raw materials exports and imperialist-manufactured is promoted by the fascist puppet regime of the comprador-landlord bureaucrat state. U.S. imperialism, together with its Asian junior partner, resurgent Japanese militarism, controls about 30% of this colonial trade. U.S. monopoly capitalists repatriate annually hundreds of millions of profits earned on assets totalling $2B as of 1969 in such strategic sectors of the economy as petroleum, mining, heavy equipment, chemicals, drug, tire and rubber, transport equipment, and marketing, industries. Another form of economic exploitation that is often ignored are the exhorbitant management fees, royalties and licenses of trademarks, patents and processes farmed out to subsidiaries and affiliates of U.S. monopolies and Filipino firms as well.

By extending loans at usurious rates to reactionary Philippine government and comprador firms, U.S. imperialists have controlled the direction of government and private investments to suit the needs of US corporations and their subsidiaries in the Philippines. Furthermore, the massive external debt of $1.9B has made the puppet state and the national economy financially dependent upon U.S. monopoly capital through such agencies as the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, U.S. Export-Import Bank and various financial consortia of private U.S. banks. "Aid" that is supposedly granted for altruistic purposes is not intended for development, but is actually used to promote U.S. monopoly interest in the U.S. and in the Philippines. In the period of 1951 to 1968. 70% of total U.S. "aid" consisted of military "aid", used to suppress the revolutionary movement, and war damage and relief payments spent to compensate comprador firms, U.S. corporations and their subsidiaries for losses sustained from U.S. bombings during the last world war.

Having overextended itself over a worldwide network of economic exploitation and military subjugaiton, U.S. imperialism has revived Japanese militarism to be its junior partner in its neo-colonial and counter-revolutionary schemes in Asia. In return for its part in this reactionary strategic alliance, U.S. imperialism has rewarded Japanese militarism with shares of Asian markets, raw materials bases and investment opportunities. Thus, Japanese militarism is second only to U.S. imperialism in foreign investments and control of foreign trade in the Philippines. Through the operation of an executive order rendered by the fascist puppet Marcos, Japanese monopoly-capitalists have engaged in untrammeled economic plunder, although they are still bargaining for the ratification of the unequal Japan-R.P. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation.

Feudal and semi-fuedal exploitation provides the social base for imperialist dominance. Landlords and compradors extend political support for imperialist rule because they are allowed to patricipate in the colonial trade of agricultural crops and raw materials with finished products. Particular forms of landlord exploitation under the old feudal mode of production are the exorbitant land rent that ranges from 50% to 80% of the crop, usury, compulsory menial service, price manipulation and forms of tribute. Semi-feudal exploitation in capitalist forms take the form of wage slavery under sub-human conditions.

The reactionary puppet state has consistently shown that it cannot undertake land reform because it is financially bankrupt and because it is politically controlled by compradors, landlords and bureaucrat capitalists. Even the implementation of the Agricultural Land Reform Code which merely purports to transform tenants into lease-holders and eventually into owner-cultivators has been done on a token and spotty basis. The "revolutionary" provisions which in reality allow the landlord to evade expropriation of his land or exact a prohibitive expropriation and redistribution price for it.

Activists of Kabataang Makabayan should go to the countryside and make concrete social investiga tion in order to determine the particular forms of feudal and semi-feudal exploitation and oppression The facts learned from social investigation when processed and analyzed can become the basis for arousing and mobilizing the peasant masses to smash the chains of feudalism. Kabataang Makabayan seeks to mobilize the poor peasants and the farm workers in the struggle for land and the middle peasants for more land in order to build up people's democratic power in the countryside to oppose and defeat the monoply of political power exercised by the landlord class and other local tyrants. The main content of the people's democratic revolution is agrarian revolution which arises from a basically agricultural economy in which the peasantry is the main revolutionary force. It is in the countryside where the enemy is defeated gradually and where the initial bases of revolutionary power are established and consolidated to prepare transformation of political power on a national scale. Mechanized plantations and estates will be nationalized and operated by agricultural workers. Agricultural cooperatives will be organized among middle peasants and initial forms of agricultural cooperation among poor peasants like mutual labor exchanges and mutual aid teams wil be established. The liberation of the peasantry from feudal and semi-feudal exploitation will unleash vast potentials for producing food and raw materials that will meet the needs of massive industrialization. Industry as the leading sector will accelerate agricultural production, while a peasantry with an improved livelihood will provide the vast market for the products of industry.

In the same manner that the symbiotic relationship which exists between imperialism and feudalism determines the semi-colonial and semi-feudal character of the national economy, the powerful alliance of working class and the peasantry will determine the success of agrarian revolution and economic emancipation from US imperialism. The main contingent of the national democratic forces from the peasantry will provide the strong backing for the nationalization of imperialist enterprises, all heavy and basic industries which are not monopolies and are not detrimental to the people's welfare will receive the support and encouragement of the national democratic state.

Even before the expiration of the Parity Amendment and the Laurel-Langley Agreement, the US imperialists have already secured the preservation and expansion of their monopoly privileges through recent pieces of bourgeois legislation which have been ballyhoed as "nationalist", namely the Magna Carta for Economic Freedom and Social Justice, Investment Incentive Act, and the Export Incentives Act. These reactionary measures have enshrined the role of imperialist loans and investment in the country's economic development, guaranteed capital and profit remittances; safeguard imperialist enterprises against outright nationalization and expropriation, and laid prostrate lucratice sectors of industry to imperialist exploitation. Under the new slogans of "national treatment", "vested rights" and "preferred pioneer industries", "parity rights " have merely assumed new names. Already the Virata-Braderman panels for the renegotiation of the Laurel-Langley Agreement have cooked up a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between US and the Philippines to take the place of the Parity Amendment.

The collaboration between comprador and bureaucrat capitalists on the one hand, and US monopoly capitalists on the other has been intensified in such ararngements as "multinational corporations" and "joint ventures" especially in tax exempt "free trade groups."

As the KM relentlessly continues the campaign to nullify the Parity Amendment, the Laurel-Langley Agreement, the Agreement Relating to Entry Rights of American Traders and Investors, the Economic and Technical-Cooperative Agreement and Agricultural Commodities Agreement. KM shall exercise the strictest vigilance to denounce new instruments and methods of economic aggression.

KM rejects the begging of loans and "aid" from imperialist and social-imperialist sources which are used to exercise dollar dictatorship over the national economy and prevent self-restraint economic growth. Under the orders of US imperialism, the fascist puppet Marcos regime will shortly open diplomatic and trade relations with social-imperialist Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries so that they can share in the burden of supporting the crisis-ridden puppet state. The chief bureaucrat capitalists find each other suitable partners in the exploitation of the Filipino and Soviet peoples.

3. *Culture*

In the field of culture, Kabataang Makabayan is fully committed to the propagation of a national, scientific and mass culture which must overthrow and replace the prevailing semi-colonial, semi-feudal, and anti-popular culture perpetrated by the existing social and economic relations. In doing so, it must continue to relentlessly wage a Second Propaganda Movement of a new type.

Kabataang Makabayan is inspired by the most advanced ideas in the world and seeks the application of these ideas on national conditions. It rejects the prevailing bourgeois and feudal culture which helps perpetuate the oppression and exploitation of the broad masses of the Filipino people. It must wage a relentless campaign to end the bourgeois and sectarian influence which permeats the educational system, the mass communications system and other cultural media in the Philippines.

At every level of our society, US imperialist and feudal forces attempt to foster concepts, habits, attitudes and customs which reinforce their system of exploitation. These forces have so far succeeded in influencing our institutions, particularly the education system, that they have produced an educated elite that is not only divorced and alienated from the broad masses of our people but has also served as the willing transmission belt of ideas which perpetuate their interest. This educated elite and intelligentsia must undergo re-education by turning to the masses for correct ideas.

The rising national student protest movement has served to expose the basically reactionary orientation of the educational system. Kabataang Makabayan has helped in correctly directing this movement to expose the colonial and commercial education and demands its re-orientation to serve the needs and aspirations of the broad masses of our people. It must continue to play a vanguard role in this movement to change the fundamental character of our educational system.

Kabataang Makabayan must expose the open and sinister tie-up between the feudal forces represented by the Church and US imperialism in their attempt to frustrate the growth and advance of national democratic forces as shown in the blacklisting and expulsion of student activists in schools that are directly and indirectly tied up with their interests. It must firmly and resolutely defeat the systematic campaign of these forces to denigrate and vilify the national democratic movement and its activists.

Kabataang Makabayan demands the nationalization of the Philippine educational system and the mass media. Nationalization should be taken as the first step towards the national democratic re-orientation of these institutions.

Stress should be placed on technological and scientific training in schools to complement the efforts to achieve industrialization and development of agriculture. Discussions and studies on the basic conditions and problems of the nation should be undertaken with the end in view of encouraging the students and teachers to integrate themselves with the most progressive sectors of Philippine society in the national democratic struggle.

Kabataang Makabayan urges the wider and more extensive use of Pilipino in education and government. It should become the principal medium of instruction and communication.

Kabataang Makabayan also gives all out support to art and literature that take a national democratic point of view. It urges all cultural workers to pursue a cultural revolution which would end the decadent and reactionary culture perpetrated by US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism, and which would put in its place a national democratic culture truly expressive of the needs and aspirations of the broad masses of the Filipino people. All cultural workers must integrate with the masses, learn from them and understand them in order for them to be able to create artistic and cultural products truly serving the interest of the masses.

4. *Military*

There exists at present the fascist puppet armed forces (AFP) that serves as the principal prop of reactionary rule.

It is a direct descendant of the "insular constabulary" set up by the US army in 1901 in order to finish off the national revolutions and, subsequently, to put down local peasant revolts. It has always been used by the exploiting classes to oppress the broad masses of the Filipino people.

The fascist puppet armed forces (AFP) is a colonial institution par excellence, created and tended by the imperialists who control its logistics, training and intelligence activities through the US Joint United States Military Advisory Group (JUSMAG) and the CIA. Organizationally, politically and ideologically, it is an out-and-out puppet of US imperialism. Indeed, it constitutes no less than a special detachment of the US Army, which never fails to dispatch it to imperialist wars of aggression and plunder as in Korea and Vietnam.

The fascist puppet armed forces (AFP) likewise serves as the principal state apparatus for the brutal suppression of the Filipino people; along with police and various para-military units like "special forces", "Monkees", BSDUs and other landlord private armies. It is equipped, trained, and supervised for this purpose by the US imperialist war machine. It is nothing but a tool of foreign and feudal interests to preserve their political power and retain state power in the Philippines.

The reactionaries wield power because they have the fascist puppet armed forces (AFP). The only way the revolutionary people can seize state power from the reactionaries is by building up a new army that genuinely fights for national and democratic interests. Just as it is by armed force that the reactionaries maintain their counter-revolutionary dictatorship over the people, so it is by armed force, too, that the people can establish revolutionary dictatorship over the reactionaries. The people need an army that will seize state power from the comprador-landlord-bureaucrat capitalist classes and drive the imperialists and their military bases out of the country.

The mass political struggle against the fascist puppet armed forces (AFP) must be combined with political agitation among enemy troops. The common soldiers through whose instrumentality are subjugated also suffer acutely from the semi-colonial and semi-feudal conditions of Philippine society. To support their just democratic struggle for economic benefits and political rights within and without the AFP. They can actually end their class subjugation only by uniting with the masses themselves in a broad national democratic movement.

Kabataang Makabayan repudiates the neo-colonial orientation of the PMT, ROTC and other state military programs, and it actively encourages the revolutionary youth to creatively develop military instruction and service that are guided by the correct national democratic orientation. Now that even the most peaceful patriotic mass actions are being attacked and dispersed by the puppet army and police specially trained, equipped and supervised by the US AID, "Public Safety Division", the revolutionary youth must make all the more preparations to fight in self-defense against the fascist brutes. By firmly integrating with tested worker and peasant revolutionaries in city and countryside, we can certainly wage an effective tit-for-tat struggle against the enemy on every front.

Local flunkeys and their imperialist masters try to pass of their rotten deals against the Filipino people under the sign boards of "national assistance", and the like. But it has become all too clear that the so-called agreements with the US have in fact continued to reduce us to a virtual colony.

More than 20 foreign bases with a total area of close to 200,00 hectares effectively occupy the Philippines today. US military personnel can do pretty much as they please, with the sanction of the Philippine puppet government, from shooting down our countrymen in cold blood to launching murderous raids on the Indo-China people, in frank contempt and mockery of the national rights and sovereignty of the Filipino people.

U.S. military bases actually serve the main function not of protecting the Philippines from a mythical communist invasion but of protecting foreign and feudal interests from the real Philippine Revolution. If the AFP is a special detachment of the US Army, the military bases are the reserve force. The fascist master troops indeed constitute the chief component of neo-colonial state power.

5. *Foreign Relations*

For a nation to chart independent foreign relations presumes basically that nation's freedom from foreign control and dictations. Furthermore, for foreign policy to serve and synthesize the basic demands and aspirations of the people is to establish a state in which the people themselves wield political power and chart the destiny of their nation. It is therefore imperative for the people to conduct political struggle and to seize political power, so that they may exercise revolutionary dictatorship dedicated to the promotion of the interests of the majority and the society as a whole.

Ever since the imposition of US imperialist power on the Filipino people by means of arms, successive Filipino puppet regimes have shamelessly and slavishly toed the line of U.S. imperialism in matters of foreign relations. Political, economic, military and cultural agreement between the Philippines and the United States were dictated by US imperialism to oppress and exploit the Filipino people.

At present, US imperialism is beset with internal and external difficulties. On the homefront, it is suffering from serious financial problems and chronic balance of payments because its economy cannot sustain anymore the successive defeats in US imperialist wars of aggression. In the storm center of world revolution, Asia, Africa and Latin America, US imperialism is being dealt heavy blows by the revolutionary peoples. The raging flames of peoples' wars are eating up US imperialism rapidly and placing it in a more desperate situation and totally indefensible position.

Because of this, US imperialism finds it necessary to make Soviet social-imperialism and Japanese militarism its conscious accomplices in prolonging the reign of imperialist oppression and exploitation, particularly in Asia.

At the instigation of US imperialism, the fascist puppet regime of Marcos is dutifully making steps to establish diplomatic and trade relations with pseudo-socialist countries commanded by Soviet social-imperialism. Through this arrangement US imperialism expects to lessen its burden in maintaining colonies and semi-colonies like the Philippines. However, these relations will only aggravate the conditions of the Filipino people because Soviet monopoly bureaucrat capitalists will actually make use of our natural resources and raw materials for their own narrow schemes in the manner that U.S. imperialists do.

Japanese militarism, acting as the US gendarme in Asia, is allowed by US imperialism certain privileges in the Philippines. At present, a series of executive agreements benefiting Japanese monopoly capitalists has been approved by fascist puppet Marcos. US imperialism expects to continuously control the Philippines through Japanese militarism by way of their joint partnership, the Asian Development Bank of the Philippines. Also, through Japanese militarism, US imperialism lords over ASPAC which is virtually a "regional" security arrangement of U.S. puppet states in Asia designed to perpetuate the US imperialist interests of plotting aggression against the people, against the revolutionary struggles and against China.

The "independent" foreign policy Marcos so noisily prates about is one of unparalled subservience to U.S. imperialism as the strengthening of the latter's hold on its puppet in the case of the so-called Asian Forum which he proposed on the behest of his masters. Asian Forum was a mere gathering of puppet states of US imperialism convened to condone US wars of aggression in Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos and other Southeast Asian countries.

Kabataang Makabayan finds itself in an excellent national and international situation. Internally, there is a new high tide in the national democratic struggle both in the city and countryside, with all patriotic classes and groups intensifying their resistance against the fascist regime of Marcos. Externally, US imperialism is being weakened mortally by the revolutionary struggles of the oppressed peoples of the world. Even in the heartland of US imperialism, revolutionary black and whilte Americans are militantly struggling against imperialism and all forms of reaction.

Ours is an era when imperialism is heading for total collapse and socialism is advancing towards total victory. Arising from the fundamental class contradictions in the world today in an ever expanding united front of the oppressed and exploited peoples against the counter-revolutionary global alliance of US imperialism and Soviet social-imperialism. Japanese militarism, acting as the US imperialist gendarme in Asia, it is increasingly being isolated at home and exposed as a junior partner of the US imperialism in oppressing and exploiting the people of Asia.

As Kabataang Makabayan helps build up people's democratic power in our society, it aspires for an independent foreign policy that is guided by revolutionary internationalism, upholds the sovereignty of other peoples, lends support to and cooperates with all friendly revolutionary peoples on the basis of mutual respect and benefit. In this light, it pledges to persistently wage an uncompromising struggle against US imperialism, Soviet social-imperialism, Japanese militarism and all reaction.

Inspired by true revolutionary internationalism, Kabataang Makabayan firmly supports the just struggles of the peoples in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It forges a revolutionary alliance with the oppressed people of neighboring Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Indonesia, Thailand, Kalimantan Utara, Malaya, Burma, Korea and others.

Kabataang Makabayan firmly opposes such "regional" arrangements as the Asian Development Bank, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) and others that have been contrived to buttress the SEATO and other instruments of U.S. imperialism in the area.

Kabataang Makabayan fights against all unjust treaties and agreements imposed by US imperialism, it strives to develop the closest relations with the People's Republic of China, Albania and all revolutionary governments and peoples.

Kabataang Makabayan opposes the United Nations as one of the principal instruments used by US imperialism and Soviet socio-imperialism in perpetuating the oppression and exploitation of the peoples of the world.

We, the youth, should know well the history of the continuing exploitation of our people and discover our new friends in Asia, Africa and Latin America and the world at large.

ANNEX C

SALIGANG BATAS NG SAMAHANG DEMOKRATIKO NG KABATAAN (SDK)

PREAMBLE

Kami, ang Kabataang Pilipino, sa layuning itatag ang isang samahan na ipaglalaban ang pagtatag ng isang pambansang demokratikong lipunan sa pamamagitan ng tuwirang pakikiisa at pakikipagtulungan sa mga pinagsasamantalahan at inaaping mamamayan ng Pilipinas, at pagsunod sa mga adhikain, layunin at patakarang nakatala sa ibaba ay pinagtitibay at ipinatutupad ang saligang batas na ito.

ART. I—*Ang Pangalan, Sagisag at Punong-Tanggapan*

SEK. 1—Ang samahan ay makikilala sa pangalang Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan.

SEK. 2—Tataglayin ng samahan ang bandilang pula na may talang ginto sa gitna. Sa gitna ng tala ay may bilog na pula na kinatititikan ng mga gintong letra na "SDK".

SEK. 3—Ang punong-tanggapan ay itatatag sa Maynila o' sa ibang pook na itatalaga ng pamunuan kung may pangkagipitang kalagayan.

ART. II—*Ang Mga Layunin at Adhikain*

SEK. 4—Ang Samahang Demokratiko ng Kabataan ay isasakatuparan ang mga sumusunod:

a. Buuin at pakilusin ang mga kabataang manggagawa, magsasaka, mangingisda, walang hanapbuhay, estudyante, intelektwal, propesyonal, at iba pang progresibong bahagi ng lipunan sa isang nagkakaisang popular na puwersa upang wasakin ang pagsasamantala at pang-aapi ng mga uring nakikinabang at nagpapasasa sa ating malapiyudal at malakoloniyal na lipunan;

b. Ipaglaban ang malawakang paggamit ng mga kalayaang sibil at karapatang demokratiko ng nakararami sa lipunan;

k. Tuligsain at ibunyag ang mga katiwalian at kasamaang nagaganap sa pamahalaan at iba pang bahagi ng lipunan;

d. Ipaglaban ang mga kalayaan at karapatang demokratiko ng pambansang minorya, at wakasan ang pandaraya, pang-aapi at pagsasamantala sa kanila ng mga swapang na kristiyano;

e. Makiisa sa mga manggagawa sa pakikibaka nito para sa mas mahusay na kalagayan ng paggawa, mas mataas na sahod, pagkakamit ng mas malawak na kalayaan at karapatang demokratiko, at pagsasakatuparan ng makasaysayang misyon nito bilang pangunahing uri sa kaunlaran ng lipunan.

g. Makiisa sa mga magsasaka sa pakikibaka tungo sa pagbabago ng kaayusan at pamamalakad sa kanayunan at upang wakasan ang pagsasamantala ng mga ma lalaking asendero, usurero, at iba't ibang uri ng mga ga haman.

h. Buuin at pakilusin ang mga progresibong estudyante, guro at mga empleyado ng mga kolehiyo at pamantasan sa pagkakamit ng karapatang umugit ng mga patakarang pam-paaralan.

i. Palawakin ang pambansang demokratikong kultura bilang isang sandata ng mga inaapi at pinagsasamantalahang mamamayan laban sa mga reaksyonaryong kaisipan at kaugalian na pinamamalagi ng kasalukuyang naghaharing uri;

l. Gumawa ng kampanya para sa mababang halaga ng bahayan, libreng serbisyong pangkalusugan at gamot at libreng edukasyon mula sa mababang paaralan hanggang sa kolehiyo;

m. Tumulong sa mga nasasalanta ng kalikasan, gawaing pambayan at sibiko;

n. Makipag-ugnayan at makipagkaibigan sa mga mamamayan ng ibang bansa, lalung-lalo na sa mga bansa sa Asya, Aprika, at Latina Amerika, na nakikibaka sa imperyalismo at bagong mukha ng pandaigdigang reaksyon na humahadlang sa pagkakaroon ng pandaigdigang kapatiran at pagtutulungan na nakasalig sa prinsipyo ng pantay-pantay na karapatan.

ART. III—*Ang Kasapian* (*Membership*)

SEK. 5—Ang sinumang kabataang Pilipino na naniniwala at sumusunod sa mga adkhikain, layunin, patakaran na itinatadhana ng saligang batas at sa mga pangkasalukuyang desisyon ng pamunuan ay maaaring sumapi sa samahan.

SEK. 6—Matapos ang sapat na panahon na hindi lalampas sa isang taon bilang pagsubok sa pagtupad ng mga reglamento ng pagsapi, ang isang sumasapi ay magiging ganap na kasapi.

SEK. 7—Ang lahat ng ganap na kasapi na patuloy na gumagawa at sumusunod sa mga patakarang itinadhana ng sa ligang batas at sa mga desisyon ng pamunuan ay may pantay-pantay na karapatan.

SEK. 8—Ang bawa't kasapi ay may mga sumusunod na tungkulin:

a. Pangalagaan ang pagkakaisa at karangalan ng samahan sa tuwina;

b. Ipailalim ang pansariling interes sa interes ng samahan;

k. Sumunod sa mga adhikain, layunin, at patakaran sa saligang batas at sundin ang lahat ng desisyon ng pamunuan.

d. Ipagtanggol ang samahan sa lahat ng puwersa, sa loob o' sa labas nito, na naglalayong wasakin at siraan ang samahan;

e. Ituring na isang kapatid ang kapwa kasapi;

g. Patuloy at masusing pag-aralan ang mga prinsipyo ng pambansang demokratikong kilusan at iba pang progresibong kaisipan, sa loob at labas ng Pilipinas, na magagamit na sandata sa lahat ng kaaway ng mga inaapi at pinagsasamantalahang mamamayang Pilipino;

h. Patuloy na paunlarin ang pansariling kakayahan upang paglingkuran ang samahan at tulungan ang mga kasama na matutong kumilos para sa samahan.

SEK. 9—Ang lahat ng mga sumasaping may kakayahang magbayad ay kinakailangang magbayad ng halagang piso (₱1.00) bilang butaw sa pagsapi; at ang butaw bilang ganap na kasapi ay ibabatay sa kakayahang magbayad o' batay sa kinikita ng kasapi na hindi bababa sa limang bahagdan (5%) ng lahat ng kanyang kinikita.

SEK. 10—Pananagutan ng sinumang kasapi ang paglabag sa mga itinatadhana ng samahan.

ART. IV—*Ang Pambansang Kongreso*

SEK. 11—Ang Pambansang Kongreso ang may pinakamataas na kapangyarihan sa samahan.

SEK. 12—Ang Pambansang Kongreso ay binubuo ng lahat ng ganap na kasapi.

SEK. 13—Ang Pambansang Kongreso ay:

a. tatanggap at magpapatibay sa ulat ng Pambansang Konseho, ng Konsehong Tagapagpaganap, at ng iba pang sentral na organo ng samahan;

b. mag-aaral, magpapatibay o' gagawa ng pagbabago sa saligang batas sa pamamagitan ng simpleng mayorya (simple Majority) ng Kongreso.

k. magpapatibay sa pangkalahatang patakaran na susundin ng samahan;

d. maghahalal sa Pambansang Konseho.

SEK. 14—Ang Pambansang Kongreso ay magpupulong minsan sa tatlong taon maliban na lamang kung may mahalagang pangyayari o kalagayang pangkagipitn na mangangahulugan ng maaga o pagkabalam ng pagpupulong.

SEK. 15—Ang adyenda at ang patalastas ng pagpupulong ay gagawin tatlong buwan bago sumapit ang Kongreso.

ART. V—*Ang Pambansang Konseho*

SEK. 16—Ang Pinakamataas na kapangyarihan ay tataglayin ng Pambansang Konseho sa pagitan ng pulong ng Pambansang Kongreso.

SEK. 17—Ang Pambansang Konseho ay bubuin ng hindi kukulangin sa labinlimang kasapi na siyang maghahalal sa Pambansang Tagapangulo, Pangalawang Pambansang Tagapangulo at sa Pangkalahatang-Kalihim mula sa Pambansang Konseho.

SEK. 18—Ang Pambansang Konseho ay may mga sumusunod na kapangyarihan:

a. magpatibay ng mga patakaran at programa ng paggawa na susundin ng buong samahan hanggang sa ito'y baguhin, pawalang-saysay o' pagtibayin ng Pambansang Kongreso;

b. magdagdag ng kasapi sa kapulungan na iminungkahi ng Konsehong Tagapagpaganap subali't ang karagdagan ay di nararapat humigit sa bilang ng mga inihalal ng Pambansang Kongreso;

k. sa nakararaming dalawang-katlo (2/3 majority) ng Pambansang Konseho, ito ay magtitiwalag, magsususpinde, tatanggap ng resignasyon ng kasapi at tatanggap ng pagsapi ng mga sumasapi;

d. ihanda ang adyenda at pulungin ang Pambansang Kongreso.

SEK. 19—Ang Pambansang Konseho ay magpupulong minsan isang taon o' higit pa kung kinakailangan.

ART. VI—*Ang Konsehong Tagapagpaganap*
(*Executive Council*)

SEK. 20—Walang sinumang kasapi ang maaaring itiwalag o' suspendihin nang walang karampatang imbestigasyon at paglilitis ng Konsehong Tagapagpaganap.

SEK. 21—Ang Konsehong Tagapagpaganap ang siyang may pinakamataas na kapangyarihan sa pagitan ng pulong ng Pambansang Konseho.

SEK. 22—Ang Konsehong Tagapagpaganap ay bubuuin ng Pambansang Tagapangulo, Pambansang Pangalawang Tagapangulo, Pangkalahatang Kalihim at ng tatlo pang kasapi ng Pambansang Konseho na hihirangin ng Pambansang Tagapangulo.

SEK.23 —Ang Konsehong Tagapagpaganap ay may mga sumusunod na kapangyarihan:

a. magpatibay ng mga patakaran, programang paggawa, at iba pang mahahalagang desisyon na susundin ng samahan hanggang ito ay hindi binabago, pinawawalang-saysay ng nakararaming dalawang katlo (2/3) majority).

b. magmungkahi ng mga kasamang idadagdag sa Pambansang Konseho kung ito ay kinakailangang palakihin;

k. mag-imbestiga at maglitis ng mga nagkakamaling kasapi at sumasapi;

d. magtatag ng mga sangguniang pang-rehiyon, panlalawigan, pang-munisipyo o' pansiyudad at pambaryo, at itakda ang kaayusan-opisyal, kapangyarihan ng mga naturang organo;

e. mag-buo ng Kalihiman (Secretariat) na bubuuin ng mga kinakailangang komite sa paggawa;

g. maghanda ng adyenda at pulungin ang Pambansang Konseho.

SEK. 24—Ang Konsehong Tagapagpaganap ay magpupulong ayon sa pagpapasiya ng Pambansang Tagapangulo. Ang simpleng mayorya ng Konsehong Tagapagpaganap ay maaaring tumawag ng pulong at gumawa ng mga kinakailangang desisyon.

ART. VII—*Ang Kalihiman* (*Secretariat*)

SEK. 25——Ang Kalihiman ay binubuo ng Pangkalahatang Kalihim at ng iba pang kasapi na bumubuo sa mga komite sa paggawa na itatatag ng Konsehong Tagapaganap.

SEK. 26—Ang Kalihiman ay mangangalaga ng mga pang-araw araw na pangangailangan ng samahan na mahalaga sa gawaing pang-organisasyon at pampulitika.

SEK. 27—Managutan at mag-ulat sa Konsehong Tagapagpaganap sa lahat ng gawain nito.

ART. VIII—*Ang mga Tungkulin at Kapangyarihan ng mga Opisyal ng Samahan.*

SEK. 28—Ang Pambansang Tagapangulo ay:

a. ang opisyal na tagapagsalita ng samahan;

b. ang namumuno sa kapulungan ng Pambansang Kongreso at Pambansang Konseho.

k. ang namumuno at magpupulong sa Konsehong Tagapagpaganap;

d. ang opisyal na kinatawan sa anumang opisyal na gawain na lalahukan ng samahan.

SEK. 29——Ang Pambansang Pangalawang Tagapangulo ay:

a. ang papalit sa Pambansang Tagapangulo sa lahat ng opisyal na gawain nito kung ang huli ay may sakit, nasa kalagayang hindi makatutupad sa kanyang tungkulin, itiniwalag ng samahan, o namatay;

b. gaganap sa partikular na tungkuling iaatas sa kanya ng Pambansang tagapangulo.

SEK. 30—Ang Pangkalahatang-Kalihim ay:

a. mamumuno sa Kalihiman;

b. mangangalap ng ulat mula sa mga balangay, komite sa paggawa at mga espesyal na organo na bubuin ng Konsehong Tagapagpaganap maliban na lamang kung ang huli ay magtatadhana ng ibang patakaran sa pag-uulat; at ang mga ulat na ito ay kanyang ihahatid sa Konsehong Tagapagpaganap, kasama na ang kanyang sariling pag-aaral sa mga ulat na nabanggit;

k. hihirang ng mga kinatawan kung hinihingi ng pagkakataon matapos ang pagsangguni sa kapulungan ng Konsehong Tagapagpaganap.

SEK. 31—Ang tatlong kasapi ng Pambansang Konseho na hinirang ng Pambansang Tagapangulo upang maging kasapi ng Konsehong Tagapagpaganap ay gaganap sa partikular na gawaing iaatas ng huling nabanggit sa Konseho.

ART. IX—*Ang Balangay*

SEK. 32—Ang pinakamaliit na bahagi ng samahan ay ang balangay na bubuuin ng hindi kukulangin sa 5 kasapi, at matatatag ayon sa pook ng gawain, pinag-aaralan o' tirahan.

SEK. 33—Ang Balangay ay:

a. ipatutupad at palalaganapin ang mga layunin at adhikain ng samahan;

b. ipatutupad ang mga desisyon ng nakatataas na organo ng samahan;

k. magmamasid na mabuti sa lugar na kinikilusan nito, at gumawa ng napapanahong ulat sa Pangkalahatang-Kalihim o' sa sinumang kasapi ng Konsehong Tagapagpaganap para sa kaukulang desisyon o' programa ng pagkilos na kinakailangan;

d. mangangalap ng mga kasapi, kukolekta ng butaw sa mga kasapi at sumasaping may kakayahang magbayad; at magpapatupad ng disiplina sa mga kasapi nito.

SEK. 34—Ang balangay ay pamumunuan ng isang komite na bubuuin ng hindi kukulangin sa tatlong kasapi.

SEK. 35.—Ang komite ng balangay ay bubuin ng Tagapangulo, Pangalawang Tagapangulo at Kalihim-Ingat-Yaman na pawang inihalal ng mga kasapi ng balangay, at ng ilan pang kasapi ng balangay na hihirangin ng Tagapangulo na siya ring nagtatakda ng partikular na gawain ng mg a ito.

SEK. 36—Ang mamumunong komite ay manunungkulan ng hindi hihigit sa isang taon maliban na lamang kung may di pangkaraniwang pangyayari na mangangahulugan ng pag-ikli o paghaba ng panahon ng panunungkulan.

SEK. 37—Ang balangay ay magpupulong minsan isang buwan o' mas malimit pa kung kinakailangan.

ART. X—*Ang Pananalapi*

SEK. 38—Ang pananalapi ng samahan ay pamamahalaan ng sangay ng samahan na bubuuin ng konsehong Tagapagpaganap para sa gawaing ito.

SEK. 39—Ang panustos sa mga pangangailangan ng samahan ay magmumula sa butaw ng pagsapi at ang mga kasapi, kontribusyong walang kondisyon, at sa mga pagpupunyagi ng mga kasapi.

ART. XI—*Pagbabago sa Saligang Batas*

SEK. 40—Sa pamamagitan ng simpleng mayorya ay maaaring baguhin ang saligang batas na ito.

ART. XII—*Pambansang Kumperensya*

SEK. 41—Tuwing Enero 30 ay gaganapin ang pambansang kumperensya upang magsuri at magbuod ng isang taong karanasan ng samahan, at batay dito ay gumawa ng mga karapatang resolusyon at patakaran.

CHARTER OF THE MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC PHILIPPINES (MDP)

PREAMBLE

We, the organizations and individuals who are members of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines, representing the progressive classes, strata and social groups in Philippine society; determined to forge the broadest national united front for struggle against the oppression and exploitation perpetrated by U.S. imperialism, domestic feudalism, bureaucrat capitalism and all reaction; in order to actively participate in the movement which will establish a national democratic society; and inspired and guided by the finest traditions of patriotism and revolutionary struggle of the Filipino people as well as by the theory and practice of the revolutionary movements the world over; hereby ordain this Charter of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines.

Section 1. *Aims*

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall:

1. Unite all parties, organizations, groups and individuals in the country who are oppressed and exploited by U.S. imperialism, domestic feudalism, bureaucrat capitalism and all reaction.

2. Articulate in both comprehensive and concrete ways the common grounds for political agreement among all patriotic classes, organizations and individuals in the struggle for national democracy.

3. Defend and expand the people's democratic rights and actively participate in the exercise of these rights.

4. Expose, oppose and work toward the breaking of the monopoly of political power enjoyed jointly by reactionary political patries such as the Nacionalista Party, Liberal Party and other political organizations which are puppet instruments of foreign and feudal exploitation.

5. Work toward the elimination of all treaties, execute agreements and statutes that perpetuate imperialists privileges as "parity rights" or "national treatment" and repudiate all kinds of foreign investments, loans or aids which are used to perpetuate the colonial exchange of raw materials from our country and finished products from abroad.

6. Give all out support for a real agrarian reform as a necessary base for a self reliant programme of nationalist industrialization; give full support to the peasants who take direct actions to achieve social justice for themselves and denounce and oppose the landlord class for having exploited the peasants and kept them backward for centuries.

7. Help the oppressed masses in their struggle to improve their living conditions and encourage them to demand their just share from the wealth of the nation and the right to make full use of its productivity.

8. Fight the transgression of our national sovereignty and territorial integrity by U.S. imperialism and campaign for the dismantling of foreign military bases and for the stopping of U.S. military movements in Philippine territory.

9. Actively participate in the national democratic cultural revolution; promote and propagate Pilipino as the national language; respect and cultural identity and right to self-determination of the national minorities and campaign for free education at all levels.

10. Campaign for a foreign policy that is truly independent and in accord with the national democratic interests of the people; urge the Filipino people to join the international united front against U.S. imperialism, Japanese militarism, Soviet social imperialism and other oppressor governments that collude with any and all of them.

Section 2. *Name, Headquarters and Emblem*

1. The Organization shall be known as the "Movement for a Democratic Philippines", or by its initial "MDP".

2. The national headquarters of the MDP shall be in the Greater Manila unless, by force of necessity or circumstance, it is deemed necessary to transfer this to some other region or province of the country.

3. The MDP shall have an official banner, the design of which will be decided by the Council of Leaders.

Section 3. *Membership*

1. Membership in the MDP shall be by organization However, some personalities, who, by means of their political following actively help the organization in its work, shall be considered as affiliated with the MDP.

2. The original members of the MDP shall be those organizations officially listed as "members" prior to the National Assembly of March 29 and 30, 1971, plus all those o

ganizations officially invited to the said Conference which participated in the ratification of this Charter.

3. Membership in the MDP is open to all organizations which accept and pledge to abide by the Charter, the Programme and current policies and decisions of the MDP.

4. Admission of any organization to membership in the MDP shall be decided on by the Council of Leaders upon the recommendation of the Secretariat or a simple majority of the Secretariat.

5. The Council of Leaders, upon the recommendation of the Secretariat shall have the power to impose disciplinary actions upon, suspend or expel any organization which violates or contravenes the Charter, Programme and/or current policies and decisions of the MDP, or which persistently works against the general interests of the Organization.

Section 4. *Organs and Officers*

Article 1

1. The MDP shall have as its principal organs: the National Assembly, the Council of Leaders and the Secretariat.

2. The National Assembly shall elect the Secretariat of the Organization.

3. The Secretariat shall elect the General Secretary and the National Spokesman of the Organization.

4. The Secretariat may establish or abolish any subsidiary or committee under the Secretariat in accordance with the needs of the Organization.

5. The Secretariat, in consultation with the Council of Leaders, shall establish Regional Councils of the MDP as the need arises.

Article 2. The National Assembly

1. The National Assembly shall consist of all member organizations and individual affiliates of the MDP.

2. In the sessions of the National Assembly, the principle of proportional representation shall be followed. The number of representatives of organization to the Assembly shall be subject to the approval of the Secretariat.

3. The National Assembly shall be the highest policy-making organ of the MDP.

4. The National Assembly shall adopt and amend the Programme and Charter of the MDP.

5. The National Assembly shall convene at least once a year, and as often as deemed necessary by the Secretariat and the Council of Leaders.

Article 3. The Council of Leaders

1. The Council of Leaders shall be the highest-policy making organ in between meetings of the National Assembly.

2. The Council of Leaders shall consist of the permanent representatives of all member organizations; each organization shall be entitled to send one permanent representative, or his authorized alternate, to attend meetings of the Council.

3. The Council of Leaders shall decide on policies on the rule of simple majority.

4. The Council of Leaders shall meet at least once a month.

Article 4. The Secretariat.

1. The Secretariat is the Executive arm of the organization.

2. It shall consist of twelve members who shall be elected by the National Assembly.

3. Vacancies in the Secretariat may be filled through election in the Council of Leaders.

Article 5. The General Secretary

1. The General Secretary shall be the chief executive and administrative officer of the Organization.

2. The General Secretary shall call and preside over the meetings of the Secretariat and the Council of Leaders.

3. The General Secretary shall exercise all the powers and functions as defined in the Charter, and in addition, all those granted to him by the Council of Leaders.

Section 5. *Amendment of the Charter*

1. This Charter may be amended by a simple majority of the National Assembly this being subject to ratification by the National Assembly in order to become official.

2. The Council of Leaders may revise or amend the Charter by a 3/4 vote.

PROGRAMME OF ACTION OF THE MOVEMENT FOR A DEMOCRATIC PHILIPPINES

A New Awakening of our People

A new awakening is sweeping the land. It is arousing and mobilizing our entire people for direct mass actions and for a new democratic revolution. It is far more vigorous and widespread than the propaganda movement that led to the old democratic revolution of 1896. It is an awakening engendered by the excessive accumulation of suffering and hardships among the broad masses of the people.

It is the resurgence of old hopes and aspirations against foreign and feudal domination and exploitation. But at the core of it is a new ideological and political direction that is truly responsive to the most fundamental demands of the masses, that draws lessons from all past revolutionary struggle ever advancing throughout the world.

The basic programme of the new democratic movement is still the struggle for national democracy. It is a struggle for national freedom mainly directed against US imperialism. It is also a democratic struggle responding to the demands of all patriotic classes for greater democratic rights.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines hereby assumes the supreme task of contributing all that it can hasten and heighten the new awakening of the Filipino people. It vows to help clarify in both comprehensive and concrete ways the common grounds for political agreement among all patriotic classes, organizations and individuals in the struggle for national democracy.

In order to carry out successfully its role as catalyst not only in the realm of ideals but also in the realm of action, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall draw its membership from the progressive worker, peasant, intellectual, professional, teacher, youth and student, businessmen, women, national minority organizations and individuals who have demonstrated their militant interest in the national democratic cause. Our organization is both a consolidation of all patriotic and progressive efforts and at the same time a base for achieving the broadest and most profound support for our struggle throughout the archipelago

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines is aware of the variance of class, group and personal interests but it takes the view that, as the crisis of a whole political system becomes graver and as the reactionaries become more vicious in their suppression of freedom, the real patriots and progressives have no choice but to band together. Our organization is committed as a matter of principle to the creation of the broadest and most militant united front of all national democratic forces.

At this stage, it is decisive to be able to project the most fundamental issues in order to stimulate and create a wide range of direct democratic action which confronts the most pernicious enemies of the people, which are U.S. imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. It shall be then the duty of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines to defend the people's democratic rights and to participate in the exercise of the same.

It shall always be the objective of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines to undo the monopoly of political power enjoyed jointly by such parties such as the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and other political organizations which function as mere puppet instruments of foreign and feudal exploitation. Direct democratic action is the answer to their joint control of the present electoral process and their control of government channels. The Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall always strive to coordinate the broadest range or fronts of mass organizations against US imperialism, feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism. Direct democratic action by mass organizations is the key to the emergence and strengthening of a genuine party that can truly achieve the goals of national democracy.

What is presumably called the rule of law is essentially the economic and political privileges of a few who belong to the exploiting classes and who serve foreign masters. An entire legal system can be changed to suit the interests of the exploited classes.

Nevertheless, it is idle to hope that a constitutional convention where material conditions of a society have not substantially changed can automatically result in the satisfaction of the basic demands of the exploited masses. In this regard, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall fight during and after, within and outside the Constitutional Convention of 1971 any attempt to put into new legal form imperalist and class privileges.

At all times, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall fight all kinds of hindrance to the advance of the national democratic cause. It shall take every step to broaden the sphere of direct democratic action by relying on the masses, by building up its own strength and even making use of the factional conflicts of those who rule.

Free the Economy from Foreign and Feudal Control

As U.S. imperialism and the entire world capitalist system are now in a deep financial crisis reflecting their crisis of over-production and their defeat in wars of aggression, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines is keenly aware of the attempts of U.S. imperialism and its accomplices, local and foreign, to take advantage of the semi-colonial and semi-feudal conditions in the Philippines.

To prevent U.S. imperialism from taking further advantage of our nation, our organization shall vigorously campaign for the elimination of all treaties, executive agreements and statutes that perpetuate in any degree such imperialist privileges as "parity rights" or "national treatment". We shall not be deceived by such ludicrous proposals as "joint venture" and "profit sharing" which are intended to hoodwink the impoverished masses.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall fight for nationalist industrialization and shall repudiate all kinds of foreign investments, they be direct or in the form of loans, so long as these shall be used only to perpetuate the colonial exchange of raw materials from our country and finished products from abroad.

So as to deprive the U.S. imperialists and other foreign investors powerful bases for threatening our economy or influencing our economic policies, the sovereign right of expropriation should be exercised on their enterprises after computing their profit remittances and the taxes that they should have appropriately paid. The Movement for a Democratic Philippines does not expect nationalization to occur without first arousing and mobilizing the broad masses of the people behind it.

As a necessary base for a self-reliant programme of industrialization, real agrarian reform shall be given all-out support by the Movement for a Democratic Philippines. If the peasants should take direct action to achieve social justice for themselves, it shall be the firm standpoint of our organization to support them and denounce the landlord class for having exploited the peasants for centuries and kept them backward. The masses of landless peasants and farm workers are the backbone of an economy such as ours in their role as producers and consumers.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines considers the masses of workers, peasants and the intelligentsia as powerful forces of production that have long been restricted by U.S. imperalism and landlordism. They should be released from their actual bondage in order to make a prosperous and just society.

Improve our Social Conditions

The reactionary government has so undermined its financial position that it has become more unable to meet the social needs of the people. It has incurred such a heavy public internal and external debt only to serve primarily the narrow interests of the imperialists, the compradors, the landlords, the corrupt government officials and the sham industrialists. The Movement for a Democratic Philippines holds the reactionary government responsible for all these.

It is our duty to encourage the masses of workers, peasants, students, teachers, all government employees in the lower ranks, the national minorities, the intelligentsia in general, the unemployed and under-employed to demand their just share from the wealth of the nation and the right to make full use of its productivity. The rapid devaluation of the peso, rising prices, rising taxes, mass lay-offs, and governmental corruption are further pressing them down.

The industrial workers and the farm workers must have higher wages and better working and living conditions. The peasants must have their piece of land and cooperatives beyond the control of the exploiting classes. The fishermen must have greater share of the haul or must have their own fishing implements and fishing grounds must be open to them. The students must enjoy lower tuition fees and better facilities. The public school teachers and all government employees must be given higher compensations and better faciltiies. The national minorities must be able to reclaim or hold the lands that they have been deprived of by such exploiters as landlords, plantation companies, loggers, ranchers, mining companies and the reactionary government. The unemployed and under-employed must be fully employed. If there are laws in their favor by any degree, such should be implemented immediately and fully. But the Movement for a Democratic Philippines observes that all reform laws so far enacted fall short of giving social justice to the people and that these should be drastically improved and new ones promulgated.

There is no alternative for the exploited but to raise their demands through direct democratic actions. As strikes and demonstrations for social welfare spread, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall progressively give them the correct political coherence.

To hold back Filipino citizens from selling their skills and knowledge to foreign countries, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall provide them with the motivation to serve their own people and at the same time help them press for better wages and better working and living conditions in the country.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines asks its members in the medical profession to charge lower fees from the least fortunate in our society and charge none at all from those who really cannot pay. They should persuade their colleagues to do the same with the explanation that the increased number of their patients will make up for the reduced fees that they charge.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines asks its members in the legal profession to take up the cause of the exploited in litigations where they are confronted with the exploiters. Since the present laws are mainly designed for the exploiters, our lawyer-members should zealously take up the cause of the exploited.

Our organization asks its members in the mass media and in teaching profession to articulate the social plight of the exploited masses and dramatize the need for drastic social solutions instead of fascist force.

Liberate the Nation from the U.S. Military

The Filipino people are still strategically encircled by U.S. military bases and by air and naval patrols of the U.S. 13th Air Force, the Seventh fleet and other units of the U.S. military. The Armed Forces of the Philippines has served as a mere subordinate of the U.S. military in the shameless tradition of the Macabebes. The whole nation is literally captive in a big imperialist jail.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines vows to fight this imprisonment of the Filipino people and this transgression of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. It shall campaign for the dismantling of these foreign milita bases, the stopping of U.S. military movements in Philippine territory and the repudiation of the puppetry of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.

Our organization shall support every effort of the youth and the people at large not to get drafted into a military service and training programme that will only serve to suppress the broad masses of the people in defense of imperialist and feudal interests. It is our stand that the best guarantee for peace and order is the elimination of class exploitation and social injustice.

A prosperous and just society can withstand the threats and aggressive acts of any foreign power.

Within the reactionary military service itself, there is exploitation and anti-democratic treatment inflicted on honest junior officers and enlisted men. Throughout the land, there is the undercompensation of policemen. The Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall bring out the plight of reactionary soldiers and policemen and shall expose the insanity of their unreasoning service to the very same foreign power, local exploiting classes and corrupt officials of the government that take advantage of the broad masses of the people.

Promote a National Democratic Culture

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall militantly fight for the anti-national system of education and culture that we have today. Our schools and mass media must be cleansed of all erroneous precepts and concepts bequeathed to us by our colonial and feudal history. Our system of education and culture should have a national democratic and scientific orientation.

In the fight to re-orient the system of education and culture, the Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall rely heavily on the masses of progressive students, teachers journalists, writers and artists who have already demonstrated their critical attitude. The student youth can serve as a powerful vanguard in a cultural revolution that should spread out among the broad masses of the people.

The activists among the students and teachers have the special role in this society to link the working class in the city with the peasants and farm workers in the countryside for an uncompromising struggle for national democracy against U.S. imperialism, domestic feudalism and bureaucrat capitalism.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall wholeheartedly support the fight of the students to have a greater say in the policies of their schools and also of the whole nation. Their struggle in the school and outside on a wide range of issues shall temper many of them to become cadres in the corps of activists of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines.

Among the students and among the people, Pilipino language shall be propagated by the Movement for a Democratic Philippines as the principal medium for expressing the struggle for national democracy. It should be the principal medium of instruction and communication.

Particular attention shall be given to the Filipino women's struggle for liberation from the feudal and bourgeois values through which they are oppressed and exploited, and which are the greatest obstacles of their full participation in the national democratic struggle.

The cultural integrity of the national minorities should be respected. The Movement for a Democratic Philippines condemns the imposition of chauvinistic measures calculated to rob them of their land and wealth or waylay their fundamental demands.

Universal free education at all levels shall always be an objective of the Movement for a Democratic Philippines. The students shall be encouraged to consider what social system can make this possible.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall always support the struggle of students against the most backward, anti-national and anti-democratic sections of the educational system and the mass media. The rebellion against commercialism in schools is justified. So is the present struggle within sectarian schools against class exclusiveness, tax exemption and bigotry. The student rebellion should spread through the whole fabric of this society.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall also support the progressive members of the laity and the clergy who condemn the foreign control, big land-holdings, huge business investments and corruption of the Catholic Church and of other churches.

Exercise True Internationalism, a Revolutionary Internationalism

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines is inspired by the spirit of revolutionary interantionalism. It shall always urge the Filipino people to join the international united front against U.S. imperialism, Japanese militarism, Soviet social-imperialism and other oppressor governments that collude with it.

The Filipino people should isolate and ear down U.S. imperialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The Indo-Chinese people are demonstrating that no matter how small their countries are, they can effectively fight the U.S. war of aggression. In asserting their national sovereignty, the Filipino people can take advantage of the growing weakness of U.S. imperialism and the growing strength of revolutionary peoples in every part of the world.

In its relations with other countries, the Philippines should be guided by the Five Principles of mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence, and to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war.

The Movement for a Democratic Philippines shall campaign for the opening of diplomatic relations with all countries on the basis of the Five Principles and will exert all efforts to resist the repetition or prolongation of the type of foreign relations that the Philippine government has with the United States.

SALIGANG BATAS NG MALAYANG PAGKAKAISA NG KABATAANG PILIPINO (MPKP)

ARTIKULO I

Pangalan, Sagisag at Tanggapan

Tun. 1. Ang isang kapisanan ng mga kabataan ay itinatag ngayon na kikilanling MALAYANG PAGKAKAISA NG KABATAANG PILIPINO.

Tun. 2. Ang kanyang sagisag ay pagpapasiyahan ng Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapag-paganap.

Tun. 3. Ang pambansang tanggapan ay itatayo sa Lalong Malaking Maynila.

ARTIKULO II

Mga Simulain at Layunin

Tun. 4. Ang MALAYANG PAGKAKAISA NG KABATAANG PILIPINO ay nagtataguyod sa mga sumusunod na layunin at simulain:

a. Ipagpatuloy ang naantalang pambansang kilusang demokratiko tungo sa maunlad na pagbabago.

b. Makibaka ng puspusan laban sa imperyalismo at galamay nilang mga Pilipino hindi lamang sa pulitika kundi pati sa larangan ng pangkabuhayan, edukasyon at kultura.

k. Buong katatagang ipagtanggol at palakasin ang pagkaka-isang hanay ng iba't ibang sangay ng lipunan tungo sa pagkakamit ng lubos na kalayaan at kaunlarang pambansa at kapayapaang pandaigdig.

d. Makisama sa lahat ng mga progresibong masa upang matuto sa kanilang mga karanasan sa pakikibaka at makipagpalitan ng mga kaalaman.

e. Gumawa ng maayos at masinop na pagaaral ng tunay na kalagayang umiiral sa bayan, at batay sa madalubhasang pagpapalagay bunga nito ay magpanukala ng mga alituntunin at dibdibang isagawa ang mga iyon.

g. Sikaping magkaroon ng mabuting pag-uunawaan at pakikitungo sa lahat ng mga kilusang mapagpalaya sa ibang bansa, bilang pagkilala na ang kilusang nasyonalismo sa Pilipinas ay bahagi rin ng makasaysayang pagbabago ng buong daigdig.

h. Kilanlin na tanging sa pagtatagumpay ng nasyonalismo maaaring tamasahin ng lubos ang kaginhawahan, karunungan at kaunlaran ng pinaka-malaking bahagi ng ating masa, kasama na ang mga kabataan na sa loob ng ilangpung taon ay hinuhothot at pinaghihirap ng mga dayuhan at ng mga Pilipinong napapakasangkapan sa kanila.

i. Bilang pagkalinga sa mga kabataan na siyang pag-asa ng bayan sa kinabukasan, sikapin nating pag-aralan, isagawa, ipagpatuloy at paunlarin sa angkop na kalagayan nila ang

1) karapatang pag-aaral sa lalong ikamumulat ng kanilang isipan at paninindigan;

2) ang pagtulong at paghahanda ng kanilang kinabukasan sa pamamagitan ng paghanap ng iba't ibang gawain o empleo na naangakop sa kanilang kaalaman, pinagaralan o' pinagsanayan; at

3) ang maayos ang kanais-nais na iba't ibang palaruan na makapaghuhubog sa kanilang kalawakan ng pagiisip, pagkakapatiran at pagtutulungan;

4) dahil diyan, ipakipaglaban natin ang pagkakaroon na makabayang alituntuning panglabas, iwawaksi ang lahat ng di-makatarungang kasunduan sa Amerika, walang pasubaling kakalag sa lahat ng ating pakikiisa sa mga militar at pamumulitika ng imperyalismo at mga bansang kinasasangkapan nila, nang sa gayon, tayo'y magkaroon ng malaya at pangkaraniwang pakikipag-ugnayan sa lahat ng bansang nais makipagkaibigan at makitungo ng maayos at kapakipakinabang sa atin.

ARTIKULO III

Ang Pag-sapi

Tun. 5. Ang simunang Pilipino, mula sa 15 hanggang 40 ng taon ang gulang, na lubusang sumasangayon at tumatalima sa mga simulain at layunin na tinatadhana sa unahan nito, ay maaaring maging kasapi.

Tun. 6. Walang sinumang tatanggaping kasapi rito kailan ma't ang humihiling ay hindi pinananagutan ng dalawang kasapi at pinagtibay ng Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapagpaganap.

Tun. 7. Ang sinumang kasapi ay maaaring masuspindi at matiwalag kailan ma't siya ay napatunayang hindi tumutupad sa tungkulin ng isang kasapi o lumaban sa mga simulain at layunin ng kapisanan. Ang organong kinabibilangan ang magsusuri, maglilitis at magpapasiya sa pagsuspindi o pagtitiwalag, at ang pangwakas na pagpapasiya ay nasa Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapag-paganap.

ARTIKULO IV

Ang Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapag-paganap

Tun. 8. Ang Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapagpaganap ay siyang mamamatnugot sa buong kapisanan.

Tun. 9. Ang Sangguniang ito ay bubuin ng:

Pangulo

Unang Pangalawang Pangulo
Ikalawang Pangalawang Pangulo
Pangkalahatang Kalihim
Pambansang Ingat-Yaman at
(10) Sampung Kagawad, at ang lahat ay ihahalal ng Pangkabuoang kasapi, hangga't maaari, ang mga kagawad ay manggagaling at kakatawan sa iba't ibang rehiyon ng bansa. Ang lahat ng kagawad ng Sanggunian ay manunungkulan ng (1) isang taon, matangi lamang kung maalis siya ng wala pa sa panahon.

Tun. 10. Ang Sanggunian ay siyang magpapanukala at magpapatupad ng mga alituntunin at patakaran tungo sa pagsasagawa ng mga simulain at layunin ng kapisanan. Mayroon din silang kapangyarihang humirang ng pangsamantalang kagawad bilang kapalit ng sinumang maaalis dahil sa pagkakasuspindi, pagbibitiw o pagkakatiwalag, pagkamatay o pirmihang kapansanan ng isang nanunungkulan; ang ganyang mahihirang na kagawad ay manunungkulan sa panahong nalalabi ng kanyang hinalinhan. Subali't kapag ang Pangulo ang mawawala ng dahil sa anumang kadahilanan nabanggit sa unahan, siyà ay hahalinhan ng Unang Pangalawang Pangulo alinsunod sa pagkakataon.

ARTIKULO V

Kapangyarihan at Tungkulin Ng Mga Panguluhang Tagapagpaganap

Tun. 11. Ang Pangulo ay siyang

a. Opisyal na tagapagsalita ng kapisanan.

b. Mangungulo sa lahat ng pulong ng Pangkalahatang mga Kasapi at ng Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapagpaganap.

k. Magiging kinatawan ng kapisanan sa lahat ng mga gawaing pambayan na maaanyayahan ng kapisanan.

d. Tatawag ng tanging pulong ng Pangkalahatang mga Kasapi sa kahilingan ng di-kukulangin sa ikaapat na bahagi ng mga kasapi.

e. Tatawag ng tanging pulong ng Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapagpaganap sa kahilingan ng di-kukulangin sa limang (5) kagawad ng Sanggunian.

g. Mamamahala ng mga gawain ng kapisanan.

Tun. 12. Ang Unang Pangalawang Pangulo ay siyang

a. Tutupad at gaganap ng tungkulin ng Pangulo kapag ito ay wala, nagkasakit, namatay, nagbitiw, nasuspindi o kaya'y natiwalag.

b. Mamamahala sa gawaing pagpapalaganap ng kapisanan.

k. Maghaharap sa Sanggunian ukol sa gawaing pagpapalaganap ng kapisanan.

Tun. 13. Ang aka-2ng Pangalawang Pangulo ay siyang:

a. Tutupad ng lahat ng tunkulin ng Pangulo kapag ito o ang Unang Pangalawang Pangulo ay wala, nagkasakit, namatay, nagbitiw, nasuspindi o kaya'y natiwalag.

b. Mamamahala sa gawaing pang-edukasyor ng kapisanan.

k. Maghaharap sa Sanggunian ukol sa pagaaral o alituntuning pang-edukasyon ng kapisanan.

Tun. 14. Ang Pangkalahatang Kalihim ay siyang:

a. Pinunong Tagapag-paganap ng kapisanan.

b. Mamamahala o magpapatupad ng mga pinagtibay ng Pangkalahatang Kasapi o' ng Sangguniang Tagapagpaganap.

k. Mag-uugnay-ugnay ng mga gawain at alituntunin ng mga balangay o sangay ng kapisanan.

d. Magsusuri ng lahat ng kahilingan sa pagsapi alinsunod sa pamantayan ng Sanggunian.

e. Gagawa ng taunang paglalahad ng lahat ng mga gawain at palatuntunan ng kapisanan sa Pangkalahatang Kasapi.

g. Magiingat ng lahat ng mga ulat, dokumento o rekord ng kapisanan.

h. Magtatag ng Secretariat ng kapisanan na kanya rin pamumunuan.

Tun. 15. Ang Ingat-Yaman ay siyang:

a. Mag-iingat ng lahat ng salapi o pondo o ari-arian ng kapisanan.

b. Gagawa ng kaukulang hakbang upang mapangalagaan ang nasabing pondo ng kapisanan.

k. Maniningil o magpapasingil ng lahat ng butaw, pangkaraniwan o pangtangi ng mga kasapi.

d. Maglalabas ng kaukulang kabayaran o gugulin alinsunod sa pagpapasiya ng Sanggunian.

e. Mag-iingat ng lahat ng ulat at katibayan ukol sa tinatanggap at inilalabas na salapi ng kapisanan, at mag-bibigay rin ng taunang ulat ng mga iyon sa Pangkalahatang Kasapi, at

g. Maghaharap sa Sanggunian hinggil sa pananalapi, mga tanging butaw at iba't ibang pamamaraan ng pangingilak ng salapi.

Tun. 16. Ang Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapag-paganap ay hihirang ng isang Auditor o taga-suri mula sa mga kasapi, na siyang magsusuri at titiyak ng katumpakan ng pumasok at lumabas na salapi at siyang magpapatibay sa bawa't ulat sa pananalapi ng Pambansang Ingat-Yaman.

ARTIKULO VI

Mga Sangay

Tun. 17. Ang sangay ay siyang pangunahing bilang ng kapisanan. Ito'y maaaring itatag sa anumang munisipyo, pook o paaralan sa pagsang-ayon at patibay ng Pambansang Sanggunian.

Tun. 18. Ang mga sangay ay:

a. Ang magpapalaganap ng mga simulain at layunin ng kapisanan at siyang magpapatupad ng mga palatuntunan at mga kapasiyahan sa kani-kanilang kinalalagyan.

b. Ang mang-aakit ng mga kasapi, maniningil ng mga butaw sa pagsapi at tanging butaw at magpapatupad ng disiplina sa kanikanilang mga kasapi.

k. Gagawa ng pana-panahong ulat ng kanilang mga kasapi at proyekto at iba't ibang mga gawain.

Tun. 19. Ang mga sangay ay maghahalal din mula sa kani-kanilang mga kasapi ng Pangulo, Pangalawang Pangulo, at iba't ibang mga pamunuang kakailanganin nila.

Tun. 20. Sa pagpapasiya ng Sanggunian, ang lahat ng mga sangay ng isang lalawigan ay maaaring magbuo ng Panlalawigan Lupong Tagapagpaganap, na siyang mag-uugnay-ugnay at mag-aayos ng mga gawaing iaatas sa kanila ng Sanggunian.

ARTIKULO VII

Pangkalahatang Kasapi

Tun. 21. Ang Pangkalahatang Kasapi ay magdaraos ng isang Kongreso minsan lamang isang taon. Ito'y maaari din namang tawagin sa isang tanging pulong pangkalahatan sa kahilingan ng di-kukulangin sa ikaapat na bahagi ng mga kasapi o sa pamamagitan ng isang resolusyon ng Pambansang Sanggunian Tagapag-paganap.

Tun. 22. Ang Pambansang Sanggunian Tagapag-paganap ay siyang may kapangyarihan magsuspindi at magalis ng sinumang kagawad nito kailan ma't siya ay mapapatunayang hindi tumutupad sa kanyang tungkulin o lumabag sa simulain at layunin ng kapisanan.

Tun. 23. Ang bawa't kasapi ay magbabayad ng taunang butaw na katumbas ng kanyang butaw sa pagsapi. Ang mga kasapi ay aatangan ng tanging butaw kung kailangan ng sang-ayon naman sa kanyang kakayahang makapagbigay.

Tun. 24. Ang mga nalilikom na pondo mula sa mga kasapi at taunang butaw ay babahagiin sa sangay at sa Pambansang Pondo sang-ayon sa pagpapasiyahan ng Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapag-paganap, subali't ang sangay ay dapat makabahagi ng di-kukulangin sa dalawampung (20%) por siento man lamang ng lahat ng kanilang malikom mula sa kanilang mga kasapi.

Tun. 25. Ang Pambansang Sangguniang Tagapag-paganap ay may kapangyarihan magsiyasat sa kalagayan ng pananalapi ng iba't ibang sangay at gumawa ng nararapat na hakbang upang matiyak ang maayos na pag-uulat sa paggastos ng pondo ng Kapisanan.

ARTIKULO IX

Pagsususog

Tun. 26. Ang Silagang Batas na ito'y maaaring masusugan sa pamamagitan ng nakararaming boto (simple majority) ng Pangkalahatang Kasapi sa kanilang taunang pulong o sa isang tanging pulong na itinawag ukol sa bagay na ito. Nguni't anuman ang mangyari, ang bawat kasapi ay dapat pahiwatigan ng mga susog bago idaos ang pagpupulong.

Pinagtibay sa Pambansang Kapulungang ito ngayon ika-30 ng buwan ng Nobyembre, 1967, sa kabayanan ng Cabiao, Lalawigan ng Nueva Ecija, Republika ng Pilipinas.

PINATUTUNAYANG ITO'Y WASTO AT AYON SA PINAGKASUNDUAN:

(Lagda) ERNESTO R. MACAHIYA
(Tunay) ERNESTO R. MACAHIYA

SINAKSIHAN NAMIN:

(Lagda) C. ADRIANO
(Tunay) C. ADRIANO

BY-LAWS OF BERTRAND RUSSEL PEACE FOUNDATION (BRPF)

ARTICLE I

OFFICE

The Office of the Bertrand Russel Peace Foundation (Phil.), Inc. shall be at T-1605 area 17, UP Campus, Diliman, Quezon City, or at such other place as the Board of Trustees may, from time to time fix.

ARTICLE II

BOARD OF TRUSTEES

1. *Election.* — The organization shall be governed by a Board of fifteen (15) Trustees who shall be elected annually by the general membership and who shall serve until the election and qualification of their successors. Any vacancy in the Board shall be filled by a majority of the Board at a meeting specially called for that purpose, and the Trustee or Trustees so chosen shall serve for the unexpired term.

2. The Board shall be composed of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Executive Secretary, Treasurer and eleven (11) other Trustees.

3. *Quorum.* — A majority of the Trustees shall constitute a quorum.

4. *Meetings.* — The Board shall hold an organizational meeting immediately after their elections. Thereafter, the Board shall hold regular meetings at least once a month at such time and place as the Board may designate.

Special meetings of the Board may be called by the Chairman, or on written request of three (3) Trustees.

ARTICLE III

OFFICERS

1. The officers of the Organization shall consist of the Chairman, the Vice-Chairman, the Treasurer, the Executive-Secretary, and such other officers as may be appointed by the Board.

2. Chairman. — The Chairman of the Organization shall be directly elected by the general membership. He shall have the following powers and duties.

a. Preside all meetings of the Board and the general membership;

b. Exercise general supervison over all activities and officers of the Organization;

c. Sign on behalf of the organization all contracts and agreements which the Board may authorize and approve;

d. Submit an annual report of the activities of the Organization to the Board and the general membership at the annual meeting; and

e. Exercise such other functions and duties as the Board may from time to time fix or delegate.

3. The Vice-Chairman. — The Vice-Chairman shall likewise be directly elected by the general membership. He shall be vested with all the powers and authority of the Chairman during the absence or incapacity of the latter for any cause, and he shall perform such other duties as the Board may from time to time assign him.

4. The Executive Secretary. — The Executive-Secretary shall be directly elected by the general membership. He shall have the following duties and functions:

a. Attend to the organizational and administrative matters;

b. Organize and head a Secretariat to implement the policies and decisions of the Board;

c. Coordinate the various plans, projects and activities of the Organization;

d. Keep full minutes of all meetings of the general membership and the Board; and

e. Perform such other duties as may be required by the Board.

5. The Treasurer. — The Treasurer shall be directly elected by the general membership, and shall have the following functions and powers:

a. Have custody of and responsibility for all funds and other assets of the Organization, keep a complete and accurate record of receipts and expenditures in the corresponding books of accounts, and see to it that all disbursements and expenditures are evidenced by appropriate vouchers;

b. Deposit in the name of the Organization in such bank or banks as may be designated from time to time by the Board, the funds of the Organization;

c. Render an annual statement showing the financial condition of the Organization; and

d. Receive and give receipts for all moneys which may accrue to the Organiztion from whatever source.

6. The Auditor. — There shall be an Auditor to be appointed by the Board from among the general membership, and he shall inspect and pass in audit the books of accounts of the Organization. His term shall be coterminous with that of the Board which appoints him.

ARTICLE IV

Membership

1. Qualification. — Every person who actively subscribes to the aims and purposes of the Organization as expressed in its Articles of Incorporation and Declaration of Principles, who is not an active member of any military or intelligence establishment or branch, who does not advocate military aggression — nuclear or otherwise, and who does not accept foreign domination and control, is eligible for membership.

2. Suspension or expulsion of members. — The Board may suspend, and the general membership may expel, by majority vote, a member for any of the following reasons:

a. Any act or conduct contrary to the aims and purposes of the Organization;

b. Any act or conduct inimical to the Organization; and

c. Non-payment of membership, annual or any other fees validly assessed by the Board.

Any charge or complaint shall be presented to the Board of Trustees.

The member sought to be suspended or expelled shall be notified in writing of the charge or charges against him at least three (3) days before at which he may exercise the right to be heard and defend himself.

ARTICLE V

Meetings

1. Annual meetings. — The regular meeting of the Organization after 1967 shall be held in October of each year at such time and place as may be designated by the Board.

Written notice of the regular meeting shall be sent to the members at least ten (10 days prior to the date of such meeting.

2. Special meetings. — Special meetings of the general membership may be called by a majority of the Board or by the majority of the members.

ARTICLE VI

Fees

The annual membership and other fees of the members shall be such amounts as the Board may from time to time decide by resolution.

ARTICLE VII

Corporate Seal

The Board shall provide for a corporate seal which shall bear the name and symbol of the Organization as hereon impressed.

ARTICLE VIII

Amendments

A majority of the members may alter or amend the by-laws at any regular meeting or at any special meeting held for that purpose unless the power is delegated to the Board.

Adopted by the Board of Trustees at Quezon City, Philippines, this ...., 1967.

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